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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the regional economy of Galilee in the Early Roman period. It re-evaluates 
models traditionally used to assess economic transactions and socioeconomic conditions in this region, 
and assess the role that Roman/Herodian state institutions as well as Jewish religious institutions would 
have played in shaping the contours of economic decision-making within this system. In particular, it 
explores the ways that travel, cult obligations at the Jerusalem Temple, and agricultural laws defined the 
parameters of economic necessities, structured incentives for economic behavior, and defined a 
“bounded” economic rationality for Galilean Jews. This dissertation draws on a combination of literary 
sources—especially the writings of Josephus, the New Testament gospels, and the Mishnah—and 
archaeological evidence from recent excavations in Galilee. New Institutional Economics is deployed as a 
framework for analyzing the role of socially-constructed institutions in defining the incentives, costs, and 
bounds of the environment in which people make their economic decisions. Insights are also drawn from 
the social sciences on norm creation and enforcement and on emergent group behavior to consider how 
social forces factor into economic decisions. This dissertation argues that the focus on state institutions 
in shaping the economy in Early Roman Galilee is misplaced, and instead argues that religious institutions 
played a more formative role in shaping economic behavior. Galilean Jews primarily interacted with other 
Jews in Galilee, forming a relatively closed and insular economy characterized by high levels of 
interconnectivity between settlements that may be described as a “small world” network and that created 
ideal conditions for strong norm enforcement. Adherence to the statutes of the Torah would have created 
an economic system temporally structured around the three annual pilgrimage festivals and the 
sabbatical cycle, and obligations in the Torah constrained the timing and manner of production, 
consumption, and exchange of agricultural products that constituted the bulk of economic transactions. 
By highlighting the role of religion in shaping the traditionally compartmentalized sphere of economy, this 
study indicates the value of integrating analysis of religion and economy not only for Early Roman Galilee, 
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TORAH, TEMPLE, AND TRANSACTION: JEWISH RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR IN EARLY ROMAN GALILEE 
Alexander J. Ramos 
Annette Yoshiko Reed 
This dissertation examines the regional economy of Galilee in the Early Roman 
period. It re-evaluates models traditionally used to assess economic transactions and 
socioeconomic conditions in this region, and assess the role that Roman/Herodian 
state institutions as well as Jewish religious institutions would have played in shaping 
the contours of economic decision-making within this system. In particular, it 
explores the ways that travel, cult obligations at the Jerusalem Temple, and agricul -
tural laws defined the parameters of economic necessities, structured incentives for 
economic behavior, and defined a “bounded” economic rationality for Galilean Jews. 
This dissertation draws on a combination of literary sources—especially the writings 
of Josephus, the New Testament gospels, and the Mishnah—and archaeological 
evidence from recent excavations in Galilee. New Institutional Economics is deployed 
as a framework for analyzing the role of socially-constructed institutions in defining 
the incentives, costs, and bounds of the environment in which people make their 
economic decisions. Insights are also drawn from the social sciences on norm creation 
and enforcement and on emergent group behavior to consider how social forces factor 
into economic decisions. This dissertation argues that the focus on state institutions in 
shaping the economy in Early Roman Galilee is misplaced, and instead argues that 
religious institutions played a more formative role in shaping economic behavior. 
Galilean Jews primarily interacted with other Jews in Galilee, forming a relatively 
closed and insular economy characterized by high levels of interconnectivity between 
settlements that may be described as a “small world” network and that created ideal 
conditions for strong norm enforcement. Adherence to the statutes of the Torah would 
have created an economic system temporally structured around the three annual 
pilgrimage festivals and the sabbatical cycle, and obligations in the Torah constrained 
the timing and manner of production, consumption, and exchange of agricultural 
products that constituted the bulk of economic transactions. By highlighting the role 
of religion in shaping the traditionally compartmentalized sphere of economy, this 
study indicates the value of integrating analysis of religion and economy not only for 
Early Roman Galilee, but also for ancient Mediterranean history and for Religious 
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INTRODUCTION—TORAH, TEMPLE, AND TRANSACTION 
The first century CE is a crucial period in the history of ancient Judaism and early 
Christianity. It was a major period of transformation for Palestine;
1
 after nearly a 
century of relative independence as the Hasmonaean kingdom, the region was again 
subjected to an imperial power—Rome. Our major source for Palestine in this period, 
the Jewish historian Josephus, describes this first century of Roman domination as 
tumultuous, full of political restructuring, insurrections, and messianic/revolutionary 
figures. The First Jewish Revolt against Rome, the climax of Judaean political unrest 
leading to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in 70 CE, stands out as one of 
the most formative events in Jewish history and is also crucial in the history of the 
wider Roman Empire. In addition, the region of Galilee in northern Palestine is 
important and much-studied as the setting of the historical Jesus’ ministry and as the 
crucible for Christian origins.  
Past research on the history of first-century Palestine has largely followed the 
lead of Josephus and the New Testament Gospels, which frame their narratives of 
events in terms of political and religious concerns. Economic factors were long 
neglected by comparison. Since the 1970s and 1980s, however, there has been growth 
in research on economy in Early Roman Galilee,
2
 inspired largely by Moses I. 
Finley’s The Ancient Economy, published in 1973.
3
 Finley presented a model of the 
                                                          
1
 I recognize the anachronism in deploying a politico-geographic term from the post-70 era and 
its fraught entanglement in the modern geopolitical situation of contemporary Israel. However, I use it 
as an expedient solution to the problem that “Judaea” is a term used in the ancien t sources for a 
specific region around Jerusalem as well as for a province or kingdom (of various configurations). 
Rather than deploying alternatives like “Greater Judaea” or “Iudaea” for the latter, and thereby risking 
confusion, I have opted for the distinct though problematic “Palestine.”  
2
 For a good overview of this turn toward economy, see Philip A. Harland, “The Economy of 
First-Century Palestine: State of the Scholarly Discussion,” in Handbook of Early Christianity: Social 
Science Approaches, ed. Anthony J. Blasi, Jean Duhaime, and Paul-André Turcotte (Walnut Creek, 
CA: AltaMira, 2002), 511–27. In addition to Finley, several early works related to agrarian life and 
economy by scholars from the interwar period continued to influence the depiction of e conomic reali-
ties in Roman Palestine: F. C. Grant, The Economic Background of the Gospels (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1926); Joseph Klausner, “The Economy of Judea in the Period of the Second 
Temple,” in The World History of the Jewish People, vol. 7: The Herodian Period, ed. M. Avi-Yonah 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1975 [1930]), 180–205; Joachim Jeremias, Jerusalem in 
the Time of Jesus: An Investigation into Economic and Social Conditions during the New Testament 
Period, trans. F. H. Cave and C. H. Cave (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969 [1933]). 
3
 Moses I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (2nd rev. ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999 [1973]). It is to Finley that we owe the popularization of this position, though we can find ant e-
cedents to it already in the work of A. H. M. Jones; see his posthumously published Studies in Ancient 
Economic and Administrative History, ed. P. A. Brunt (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). Finley’s model 
stands in contrast to Mikhail Ivanovitch Rostovtzeff’s earlier propositions about the economy of the 
Hellenistic and Roman empires; see The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire , trans. O. 





economy for ancient Greece and Rome that minimized the role and extent of trade, 
emphasized the subsistence orientation of peasant agrarian producers, and character-
ized the relationship of cities to the countryside as extractive and exploitative. 
Finley’s model became the dominant paradigm in the study of the ancient Mediterra -
nean economy, and to this day one can hardly talk about the ancient economy without 
reference to his work. Though Finley himself eschewed discussion of the Near East in 
his analysis, treating it as an altogether different system, scholars of Early Roman 
Galilee from the 1980s onward, such as Seán Freyne, Richard Horsley, Douglas E. 
Oakman, have embraced Finley’s model as a means to evaluate the socioeconomic 
conditions that undergirded Jesus’ ministry and the Jewish Revolt.
4
  
The study of economy in ancient Galilee, however, has stalled on Finley. While 
the importance of Finley’s groundbreaking contribution cannot be understated, 
scholarship on the ancient economy over the following decades has challenged many 
aspects of the model and its underlying assumptions.
5
 Specialist research on Galilee 
has not yet adequately grappled with the critiques of his model and continues to 
perpetuate some of its most problematic assumptions and foci. Archaeologists exca-
vating sites in Galilee over the last few decades have yielded important data for 
understanding economic activity in the first century,
6
 and they have pushed back 
against the view that trade was limited and that urban–rural relations were unidirec-
                                                                                                                                                                             
istic World (3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1941). Finley and Rostovtzeff are often identified with oppo -
site poles in the primitivist–modernist debate respectively.  
4
 See, e.g., Seán Freyne, Galilee from Alexander the Great to Hadrian, 323 BCE to 135 CE: A 
Study of Second Temple Judaism (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1980); Freyne, Galilee, Jesus, 
and the Gospels: Literary Approaches and Historical Investigations  (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988); 
Richard A. Horsley with John S. Hanson, Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements in the 
Time of Jesus (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1985); Horsley, Jesus and the Spiral of 
Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987); 
Douglas E. Oakman, Jesus and the Economic Questions of His Day (Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 1986). 
5
 For evaluations of the scholarship on the ancient Mediterranean economy subsequent to Finley, 
noting the shifts in the types of evidence and modeling deployed and the questions guiding research, 
see Jean Andreau, “Twenty Years after Moses I. Finley’s The Ancient Economy,” trans. Antonia 
Nevill, in The Ancient Economy, ed. Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 33–49. On the afterlife of Finley in the context of the primitivst–modernist and substantivist–
formalist debates, see Paul Cartledge, “The Economy (Economies) of Ancient Greece,” in Scheidel 
and von Reden, The Ancient Economy, 11–32; Richard Saller, “Framing the Debate over Growth in 
the Ancient Economy,” in Scheidel and von Reden, The Ancient Economy, 251–69. 
6
 For a sampling of recent studies of the archaeological data from Galilee directed toward 
economic questions, see the contributions in David A. Fiensy and James Riley Strange, eds., Galilee 
in the Late Second Temple and Mishnaic Periods, vol. 2: The Archaeological Record From Cities, 
Towns, and Villages (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015); Douglas R. Edwards and C. Thomas McCollough, 
eds., Archaeology and the Galilee: Texts and Contexts in the Graeco-Roman and Byzantine Periods 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997); Edwards, ed., Religion and Society in Roman Palestine: Old Ques-
tions, New Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2004). For a useful socioeconomic analysis of a few 
select but important settlements in Galilee, as well as the coinage found there, see Martin Hørning 
Jensen, Herod Antipas in Galilee: The Literary and Archaeological Sources on the Reign of Herod 







 But even so, much of the conversation remains trapped in the 
bounds of the Finleyan paradigm, with literary scholars and archaeologists at an 
impasse.
8
 It is an opportune time to forge a new path by appealing to alternative 
models for thinking about the economic system in which Galileans operated. 
In this dissertation, I attempt to formulate an alternative framework for under-
standing the Galilean economy in the Early Roman period (63 BCE–70 CE).
9
 The 
center–periphery model that emphasizes the relationship between city and satellite 
country settlements defies the settlement patterns revealed by archaeological surveys 
and excavations of Galilee. Instead, I suggest that a “small world” network is a more 
appropriate model for the landscape of Early Roman Galilee, a model that exhibits 
high levels of inter-settlement connectivity not necessarily based around urban hubs. 
This interpretation redirects the debate from whether or not cities were exploitative to 
a question of how different settlements and their inhabitants interacted with one 
another to meet their needs. 
In recent years, it has also become clear that more integrative approaches to 
ancient Jewish history are needed. Across the field of Religious Studies, scholars have 
demonstrated the artificiality of the modern distinction between religious, political, 
and economic spheres; especially in antiquity (but even today) they were inextricable 
and intertwined with one another.
10
 Perhaps unexpectedly, scholarship on the 
                                                          
7
 See, e.g., Douglas R. Edwards, “The Socio-Economic and Cultural Ethos of the Lower Galilee 
in the First Century: Implications for the Nascent Jesus Movement,” in The Galilee in Late Antiquity, 
ed. Lee I. Levine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 53–74; Edwards, “Identity and 
Social Location in Roman Galilean Villages,” in Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee: 
A Region in Transition (WUNT 210; Tübingen: Mohr Seibeck, 2007), 357–74; Dennis E. Groh, “The 
Clash Between Literary and Archaeological Models of Provincial Palestine,” in Edwards and 
McCollough, Archaeology and the Galilee, 29–37. 
8
 See the back-and-forth between Richard A. Horsley and Eric M. Meyers in BASOR 297 (1995): 
Horsley, “Archaeology and the Villages of Upper Galilee: A Dialogue with Archaeologists,” 5–16; 
Meyers, “An Archaeological Response to a New Testament Scholar,” 17–26; Horsley, “Response,” 
27–28; cf. scholarly overviews in Groh, “The Clash Between Literary and Archaeological Models of 
Provincial Palestine”; Mark Rapinchuk, “The Galilee  and Jesus in Recent Research,” Currents of 
Biblical Research 2 (2004): 197–222. 
9
 This designation, from Pompey to the destruction of the Temple, is conventional but not ubiqui -
tous. Uzi Leibner, for instance, designates 50 BCE to 135 CE as Early Roman period; Settlement and 
History in Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine Galilee (TSAJ 127; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009). I 
will also occasionally refer to the Second Temple period, by which I mean 538 BCE to 70 CE, and to 
the late Second Temple Period, by which I mean the period after the Maccabean Revolt (167 BCE–70 
CE). 
10
 The argument for the embeddedness of religion is based in the recognition that religion only 
emerged as an analytical category in modernity and does not reflect the terms with which the ancie nts 
represented their world. William Cantwell Smith first argued that religion was a modern reification 
and absent in the terminology of the premodern world; The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: 
Macmillan, 1963). Several monographs in the 1990s and 2000s developed this idea and convincing 
demonstrated that the conception of religion as a distinct and separable aspect of the social world is a 
modern invention deeply entangled in European identity construction, colonialism, and secularization; 
see David Chidester, Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa  





economy in Early Roman Galilee has largely overlooked the role that religious 
practices and institutions played in shaping the contours of economic behavior and 
interaction. In part, this is a failing of the larger scholarly discourse on economy in 
the ancient world, in which religion and economy have typically been treated in 
isolation as distinct spheres. Yet we may gain considerable insight about both 
economic behavior and religious practice in first-century Palestine by bringing 
research on the ancient economy into conversation with the study of Second Temple 
Judaism. This dissertation does so by examining the vital role that religious 
institutions, namely the rules of the Torah that govern cult practice at the Jerusalem 
Temple, pilgrimage for the festivals, and assorted aspects of agricultural production 
and consumption, could play in defining the networks and temporal rhythms of 
economic activity. My hope is that this approach can contribute not only to 
scholarship on Early Roman Galilee, ancient Judaism, and early Christianity but also 
to the study of the ancient Mediterranean economy more broadly. 
Because economy and religion have been analyzed separately, scholars have 
tended to conceptualize the agrarian base of Galilee as a peasantry whose economic 
rationality was narrowly focused on subsistence, defined as meeting the basic needs 
of food and shelter. As a result, some have expressed doubt as to whether most Jews 
even followed the obligations of the Torah when they made demands on economic 
resources or placed constraints on production and labor. They have thereby neglected 
the very real and serious role that Galilean Jews may have allotted to religion and 
piety in defining just what economic subsistence entails or how one may appropri -
ately meet those needs. My dissertation challenges the flattening “peasant model” of 
subsistence orientation by suggesting that Jews—as did others—employed a more 
complex notion of economic rationality to define needs and strategically allocate 
resources to accomplish them.
11
 By assuming that most Galileans internalized the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
anity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Tomoko Masuzawa, The Inven-
tion of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of 
Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).  
In referencing “religion,” I keep in mind Russell T. McCutcheon’s strong exhortation to eschew 
analysis of religion as an ontologically distinct category, treating it instead as a second-order, 
redescriptive category; Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse of Sui Generis Religion and the 
Politics of Nostalgia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); cf. Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A 
History of a Modern Concept (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). Ironically, it remains diffi -
cult to argue for the entanglement and inseparability of religion from other aspects of the social world 
without taking a rhetorical standpoint that continues to speak of it as a distinctive analytic category.  
11
 The scholarship on and notion of a distinct peasant mode of existence goes back to the work of 
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Mosaic commandments as imperative obligations rather than treating them as dispen-
sable luxuries, we may explore the practical effects of adherence to the Law on 
economic behavior and the tactics that might have been available to them to meet or 
mitigate these expenses. 
This study focuses on the region of Galilee in particular rather than on Palestine 
as a whole. By doing so, we will be able to explore with more granularity the 
dynamics of socioeconomic interactions at a regional level. There is a growing 
consensus among archaeologists working in Galilee that the region exhibits a material 
culture distinct from that of its neighbors on all sides, and thus signals that Galilee 
can be treated as a coherent and discreet economic unit.
12
 And owing to the location 
of the Temple city of Jerusalem in Judaea, we can expect that the two regions would 
have exhibited considerable differences in economic activity, and it would require an 
onerous expansion of this project to do justice to both of them. Unlike Galilee, Judaea 
was a consistent center of political power and governing aristocracy, its settlement 
landscape featured a large metropolis, a far greater proportion of its resources were 
directed toward the “temple economy,” and its inhabitants did not face considerable 
outlays in resources and time to participate in the Temple cult. Furthermore, the 
literary sources are quite favorable to a focus on Galilee—Josephus provides firsthand 
accounts of his time in Galilee in Life and books 2–4 of Jewish War; the New Testa-
ment gospels reflect on life in Galilee in both the narratives and parables; and the 
tannaitic rabbinic sources were written in and presume life in Galilee of a slightly 
later period. There has been an abundance of archaeological research conducted in 
Galilee, and many of the excavations have made economic matters a central research 
question. 
This study will focus primarily on the production, consumption, and trade of 
agricultural and manufactured goods within the region of the Galilee. As such, this 
project does not constitute a comprehensive study of all aspects of economy. I will 
engage with other factors that may be considered economic, such as land tenure, 
monetization, and debit and credit, only insofar as necessary for my tasks of modeling 
exchange and assessing the effects of religious institutions. In my view, the focus on 
trade and movement provides an interesting avenue for connecting the study of 
economy to religion—that is, by exploring the ways production and consumption of 
goods were shaped by concerns over ritual purity, requirements for sacrificial offer-
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ings, Torah constraints on usage, rhythms of pilgrimage, and the differential prefer-
ence for goods from the holy city. 
Relationship to Past Research 
This dissertation builds on four areas of prior scholarship. First, it builds on specialist 
studies on the Galilee. One of my primary interlocutors in Galilean studies is Richard 
A. Horsley, who has been one of the most vocal advocates of a political-economic 
approach to study of the Galilee. Using sociological models to interpret the literary 
sources, Horsley depicts the socioeconomic climate of the first century as one of 
exploitation and piqued animosity between rural peasantry and urban elite.
13
 Though I 
find myself at odds with many of his conclusions, I embrace his combined use of 
literary, sociological, and archaeological approaches. Douglas E. Oakman follows a 
similar approach, drawing explicitly on cross-cultural peasant studies to interpret and 
model agrarian life in Galilee.
14
 I recognize the value in his use of “economic 
anthropology” for making sense of our often-limited evidence, but I follow Sharon 
Lea Mattila in questioning the particularly flat notion of a cross-culturally consistent 
notion of “peasantry”
15
 and am cautious about treating modern comparanda as simple 
proxy data. Another scholar whose regional focus on Galilee has proved valuable in 
formulating this project is Seán Freyne.
16
 He has attempted to demonstrate that the 
relationship between city and countryside in Galilee was less exploitative than 
Horsley and Oakman have suggested, and that despite economic pressure, the “peas-
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antry” was able to cope through reliance on intra-village networks of exchange.
17
 I 




Second, I build on the work of archaeologists of the Galilee. As noted above, the 
ability to construct economic models of trade and commerce has been improved by 
the surge in archaeological work conducted in Galilee in the last two decades, much 
of which has explicitly grappled with economic questions. Enough excavations and 
surveys have been conducted in the region to get a good sense of the pattern of 
settlement distribution and the relative size of these settlements, which will be crucial 
data for evaluating the plausible utility of different models of economic interaction to 
the Galilean landscape.
19
 The discoveries of production sites in the Galilee for 
ceramic wares (e.g., Kefar Ḥananiah, and more recently Shikhin and Yodefat) and 
limestone vessel (e.g., Kefar Reina, Bethlehem, and Khirbet Qana) have provided 




I draw inspiration from Douglas R. Edwards in particular. He has convincingly 
demonstrated that economic exchange in the region was complex and that towns and 
villages—not solely the cities—served as hubs of economic activity and exchange.
21
 
David Adan-Bayewitz’s pioneering work introducing compositional analysis of 
ceramics to Galilean archaeology is also useful for my goal of identifying patterns of 
exchange. His study on the pottery workshops of Kefar Ḥananiah has enabled us to 
identify ceramic finds with specific production sites and to map distribution of 
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coursewares produced and consumed locally.
22
 The current excavators of the village 
of Shikhin—Mordechai Aviam and James Riley Strange—are conducting similar 
analysis of the ceramics manufacturing operation discovered there, adding each year 
to the data for identifying and modeling patterns of exchange.
23
 I also follow the 
example of Martin Hørning Jensen, whose recent monograph Herod Antipas in 
Galilee integrates both literary and archaeological data.
24
 I build off his demonstration 
that, on the one hand, the cities in Galilee were quite modest and, on the other hand, 
villages and towns were not undifferentiated peasant communities but were internally 
stratified and engaged. His findings suggest to me that the dominant assumptions of a 
dichotomized model of antagonistic urban–rural relations should be discarded and 
networks of interaction should be reconsidered without the fixation on dominating 
centers.  
Third, I draw on the now-vast scholarship on the economy of the ancient Mediter-
ranean world. Since Finley’s The Ancient Economy, there have been several edited 
volumes dedicated to re-evaluating and voicing alternatives to many of his models 
and propositions.
25
 Scholars have offered alternative models for comprehending the 
relationship between cities and small settlements in their vicinity that may prove 
helpful in considering alternate models we could invoke to comprehend the economy 
in Galilee.
26
 On agricultural production, I look to the work of scholars such as Dennis 
P. Kehoe and Paul Halstead, who have expanded our understanding of agricultural 
strategy to account for the array of tactics that agriculturalists could deploy to protect 
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against risk and efficiently use their labor and resources.
27
 Many scholars have pushed 
back against Finley’s limited view of trade in antiquity.
28
 Keith Hopkins authored an 
influential “tax and trade” model for the Roman economy, arguing for considerable 
aggregate trade through a highly integrated and monetized economy.
29
 Peregrine 
Horden and Nicholas Purcell argue in their monumental work The Corrupting Sea 
that trade was as much a byproduct of Mediterranean ecology; owing to the volatility 
of agriculture in the Mediterranean region from year to year and from microregion to 
microregion, small- and medium-distance, trade was a practical necessity.
30
 I also 
draw considerable inspiration from Neville Morley’s brief Trade in Classical 
Antiquity, in which he considers a number of social and institutional factors that 
define trade goods and affect transactions.
31
 
Fourth, I draw on insights from scholarship on Late Antiquity that has 
emphasized agency among the disenfranchised in relations of economic or power 
disparity in order to develop a multi-directional (rather than top-down) approach to 
interaction. The works of David Frankfurter and Cam Grey have been instructive in 
formulating this project, highlighting potential alternatives to the centric focus of 
previous work in Galilee. Frankfurter’s Religion in Roman Egypt concentrates on 
micro-localities within the Egyptian landscape, assessing their engagement with the 
larger regional institutions but especially indicating the continued importance of 
translocal (yet non-dominant) traditions, relations, and identities.
32
 A more specifi-
                                                          
27
 Dennis P. Kehoe, Management and Investment on Estates in Roman Egypt during the Early 
Empire (Bonn: R. Habelt, 1992); Paul Halstead, Two Oxen Ahead: Pre-Mechanized Farming in the 
Mediterranean (Malden: Blackwell, 2014); Halstead, “Traditional and Ancient Rural Economy in 
Mediterranean Europe: Plus ça change?,” in Scheidel and von Reden, The Ancient Economy, 53–70; 
see also Lin Foxhall, “The Dependent Tenant: Land Leasing and Labour in Italy and Greece,” JRS 80 
(1990): 97–114; Geoffrey Kron, “Roman Ley-Farming,” JRA 13 (2000): 277–87. 
28
 In addition to those explicitly mentioned below, see the following on market locations: Luuk 
de Ligt, “The Roman Peasantry: Demand, Supply, and Distribution between Town and Countryside, 
Part 1,” Münsterische Beiträge zur antiken Handelsgeschichte  9 (1991): 24–56; de Ligt, “The Roman 
Peasantry: Demand, Supply, and Distribution between Town and Countryside, Part 2,” Münsterische 
Beiträge zur antiken Handelsgeschichte 10 (1992): 33–77; Joan M. Frayn, Markets and Fairs in 
Roman Italy: Their Social and Economic Importance from the Second Century BC to the Third Century 
AD (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993). 
29
 Keith Hopkins, “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200 BC–AD 400),” JRS 70 (1980): 
101–25. 
30
 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2000). 
31
 Neville Morley, Trade in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
32
 David Frankfurter, Religion in Roman Egypt: Assimilation and Resistance (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998). Translocal identities in Galilee too may have played an important 
role in determining patterns of interactivity, both within the region and with neighboring areas. 
Several studies on ethnic identity and its impact on the distinctive material culture of the region 
provide a starting point: Jonathan L. Reed, Archaeology and the Galilean Jesus: A Re-examination of 
the Evidence (Harrisburg: Trinity International Press, 2000), 23–61; Avshalom-Gorni and Getzov, 
“Phoenicians and Jews”; Aviam, “Distribution Maps of Archaeological Data from the Galilee.” On 
regional differences—though limited—between Judaea and Galilee, see Martin Goodman, “Galilean 





cally socioeconomic exemplum is Cam Grey’s Constructing Communities in the Late 
Roman Countryside, which emphasizes the role of strategy and the variety of relation-
ships used to cope with pressures and risk.
33
 I also find valuable his recognition of the 
reciprocal potential and mutual benefit in these relationships, however asymmetrical 
their statuses.  
With regard to the strategies and tactics available to the subjects of imperial and 
economic pressures, I draw more broadly on some of the concepts developed by Homi 
K. Bhabha, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and James C. Scott.
34
 All three have indicated 
important ways that misunderstanding and ambiguity at the interface of the 
dominating/imperial and the dominated/colonial facilitate certain modes of resisting, 
subverting, or inverting domination. I follow the implications of these studies in 
recognizing the capacity of the “non-powerful” to act upon the dominant class and to 
foster interactions among themselves that bypass and elude the imperial gaze. I like-
wise draw from Michel de Certeau, who argues against the notion that individuals are 
ever wholly dominated by systems of domination and control, but may find ways of 
creatively working within the space of those parameters imposed from above through 
“tactics” to adapt those constraints to their own ends. I will deploy the terminology of 
“tactic” throughout the dissertation to refer to such methods of working within the 
constraints of a system to achieve goals that may not neatly fit within it.  
Sources 
This project will marshal data from both literary and archaeological sources. The 
main literary sources that this study will engage with are the writings of Josephus 
(esp. Jewish Antiquities, Jewish War, and Life) and the New Testament gospels, all in 
Greek. These sources are by no means objective and comprehensive accounts of the 
history of their contemporary Galilee; as all texts, they are selective in the material 
that they present and deploy this material to particular narrative ends. Despite the fact 
that they are rarely explicitly concerned with economic matters, these sources none-
theless provide valuable evidence in brief, scattered, and often oblique references to 
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production, consumption, and trade. Of course, as highly constructed literary crea-
tions, none of these texts can be simply read as a guide to religious practices or a map 
of social interactions. Nevertheless, in their representation of life in Galilee and in the 
assumptions that underlie the narratives that they present, these texts suggest 
important information that can be used to create a portrait of movement and economic 
interaction. When considering the evidence from the textual sources, I have tried to 
consider the impact of the literary context on the ways that these texts represent 
aspects of economic life. On occasion, I will make use of other Second Temple 
Jewish sources such as Jubilees and the Dead Sea Scrolls as well. These offer 
valuable insight into religious practices (and more rarely, into economic issues) in 
Palestine, even though they sometimes lie outside our temporal and geographical 
focus and may reflect sectarian positions not held by many (or any) Galileans. We 
may consider them as indications of the range of possible interpretations of the 




I also turn to the Mishnah as another literary source for thinking about the ancient 
economy of Galilee. Because of its later date and particular concerns, I recognize that 
it is a difficult—if not impossible—source to use for historical data about the Second 
Temple period, but I believe that it can be used responsibly to gauge the range of the 
possible. Since there is significant discussion in certain tractates about economic 
transactions and especially economic activity as it relates to religious concerns, the 
Mishnah may be useful for suggesting scenarios that Jews concerned with adherence 
to the commandments may have had to consider in conducting their economic affairs. 
Of course, these issues are framed in accordance with the halakhah of the rabbis, who 
did not represent the views of the majority, and we must always keep in mind that 
their concerns were not widely shared.
36
 In many cases, however, the Mishnah seems 
to have co-opted or plugged the rabbis’ discussion into actual practices and norms of 
their contemporary Galilee, rather than simply reflecting the rabbis’ imagination and 
exegesis.
37
 If we acknowledge that indeed the rabbis did not invent this material and 
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were instead usurping it, we may presume that the assumed positions from which they 
worked had been long-established regional norms, especially on topics such as agri-
culture that did not typically experience rapid change in pre-industrial societies. 
Whereas most scholarship on the Mishnah has taken this observation and carried it 
forward, asking what this can tell us about how the early rabbis  engaged with and 
shaped their world in an attempt to position themselves as authorities, we can take it 
in the other direction and ask what this observation can tell us about Galilee prior to 
this act of co-opting.
38
 
Documentary texts, where available, provide glimpses into interactions that are 
rarely if ever discernible in literary texts. The climate of Galilee, unfortunately, is not 
conducive to the preservation of papyri and other writing materials. We will make 
occasional use of documentary texts found elsewhere when useful. Aside from the 
Dead Sea Scrolls, the major papyri finds from Roman Palestine are the Aramaic Bar 
Kokhba letters and the Greek and Aramaic Babatha archive, both collections discov-
ered in the Judaean desert and containing documents dated to the period around the 
two Jewish revolts.
39
 These documents indicate something about the role played by 
specifically Jewish cultural and religious institutions, sometimes in connection with 
economic decision-making. We may also draw insights from the abundant 
papyrological evidence from Egypt, which, despite some regional peculiarities, may 
be aptly considered more representative than anomalous within the Roman Empire.
40
 
These documentary papyri suggest the variety of modes of exchange, the roles played 
by family and other social networks in the movement of goods and information, and 
the array of possibilities for land tenure and deployment of labor. 
As noted above, archaeological evidence from Galilee will play a significant role 
in this project. The major excavations at Sepphoris and now Magdala provide us with 
ample evidence of large settlements with urban characteristics that—at least in part—
date back to the Early Roman period. But in contrast to other regions, where cities are 
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still often the privileged targets of archaeological research, a great many villages and 
even non-domestic sites have been the subject of excavations in Galilee. I had the 
privilege of participating in excavations of one such village, Shikhin, for four seasons 
as an area supervisor under the tutelage of James Riley Strange and Mordechai 
Aviam. I have tried to access the excavation reports for Galilean sites where avail -
able, but in many cases the excavations are ongoing or the final reports have not yet 
been published. For ongoing projects and salvage excavations, archaeological data 
and summaries of findings can be found in the publications ʽAtiqot, Ḥadashot 
Arkheologiyot/Excavations and Surveys in Israel, and Qadmoniot (in both English 
and Hebrew). In many cases, the excavators have made preliminary findings acces-
sible through articles, and most recently in volume 2 of Galilee in the Late Second 
Temple and Mishnaic Periods, which gathers in one place summary reports of the 
most important archaeological sites in Galilee for our period.
41
 The archaeological 
excavations in Galilee have provided ample evidence for production and processing 
of agricultural goods (such as grinders and oil and wine presses) as well as non-agri-
cultural goods (such as pottery, stone vessels, and lamps). We must assess consump-
tion primarily in terms of non-organic products or proxy evidence (such as discarded 
storage vessels), but as we will discuss, this is somewhat tricky and uncertain. Like-
wise, for distribution and movement of goods, we must focus on the data from 
durable objects like ceramics, drawing especially on the work of David Adan-
Bayewitz.
42
 These archaeological data, in conjunction with other lines of evidence, 
can be used to suggest the extent and patterns of trade within Galilee and with nearby 
regions.  
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New Institutional Economics and the Social Sciences 
Recent scholarship on ancient Mediterranean economic history has made a turn 
toward New Institutional Economics (NIE) as a lens for analysis.
43
 Especially influen-
tial has been the work of Nobel laureate Douglass C. North, whose formulation of 
NIE emphasizes the role of manmade institutions in shaping how humans make 
economic decisions in contexts of imperfect information and uncertainty.
44
 Despite 
NIE’s wide application to study of the ancient Mediterranean economy in the last 
decade, scholars have deployed it for political and legal institutions but have engaged 
very little with religious institutions and norms.
45
 To the extent that religious institu-
tions have been studies in connection with the economy, it has primarily been within 
the frame of “temple economies” that inquires how temples acquired the resources 
they required from their periphery, rather than how these institutions affected 
economic behavior beyond the context of temple cult itself.
46
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The framework of NIE has not, to my knowledge, been explicitly deployed in 
study of Roman Palestine, and this study is an attempt to illuminate the profitability 
of applying principles learned from NIE to analysis of the economy in Early Roman 
Galilee. NIE would suggest, however, that institutions such as temples, synagogues, 
tithes, and pilgrimage had a significant role in shaping economic relationships and 
decision-making more broadly.
47
 Given the strength of Jewish and early Christian 
textual sources on these very elements, a study of economy in Galilee that integrates 
religious institutions alongside political and legal ones has the potential to serve as 
beacon for those working in other regions of the Roman world. 
At its heart, NIE proposes the intrinsic integrality of the social world with the 
economy, since it grants so much latitude to the role of socially constructed institu-
tions in defining the incentives, costs, and bounds that make up the environment in 
which people make their economic decisions, rather than assuming a sort of natural 
and universal incentive structure as in Neoclassical Economics. In this way, NIE 
embraces the notion pioneered by Karl Polanyi, and adopted by the “substantivist” 
camp, that economic exchanges are  
embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-economic. The inclusion 
of the non-economic is vital. For religion or government may be as important for the 
structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability 
of tools and machines themselves that lighten the labor.
48
  
NIE goes beyond the important observation that economic transactions are conducted 
along lines of social interactions to consider also how all sorts of economic decisions 
are made in the context of a social environment that sets limits and constraints on 
certain modes of acting while facilitating and incentivizing others.
49
  
Institutions, in NIE parlance, refer to the rules that humans construct to define the 
acceptable parameters of behavior, together with their mechanisms of enforcement. 
                                                          
47
 The connection between Galilee and Jerusalem and its Temple cult, particularly at the times of 
the “pilgrimage festivals,” is quite evident in Josephus’ writings and in Jesus’ journey to Jerusalem in 
the New Testament Gospels. Such journeys and the concomitant sacrifices and lodging needs surely 
factored heavily into the economic decisions of the portion of the population who regularly attended 
these festivals. For a recent suggestion of the implications of pilgrimage on economy, see Adan-
Bayewitz’ interpretation on the widespread distribution of Jerusalem-made lamps in Galilee: David 
Adan-Bayewitz et al., “Preferential Distribution of Lamps from the Jerusalem Area in the Late Seco nd 
Temple Period (Late First Century BCE–70 CE),” BASOR 350 (2008): 37–85. 
48
 Karl Polanyi, ”The Economy as Instituted Process,” in Economic Anthropology, ed. Edward E. 
LeClair, ‎Harold K. Schneider, and Melville Jean Herskovits (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
1968), 22–51, quote at 34; cf. Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness,” The American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 481–510; Stuart Plattner, 
“Introduction,” in Economic Anthropology, ed. Plattner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 
1–20. 
49
 On the long-standing debate between primitivists and modernists—and the debate between 
substantivists and formalists with which it is often homologized—see Richard Saller, “Framing the 
Debate over Growth in the Ancient Economy,” in Scheidel and von Reden, The Ancient Economy, 
251–69; Jean Andreau, “Twenty Years after Moses I. Finley’s The Ancient Economy,” in Scheidel and 





Institutions in NIE can be divided into two broad classes. Formal institutions are 
explicitly crafted rules such as laws, constitutions, and treaties that are drafted by 
organizations—groups bound by some common purpose, such as governments or 
guilds. Informal institutions are constraints that are often unwritten and arise through 
less deliberative means, such as norms and conventions, but nevertheless define the 
parameters of acceptable behavior in a given social context. Formal and informal 
institutions alike are only important to the extent that there are apt mechanisms for 
enforcing the rules. Enforcement can be effected by official mechanisms of policing 
and punishment, by social pressure and sanctioning by societal peers, or by one’s own 
conscience if the rules are internalized and/or moralized. It is helpful to think of 
institutions in terms of the metaphor North uses: they constitute the “rules of the 
game.” Formal institutions are those rules one would find in the rulebook, explicitly 
stated and clearly defined to all. Informal institutions are the usually unwritten rules 
that govern fair play, such as a prohibition on flipping the game board or cheating. 
These rules can be enforced by an individual designated to oversee adherence, or by 
the reprimand of fellow players or refusal to play with the defector again.  
NIE grants considerable latitude for the role of norms in determining individual 
and group behavior.
50
 To expand upon North’s discussion of norms, I turn to sociolo-
gists such as James S. Coleman who have studied the topic at length. Religious norms 
will play an important role in our discussion of the formal institution of the divine 
Laws inscribed in the Torah, since details necessary to implement them are often 
missing from the written, codified form, and would have required the emergence of 
normative interpretation or norms of execution to effectively follow them. Coleman 
suggests that closed networks are especially fertile territory for the development of 
strong norms and for effective policing by peers. Because such networks are 
characterized by high levels of interconnectivity and few avenues for acting outside 
the system, they are ideal for producing consensus norms of behavior and make it 
easy for peers to sanction defectors from those norms.
51
 
NIE dispenses with the assumption of perfect information, instead lending 
significance to the barriers that lack of information or asymmetrical information (i.e., 
one party has information the other lacks) impose on the initiation and/or execution of 
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 Rather than assuming order as the default condition, North 
argues that “non-ergodic” conditions of uncertainty and unpredictability predomi-
nated for most people over most of history. It is in light of pervasive uncertainty that 
human societies develop institutions and norms that serve to mitigate uncertainty by 
defining rules that serve to normalize the conditions for economic interaction.
53
 NIE 
also dispenses with the assumption of frictionless transactions, addressing the variety 
of barriers that must be overcome in order to enact a transaction under the collective 
designation of “transaction costs.”
54
 These include such issues as confirming accuracy 
of weight and measures, comparing prices and quality against other available options, 
and ensuring enforcement of the agreed transaction. It even dispenses with the notion 
that humans are inherently rational in their decision-making, at least as classically 
defined. Drawing on findings from social psychology, North suggests that because 
agents are imperfectly informed, they often make decisions on the basis of their own 
past choices, the choices of peers, and other pattern-based modes of decision-making.  
In distinction to neoclassical “rational choice theory,” North deploys a concept of 
“bounded rationality,” defining rational behavior according to the constraints and 
incentives that a given social environment imposes on those acting within it.
55
 Behav-
iors that may seem irrational or counterintuitive according to the modern, western, 
secular calibration of Neoclassical Economics may in fact seem perfectly rational 
given a different set of values, ideas, and conditions are assumed.
56
 The work of 
Duncan J. Watts serves as a helpful point of entry to a wide array of pertinent 
phenomena that shape how humans as individuals and as groups make decisions, 
some of which are explicitly integrated into North’s version of NIE. Watts’ book Six 
Degrees lays out the basics of network theory and the groundwork for considering 
how emergent behaviors arise from groups that may not necessarily be predicted from 
individual behavior.
57
 In Everything is Obvious, he identifies a number of other 
phenomena that guide human decision-making in unexpected ways.
58
 Path depend-
ency describes the tendency of individuals to make future decisions on the basis of 
past choices, incentivizing iteration of the familiar and disincentivizing novel choices 
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because of higher risks and barriers to entry.
59
 Information cascade describes the 
tendency of individuals to follow the course of action observed in others. Related to 
this is the idea of cumulative advantage, a phenomenon by which an initially small 
edge precipitates greater and greater gains, without necessary regard to merit over 
other potential choices. Watts also describes the halo effect as the tendency to 
attribute a host of traits to an individual or item on the basis of unrelated characteris-
tics, such as associating beauty with success. Together, these phenomena demonstrate 
the limits of “rational choice” even in a bounded sense. But they also suggest some of 
the mechanisms by which norms may emerge, spread, and perpetuate through a 
system—especially a dense, closed one. 
I also draw insight from Pierre Bourdieu to comprehend how a given social envi-
ronment can shape the behavior of individuals in that system.
60
 Particularly instruc-
tive are his conceptualizations of social capital, habitus, and doxa. Social capital 
refers to the access to resources enabled by one’s interpersonal network connections; 
we may think of it as an extension of one’s wealth through one’s associates, often in 
the form of stored debt, favors, and obligation produced through past interactions. 
The accrual and expenditure of social capital affects one’s ability to make use of a 
social network to fulfill one’s goals. Habitus is the “system of internalized structures, 
schemes of perception, conception, and action” that invisibly shapes individual 
behavior without conscious deliberation.
61
 Those habitualized actions shape the 
default parameters of action, guiding people through a combination of path depend-
ence and peer conformity. Habitus is a useful way to think about how Jews may come 
to act in accordance with emergent societal norms often at a less-than-conscious level. 
Doxa is useful for thinking about the bounds between conscious and unconscious 
realms of decision-making. Doxa refers to those aspects of behavior that are so 
normative and unquestioned that they operate in the background, shaping behavior 
without explicit consideration. Once certain issues are questioned and move into the 
realm of public disagreement, debate, and difference, then we may describe different 
positions as orthodox or heterodox, labeled according to one’s positionality. The latter 
two concepts are especially useful for considering norms, since norms are often 
unspoken but widely held and followed, and their very normativity is only explicitly 
recognized when called into question by defectors from those norms.  
The Jewish Law and Its Observance 
For North, beliefs are important in determining the choices that individuals make, and 
those choices themselves accrete into structures that define the parameters of action in 
the human landscape. The second part of this statement is important. “Much of what 
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passes for rational choice is not so much individual cogitation as the embeddedness of 
the thought process in the larger social and institutional context.”
62
 In this disserta-
tion, we consider the effects of the religious institutions that were especially 
important in defining that human landscape in Jewish Palestine. It is worth noting at 
the outset the approach I take concerning the nature of Judaism in Second Temple-
period Galilee and observance of the Torah laws. 
In some respects, I follow in the footsteps of Sanders, who assumed that the Jews 
of Palestine generally “wanted to obey the Law and that they considered how best to 
do so.”
63
 Sanders appealed to a lowest common denominator form of Judaism that he 
called “common Judaism,” characterized by the centrality of the Torah and Temple. 
The Torah was taken by most Second Temple Jews to represent a normative and 
prescriptive view of the proper conduct of religious observation, and most Jews 
attempted to live their lives in accordance with its statutes as they understood them. 
The Temple was understood by most as the sole legitimate cult site and the object of 
annual pilgrimage from all around the country. Another way to understand Sanders’ 
project was an attempt to argue for the inherent possibility of following the Jewish 
Law in a world where the Temple still stood. 
But as Lee I. Levine rightly notes, general agreement on a common Judaism 
“does not mean that there were no differences of opinion among individuals and 
groups on how to interpret these beliefs and apply the commandments.”
64
 The Torah 
may have been normative, but its prescriptions were not always clear. In fact, the 
descriptions of festivals and other ritual obligations are often opaque, lacunose, or 
even contradictory.
65
 Our textual evidence from the Second Temple period indicates 
that Jewish writers attempted in different ways to harmonize these inconsistencies and 
establish clearer interpretations of the Torah laws. These texts themselves exhibit 
considerable variation, however, disagreeing on issues so fundamentally important to 
the operation of the cult as the calendrical system, the dating of particular festivals, 
and which consecrated items belonged to the priest and which to the offerer.  
Some scholars have expressed doubt about the extent to which Jews actually 
followed the statutes of the Torah, particular those that have been viewed as economi-
cally burdensome, such as the tithes or the Sabbatical Year fallow.
66
 Behind this 
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evaluation we can see the assumed pertinence of a neoclassical definition of economic 
rationality, defined along fairly narrow and secular standards and oriented toward 
evaluating profit. Following this neoclassical perspective of rational self-interest, it 
makes some sense to view piety as a luxury afforded to those who were relatively 
secure in their economic resources, while the rest strove primarily to meet food needs 
with a comfortable margin of safety and relegated religious duties to a second tier of 
priority. In this dissertation, I take a different tack by flipping this key assumption. 
Instead of a narrowly defined rationality, I instead offer an analysis on the assumption 
that adherence to religious obligations and constraints were of comparable importance 
to Galilean Jews and were a fundamental rather than secondary consideration in 
formulating strategies of “making ends meet.” I take a more expansive view of the 
context in which people make their decisions, drawing on research in social sciences 
and social psychology that indicates that people make decisions within a social envi -
ronment that guides and pressures individuals to behave in certain ways. These forces 
lead people to act in ways that may seem to us irrational and counterintuitive. 
I do not pretend that the evidence is sufficient to prove this outright. The 
evidence from our written and material sources often do not give us the data that 
would be most helpful for understanding economic behavior. Due in part to the 
commonality and banality of agricultural production, consumption, and exchange, the 
literary sources often have little to say aside from passing references and/or 
presupposed context for a particular episode. Broad statements are few and far 
between, and it is sometimes difficult to tell when they are prescriptive and when they 
are descriptive in producing generalized statements. (Indeed, one can argue that even 
ostensibly descriptive passages are being prescriptive in their elision of deviant or 
minority practices and in other manners by which they are selectively presenting these 
descriptions.) For the most part, any assessment of economy in ancient Palestine is 
attempting to flesh out a picture from scattered bits—drawing inferences from compa-
rable evidence from elsewhere, and making assumptions that guide the process of 
extrapolating the rest.  
This dissertation attempts to explore the rippling effects that this fundamental 
shift in assumption creates. These effects may not all be correct, and one may reason-
ably quibble with any given point. We grant that, for instance, not all Galilean Jews 
may have observed the Torah’s constraints on agriculture, or that not all may have 
attended all of the festivals every year. Within a given set of culturally constructed 
constraints, there will always remain variability and outliers. But it is worth consid-
ering the sorts of effects that result from taking seriously the notion that religious 
institutions and norms were an important factor in shaping the tendencies of the 
system or network. There is heuristic value in setting aside the prevailing assumptions 
about how economic decisions were made by the agrarian base in antiquity, even if 
the resulting image is itself an idealized form. The reality may be somewhere in the 
middle, or an overlap of the two, but we cannot ably move toward this middle without 
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an exploration of the other end of the spectrum. It is to that end that I consider this 
attempt to map out the potential effects of adherence to the rules laid out in the Torah 
as an advancement in our understanding of the ancient Galilean economy. Once we 
observe that changing the parameters of the human environment in which economic 
decisions are made could have real effects on the system, we can move on to 
adjusting any given parameter with closer scrutiny. 
I also take some inspiration from Robert A. Orsi’s sociological study of contem -
porary catholic practitioners.
67
 Two points in particular are, I believe, important and 
pertinent to my understanding of Galilean Jews in antiquity. First, Orsi argues that we 
ought to take seriously the fact that the practitioners understand their relationships 
with supernatural beings and forces quite real. They perceive themselves as engaged 
in interpersonal relationships with these beings that, while perhaps qualitatively 
different from interaction with other human beings, are just as important to foster and 
maintain. To treat religious practitioners’ behavior solely in terms of social function 
or signaling to others risks missing the important impact that religious convictions 
can have on behavior. Moreover, Orsi notes that these relationships between super-
natural beings and humans are not inherently positive, bringing calm and comfort and 
hope. To the contrary; these relationships can be a source of considerable discomfort 
and anxiety. 
It is worth keeping these insights in mind when conceiving of the social world of 
Early Roman Galilee. Although sociologists typically think of social networks solely 
in terms of human agents, connections to supernatural agents could be just as 
important to understanding the effects of personal relationships on the calculus of 
social behavior. God, in this network, was not simply another peer to interact with. He 
would have been the most highly interconnected—conceived of as having a relation to 
each and every individual. Due to his omniscience or near-omniscience, he would 
have greater access to information than any other agent, and his great power would 
have made him a useful ally to be able to call upon or a formidable enemy if crossed.  
As Sanders has noted, Jewish literature from the Second Temple period suggests 
that “covenantal nomism”—the belief that one’s standing with God is determined by 
one’s obedience to the terms of the Mosaic covenant, and that one may be rewarded 
or punished on that basis—was a widely held theology.
68
 To most Jews, we may 
suggest, God was thought to be an active agent in the world, one who brought about 
the bounties of harvest and prosperity to those who acted according to his will, and 
punishment of disease, famine, and war to those who spurned it. This would have 
placed great incentive for individuals in the network to act in accordance with those 
rules that God put in place, because in addition to any peer pressure to do so, it was 
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nigh impossible for transgressions to escape notice of God, and his ability to punish 
defectors was unparalleled. We may imagine that, as a result, the relationship with 
God could be a source of great strength if one was confident in their adherence to the 
divine Law, but a source of great anxiety, too, if one unwittingly broke the Law or 
was not sure if they had, or if one knew friends or family who had done so. We shall 
argue that, in general, the Jews’ belief that God was an active agent in the world who 
concerned himself with his chosen nation’s obedience to his covenant was a consider -
able incentive for Jews’ voluntary adherence to the strictures of that covenant, even 
when it might require behavior that seems “irrational” within the bounds of a social 
network composed of human actors alone.  
Outline of Chapters 
In chapter 1, we shall consider the nature of the state—the political structure and 
governmental institutions—that presided over Galilee in the Early Roman period. We 
begin here because many past assessments of the economy in Palestine—and, indeed, 
of the economy of the ancient Mediterranean more broadly—have placed 
considerable emphasis on the effects of the state on the economic conditions in a 
given locality. I argue, however, that the role of the state has been overemphasized, at 
least when it comes to Galilee. In line with the assessment of Andrew Lintott, I argue 
that the Roman administrative apparatus was quite small and lacking in extensive 
policing mechanisms, and that the Roman government, moreover, was usually unin-
terested in getting too involved in provincial matters except when sedition or pressing 
financial need required it.
69
 The provincial government was generally quite weak and 
circumscribed, and did not exert much influence in shaping the social environment in 
which economic transactions were conducted. We will see that the political admin-
istration and political geography of the region changed quite often over the course of 
the Early Roman period, but I argue that, due to the weak state institutions and 
Galilee’s positions as a relative backwater, these changes did little to disrupt the 
social world in which Galileans operated. The kingdom of Antipas may be somewhat 
exceptional in this regard, since Galilee was transformed for a few decades from an 
unimportant rural district to the center of a vassal’s domain, and we will address some 
of the effects of his city-building projects in the following chapter. Having dismantled 
in this chapter the notion that the state was a major source of institutional structuring 
in Early Roman Galilee, we shift to consider what other sorts of institutions and 
norms could have played a more defining role in this society, and what non-state 
mechanisms of enforcement could account for general adherence to them. 
In chapter 2, we turn to the Galilean economy more specifically. Drawing on both 
archaeological and literary evidence, I shall argue that the prevailing urban–rural 
framework through which scholars have tended to analyze the economic system of 
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Galilee is flawed, and offer an alternative view. Instead of asking whether or not rela-
tions between city and countryside were exploitative and parasitic or reciprocal and 
beneficial, I argue that the role of the cities has been overstated. I suggest instead that 
the Galilean economic network is more aptly viewed as a “small world” network—a 
dense web of interconnected settlements. To support this model, I draw on the 
archaeological evidence for Galilean settlements that suggests settlements in this 
period were fairly small but numerous and close to one another, and that wealth was 
not solely concentrated in urban hubs. I also draw on literary descriptions of move-
ment through the region to support the contention that travel within Galilee was both 
easy and commonplace, and that it was conducted between villages, not just to and 
from the city. I also assess the evidence for trade within Galilee, especially in ceramic 
and stone products that are abundantly attested in the archaeological record, to 
suggest the scope and pattern of trade in Galilee. In arguing for such a network, I not 
only make the case for ample exchange of resources within and between settlements 
in Galilee through various trade mechanisms, but I also argue that the ease of move-
ment and communication through the region has implications for how we understand 
the development and proliferation of social norms. This will become important espe-
cially for chapters 3 and 4, where we turn more explicitly to the effects of religious 
institutions on economic decision-making. 
In chapter 3, we examine some of the laws from the Torah that pertain to the 
production and consumption of agricultural goods. Certain laws set constraints on the 
timeframe in which agricultural production—and other occupations as well—could be 
conducted. Sabbaths, festivals, and Sabbatical Years featured periodic abstention 
from labor as a requirement. Other laws, such as the prohibition on mixing species 
and the prohibition on fourth-year produce from fruit trees, set constraints on the 
mode of agricultural production. Other commandments limited the amount of produce 
that could be used by the household, or constrained the manner and timing in which it 
could be used. We look in particular at the Sabbatical Year fallow, tithes, firstfruit 
offerings, and obligatory leavings for the poor. While this chapter is not a thorough 
examination of the manifold ways that the Torah’s strictures could and would have 
shaped the manner in which agricultural pursuits were conducted, this sampling high-
lights some of the more explicit and interesting cases. Through examination of the 
implications of following these laws within the Galilean economy, we seek to demon-
strate how religious institutions could play a fundamental role in shaping the social 
environment and bounding the acceptable parameters of behavior by which 
individuals strove to meet their economic needs. 
In chapter 4, we shift our focus southward to consider the effects of periodic 
travel to Jerusalem on Galilean household economics. Our primary focus will be on 
the three annual pilgrimage festivals, which the Torah obliges male Jews to attend. 
We will consider the choices involved in how Galileans proceeded on the journey, 
and consider the economic implications on management of resources for the journey 
and conducting agricultural work back home. Once in Jerusalem, pilgrims also had to 
account for their food needs and the materials required to participate in the sacrificial 





agricultural activities, placing constraints on the timing of labor and preparation of 
the harvest. Related to this, we will consider how the timing of the festivals likely 
incentivized performance of other religious duties in Jerusalem—such as consumption 
of the Second Tithe or giving firstfruit offerings—at festival time, with implications 
for timing and profit. This chapter serves to connect the Galilean regional economy, 
in which most everyday transactions were local, to a broader Jewish Palestinian 
economic network on a periodic basis. 
Through this dissertation, I aim to contribute to several areas of scholarly 
research. Most obviously, it contributes to the historiography of ancient Judaism and 
early Christianity in defining the shape of the Galilean socioeconomic world in which 
the unrest and uprisings in the first century occurred and in which the Jesus move-
ment emerged, and evaluating the extent to which economic considerations help to 
explain them. It also fits into the larger discourse surrounding the ancient economy of 
the Roman Mediterranean, drawing on the tools and questions deployed for other 
areas of the empire to a region still often bypassed and implicitly marginalized as 
distinct from the Mediterranean. To this end, the project speaks at least implicitly to 
recent concern for a broader concept of “Mediterraneanism.”
70
 However, by focusing 
analysis on a particular region, the dissertation contributes to the current interest in 
regional studies, and shifts the discussion away from evaluations of imperialism or 
economy on a macro-scale that often blurs important and interesting differences 
within the empire.
71
 But most importantly, the dissertation seeks to reorient the 
prevailing center-fixation of analyses of imperialism and economic determination in 
Palestine and beyond, simultaneously giving due weigh to the role of central, formal 
institutions and to the role of decentralized informal institutions and translocal 
networks of interactivity in bounding economic decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 1—THE OVERSTATED ECONOMY  
Calibrating the Importance of Institutions of Administration and Taxation  
in Early Roman Palestine 
Studies on the economy of Roman Palestine have often emphasized the importance of 
the state
72
 in their evaluation of economic conditions under Roman and Herodian 
rule—focused especially on taxes, property rights, and law.
73
 In so doing, these 
studies follow a long tradition in scholarship on the ancient Mediterranean economy 
of focusing on the role of the state in shaping the economic systems of individual 
polities and the Mediterranean region as a whole. Mikhail I. Rostovtzeff’s study on 
the economy of Ptolemaic Egypt, for instance, depicts a command economy enabled 
by a highly developed bureaucracy.
74
 Keith Hopkins’ “tax and trade” model for the 
Roman economy depends on motors of state taxation and monetization.
75
 The most 
recent turn in study of the ancient Mediterranean economy toward New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) has likewise emphasized the role of the state in structuring the 
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economic system, albeit in a more sophisticated way.
76
 Although NIE posits that 
institutions of various kinds shape the incentive structures according to which 
economic actors interact and deploy their resources, scholars deploying NIE for anal-
ysis of the Roman world have focused primarily on the Roman state’s administrative, 
fiscal, and legal institutions.
77
 
The very notion that the state can be examined as a force that shaped the econ-
omy from the top down presumes that we can speak of Rome as having a coherent 
and strong state. But the Roman Empire was hardly a homogenous and centralized 
entity, especially in our period of investigation. The relationship between Rome and 
the various regions that were subject to it took on a wide array of different configura-
tions: from provinces governed directly by Roman administrators, to “free cities” and 
petty kingdoms overseen by Roman governors, to allied kings installed by but largely 
independent of Rome. Even when Rome instituted direct Roman rule, it often co-
opted established native institutions of administration, taxation, and law
78
 to meet the 
needs of governance rather than imposing a wholly new and characteristically Roman 
administrative order on the province.
79
 The political bureaucracy in most provinces 
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seems to have been relatively small and underdeveloped, hindering the state’s ability 
to collect vital information and to enforce compliance. But even areas where state 
bureaucracy and infrastructure seems to have been strong and localized, the govern-
ment imparted considerable power to lowly recruited officials who had considerable 




Michael Mann provides a helpful way to think about this configuration of Roman 
state power. Most ancient agrarian empires were despotically strong—meaning they 
were able to act unilaterally and without routine, institutionalized negotiation with 
locals. But they were infrastructurally weak—meaning they lacked the capacity to 
penetrative civil society and implement their political decisions broadly.
81
 As we will 
suggest in this chapter, these are apt descriptors for the Early Roman Empire and its 
administration of its eastern subject territories. The Roman state could rely on mili-
tary force to carry out the senate’s or emperor’s orders in a targeted fashion without 
local cooperation, but the Roman administration was not sufficiently developed to 
ensure full, widespread compliance over a long term. From what we know of Early 
Roman Palestine, the Romans were generally satisfied to remain aloof “silent part-
ners” in governance so long as regional stability was maintained and/or a revenue 
stream from tribute was uninterrupted.  
Early Roman Palestine exemplifies well the problems with envisioning state 
institutions—especially Roman state institutions—playing a powerful role in defining 
the parameters of economic activity at the provincial level. The political relationship 
between Rome and Palestine in this period was reconfigured many times: it was 
administered sometimes directly by Roman officials, sometimes by quasi-independent 
kings, and sometimes a murky admixture of the two. The political boundaries (or 
“political geography”) were adjusted time and again as territories were added and 
removed, divided and recombined. These diachronic changes, especially when they 
occurred rapidly, undermine claims that Rome’s hegemonic power was the most 
important factor structuring the economy of Early Roman Palestine. Especially during 
the first couple decades, conditions on the ground can even be described as chaotic, as 
political instability cast doubts on who held legitimate authority and hindered imple-
mentation of law. Later Roman governors over Galilee were unpredictable in the 
length or quality of their tenure. Often the administrative system was murky, and 
there could be utter confusion on the ground as to who was ultimately in charge and 
what administrative institutions one needed to engage for matters of political or judi-
cial dispute. Conditions on the ground were not always conducive to effective tax 
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collection, and an underdeveloped bureaucracy further weakened the effectiveness of 
the state’s financial institutions. The general infrastructural weakness suggests that 
the Roman state was like a patina encrusted atop the existing local systems of inter -
action, rather than the fundamental force shaping its guiding incentives.  
This is not to say that state or its institutions were wholly unimportant in defining 
the parameters of the economy in which Galilean Jews participated. The stability or 
instability of the state could itself have an effect on the economic calculus Galileans 
employed in determining how to allocate their resources. But for much of the period 
in question, these institutions would not have penetrated very deeply into Galilean 
society and would have played a relatively minor role in defining the economic “rules 
of the game” or the day-to-day decision-making of Jewish households. This is espe-
cially so for Galilee, which for much of this period was a backwater far from the 
centers of administration and only occasionally affected by its institutional organs. 
We will therefore suggests that a state-centered approach emphasizing the top-down 
structuring of economic incentives and systems is not ideal for considering the econ-
omy in Early Roman Galilee. 
Once the weakness and in some cases irrelevance of the formal institutions of the 
state is sufficiently demonstrated, we may ask what other institutions may have 
played a more profound and sustained role in shaping the economic behavior of 
Galilee’s general population. I will suggest that religious institutions could have been 
quite important in defining the parameters of economic interaction in Palestine. In 
contrast to the evanescent political configuration of Palestine and the weakness of 
Roman power in penetrating society, many of these Jewish religious institutions had 
been subject to less substantial change over the centuries, and Jews were more likely 
to hold these institutions in high regard and take them into consideration in managing 
their economic resources. Given the weakness of the state in enforcing its own insti -
tutions, we will need to consider the social forces that would have served to compel 
compliance with these rules and thereby shaped the dynamics of economic behavior 
(chapter 2).  
The Changing Political Configurations of Early Roman Galilee 
While there are good reasons to treat the Early Roman period (63 BCE—70 CE) as a 
discrete historical era, homogeneity in the political structure under Rome is ironically 
not one of them. Over the course of this timeframe, Roman dominion vacillated 
between forms of so-called “direct rule,” in which a provincial governor oversaw 
administration of the province in some capacity, and “indirect rule,” in which vassal 
kings ruled with some amount of dependence on and deference toward Rome. These 
shifts in government did not always occur to the same regions of Palestine at the same 
time. The Romans repeatedly reconfigured the political geography of Palestine, 
subdividing and recombining regions of the former Hasmonaean kingdom, and adding 
and removing cities at their discretion. For Galilee, we can roughly break the Early 





(1) from 63 to 40 BCE, it was administered by a Roman governor as an annex to Syria, 
but managed locally as part of a Jewish ethnarchy; (2) from 37 BCE to 44 CE it was 
administered by three successive quasi-independent monarchs, and (3) from 44 CE to 
the First Jewish Revolt it was administered by a Roman procurator as part of the 
Roman province of Judaea. This schema will serve as a useful heuristic to investigate 
the differences between so-called “direct” and “indirect” rule, but we will note that 
these periods too were hardly homogenous.  
Judaea as a Syrian Annex (63–40 BCE) 
The first two decades under Roman rule were the most chaotic. Judaea became part of 
the Roman Empire in 63 BCE, when Pompey intervened in the civil war between 
Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II, two Hasmonaean dynasts contending for the kingdom. 
This intervention spelled the end for the Hasmonaean kingdom as a fully independent 
government; Pompey reinstalled Hyrcanus as high priest but denied him the title 
“king” (Ant. 14.78) and annexed Judaea to the newly-created Roman province of 
Syria (War 1.157; cf. Ant. 14.79). This province was an amalgam of autonomous city-
states and petty monarchies that had emerged in the wake of the gradual fragmenta-
tion and collapse of the Seleucid Empire over the preceding decades.
82
 While the 
governor of Syria presided over the province as a whole, it seems that much of the 
regional administration was left in the hands of the rulers and municipal bodies that 
had governed before Rome’s intervention in the East.
83
 Hyrcanus in like fashion 
remained the de facto political administrator of Judaea, wielding political authority as 
ethnarch over the Jewish people.
84
 Hyrcanus and his government were still subordi-
nate to the Syrian governor, who could intervene politically or militarily as he saw fit, 
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though usually in response to political unrest in 
Plaestine or a pressing need for war resources. 
The territory governed by Hyrcanus was consider-
ably smaller than the Hasmonaean kingdom that had 
preceded Roman intervention. When Pompey annexed 
Palestine to Syria, he reduced Judaea “solely to its par-
ticular bounds” (μόνοις ... τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅροις περι-
έκλεισεν; War 1.155; cf. Ant. 14.74), or in other words, 
to those regions that were chiefly inhabited by mem-
bers of the Judaean ethnos. This left Hyrcanus in 
control of the regions of Judaea and Peraea in the south 
and Galilee in the north (see Figure 1).
85
 Pompey 
removed the many cities that the Hasmonaean kings 
had conquered and incorporated into the kingdom: 
Hippos, Scythopolis, and Pella in Transjordan; the city 
of Samaria in its eponymous region; Marissa in 
Idumaea; and Ashdod, Jamnia, Arethusa, Gaza, Joppa, 
Dora, and Strato’s Tower on the coastal plain (Ant. 
14.73; War 1.155–157). These cities were incorporated into the Syrian province as 
autonomous polities.
86
 Assuming that the removal of Samaria also entailed removing 
the region around it
87
—the domain of the Samaritans, which Pompey may have 
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Figure 1. Approximate territory 
administered by Hyrcanus II as 





thereby judged as not the land of the Jews proper—the regions under Hyrcanus’ 
control were not geographically contiguous. There are no signs, however, that this 
was itself a hindrance to transregional movement or administration between Jerusalem 
and Galilee. 
As part of the Syrian province, the ethnarchy of Judaea also owed annual tribute 
to Rome. The details of this tribute payment from 63 to 47 BCE are murky—we do not 
know how much was owed,
88
 whether it was assessed as a fixed sum (stipendium) or a 
proportional value (decumae), or whether it was paid in cash or paid as produce 
rendered in kind (i.e., as produce).
89
 Tribute in Asia Minor and the rest of Syria was 
collected in this period by publicani, corporations of tax farmers who contracted from 
the Senate the right to gather the provincial tax revenues, and Palestine was likely 
subject to the same system.
90
 This system ensured fixed revenues for Rome, since it 
collected the contract fee up front and displaced the risks and logistical burden of tax 
collection to the publicani. It also meant that the Roman state did not need to invest in 
bureaucracy and other infrastructures for tax assessment and collection.  
This system could lead to abuse of local populations and harsh exactions by tax 
collectors looking to make a quick profit off their contract,
91
 but publicani faced a 
number of barriers. We know of no attempt to conduct a census in Palestine (prior to 
6 CE; see below) that would give publicani the data necessary to make an informed 
bid for the contract or to effectively extract those revenues once in the country. When 
Crassus plundered Syria during his governorship, he reportedly had to reckon the 
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revenues of cities himself, suggesting this information was not otherwise readily 
available, as well as indicating that it was logistically preferable to raid cities than to 
collect revenues from the villages and countryside (Ant. 14.105–109; War 1.180; cf. 
Plutarch, Crassus 17.5, 9–10).
92
 Adding to the difficulty of tax collection was the 
political chaos on the ground in Palestine at this time, as we shall relate. Political and 
military revolt would have impeded bureaucratic assessment of taxable land and 
physically collecting revenues would have required greater access to force than was 
characteristic of publicani operating in the provinces.
93
 We should therefore be wary 
of imagining Palestine completely overrun with tax collectors extorting the populace; 
at times, they would be lucky to make a return on their investment at all. And while 
revolt and civil war may themselves have been a detriment to the ability of Jewish 
farmers to produce and retain their foodstuffs, adding to the air of risk,
94
 it also 




 Despite the nominal Roman annexation and numerous attempts at reformulating 
administration, Roman control over Palestine (and Syria more generally) was initially 
very tenuous. Pompey’s military intervention had only really targeted Jerusalem, and 
many in Judaea and Galilee continued to support the rival house of Aristobulus II.
95
 
While the first Syrian governors were busy quelling local insurrection and fighting off 
Parthian incursions,
96
 Aristobulus II’s son Alexander was able to lead a revolt against 
Hyrcanus (Ant. 14.82; War 1.260). The new Syrian governor Gabinius succeeded in 
putting down Alexander’s revolt in 57 BCE.  
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course, would have made granted considerable latitude to the local leaders to determine how that tax 
burden was allocated and collected (see discussion below).  
93
 Udoh notes in reference to the political instability within Palestine that “Roman control … 
could not have permitted a systematic Roman taxation in the territory” and tribute “could not have 
been raised in large sections of the Jewish state”; To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 26, 30. As to the 
publicani’s access to force, Van Nijf notes that toll (indirect tax) collectors lacked the capacity in 
most places to patrol the countryside and could be easily evaded; “The Social World of Tax Farmers 
and Their Personnel,” 290–92. Of course, the logistics of collecting tribute from fixed settlements 
differs from assessing and levying taxes on goods moving across borders.  
94
 Armies lived off the land where they were fighting when possible, meaning that both sides 
were parasitic on the population’s food producers. Agricultural interruption may have continued after 
the war as well, as violence impeded the agricultural tasks of plowing, sowing, maintaining, and 
harvesting and created collateral damage to both manpower and infrastructure. For discussion of the 
deleterious effects of warfare on a region’s economy, see Angelos Chaniotis, “The Impact of War on 
the Economy of Hellenistic Poleis: Demand Creation, Short-Term Influences, Long-Term Impacts,” in 
Archibald, Davies, and Gabrielsen, The Economies of Hellenistic Societies, 122–41.  
95
 And, as Israel Shatzman notes, a considerable part of the Hasmonaean army probably aligned 
with him as well; The Armies of the Hasmonaeans and Herod: From Hellenistic to Roman Frame-
works (TSAJ 25; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 131. 
96
 Sartre notes that there is little extant to indicate that the first provincial governors of Syria did 





In the aftermath of that revolt, Gabinius restructured the administration of Pales-
tine, perhaps in part to prevent further insurgence by anti-Hyrcanus factions. Gabinius 
left the Temple in the trust of Hyrcanus but divested him of political control over 
Jerusalem or any of the territories, empowering instead aristocratic councils (Ant. 
14.91; War 1.169). He divided the Jewish “people” (ἔθνος) into five regions, each 
with its own council (συνέδρια, Ant. 14.91; συνόδους, War 1.170).
97
 The exact geog-
raphy of this administrative redistricting is not clear; Josephus notes the “capitals” of 
the districts—Jerusalem, Gadara, Amathus, Jericho, and Sepphoris—but not how the 
surrounding territory was apportioned. (Figure 2 produces a highly tentative rendering 
of the five districts.) It is also not clear whether this framework was intended to 
incorporate more territory than Hyrcanus had presided over; the inclusion of Gadara 
in particular is anomalous, since Gadara was removed 
from his control by Pompey (Ant. 14.75–76; War 1.155–
156), and this district could perhaps have included other 
proximate cities of the Decapolis. In addition to appeas-
ing those hostile to Hyrcanus’ governance, the redistrict-
ing may have served a strategy of “divide and conquer,” 
as E. Mary Smallwood has argued, granting the governor 
greater control by decentralizing administrative authority 




This new administrative system does not seem to 
have endured long, if it took hold at all. Affairs in Judaea 
were disrupted by two successive revolts during Gabi-
nius’ tenure: the first spurred by Aristobulus II when he 
escaped from Rome (Ant. 14.92–98; War 1.171–174), and 
the second by Alexander while Gabinius was engaged 
with Parthia (Ant. 14.100–102; War 1.176–178). After the revolts, Josephus says that 
Gabinius “established the government according to the will of Antipater” (πρὸς τὸ 
Ἀντιπάτρου βούλημα κατεστήσατο τὴν πολιτείαν; War 1.178; cf. Ant. 14.103), which 
may indicate the re-establishment of consolidated political authority over Judaea in 
the person of Antipater, Hyrcanus’ advisor and lieutenant, who takes a more prom i-
nent position in the political narrative that follows.
99
 We never hear of the five-district 
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 The settlements were: Jerusalem, serving the immediate area of Jerusalem; Gadara, serving the 
northern parts of Trans-Jordan and perhaps the eastern Jezreel Valley; Amathounta probably in the 
southern Trans-Jordan; Jericho, serving the Dead Sea region. and Sepphoris serving Galilee; cf. Ant. 
14.91; War 1.169–170. Note the apparent absence of a synod in the region of Samaria, strongly 
suggesting that the region was considered as attached to the city of Samaria (removed from Hyrcanus’ 
control under Pompey) and distinct from the Judaean regional administration.  
98
 Smallwood, Jews under Roman Rule, 31. 
99
 Smallwood notes that Antipater seems to bear the title “governor of the Jews” in 48 BCE, 
implying unification had at least occurred by then. Furthermore, Caesar’s decree (Ant. 14.202–210) 
presumes the territories were all again governed by Hyrcanus from Jerusalem in 45 BCE, and the fact 
that Antipater appointed his sons as regional governors of Judaea and Galilee in 47 BCE (Ant. 14.158) 
Figure 2. Approximation of 





system again. If the system had been an experiment in effecting peace and stability 
through political restructuring, it failed miserably.  
The next Syrian governors, Crassus and Cassius, were likewise unable to bring 
about peace and stability in Palestine. Both were preoccupied with military conflict 
against the Parthians. These governors turned to pillaging in order to fund their 
campaigns to the east. Crassus raided the Temple, plundering money from the 
treasury and other valuable artifacts (Ant. 14.105–109; War 1.179). Cassius in turn 
sacked the town of Magdala and took its inhabitants as slaves (Ant. 14.120; War 
1.180).
100
 That political instability and rebellion continued to be a problem is indi-
cated by Crassus’ purported execution of a pro-Aristobulus seditionist, Pitholaus, and 
Cassius’s need to make truce with Alexander once again (War 1.180–182; cf. Ant. 
14.119–120, which omits Alexander). 
Adding to the political confusion was the gradual shift of power from Hyrcanus 
to Antipater. In Josephus’ narrative, it is around this time that Antipater seems to take 
on a more prominent role in making and executing political decisions. During the 
civil war between Pompey and Caesar, Antipater came to Caesar’s aid ostensibly on 
orders of Hyrcanus (Ant. 14.127), but Antipater got all the credit: Caesar merely 
confirmed Hyrcanus in the priesthood but granted Antipater governorship over Judaea 
(ἐπίτροπον αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσιν τῆς Ἰουδαίας; Ant 14.143; cf. War 1.199). Antipater is 
the one who ordered the rebuilding of Jerusalem’s wall and quieted growing sedition 
(Ant. 14.156–157; War 1.201–202). Not long after, Antipater unilaterally decided to 
delegate authority to his sons, appointing Phasaelus over Jerusalem and its environs—
Hyrcanus’ natural domain—and Herod over Galilee (Ant. 14.158; War 1.203). Yet 
Hyrcanus had not been totally eclipsed; at the instigation of Jerusalem elites, he was 
still able to compel Herod to answer charges leveled against him in court—though 
Herod’s own display of military force upon arrival in Jerusalem publically contested 
Hyrcanus’ authority (Ant. 14.163–184; War 1.208–215). And despite the receding 
scope of Hyrcanus’ power, he continued to be the only figure named in Roman 
decrees attributed to Caesar over this period (Ant. 14.190–212).
101
 The exact relation-
ship between Antipater and the ethnarch Hyrcanus may have been just as difficult to 
pin down in antiquity, leaving the general populace uncertain as to just who exactly 
was in charge of which aspects of government at a given moment.
102
 Other personali-
ties, such as the military commanders Malichus and Helix (see below), who are over-
shadowed in Josephus’ narrative by Antipater and his scions, probably contended for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
likewise indicates unification at least within a decade of the reform. See also Smallwood, Jews under 
Roman Rule, 35; Richardson, Herod: King of the Jews, 102–3. 
100
 Or a part thereof; given the difficulty of Josephus’ numbers, it is impossible to say whether 
these thirty thousand are meant to represent all or only a portion of the inhabitants.  
101
 Hyrcanus is also the only official mentioned in the later letters by Marc Antony cited at Ant. 
14.314–322. 
102
 On the difficulty of determining exactly what Antipater’s role was in this period, see 






administrative and/or military power as well, muddying further the understanding on 
the ground of who held authority over what.
103
 
Caesar apparently intervened to make some changes in Palestine. Josephus cites a 
senatus consultum confirming certain grants made by Caesar in 47 BCE (Ant. 14.202–
210)
104
 to the territory of Hyrcanus’ ethnarchy: the port city of Joppa (Ant. 14.205) 
and the villages of the “Great Plain” (14.207) (see Figure 3).
105
 The decree also 
granted the Jews some protection against potentially exploitative practices by tax 
collectors and the military (Ant. 14.204; cf. 14.195).
106
 This decree, along with several 
others issued by Caesar, reiterates the right of Jews to operate according to their 
“ancestral laws” (Ant. 14.208, cf. 14.194–195, 199), including the practices of 
Levitical Tithe and Sabbatical Year fallow (Ant. 14.203). These confirm that during 
Caesar’s control of the Roman state Jews in Palestine were largely permitted to 
continue to govern themselves according to traditional and local institutions, even 
when this meant depriving the Romans of valuable human and monetary resources.  
This decree also gives us a rare glimpse at tribute under one permutation of the 
relationship between Rome and the Judaean ethnarchy. The decree stipulates that the 
tribute due was to be calculated at “one-fourth of what was sown” (τὸ τέταρτον τῶν 
σπειρομένων; Ant. 14.203). This clearly indicates that the tribute was a tax assessed 
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 So Shatzman argues for Malichus and other unnamed epimeletai; The Armies of the 
Hasmonaeans and Herod, 143–46. The identification of Helix, a military commander  at Jerusalem, is 
particularly problematic 
104
 The decree is dated to Caesar’s second imperatorship. For a detailed discussion of the dating 
of this decree and its relationship to other documents cited by Josephus in this same section, see Udoh, 
To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 32–41; Miriam Pucci Ben Zeev, Jewish Rights in the Roman World: The 
Greek and Roman Documents Quoted by Josephus Flavius (TSAJ 74; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 
1–11, 357–68. Though there are some inconsistencies and missing details in the documents that have 
led some to declare these excerpted documents forgeries, I find convincing Pucci Ben Zeev’s argu-
ment that these are errors due to corruptions in antiquity, some from the rendering the senatus 
consulta into Greek in the East (pp. 357–68). 
105
 I am convinced by Udoh’s identification of “the Great Plain” in this decree  with the Sharon 
valley rather than the traditional identification with the Jezreel; see To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 61–
75. Others have argued for the Jezreel Valley: Shimon Applebaum, “Economic Life in Palestine,” in 
The Jewish People in the First Century, vol. 2, ed. Shmuel Safrai and Menahem Stern (CRINT 1.2; 
Assen: van Gorcum, 1974), 631–700 at 635–36; Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, 40. Argu-
ments for identifying it as the Jezreel Valley stem from the incorrect assumption that all references to 
the Great Plain in Josephus are references to the Jezreel, and hence it should be the default. Udoh 
shows quite clearly that Josephus applied the term to a number of distinct and disparate regions in 
Palestine, including also the Jordan Valley (e.g., War 4.455) and the Plain of Asochis (e.g., War 3.59). 
The grant of the Sharon Valley would make sense in that it added to Joppa (and Lydda; see 14.208) 
control over a key portion of the coastal road as well. Moreover, the Sharon valley is the only Valley 
that we know was removed by Pompey in 63 BCE (cf. Ant. 14.74–76). 
106
 Namely, billeting Roman troops, conscription into the auxiliary ranks, and extortion of prop -
erty. Such impositions would have constituted unpredictable ad hoc economic burdens. It could also 
create complications for Jews who feared that interaction with gentiles or impressments into military 
service could compromise their adherence to the Mosaic Law (cf. Ant. 14.226–227). We will return in 







 rather than a poll tax assessed 
per capita, probably paid in kind rather than in coin. It 
also makes very clear that the tribute was a 
proportional tax (decumae) rather than a fixed-rate tax. 
Proportional taxes are generally beneficial to the small-
scale farmer, because they reduce the risks associated 
with crop failure; if the yield is low, so is the net 
amount owed as tribute.  
This decree (and one shortly before it; see Ant. 
14.201) also indicates that at least by 47 BCE the early 
mechanism of tax farming had been replaced by a 
system of tax collection coordinated from Jerusalem 
(Ant. 14.203). The Jews were to send the tribute 
payment to Sidon every other year
108
 (with an 
exemption for the Sabbatical Year),
109
 which suggests 
that Roman agents were no longer entering Palestine to 
collect it themselves. Rather, Hyrcanus and his 
delegates in Judaea—in all likelihood, native Jews—were responsible for the local 
collection of taxes.
110
 These agents likely had better access to information about the 
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 And perhaps specifically grain land, rather than orchards or vineyards, since it speaks of land 
as sown. I have read the term “σπειρομένων” as the yield at harvest from sown crops, but it could also 
be read as the harvest anticipated based on land sown. The former seems most likely since it would 
have been easier to measure and would require a minimal bureaucratic apparatus. Projecting a yield, 
by contrast, would require a fairly accurate record of landholdings, cropping and fa llowing cycle, and 
a stable and reliable seed-to-yield ratio. In both cases, we would be right to imagine a system that left 
plenty of opportunity for farmers to mask the real sum total of their produce and mitigate their tax 
burden. On the variability of seed-to-yield ratios depending on farming strategies, which would 
complicate any system of predicting harvest beforehand, see Paul Halstead, “Traditional and Ancient 
Rural Economies in Mediterranean Europe: Plus ça change?,” in Scheidel and von Reden, The Ancient 
Economy, 53–70. 
108
 The phrase τῷ δευτέρῳ ἐτεὶ has been a matter of some interpretive difficulty. See the review 
of interpretations in Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 48–51. A. H. M. Jones took it to mean 
payment in the second year of the five-year lustrum, the period he supposes for tax-farming contracts, 
but he is at pains to coordinate this with the seven-year sabbatical cycle; review of Arnaldo 
Momigliano, Ricerche sull’organizzazione della Giudea sotto il dominio romano , JRS 25 (1935): 228–
31 at 228–29; cf. Lintott, Imperium Romanum, 87–90. Gildas Hamel takes it to refer to the year after 
the Sabbatical Year (and the following five years), though this does not account well for the isolated 
reference to the “second year”; Poverty and Charity in Roman Palestine, First Three Centuries CE 
(Near Eastern Studies 23; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 146. Udoh follows Arnoldo 
Momigliano’s interpretation—that it means every other year—as the simplest most sensible (see 
Ricerche sull’organizzazione della Giudea sotto il domin io romano, 63 a.C.–70 d.C. [Bologna: Annali 
della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, 1934], 21–24). With the inclusion of the Sabbatical Year 
remission, this would mean years two, four, and six of the seven-year cycle. I follow this interpre-
tation. It remains an open question whether the tax was collected  in Judaea annually or biennially. 
109
 For more on the implications of the Sabbatical Year, see ch. 3.  
110
 From the time that Caesar ended the practice of selling tax farming contracts for the tribute 
collection, the only tax collectors of any kind that we hear of in Palestine seem to be Jews: John the 
Figure 3. Approximation of 
Hyrcanus’ Judaea after Caesar’s 





region than Roman publicani had, knowing the land and many settlements firsthand, 
and having an established interpersonal network to tap for information, all of which 
would have made assessing tax liability and extracting the tribute easier. Resident 
Judaeans also had more incentive to treat their task with moderation. Roman 
publicani were outsiders attempting to extract a profit on short-term contracts and 
hence had every incentive to maximize the revenue they could collect (given their 
limited information). Natives to the region, on the other hand, had concerns other than 
profit to account for: their actions impacted their local reputation and hence their 
interactions with other Jews of their community, and gross extortion could adversely 
affect the stability and peace of the land in which they reside.
111
 This system granted 
considerable latitude to the local administration; there is no indication that Romans 
had any oversight over the process in Palestine under this configuration, which 
suggests a Roman empire less concerned with systematic maximization of tribute 
extracted from the province than ensuring a constant and consistent revenue stream.  
As with Gabinius’ administrative restructuring, the Caesarean reform also seems 
to have been impeded by the political turmoil that resumed after a few years. Another 
civil war embroiled Rome after the assassination of Caesar and rolled over into the 
East. Cassius returned to the familiar territory of Syria and raised war funds by 
exacting heavy taxes on the cities of Syria. He levied against Jerusalem a tax of seven 
hundred talents, which Antipater and his sons were compelled to collect out of the 
regions of the Jewish ethnarchy (Ant. 14.271–276; War 1.221–222). Internal conflicts 
multiplied when Cassius left Syria to fight against Antony. The Jewish commander 
Malichus took the opportunity to assassinate Antipater (Ant. 14.280; War 1.225–228). 
Another military leader, Helix, used his soldiers stationed at Jerusalem to move 
against the city’s governor Phasaelus and triggering the populace to take up arms as 
well (Ant. 14.294; War 1.236–237). Antigonus son of Aristobulus raised a 
revolutionary army and invaded Judaea, while his ally Marion of Tyre seized several 
fortified settlements in Galilee and held them until Herod later recaptured them (Ant. 
14.297–300; War 1.238–239). The end of the Roman civil war after the battle of 
Philippi did not restore stability to the administrative landscape of Palestine. Against 
the protest of a group of Jewish elites (Ἰουδαίων ἑκατὸν οἱ δυνατῶτατοι; Ant. 14.324; 
                                                                                                                                                                             
tax collector in Caesarea in War 2.287, and Galilean collectors in Matt 9:9; 10:3; Mark 2:13–15; Luke 
3:12; 5:27–29; 7:29; 18:10–14; 19:2. These instances are considerably later; but there is nothing to 
suggest that, to the contrary, outsiders played a substantial role in the tax collecting apparatus of 
Palestine in this period. 
Following Momigliano (Ricerche sull’organizzazione della Giudea), scholars have generally 
pinned the end of publicani-directed collection of tribute to the time of Gabinius, based on Cicero, De 
provinciis consularibus 10. D. C. Braund has questioned this interpretation of the text, and suggests 
instead that the end of this mode of tax collection came under Caesar and the reforms embodied in this 
decree; see “Gabinius, Caesar, and the ‘Publicani’ of Judaea,” Klio 65 (1983): 241–44. I follow here 
the more cautious interpretation of Braund. 
111
 On reputation as a social mechanism for shaping behavior, see below. The New Testament 
references to tax collectors suggest they did not have a great reputation to begin with; see the numer -
ous references to them in association with sinners, prostitutes, gentiles, and other outsiders (Matt 5:46; 





War 1.244–245), Antony decided to install Herod and Phasaelus as tetrarchs over the 
Jewish ethnarchy, in charge of its political affairs in place of the late Antipater. 
Shortly thereafter, Antigonus again invaded Judaea, this time with the backing of 
Parthians forces. He seized Jerusalem and a number of fortresses, took Hyrcanus and 
Phasaelus prisoner; Hyrcanus was maimed, disqualifying him for the high priesthood, 
and Phasaelus committed suicide (Ant. 14.330–369; War 1.250–273). With Herod 
forced to flee, Rome effectively lost any semblance of control of Judaea in 40 BCE, 
and Antigonus—now a vassal of Parthia—governed Judaea. 
In the first twenty-three years after Pompey annexed Palestine, Roman control 
over Palestine and Syria remained tenuous and its roots were shallow. The Syrian 
governor had the authority to intervene in Judaean affairs, but more often regional 
administration was left to local rulers—first Hyrcanus and later Antipater and his 
sons. In Josephus’ narrative these early governors enter primarily to quell revolts or 
raid the region for revenues, suggesting little more than a reactionary approach to 
Roman governance. In lieu of effective top-down leadership from the Syrian 
governors, local strong men played a more important role in determining the political 
configuration of the region. Hyrcanus, then Antipater and his sons, seem to have had 
considerable control over matters of day-to-day governance and justice.  
But even local administration was complicated by the fairly frequent recurrence 
of uprisings in support of the alternate Hasmonaean line of Aristobulus. The result is 
that periods of peace were short. It is doubtful under such conditions that a stable 
system of regional, let alone imperial, administration ever had much chance to be 
effective. The combination of overlapping and contesting individuals that claimed 
authority over this territory would have created an atmosphere of volatility, leaving 
the average Jew uncertain about what state institutions would persists and what 
political conditions would be like in subsequent years.  
A combination of the minimalist Roman bureaucracy, the reliance on native 
administration, and the endemic political conflict in Judaea make it unlikely that 
tribute collection in this period was ever a very effective Roman state institution. The 
lack of a state-directed census meant that publicani faced considerable logistical 
obstacles in their task of collecting tax revenues from the region, and during times of 
armed conflict the threat to life and limb was high. And after Caesar’s reformulation 
of the tribute—however long we take that to have lasted—Rome left oversight of the 
assessment and collection to local Jews, indicating they did not care about extracting 
every bit they could out of the province. The brief periods of peace were hardly suffi -
cient for a regular, predictable tax cycle to take hold in Palestine, in any case. Jewish 
revolts and excessive one-off exactions by governors created disruptions whose 
timing and damage could not be anticipated. While this created conditions that could 
facilitate strategies of tax avoidance, the unpredictability of taxation also created a 
perpetual state of risk.  
The Romans seem to have been concerned chiefly with two objectives in their 
governance of Judaea as a Syrian annex—regional stability and a moderate revenue. 
Given the conditions of the state in this period, we may propose that the most 





so much in the state institutions themselves but the uncertainty surrounding their form 
and effectiveness. Under such conditions, two strategies—not mutually exclusive—
present themselves: (1) Galileans could treat state institutions as largely irrelevant and 
attempt to bypass them, appealing instead to highly local institutions (e.g., town 
councils of elders) and granting greater importance to local rules and norms, or (2) 
Galileans could executed conservative strategies of hoarding and hiding resources in 
order to try to weather the unpredictability of the state’s effects.  
Indirect Roman Rule—The Herodian Kingdoms 
Judaea was outside the Roman sphere of control in 40 BCE, when the Roman Senate 
declared Herod king of Judaea. In effect, they were outsourcing the task of retaking 
the territory from their Parthian enemies by military force (Ant. 14.384–385; War 
1.282–284).
112
 This war was one of the few times in the Early Roman period that 
Galilee experienced direct military conflict; most of the early revolts—as with most 
later uprisings—seem to have been centered to the south in Judaea. Herod’s forces 
marched first through Galilee; Josephus claims that most of Galilee acquiesced to 
Herod (Ant. 14.394; War 1.291), but he also mentions “places that were held by 
Antigonus’ garrisons,” namely Sepphoris and the caves of Mt. Arbel (Ant. 14.413–14; 
cf. War 1.304–307). The fighting itself seems to have been relatively isolated, and 
there is little archaeological evidence left behind of the site’s utter destruction.
113
 Yet 
warfare still had negative effects for those not engaged in the fighting, in the form of 
impositions on economic resources. Herod wintered his troops in those areas of 
Galilee that he pacified (Ant. 14.417–419; War 1.308)—chiefly in Sepphoris but at 
times imposing on villages (Ant. 14.453; War 1.330)—and possibly levied demands 
on locals for foodstuffs and billeting troops.
114
 Both Herod’s and Antigonus’ forces 
plundered the land for provisions (Ant. 14.418–419, 432, 448). Herod, the eventual 
victor, imposed indemnities on some unspecified parts of Galilee for their support of 
Antigonus (Ant. 14.433; War 1.316). After three years of warfare and facing much 
resistance, Herod’s combined Jewish and Roman forces defeated Antigonus, who was 
brought back to Rome for execution (Ant. 14.487–491; War 1.357), and Herod was 
installed as king over Galilee, Peraea, Judaea, and Idumaea.  
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 Gilbert Labbé, L’Affirmation de la puissance romaine en Judée (63 a.C.–136 p.C.) (Études 
anciennes 74; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012), 503; Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 114–15. 
113
 Eric Meyers notes that only one team found any evidence of destruction by fire dating to that 
period, in “Sepphoris: City of Peace,” in The First Jewish Revolt: Archaeology, History, and Ideology , 
ed. Andrea M. Berlin and Andrew J. Overman (London: Routledge, 2002), 112. 
114
 It is also likely, though, that Herod used the former Antigonid garrison spaces, insofar as they 





Herod and his successors were undeniably 
vassals or “client kings”
115
 dependent on Rome for 
obtaining and maintaining power.
116
 As we saw, 
Herod came to power with the blessing and military 
backing of the Romans. After Augustus defeated 
Antony—whom Herod had supported in the civil 
war—Herod rushed to Rome to petition the victor to 
confirm him in his kingdom, lest Augustus decide to 
depose him and grant the territory to someone else 
(Ant. 15.183–201; War 1.386–400). When Herod 
died, it was the Roman emperor Augustus who 
ultimately decided how to allocate Herod’s territories 
among his sons, rather than strictly following either 
version of Herod’s will (Ant. 17.317–323; War 2.93–
100). And the Romans did not quibble with removing 
Archelaus and Antipas from power for supposed 
mismanagement of the territory, annexing Archelaus’ 
territory again to Syria (Ant. 17.342; War 2.111, 117) 
and granting Antipas’ territory to another Herodian 
ruler (Ant. 18.240–256; War 2.181–183). 
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 Scholars often label rulers such as Herod “client kings.” This term is based on a modern 
scholarly analogy that conceives of these kings as bound to the Romans (the people, senate, or 
powerful individuals) as clients were to their patrons. Erich S. Gruen, among others, has called into 
question the utility of this terminology since the ancient literary and epigraphic sources do not use the 
language of patronage but rather the language of “friends” (φίλοι, amici) and “allies” (σύμαχοι, socii); 
The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (2 vols.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), 1:158–200; cf. Braund, Rome and the Friendly King, 5–7, 23–24; J.-L. Ferrary, “The Hellen-
istic World and Roman Political Patronage,” in Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, 
and Historiography, ed. Paul Cartledge, Peter Garnsey, and Erich S. Gruen (Hellenistic Culture and 
Society 26; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 105–19. In general, these rulers occupied 
an ambiguous state, neither clearly within nor outside of the bounds of the Roman Emp ire; see Millar, 
“Government and Diplomacy in the Roman Empire,” 202; Millar, “Emperors, Kings, and Subjects: 
The Politics of Two-Level Sovereignty,” in Cotton and Rogers, Rome, the Greek World, and the East, 
vol. 2, 229–48. Rather than resolve the issue of terminology here, we can focus our attention on the 
question of to what extent the Romans determined the administrative configurations that these quasi -
independent Herodian rulers deployed over their realms and the extent to which they could direct 
these rulers to act according to Roman prerogatives.  
116
 As were other so-called “client kings” around the margins of Syria; see Sartre, Middle East 
under Rome, 72–73. Change of ruler was sometimes precipitated by threats to the security of the 
empire, in some cases through breakdown in relation between Rome and client king, or even as a 
pretext for Roman expansionism; see David J. Mattingly, Imperialism, Power, and Identity: Experi-
encing the Roman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 75–93.  
Figure 4. Herod’s kingdom (light 
gray) after Antony grants Cleo-
patra territory from Judaea and 





The territory that the Romans allotted to Herod for 
his kingdom was essentially the same as Hyrcanus’ 
ethnarchy earlier, including the omission of Samaria.
117
 
Roman rulers exercised the right to add territory to the 
Herodian kingdoms (e.g., Ant. 18.255; 20.159; War 
2.183, 252). But aside from deposing a ruler altogether, 
the Romans rarely removed territories from these 
vassals. The most prominent example of a removal 
occurred early in Herod’s reign, when Marc Antony 
transferred Jericho and the Levantine coast south of 
Tyre to Cleopatra (Ant. 15.95–96; War 1.361) (see 
Figure 4). When Augustus confirmed Herod in his 
kingdom at the end of the civil war with Antony in 30 
BCE, he restored the cities given to Cleopatra and added 
also Samaria, the Decapolis cities of Gadara and 
Hippos, and the coastal cities of Gaza, Anthedon, 
Joppa, and Strato’s Tower (Ant. 15.287; War 1.396). In 
22 BCE, Augustus expanded the kingdom further (see 
Figure 5) by adding “all the land between Trachonitis and Galilee (War 1.400). 
Whether the Golan was an addition or already part of his territory is unclear, as 
Josephus sometimes lumps Golan and Galilee together, and the parallel in Antiquities 
(15.343) specifies Trachonitis, Batanaea, and Auranitis without mentioning it.
118
  
For the most part, though, the Romans meddled little in Herod’s affairs and both 
he and his successors exercised considerable independence over their realms. These 
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 That it was not part of Herod’s kingdom initially is demonstrated by the fact that the city of 
Samaria was granted as an addition to Herod’s kingdom when Augustus confirmed him in his kingship 
after Actium (Ant. 15.287; War 1.396). This may seem odd given that Samaria is a major region of 
Herod’s military campaign during his war to conquer his kingdom from Antigonus (see Ant. 14.408, 
412–413, 431–438, 456–461; War 1.297–302, 333–334). Presumably, Samaria was restored to its 
status as a free city of Syria after the fighting, perhaps with the surrounding Samarian hill country.  
118
 Josephus generally uses Galilee as a synecdoche for both Galilee and Golan unless he needs to 
distinguish Golan in particular. He refers to his own command as over Galilee, but clearl y it included 
Golan in its purview, including Gamla: “Josephus son of Matthias was made commander [ἡγεμὼν] of 
both Galilees [Γαλιλαίας ἑκατέρας], and appended to this was Gamla, the strongest of the cities” (War 
2.568). The list of towns he supposedly walled in (War 2.573–574; Life 187–188) includes Gaulanite 
sites. While he identifies them as such, he also distinguishes the two Galilees here, indicating that the 
conceptual division is not so much between Galilee and Golan as between subdivisions of a combined 
Galilee–Golan. Others have also noted the conflation of Galilee in Golan in the nomenclature of  Judas 
of Gamla, variously called a Gaulanite (Ant. 18.4) and a Galilean (Ant. 18.23; 20.102; War 2.118; cf. 
Acts 5:37); see discussion in Uriel Rappaport, “Who Were the Sicarii?,” in The Jewish Revolt against 
Rome: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mladen Popović (JSJSup 154; Leiden: Brill, 2011), 323–42 
at 331. Chaim Ben David notes that tannaitic sources divide Israel into three parts—Judaea, Galilee, 
Peraea—and fit Golan into Galilee (rather than Peraea) to do so; The Jewish Settlement on the Golan 
in the Roman and Byzantine Period [Hebrew] (Qazrin: Golan Research Institute, 2005), 11–12. We 
will see in ch. 2 that there is justification for considering Galilee and Golan as deeply linked and 
distinct from the surrounding regions on the basis of their material culture as well. 






rulers felt free to engage in military conflicts with other regional potentates without 
necessarily taking into consideration Rome’s interests. Antipas waged war against 
Aretas, king of Arabia (Nabataea),
119
 ostensibly over a broken marital alliance (Ant. 
18.109–114) but probably also over a long-running territorial dispute (Ant. 18.113). 
Only after Antipas’ initial military defeat did Antipas bother to consult Rome, 
appealing for help (Ant. 18.115). As further evidence that the so-called “client kings” 
felt free to conduct “international” matters on their own, we may point to the council 
of regional rulers called by Agrippa I—from Commalena, Emesa, Lesser Armenia, 
Pontus, and Chalcis. But in this instance, the governor of Syria (encircled by these 
petty kingdoms) considered the collaboration of so many quasi-independent kings 
potential threat to Roman interests and intervened to disband the group (Ant. 19.338–
341). Clearly, these kings did not consider it necessary to preemptively inquire of 
Rome on how to proceed in matters of “foreign policy”; they acted according to their 
own aims and deferred to Rome only if one party in the dispute appealed for Roman 
intervention or a Roman official intervened to protect Rome’s interests.
120
 
From Josephus’ account, it seems that Herod was quite free to shape the admin -
istrative infrastructure of his kingdom as he saw fit. Unlike Hyrcanus and Antipater 
before him, Herod was not directly subordinate to a Roman governor and ruled an 
ostensibly separate state that was designated a “friend and ally” to Rome. It seems 
from Josephus’ account that Herod attempted to concentrate civil power in the king 
and away from alternative figures and institutions that could have rivaled his 
authority. Josephus depicts Herod’s execution of Hyrcanus as a measure of power 
consolidation; he purportedly feared that Augustus might elevate Hyrcanus as king 
rather than confirm Herod at the conclusion of the war against Antony (Ant. 15.164, 
179–182).
121
 He later subverted the power of the preeminent religious and  political 
position in Judaea, the high priest, by assuming the authority to appoint and depose 
them at his discretion. He thereby transformed the high priesthood from a hereditary 
office held for life to an appointed position held at the pleasure of the king and 
subject to capricious change.
122
 Herod tended to choose priests from more obscure 
priestly families and even the diaspora—e.g., Ananel of Babylon (Ant. 15.22) and 
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 The Nabataean kingdom served as an additional buffer between the Parthian and Roman 
empires. There is some evidence to suggest Aretas may have been in a similar position to Herod as a 
vassal to Rome. The Roman reaction to his ascension to the throne without consultation of Rome 
suggests that Rome at least viewed the position as one held at the pleasure of the emperor and senate. 
Glen Bowersock also understands the kingdom as a “client” of Rome; Roman Arabia (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1983). 
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 See Millar, The Roman Near East, 60–61. 
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 The brief parallel account of Hyrcanus’ murder in War 1.431–434 does not impute to Herod 
the motive of fear that Caesar would install Hyrcanus as ruler, but it is plausible to suggest that He rod 
wished to remove the possibility of Hyrcanus succeeding him. 
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 On the political machinations surrounding Herod’s appointing and deposing of high priests, 
see James C. VanderKam, From Joshua to Caiaphas: High Priests After the Exile  (Minneapolis: 





Jesus son of Phiabi (Ant. 15.322) possibly of Egypt
123
—whose personal networks 
were less entrenched in Judaean society and who thereby posed less a threat to the 
king’s influence.  
Herod also curtailed the authority of the major judicial body in Jerusalem known 
as the Sanhedrin.
124
 Although he did not totally disband it, he had a number of its 
members executed for attempting to prosecute him during his time as governor of 
Galilee (Ant. 14.175), cowing those who survived the purge.
125
 It is likely that Herod 
repopulated the council with individuals who were sympathetic to Herodian policies if 
not active supporters and courtiers. And since Herod now appointed the high priest, 
the head of the council was under the king’s influence and his continued tenure 
depended on appeasing him.
126
 The only subsequent reference to the Sanhedrin under 
Herod presents it as a sort of puppet institution. Herod presented to the council a letter 
indicating Hyrcanus’ supposed treachery so that they would approve Herod’s decision 
to summarily execute him (Ant. 15.173); given Herod’s proclivity to slay enemies 
without the council’s approval, his appeal to the Sanhedrin would seem to be solely 
out of concern for public image. 
We do not have abundant details about the political administration of Herod’s 
kingdom, but we have enough to flesh out some of the basics. Herod’s kingdom was 
divided into a number of meridarchies, as indicated by his appointment of a meridarch 
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 VanderKam argues an Egyptian connection based on the appearance of this patronym in an 
inscription from Leontopolis, the location of the Egyptian Oniad temple; From Joshua to Caiaphas, 
405–6. 
124
 There has been considerable scholarly debate about the nature of this institution in Early 
Roman Palestine; see the summary in Lester L. Grabbe, Judaism from Cyrus to Hadrian (2 vols.; 
Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 2:389–95. Some authors have posited an important governing role for 
the Sanhedrin as a local institution of Judaea; see Sarte, The Middle East under Rome, 105; 
Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, 149; Peter Schäfer, History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman 
World (rev. ed.; London: Routledge, 1995 [1983]), 88–89, 132; Jonathan J. Price envisions the 
Sanhedrin as a political organ of the revolutionary government, Jerusalem under Siege: The Collapse 
of the Jewish State 66–70 CE (Brill’s Series in Jewish Studies 3; Leiden: Brill, 1992),  64–67. That 
there was a legal institution in Jerusalem seems uncontestable, given the references to it in Josephus as 
well as the New Testament gospels and Acts. But less clear is whether it was composed entirely of 
priests and former high priests or whether lay elites were involved, whether it functioned t o try only 
“religious” cases or also civic cases, whether its reach extended beyond Jerusalem and its environs or 
not, and what sort of punishment it could mete out. I do not wish to get bogged down here in the 
details of the institution; it suffices to note that its influence was severely curtailed under Herod, but 
later under Roman direct rule it may have played a more substantial role as an independent legal 
institution in Early Roman Jerusalem, though its reach into Galilee would still have been quite t enuous 
at best.  
125
 Josephus here claims that Herod slew all the members of the Sanhedrin except Sameas. This 
may be hyperbolic. In Ant. 15.5, he is reported to have slain forty-five opponents accused of 
supporting Antigonus, which seems to be indicated by the prefatory statement in Ant. 15.4. If the 
traditional understanding of the Sanhedrin as a body of seventy is to be believed, this would represent 
only a fraction of the judicial body. That number also accords with the size of the judicial council 
prescribed in Josephus’ Mosaic discourse (Ant. 4.214–218) and the regional council that he estab-
lished when he arrived in Galilee as general at the outset of the revolt (War 2.569–571; Life 79). 
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in Ant. 15.216. Meridarchies were larger districts that probably corresponded to the 
major regional divisions—Judaea, Peraea, Samaria, Galilee, and another composed of 
the territories northeast of Lake Kinneret that Augustus added to his kingdom in 22 
BCE (Ant. 17.25; War 1.398).
127
 These meridarchies were subdivided into a number of 
toparchies. Josephus references two such toparchies—Batanaea and Trachonitis—
added to Herod’s kingdom in Ant. 17.25, without indicating a toparchic center. It 
seems from references later in Josephus’ narrative that most the toparchies were 
defined by a settlement—sometimes a city but often a moderate town or large 
village—and the settlements in its vicinity.
128
 Unfortunately, these references do not 
indicate whether or not toparchies had any dedicated administrative staff like the 
meridarchs. If the size of toparchic settlements and their territories from later periods 
is any indication, it seems unlikely that there was more than a dedicated toparchic 
scribe in many locales if any permanent staff at all.
129
 In terms of personnel, Herod’s 
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 Samuel Rocca understands Herod to have adapted the Hellenistic system of administrative 
subdivision, though he is probably incorrect in identifying Auranitis, Batanaea, and Trachonitis as 
separate meridarchies; Herod's Judaea: A Mediterranean State in the Classic World (TSAJ 122; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 197–203; see also n. 128 below. Meridarchies were used as 
administrative units under the Hellenistic rulers as well. Josephus references the meridarchy  of 
Samaria in the Seleucid period at Ant. 12.261, 264, 287. According to G. G. Aperghis, we may also 
surmise a Seleucid meridarchy based in Idumaea, with Judaea as part of it (cf. 2 Macc 10:14; 12:32) 
and possibly including the southern coastal plain around Jamnia (1 Macc 5:58–59; Ant. 12.351). He 
believes it likely there were two more to the north, one for the upper coastal plain centered around 
Kedesh in Upper Galilee, and one in southern Syria proper. See G. G. Aperghis, “Jewish Subjects and 
Seleukid Kings: A Case Study of Economic Interaction,” in Archibald, Davies, and Gabrielsen, The 
Economies of Hellenistic Societies, 22–24. Clearly this arrangement of meridarchies would not have 
persisted intact into the Hasmonaean and then Early Roman period, since the territories and settlement 
landscape changed significantly over the centuries. Merely the principle of organization persisted.  
128
 There are many references to toparchies later in Josephus’ narrative, and especially during the 
time of Judaea as a Roman procuratorial province. The list of eleven toparchies for Judaea is given in 
full, with two nearby coastal cities appended: Jerusalem, Gophna, Acrabatene, Thamna, Lydda, 
Emmaus, Pella, Idumaea, ʽEin Gedi, Herodion, and Jericho, plus Jamnia and Joppa (Ant. 18.31; War 
3.54–55; cf. War 2.167, 235, 567, 652; 3.48; 4.444, 504, 511, 551). Abela and Julias are referenced as 
toparchies in Peraea (War 2.252), the latter toparchy containing fourteen villages (Ant. 20.159). Both 
Magdala and Tiberias are noted later as toparchies in eastern Galilee (War 2.252; Ant. 20.159; see also 
ch. 2 below). A certain Narbata was a toparchy on the coast adjacent to the toparchy of Caesarea ( War 
2.509) and sixty stadia from the city (2.292). There was a toparchy at Bethletephon, which seems from 
context to be in Idumaea (War 4.445). Auranitis, Batanaea, Trachonitis are probably all to be under-
stood as toparchies in War 1.398. 
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 William E. Arnal posits the existence of village scribes in Galilee and thinks such moderately 
educated officials were the most likely original tradents of the Q source underlying Matthew and 
Luke’s sayings material; Jesus and the Village Scribes: Galilean Conflicts and the Setting of Q 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 150–55. Such positions were common in the bureaucracy in Egypt, as 
seen in the documentary papyri, and comparable figures may be the subject of a passing reference in 
Josephus (κωμῶν γραμματτεῖς in War 1.479; κωμογραμματτεῖς in Ant. 16.203). The context does not 
allow us to say much about their role, but if Arnal is correct, they would have been semi -literate 
agents situated in some (not all) settlements capable of writing contracts on behalf of locals and 
performing other aspects of local bureaucracy on behalf of the state. Rocca also presumes the appoint -





administration seems to have been fairly thin. His chief agents were personal connec-
tions—family and close associates appointed as regional governors (Ant. 15.216, 254, 
362; 17.58–61, 17.270; War 2.55).
130
 The impression we get from Josephus’ narrative 
is that power was brokered through the person of the king and these appointed 
intermediaries, meaning appeal to the king on judicial or policy matters required 
proximity to Jerusalem and personal connection to influential individuals. But the 
average person was probably not engaged in the power politics that dominated the 
court, or directly affected by it.  
For Galileans in particular, the king must have seemed a far away entity. Despite 
the fact that Herod had been the governor of Galilee during the time of Hyrcanus’ 
ethnarchy, Herod seems to have had little to do with the region once the war against 
Antigonus was over and Herod was secure in his kingdom. Herod was an avid sponsor 
of monumental building projects, both inside his kingdom and as benefactions to 
foreign cities in Greece, Asia, and Syria, but none of them were situated in Galilee 
itself.
131
 He founded a military colony for his veteran horsemen at Gaba, a site that 
Josephus places in the Jezreel Valley and Galilee (Ant. 15.294–295), though it seems 
to have been at the fringes of the country. Since Herod’s palaces were all located 
either in the south (at Jerusalem, Jericho, Masada, and Herodion) or at Caesarea on 
the Mediterranean coast, the king was for most Galileans more than a day’s journey 
away.
132
 Josephus’ narrative, at least, gives no indication that Herod regularly came 
into Galilee or invested resources into it. As in the preceding period, Galilee was 
something of a backwater, valued as a source of revenue but experiencing little of the 
Herodian state on a day-to-day basis. 
We know woefully little about the tax system of Herod’s administration. Herod 
surely collected revenues for the purpose of his own local needs, as we must presume 
earlier local administrators like Hyrcanus had done. But the full extent and burden of 
this tax system cannot be determined from the evidence. The references are scattered 
                                                                                                                                                                             
study on an Egyptian komogrammateus from the Ptolemaic period, see A. M. F. W. Verhoogt, 
Menches, Komogrammateus of Kerkeosiris: The Doings and Dealings of a Village Scribe in the Late 
Ptolemaic Period (120–110 BC) (Papyrologica Lugduno-Batava 29; Leiden: Brill, 1998). While Egyp-
tian evidence sheds valuable light on aspects of life not available in other sources, many of which can 
be aptly carried over to study of regions (see Roger S. Bagnall, “Evidence and Models for the 
Economy of Roman Egypt,” in Manning and Morris, The Ancient Economy, 187–204), Egypt seems to 
have had a more developed bureaucracy than most other regions of the Empire in this period.  
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 On the close, interpersonal web of family and friends from which Herod drew his head 
administrators and military commanders, plus other, less formally constituted roles, see Rocca, 
Herod’s Judaea, 73–77, 85–87. 
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 On Herod’s building projects, especially those within Palestine, see Ehud Netzer, Architecture 
of Herod, the Great Builder (TSAJ 117; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 17–240. On Herod’s 
euergetism to foreign cities and this as a long-standing characteristic of Hellenistic potentates, see 
Rocca, Herod’s Judaea, 36–52. 
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 On the various royal palaces—city palaces, winter palaces, and fortified palaces—see Rocca, 
Herod’s Judaea, 96–102. Caesarea is the closest palace location to Galilee at about 50 km from the 
westernmost settlements of Galilee, requiring about 10 hours on foot to traverse. Despite Herod’s 





temporally and we cannot confirm that they remained homogenous throughout this 
period. Even the revenue values that Josephus gives for the regions of Herod’s 
kingdom (Ant. 17.318–319) do not tell us much since they do not break down how 
much of the revenue came from royal properties rather than taxes, or the relative 
proportions drawn from direct taxes and various indirect taxes. 
It is clear that Herod drew some revenues from a direct tax. Land tax on agricul-
tural land is suggested by Josephus’ statement that a drought one year threatened to 
deprive the king of these revenues (Ant. 15.303).133 But this tax was variable and 
malleable in how it was applied, as we may safely presume was the case for many 
taxes.134 There are two occasions in Josephus’ narrative that depict Herod reducing the 
tax assessment; once reducing the rate by one third for all subjects (Ant. 15.365) and 
once remitting it for Jerusalemites and possibly Judaea (Ant. 16.65). We also know 
that some individuals and even whole settlements could be exempted from the tax, as 
was Bathyra in Batanaea (Ant. 17.28; War 1.428). We do not have direct evidence for 
how this tax was collected, but we may reasonably surmise that in lieu of strong 
bureaucratic recordkeeping, Herod would have employed agents to travel from village 
to village assessing and collecting produce at harvest time. This may have been orga-
nized at the level of the toparchy, which in Egypt was the primary administrative unit 
for assessment.
135
 But one episode suggests that Herod used his own slaves to make 
collections (Ant. 17.308). 
Much of Herod’s state revenue may have come from indirect taxes.
136
 The most 
important and regular such taxes would have come from portoria—tolls collected on 
commercial goods crossing between administrative regions over land or sea. We 
know some details about the imposition of portoria in other Roman provinces and 
cities, especially first-century Asia and later Palmyra. These taxes certainly varied 
geographically and temporally, so we cannot directly transpose data from one 
provincial tax system to another, but in general we may presume that portoria func-
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 Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 163–64, 171. 
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 Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 61–62; P. A. Brunt, “The Revenues of Rome,” JRS 71 
(1981): 161–72 at 168–70. Herod granted certain settlements and their residents tax exemptions (see 
the fortress-village of Bathyra in Ant. 17.28) and offered tax remissions to the whole kingdom (see 
Ant. 15.365) or specific parts (see Ant. 16.65) at various times. Clifford Ando notes that provincial 
tribute assessment often varied de facto from district to district, city to city; “The Administration of 
the Provinces,” 187. 
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 See Dorothy J. Thomson, “The Infrastructure of Splendor: Census and Taxes in Ptolemaic 
Egypt,” in Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography , ed. Paul Cartledge, 
Peter Garnsey, and Erich S. Gruen (Hellenistic Culture and Society 26; Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 242–57. Rocca attributes tax collection to village scribes (under supervision 
of village elders), though we have expressed doubt above as to the extent of this administrative tier in 
Palestine; Herod’s Judaea, 204; see also n. 129 above. 
136
 Several scholars have pointed out that the revenue stream from indirect taxes could be 
substantial, and thereby undermine the notion that Herod would have had to rely on oppressive rates 
of direct taxes to meet his enormous spending needs. See, e.g., Rocca, Herod’s Judaea, 203–5; Udoh, 





tioned in similar ways.
137
 As a general value, the “internal” portoria between Roman 
provinces and allied vassals were probably valued around 2.5 percent, and 
considerably higher on goods transported beyond the Empire.
138
 In Herod’s kingdom, 
portoria would have been collected at port cities like Caesarea and Joppa
139
 and at 
provincial borders along the major trade routes—north–south up the Levantine coast 
and west–east from Arabia to the coast. Josephus also references a sales tax (Ant. 
17.205) and a house tax (Ant. 19.299). We do not know what goods were subject to 
the sales tax, at what rate they were taxed, or at what locales. The housing tax seems 
to have been restricted to Jerusalem and may have only been a temporary tax rather 
than an annual revenue stream.
140
 It is difficult to assess just what sort of impact these 
and other indirect taxes unknown to us might have had on Galileans; given the rela-
tively unimportance of settlements in Galilee as centers of transregional trade at this 
time, Herod may not have paid much attention to sales tax in the region or may have 
had collectors in operation only at the largest settlements, Sepphoris and Magdala. In 
Galilee, portoria would have the greatest importance along the borders with the 




The end of Roman direct rule of Palestine also meant the end of tribute payments 
to Rome. Some scholars have argued that Herod continued to pay tribute, but this case 
is tenuously built on an argument from silence—Josephus makes no explicit reference 
to an end to tribute—and the assumption that the relationship between Rome and 
Herod was comparable to that between Rome and Hyrcanus II. 142 The silence, 
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 The Asian Customs Law seems to preserve a number of developments in the portoria from the 
time of the Pergamene kings up through the reign of Nero. It also contains a number of conditions 
peculiar to its geographic situation, especially regarding import and export through the Bosporous, 
that indicate the molding of tax law to the particular characteristics and traffic patterns of the prov -
ince. See Cottier et al., The Customs Law of Asia. In the Palmyra tax code, we see evidence that the 
value of the tax differed based on the type, volume, and sometimes quality of the products; see John F. 
Matthews, “The Tax Law of Palmyra: Evidence for Economic History in a City of the Roman East,” 
JRS 74 (1984): 157–80 at 172. 
138
 The Asian Customs Law generally gives the toll rate for goods at one-fortieth, i.e., 2.5 
percent; it also sets caps on the prices assessed for goods such as slaves. Portoria imposed on goods 
leaving or entering the empire through a border province could reach as high as 25 percent. See 
Lintott, Imperium Romanum, 83–85; Sarte, The Middle East under Rome, 256–58.  
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 Caesar’s bestowal of Joppa added a significant eastern-Mediterranean trade port and a portion 
of the coastal road to Hyrcanus’ Judaea, with a significant volume of trade traffic to collect revenues 
on (cf. Ant. 14.206). The grant came with the condition of an additional tax burden to Rome to offset 
the portoria revenue lost to the Romans from gifting the port (Ant. 14.205–207). 
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 Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 175–80. 
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 Cottier et al., The Customs Law of Asia, 61–63, ll. 92–94. 
142
 Momigliano argues that Herod paid an annual tribute to Rome out of Herod’s tax revenue on 
the basis of Appian, Bell. Civ. 5.75, and his assessment has been influential in some circles of New 
Testament scholarship thereafter; Ricerche sull’organizzazione della Giudea, 41–44. The absence of 
explicit references in Josephus to the end of tribute has been the centerpiece of many arguments that 





however, can be read the other direction—there is no indication that Herod or his 
successors paid tribute to Rome aside from a late and unreliable reference in Appian 
(Bellum civile 5.75).143 Nor is there positive evidence for tribute obligations imposed 
on other “client kings” in a comparable relationship to Rome as Herod.144 Herod made 
occasional “contributions” of funds to Roman leaders (e.g., Ant. 15.110; War 1.365), 
but without hint that these were regular or compulsory or that Herod necessarily 
passed the burden onto the general populace.  
If indeed Herod’s Judaea ceased the payments of tribute to Rome, this under-
mines the oft-proposed notion that taxation under the Herodians was overly burden-
some and an increase compared to the prior period.145 Many scholars have embraced 
Josephus’ depiction of Herod’s reign as particularly burdensome on the finances of 
the Jewish populace, in particular the popular call for tax relief following Herod’s 
death (Ant. 17.205; War 2.4) and the complaints to the new emperor Tiberius of over-
bearing taxes in Judaea and Syria in 17 CE (Tacitus, Annales 2.42.5).
146
 But as Fabian 
E. Udoh aptly notes, “Complaints about excessive taxation and economic maladmin-
istration are sometimes political, not economic, statements.”
147
 If such protest was 
widespread, we could also interpret it as an attempt to take advantage of a power tran-
sition to renegotiate conditions, rather than a genuine complaint against the former 
regime. Scholars have also pointed to the extensive Herodian building programs as a 
financial strain,
148
 but we do not know to what extent Herod drew on indirect taxes or 
other private revenue streams rather than the land tax that was probably the chief 
economic burden incurred by Galilean agriculturalists. The end of tribute may not 
have been a particularly significant change from the preceding era, if regular tribute 
collection was disrupted as much as we have argued, but it also meant Galileans were 
not balancing their resources against two state revenue demands. As Emilio Gabba 
put it, “The often painted picture of a kingdom tragically oppressed by the double 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, 85. On the history of scholarship on Herodian tribute to 
Rome, see Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 119–43.  
143
 Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 118–22, 137, 143–153. See also Braund, Rome and the 
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as tribute; To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 42. 
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62–64; Pastor, Land and Economy in Ancient Palestine, 106.  
147
 Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 204.  
148





weight of taxes due to the king and the tribute paid to 
Rome, is tendentious in both of its elements.”149 
After Herod’s death, Augustus divided Herod’s 
kingdom into three dominions apportioned to sons of 
Herod (Ant. 17.318–319; 18.106; War 2.95–97).
150
 Of 
all the changes in political geography in the Early 
Roman period, this territorial reallocation had the most 
potential to produce real consequences on administra-
tive structures, networks of power, and economic inter-
actions in Galilee. Antipas received a tetrarchy 
composed of Galilee and Peraea,
151
 geographically 
separated by Lake Kinneret and the territories of 
Hippos, Gadara, and Scythopolis, which were annexed 
again to Syria.152 Archelaus received the lion’s share, 
including Judaea, Samaria, and the coastal cities. 
Philip received the territories north and northeast of 
Lake Kinneret, including the Golan (Ant. 17.319; 
18.106; War 2.95).
153
 The partition segmented a unified 
and contiguous territory inhabited by Jews
154
 into 
regions governed by separate individuals and politi-
cally dislodged Galilee from Jerusalem. This also meant that the alternative lines of 
political authority in Jerusalem—especially the acting and former high priests—were 
no longer part of the political power structure of the state presiding over Galilee, even 
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though they continued to play an institutional role in shaping behavior as religious 
authorities. 
The partition of the kingdom compelled the tetrarchs Antipas and Philip to invest 
resources into new areas, since regions like Galilee that were formerly backwaters 
were now the center of the kingdom. And since Jerusalem—the traditional center of 
political power—was now the seat of a rival ruler, they needed to create functional 
capitals for their courts (Herod built in neither tetrarch’s territories), accomplished by 
building up existing settlements or founding new throne cities de novo. In Galilee, 
Antipas first developed the settlement of Sepphoris—the administrative center of the 
Galilean meridarchy under Herod,
155
 but damaged in the revolts that followed his 
death
156
—into a new capital city and a royal seat. Around 14 CE, Antipas developed a 
new city on the western lakeshore dubbed Tiberias, which displaced Sepphoris as the 
regional capital of Galilee and shifted the political center—including the state 
archives and bank—eastward to the lake region (Life 37–38). Tiberias, and perhaps 
also Sepphoris, were founded with a set of administrative bodies to govern the city 
itself: a council (βουλή) headed by a group of ten (δεκάπρωτοι) and other magistra -
cies (ἄρχων; ἀγορανόμος) (Life 64, 169, 279, 284, 296; War 2.639). The tetrarchs had 
every incentive to build and spend money in their own relatively underdeveloped 
territories to aggrandize them rather than siphoning resources to far-off cities as had 
been the case under Herod.  
While the renovation of Sepphoris as a capital probably did not have much effect 
on the regional network—it was, after all, already a modest town and the capital of a 
meridarchy—the construction of Tiberias reconfigured the administrative structure, at 
least in the eastern part of Galilee. Before Tiberias’ founding, Magdala  would have 
been the primary (if not only)157 toparchy of eastern Galilee.158 In defining a toparchy 
for Tiberias, Antipas would have partitioned the region that belonged to the political 
district of Magdala, as both are later referred to as toparchies in Josephus (Ant. 
20.159; War 2.252). There are also hints of rivalry between the two in the narrative of 
Josephus’ Life (and less visibly in Jewish War) consistent with the displacement of 
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stature and authority from Magdala.159 But these were matters of city reputation; it is 
unlikely that the redefining of toparchies had much effect on how the administration 
was felt by people on the ground. 
The period of Antipas’ tetrarchy was likely the era in which the political admin -
istration had the greatest structuring effects on Galilee. For the first time in Galilee’s 
history as a Jewish territory, the ruler was a proximate figure, residing in the country 
on a regular basis—alternately with his capital in Peraea. Because Antipas and his 
court were located within a day’s travel from most settlements in Galilee, Galileans 
would have had greater access to state agents to address matters of governance or 
justice than had been the case under Herod or the Roman governors, who came into 
Galilee rarely if at all. But an administration centered in Galilee would also have 
made it somewhat harder for individuals to evade state control, since the network of 
personnel was localized in Galilee rather than far-off Judaea. Since Antipas was also 
more dependent on Galilee for revenues than Herod had been—lacking many other 
productive lands and indirect tax revenue from coastal ports—he may have been more 
scrupulous in tax collection from the region than his predecessor. The relocation of 
the center of administration to Galilee and Peraea respectively probably had the effect 
of producing greater state infrastructural power than was the case even under Herod 
the Great, let alone under the ephemeral and perpetually weak period as a Syrian 
annex.  
We know less about taxation under Antipas than we do for Herod, but we can 
make some presumptions. It was probably dependent on many of the same, relatively 
weak bureaucratic apparatuses used by earlier administrations to register and track 
agricultural landholdings to assess tax collection. However, he had a smaller area 
from which to collect revenues and in which to deploy them. Unlike his half-brother 
Archelaus to the south, Antipas’ domains lacked big cities with considerable interre-
gional markets or imports on which to charge duties, and therefore a larger proportion 
of tax revenue may have come from direct taxes than had been the case under 
Herod.
160
 The lack of details makes it difficult to claim that Antipas’ tax regime was 
particularly onerous, or that it was particularly light. But Antipas’ building programs 
were hardly of the same ambitious scope as Herod’s extensive monument-building 
and benefaction. As we shall discuss in chapter 2, his expansion of Sepphoris seems 
to have been fairly modest, and what little evidence we have for first-century Tiberias 
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does not suggest a dramatically different pattern there. This may suggest that the 
revenues Antipas collected remained fairly moderate rather than extortionate. These 
building projects also suggest a further economic ramification of the centering of 
Antipas’ kingdom in Galilee (and Peraea): rather than expending tax revenue in 
faraway places—Jerusalem, the coastal cities, Athens, etc.—the tax money that was 
collected was largely spent locally, on construction workers, craftsman, artisans, and 
more, meaning that at least some of the money re-circulated into the population. 
It is probably correct to assume that he too depended on some combination of 
direct land taxes and indirect taxes (e.g., portoria, sales taxes) in order to run his 
kingdom. The partitioning created new political boundaries that may have had an 
effect on the movement of goods and individuals between these “client kingdoms,” as 
import/export laws were imposed on the borderlands between them. Under Antipas, 
Galilee was suddenly surrounded on all sides by administrative boundaries on which 
Antipas might impose border taxes. This even partitioned the Golan, which was part 
of Philip’s tetrarchy, from Galilee. The collection of portoria at ports in Galilee’s 
lakeshore region may be inferred from the presence of toll collectors in the gospel 
tradition (Matt 9:9; Mark 2:15; Luke 5:27). We may also surmise that taxes could be 
effectively collected along the few major highways that seem to have cut through 
Galilee in this period, where relatively high volumes of traffic could yield a signifi-
cant return.
161
 It is doubtful that toll collectors would have made much of an effort to 
police the many byways and footpaths that crossed the administrative borders, since 
they were unlikely to yield sufficient profit, creating ample opportunity for tax 
evasion off the major routes.
162
 
Both Herod and Antipas had fairly long and stable reigns—thirty-one
163
 and 
forty-five years respectively. And aside from Herod’s initial war to retake the territory 
and some brief spurts of violent revolution after his death, conditions in Galilee were 
relatively placid. The figures that populate Josephus’ list of revolutionary and messi -
anic figures who emerged in the Early Roman period are situated primarily in Judaea 
and Peraea (Ant. 17.273–284; 20.97–99, 101–102, 167–172, 188; War 2.57–65, 258–
263, 433–434), with the exception of Judas in Sepphoris between the two rulers (War 
2.56). Christopher J. Fuhrmann has pointed out that insofar as official institutions for 
policing existed in the Roman world, they were often secondary effects or duties of 
military forces.
164
 Herod’s establishment of a garrison on the fringes of Galilee at 
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Gaba (Ant. 15.294; War 2.459; 3.36) may have contributed to the maintenance of 
peace there, given that pockets of Galilee had previously shown themselves hotbeds 
of support for the house of Aristobulus leading up to Herod’s conquest.
165
 Antipas had 
his own standing army, at least until it was obliterated by the Arabian king Aretas 
(Ant. 18.112–114) and may at times have stationed them in Galilee itself: the gospels 
situate a centurion—presumably of the royal army—in Capernaum (Matt 8:5–13; 
Luke 7:1–10).
166
 If indeed Galilee was fairly tranquil in this period, this may have 
been the first period since Pompey’s arrival in which state institutions had a chance to 
develop and become entrenched, established enough to shape economic behavior in 
the region. From what little we can tell, they were not overly intrusive, though the 
mechanisms for tax collection were probably more efficient than under Early Roman 
administration. A stable regime would have made it easier for Galilean households 
over this period of nearly eighty years to account for the resource extractions from the 
state, to know how to work with and around the mechanisms of resource extraction, 
and to know what judicial and legal institutions they had recourse to at any particular 
moment. 
The political geography of Palestine changed fairly rapidly and dramatically 
between 37 CE and 41 CE. In 37 CE, the emperor Caligula made Agrippa king over the 
former tetrarchy of Philip (Ant. 18.237; War 2.181). In 39 CE, Caligula deposed 
Antipas and added his tetrarchy to Agrippa’s kingdom (Ant. 18.252; War 2.183), 
politically reuniting Galilee with Golan. By 41 CE, Agrippa controlled “all the country 
over which Herod had reigned” with a few additional territories in the far north (Ant. 
18.274–276; War 2.215). Within the span of a few years, Palestine was transformed 
from a number of separate polities administered by Roman prefects and Herodian 
tetrarchs to a territorially united kingdom.  
Political unification required a restructuring of the administrative hierarchy, in all 
likelihood a return to the meridarchy divisions under Herod the Great and the re-
centering of political administration at Jerusalem and Caesarea. Jerusalem was, 
according to Josephus’ praise, his preferred abode (Ant. 19.331), and he was also 
known to frequent Caesarea (see Ant. 19.332, 343–350; Acts 12:20–23) as the Roman 
prefects over Judaea had in the preceding period.
167
 Tiberias remained a royal seat and 
administrative center. It served as the site for Agrippa’s meeting with other regional 
kings (Ant. 19.338–341), and Justus boasts that under Agrippa Tiberias “had not 
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relinquished its primacy” in Galilee in the speech accorded to him in Josephus’ Life 
(37).168 But it seems that Galilee had by and large receded from its place of prominence 
as the heart of the kingdom and shifted to the periphery, leaving Galilee’s inhabitants with 
limited access to the top tier of the power structure. Matters of political need or judi-
cial redress to the king could require Galileans to travel to far-off Jerusalem and 
Caesarea or else wait until Agrippa returned to Tiberias, if he did so regularly at all. 
What little building Agrippa sponsored in his short reign seems to have been concen-
trated again in Jerusalem (see Ant. 19.326–327; War 2.218), meaning that once again 
tax revenues collected from Galilee were directed elsewhere; in fact, he also revived 
Herod’s proclivity for bestowing benefaction of foreign cities like Berytus (Ant. 
19.335–337).
169
 But the new configuration of government was fleeting; Agrippa died 
unexpectedly in 44 CE and his kingdom was transformed into a Roman province. 
The most notable feature of this period of Herodian rulers is the peace it brought, 
compared to the chaos of the previous two decades. The long duration of these reigns 
created conditions conducive to the development of stable state institutions, which in 
turn meant that the average Galilean could reasonably predict and adapt to the 
demands of the state. Those state institutions of taxation, administration, and law that 
existed were probably felt more strongly in Galilee under Antipas than in any period 
prior, though it is not clear from our extant sources just how much infrastructural 
reach they had or how positive or deleterious their effects were on local economy. 
(We will return in the next chapter to the question of how Antipas’ developments of 
Sepphoris and Tiberias may have affected economic networks in the region of 
Galilee.) But there is no indication that state institutions were substantially more 
developed under the Herodians than under Hyrcanus, with a thin bureaucracy and an 
administration concentrated in interpersonal networks bound to the king and his court. 
Direct Rule—Procuratorial Province of Judaea 
In 44 CE, Galilee returned to direct Roman administration as a province of its own 
under a Roman procurator.
170
 By this point, Galilee had been under the monarchic 
rule of Herodian monarchs for over eighty years, and no living Galilean would have 
remembered being subject to Roman rulers and obliged to pay tribute to a foreign 
power. Still, the annexation was remarkably quiet. There are no indications from 
Josephus or other sources that Roman rule or obligation to pay tribute triggered revolt 
at this time, though obviously the absence of evidence does not mean the whole 
                                                          
168
 We may also note that it was the site for a meeting between the Judaean people and the Syrian 
governor over the Caligula statue debacle (Ant. 18.279; War 2.193), in the period before Judaea had 
been incorporated into Agrippa’s kingdom. 
169
 On these building projects, see Daniel R. Schwartz, Agrippa I: The Last King of Judaea 
(TSAJ 23; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990), 130–34, 140–44. 
170
 Not all agree on this point. Sartre believes that Judaea was actually attached to Syria once 
again, on the basis of Tacitus’ statement to this effect (Annales 12.23.1) and the fact that Syria main-
tained military responsibilities over Judaea; The Middle East under Rome, 100. Labbé affirms the 
military dependency on Syria without, seemingly, denying Judaea the status of a procuratorial prov -





population took the change lightly.
171
 This stands in contrast to the tax resistance 
movement spurred by Judah the Galilean following the annexation of Archelaus’ 
ethnarchy in 6 CE (perhaps more in opposition to the symbolic implications of paying 
tribute than the economic burden); but this movement was quickly marginalized, as 
the general populace acquiesced to the high priests’ pleas for compliance (Ant. 18.2–
5; War 2.117–118). That the annexation seemingly yielded no resistance is less 
surprising in Judaea, since they been paying tribute to Rome for decades prior to the 
brief kingship of Agrippa. But the silence in Galilee may indicate that Roman 
management was anticipated to be an improvement over the kings or, more likely, to 
have little tangible effect on their everyday lives. It also suggests that tribute was not 
expected to be an excessive and intolerable burden that threatened Galileans’ ability 
to meet their resource needs.  
Most provinces under direct Roman administration had very thin staffs, with the 
governor aided by a quaestor and sometimes legates, and assisted by a small entou-
rage of scribes, messengers, heralds, and other minor officials. Military officials took 
on some important roles in policing the province and adjudicating disputes.
172
 There 
are no indications that conditions were any different in the province of Judaea.
173
 The 
governor was heavily reliant on local officials and institutions for administration, 
legal cases, and tax collection. Local and community governmental structures, where 
they exited, continued to function for adjudicating local disputes. Cities and toparchic 
hubs were integral for the collection of tribute for Rome, since use of publicani for 
tribute collection had long ago fallen by the wayside.
174
  
The governor and his officials were most often headquartered in Caesarea but 
came often to Jerusalem, and especially during the festival season when the mass 
influx of people raised Roman concerns for uprising or unrest.
175
 While Asia and 
perhaps other provinces had a system of assize districts through which the governor 
would circulate to hear and address local complaints,
176
 there is no direct evidence to 
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indicate that the governors of Judaea made similar rounds.
177
 It seems that Galileans 
often remained at the periphery and aloof from the Roman administrators; their major 
interactions with officials of the Roman state would occur only when in Jerusalem for 
the festivals or as a deliberate journey to plead before the governor in Caesarea.  
Roman governance in this period was considerably more stable than under the 
Syrian governors that preceded Herod, but it still created problems. The East was not 
embroiled in warfare between Rome and Parthia as it had been a century ago. And 
while a number of figures arose who contested the authority of Rome as revolution-
aries or messianic claimants (Ant. 17.273–284; 20.97–99, 101–102, 167–72, 188; War 
2.57–65, 258–263), none prior to the Jewish Revolt in 66 seems to have been 
successful in bringing the Jews of Palestine into outright rebellion. With the exception 
of Nero’s grant of four cities in Galilee and Peraea to Agrippa II (Ant. 20.159; War 
2.252), the Romans did not tinker with the political geography of the new province or 
attempt to dramatically reformulate its existing institutions. 
The presence of Roman soldiers was a mechanism for keeping the peace but not a 
wholly positive influence on conditions in the province. While the reduction of 
thievery and pillaging removed some of the danger of travel through the country and 
reduced the risk of losing one’s resources, overzealous execution of orders could lead 
to calamity for innocent inhabitants. Josephus’ narrative is punctuated by episodes of 
soldiers acting without tact (Ant. 20.105–112; War 2.223–227), abusing Jewish 
subjects (Ant. 20.113–117; War 2.228–231), and using excessive violence (Ant. 
20.177); Josephus even partly blames them at one point for spurring the First Jewish 
Revolt (Ant. 19.366). But these troops were stationed in Caesarea and Sebaste and 
seasonally in Jerusalem, and military activity was centered on Judaea proper and 
occasionally spilled into Peraea and Samaria, while Galilee itself seems to have been 
largely spared of military presence or incursions until the outbreak of the revolt.
178
 
This meant both that gentile soldiers were not a source of conflict in the north, but 
also that they were not available for policing purposes either, meaning Galileans had 
to rely on more local and social mechanisms of policing in their communities.  
The long-term stability of local institutions of administration was all the more 
important for the brevity of governors’ tenures in Palestine. Most held the post for 
only two years (Fadus, Alexander, Festus, Albinus, and Florus) before moving on or 
being ousted by the emperor. Two held the governorship for longer periods—
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Cumanus for four years, Felix for eight—but they may simply have been renewed in 
their posts at regular two-year intervals. This meant that the few Roman personnel 
that composed the top tier of provincial administration were liable to change every 
couple years and replacement with a whole new staff. The brevity of the gubernatorial 
term could incentivize exploitative behavior, as exhibited by a number of the gover-
nors. Josephus accuses Albinus of burdening the population with excessive taxes and 
tolls in order to financially exploit the province (War 2.273–275) and taking bribes 
from criminals (Ant. 20.215), and he accuses Florus of pillaging the countryside for 
plunder and revenues (Ant. 20.255–256; War 2.277–279). Even longer-serving 
governors did not necessarily exhibit restraint in their treatment of provincial 
subjects. According to Josephus, Cumanus brutally destroyed villages in punishment 
for a suspected robbery (Ant. 20.113–114; War 2.228–231) and was susceptible to 
bribery in adjudicating disputes (Ant. 20.119). The governor Felix supposedly 
executed a political opponent by conscripting the Sicarii as assassins to kill the high 
priest Jonathan (Ant. 20.161–162; War 2.256). Rather than arresting these criminals 
and threats to the general peace in Jerusalem, he allegedly fomented the tense 
violence in the atmosphere of Jerusalem in the 50s.  
Because the administrators did not hail from the region they governed and did not 
necessarily expect to stay there long, there was little to disincentivized harsh and 
exploitative treatment of the populace so long as it was not sufficient to garner the 
attention of the emperor. The short tenure incentivized extraction of greater wealth 
and profit from the province, over and against considerations for its long-term health 
and integrity. This sort of behavior is sometimes referred to as “rent-seeking,” an 
attempt to accrue wealth by virtue of position and title, acting in self-interest to the 
detriment of the rest of the society.
179
 Moreover, the rapid turnover in governorship 
could create incentives comparable to that of an unstable regime: the uncertainty of 
the value of future revenues incentivizes the maximization of immediate extraction, 
thereby deteriorating productive capability in the long-term.
180
 The paucity of Roman 
administrators and the highly hierarchical and interpersonal nature of communication 
and power gave provincials little recourse for ousting a mismanaging governor. In 
order to seek the emperor’s intervention, Jews were largely reliant on the governor or 
officials in adjacent provinces to get word on to the emperor at Rome, which 
generally meant that a governor could not be prosecuted until the end of his term.
181
 
A few passages in Josephus give us some information about tribute collection and 
payment at the time of the procurators. In response to Gaius’ plot to introduce his 
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statue into the Jerusalem Temple, many Jews come to the Syrian legate Petronius at 
Tiberias (we are not told whether they were from Galilee or points south) and entreat 
him for forty days not to carry out the order. This also constitutes an effective agri -
cultural strike—whether consciously constructed as one or not—because in so 
protesting they neglect their fields during the time of sowing and risk producing no 
harvest whatsoever (Ant. 18.271–272; War 2.200). Petronius expresses concern that a 
crop failure would leave the populace unable to pay their tribute (ἀδυναμίᾳ 
καταβολῆς τῶν φόρων) and compel them to turn to banditry (Ant. 18.273–275). This 
story indicates that the tribute at this time was levied as a fixed-rate tax rather than a 
proportional tax (decumae), since it presumes that a crop failure would preclude them 
from meeting a predetermined tribute obligation, while under a proportional tax 
arrangement a failed harvest would have meant no tribute was owed. It also suggests 




Another tantalizing passage refers to tribute payment at the eve of the outbreak of 
the First Jewish Revolt. Agrippa II, in his speech to the Jerusalemites, recommends 
that they pay the tribute that they have neglected to render unto Rome and thereby 
prevent a war before it started (War 2.204). Agents of the civil government (magis-
trates and council members; ἄρχοντες καὶ βουλευταὶ) then went out and collected 
from the surrounding villages a total of forty talents (War 2.405). There are many 
important details in here, though most of them are ambiguous. The amount of forty 
talents is probably not the sum total of the tribute due, but only a fraction of it that 
they had failed to pay (τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἔλειπεν; 2.405); yet the fact that failure to pay 
would provoke war with Rome suggests either that this was a large portion of the total 
due, or that Rome reacted harshly to even the slightest shortfall in revenue. It is not 
quite clear whether we should understand the “forty talents” as an indication that 
tribute was or could be paid in coin, or merely that the crops collected were nominally 
valued at forty talents.
183
 The former seems more likely, but the circumstances of this 
collection were somewhat abnormal, since the revenues were assembled hastily and 
late, and what was collected would seem to have come solely from the environs of 
Jerusalem—either a measure of expediency or an indication that Judaea was primarily 
responsible for the tax evasion.  
This passage is also the most explicit reference to the method by which taxes 
were collected in Roman Palestine. The implication of War 2.404–407 is that the 
municipal authorities of the district went out to villages to collect the taxes, rather 
                                                          
182
 Rocca also makes the point, though, that the tax burden may have been levied especially 
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than agents from the village bringing them to the district center. Or, perhaps, slaves or 
comparable agents working on behalf of these officials. For Judaea, because of the 
considerable overlap between the priesthood and the civic officials of Jerusalem, 
tribute collection may have piggybacked on the system for priestly collection of tithes 
(see discussion in ch. 3). But in Galilee there were few priests, and if we understand 
the system for collecting tribute to have been initially conducted at the level of the 
toparchy or meridarchy, then taxes would have been collected by the lay civic offi-
cials of Sepphoris and/or Tiberias
184
 and their delegates going town to town. There is 
no indication of a return to tax collection by Roman agents not native to Judaea, no 
publicani collecting tribute on contract. The only specific tax agents we hear of were 
in fact Jewish personages,
185
 though it seems likely that all were toll collectors—
collecting indirect taxes—rather than tribute collectors. Even after the Jews nearly 
blew off the tribute obligation, the Roman governor continued to seek local magis-
trates and aristocrats (τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας αὐτῶν ἅμα τοῖς δυνατοῖς) rather than 
bringing in agents from outside the province (War 2.407). This also suggests that 
Judaea’s tribute collectors were appointed by the Roman governor, though this may 
have typically been a mere rubber-stamping of selections made by the local 
administration.  
We may wonder once again to what extent the Roman administration had the 
information necessary to make an accurate and systematic assessment of agricultural 
production in Palestine by which to devise the amount of tribute. As Erich S. Gruen 
observed, Early Roman imperial administration did not purposefully select governors 
for their previous experience with or knowledge of the province charged to them, and 
so we can hardly expect many of them to have had helpful firsthand knowledge.
186
 P. 
A. Brunt argued that there was a census in Syria every twelve years, and Dominic 
Rathbone has argued that Egypt had one every seven or fourteen years. But the 
evidence for Syria is particularly problematic, and Rathbone believes Egypt’s regular 
system was unique and probably intertwined with Egypt’s status as a major grain 
provider to Rome.
187
 Outside Egypt, provincial censuses are chiefly attested at the 
initial time of annexation or in times of emergency.
188
 For pre-Revolt Judaea, the only 
evidenced census was in 6 CE (Ant. 18.1), which probably took the form of a property 
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registration to assess the landholdings and their landholders for the purposes of 
imposing tributum soli—direct tax levied on agricultural land and its produce.
189
 
But Galilee (along with Peraea, Golan, and regions to the northeast) was not 
subject to Quirinius’ census in 6 CE since the region was not under Roman direct 
rule, and there is no indication in the ancient sources of a comparable census when 
Agrippa I’s kingdom was annexed. Since the amount of land in a province may 
change over time (through changes in political geography or extending cultivation 
into marginal lands) and land use may vary year to year through fallowing practices, 
records needed to be kept up to date annually by other means to serve as anything 
more useful than a rough approximation. One possibility was regional land survey 
conducted by low level officials in the toparchy. This practice is evidenced in Egypt, 
as village scribes were responsible for overseeing the periodic updating of land 
records through survey.
190
 But it is unlikely that Judaea replicated the complex 
bureaucratic apparatus particular to Egypt’s Ptolemaic history and its importance to 
Rome, and we should be wary of transposing this feature.
191
 The other option for 
keeping records up to date is voluntary declaration. We actually have documentary 
evidence from the inter-revolt period (70–132 CE) for this sort of census updating (see 
P. Yadin 16; Y. Hever 61–62). This technique had the advantage of requiring little 
work on the part of the administration and little development of local bureaucracy. 
But it is obvious that dependence on declarations for information provided consider-
able latitude for tax evasion and tax fraud, and precludes the notion that Rome was 
particularly exacting in its taxation, squeezing as much as possible out of the prov-
ince. This is especially true insofar as the small cadre of Roman administrators relied 
on local agents to manage such affairs. The Roman administration would likely have 
determined the rate of tribute on inaccurate and probably underreported land data; but 
                                                          
189
 Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 214–17, 221–39. Some scholars have also posited that the 
Romans imposed a poll tax (tributum capitis) on Judaea, but as Udoh has shown, the grounds for this 
argument are quite weak. In short, there are three lines of evidence used to adduce a capitation tax: (1) 
a reference in Appian, Syriaca 11.8.50, (2) the “tribute” in Matt 22:15–22; Mark 12:13–17; Luke 
20:21–26, (3) a reference in Ulpian, De censuses 3 apud Digest L.15.4. Appian’s reference is more 
likely an anachronistic reference to the fiscus Iudaeaus, a tax levied on Jews after the First Jewish 
Revolt. The gospel reference would be the sole indication of a denarius tax, and at a time when the 
denarius was not even a common coin in circulation in the region. In Ulpian, it is unclear what time 
period the capitation tax envisioned was levied on Judaea and Syria. Josephus, on the other hand, who 
makes reference to capitation taxes often enough in other cases, fails to mention any imposed on 
Judaea aside from the postwar fiscus Iudaeus and the Temple Tax from which it was converted. 
190
 See n. 129; Verhoogt, Menches, Komogrammateus of Kerkeosiris, 131–41. 
191
 Some scholars have been wont to presume a lot of continuity in bureaucratic and tax structures 
over Palestine from its time under Ptolemaic rule, through the Seleucids, the Hasmonaeans, and 
Herodians, to the period of Roman direct rule; see, e.g., Pastor, Land and Economy in Ancient Pales-
tine; Schäfer, History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World; Rocca, Herod’s Judaea. See also n. 129. 
Monson (From the Ptolemies to the Romans) has recently demonstrated some of the major effects that 
the institutional shifts from the Ptolemaic to Roman period could have had even within Egypt, 
showing that some relatively minor institutional shifts brought about some important changes even in 
seemingly stable Egypt, contrary to the view of Dominic Rathbone (“Egypt, Augustus and Roman 





it seems once again that as far as the Roman state was concerned, an uninterrupted 
flow of resources was more important than efficiently extracting as much as possible 
from the province. 
Non-State Institutions 
Given the myopic focus on state institutions, scholars of the ancient economy have 
rarely taken full advantage of the insights of New Institutional Economics. The 
context in which economic actors make their decision is also structured by other 
formal institutions, an array of informal institutions (i.e., norms and conventions), and 
the availability and strength of mechanisms for ensuring adherence to the rules 
defined by both kinds of institutions.
192
 In fact, one of the characteristics that distin-
guishes NIE from other approaches to economics is that it brings into consideration 
the ways that other aspects of the human environment, especially the constructed 
social institutions of a given community, might shape the economic calculus of its 
members, without denying rationality altogether.  
If we are to look beyond the state for institutions that would have structured 
economic behavior in Early Roman Galilee, the obvious place to start is with the 
institutions of Second Temple Judaism. The laws of the Torah may be understood as a 
formal institution, in that they are a codified set of rules. As with any other set of 
rules, they impose constraints on some behaviors and offer incentives for others. 
Some laws pertain to practices generally included in the rubric of “religion,” such as 
ritual sacrifice at the Temple cult and festivals, but the divine Law included a host of 
commandments that broach such diverse topics as agricultural production, resource 
allocation, interpersonal conduct, and much more. The covenant’s scope illustrates 
how difficult it can be to disintegrate “the religious” from “the economic” in ancient 
Jewish society,
193
 and warrants seriously considering the ways that the divine Law 
could have fundamentally shaped the calculus of economically “rational” behavior. 
The rapid change in state institutions across the Early Roman period only adds to 
the weighty importance of investigating the role of religious institutions in defining 
the social context for economic behavior. Roman and Herodian state institutions were 
sometimes unstable and often failed to produce institutional change that penetrated 
society very widely or deeply, owing to a combination of infrastructural weaknesses 
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and many Jews’ understandable lack of desire to voluntarily comply with these 
imposed powers (except, perhaps, when it could be gamed to their advantage). While 
state institutions were somewhat ephemeral in this period, the religious institutions 
defined by the Torah were considerably more established and entrenched in Pales-
tinian Jewish society by this point. By the Late Second Temple period, the Torah had 
been written down for centuries and despite some continued variation in textual form, 
had achieved a relatively stable state.
194
 As Sanders has argued, the Law enshrined in 
the Mosaic covenant had by this time become central to Jewish identity in Palestine, 
so much so that it can be seen as one of the pillars of “common Judaism” in this 
period.
195
 Even among the numerous “sects” and factions in late Second Temple 
Palestine, it seems that they had a lot in common with one another and diverged only 
on a relative few halakhic issues.
196
 Furthermore, many understood the statutes of the 
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Law as conditions of a binding contract, which Sanders calls “covenantal nomism,” 
with punishment for transgressors and reward for the observant.
197
 David M. Carr 
helpfully encapsulates these two aspects of Second Temple Judaism in a pair of obser-
vations about the diverse corpus of texts from the later Second Temple period:  
The first is the relatively consistent presupposition that the Torah of Moses should be 
the orientation point for Jewish piety and observance. … The other main character-
istic shared across many of these texts is emphasis on the idea that Yhwh can be 
counted on to reward individuals who persist in their (Torah) obedience.
198
 
This of course need not mean total uniformity or agreement in how to comply, 
and as Seth Schwartz has rightly noted, the vagaries of the Law often required or 
allowed a prominent position to expert interpretation and local traditions.
199
 These 
differences in interpretation are attested by some Second Temple-period texts that 
attempt to overwrite or modify the Torah (e.g., Jubilees or the Temple Scroll).
200
 But 
even in these cases, the texts often presume the authority of the Torah in attempting to 
modify it or presume the reader’s intimate knowledge of its statutes.
201
 And given the 
limited role of the state in defining the rules of economic interaction, the Torah’s 
commandments may have been all the more important for their role in perpetuating a 
stable set of rules within which to operate.  
Stability is a result of the seemingly inherent conservatism exhibited by estab-
lished institutional frameworks.
202
 North notes in his study of economic change that 
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institutions tend to transform gradually and incrementally, remaining fairly stable 
even when the rules cease to be optimized for contemporary circumstances, with 
occasional rapid changes akin to punctuated equilibrium.
203
 This may in part be 
explained by the human propensity to act within the constraints determined by their 
own past actions and knowledge, known as “path dependence,” which can facilitate 
the creation of enduring equilibria.
204
 Once people habitualize and internalize modes 
of acting shaped by institutions, those modes of acting perpetuate even as the human 
environment incrementally changes, while the institutions themselves follow the 
conservativism of human path dependence and thereby develop in a way “broadly 
consistent with the existing institutional matrix.”
205
 Religious institutions that had 
been established and followed long before the Roman conquest of Palestine, and that 
the Romans did not directly meddle with, thus likely constituted a durable framework 
for shaping human action in Palestine’s Jewish communities despite the changes in 
the political superstructure.  
Norms 
In addition to the codified rules of formal institutions, norms play an important role in 
shaping socioeconomic behavior.
206
 Norms are informally constituted and 
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communally constructed rules that define what constitutes correct and incorrect 
behavior, and are essential to the self-governing mechanisms of a society.
207
 They 
often serve to fill in the gaps, establishing expectations for behavior in areas not 
touched by codified rules. Some norms constitute necessary supplements essential to 
the functioning of formal institutions, defining parameters not explicitly spelled out 
but required for execution. Sometimes norms can even overpower codified laws, 
when enforcement of those laws is lax and it becomes normative for a community to 
ignore or modify them. Norms, though sometimes harder to get at, are equally if  not 
more important in understanding how the human social environment shapes decision-
making—economic or otherwise.  
Norms, like formal institutions, can be quite slow to change once they emerge. 
There are a number of forces that contribute to this. One is the tendency to follow the 
behavior of other individuals in the group, on the assumption they are operating on 
better knowledge (information cascade) or in order to avoid disapproval for being out 
of step with the majority (reputation cascade), that serves to reinforce the normative 
status quo. Another is the costliness of displacing internalized norms and replacing 
the institutions that socialize people into those normative systems in the first place. It 
can also be costly to move people away from a local optimum; in other words, if the 
conditions that the norms establish provide sufficient stability, there may not be 
enough incentive to move a critical mass to embrace new norms.
208
 
Norms are a property of the social system at the macrosocial level, which subse-
quently governs individual behavior at the microsocial level.
209
 They are in effect an 
emergent property of social interaction rather than the product of conscious and delib-
erate construction.
210
 James S. Coleman argues that strong norms are most likely to 
emerge and endure in social networks that exhibit “closure”—what in network theory 
is called a “small world network,” one in which most nodes are redundantly 
connected to most other nodes. Such networks create conditions highly conducive to 
norm enforcement because information can flow quickly and broadly, and barriers are 
high to accessing individuals outside the system.
211
 In the next chapter, I will argue 
that we should view Galilee as just such a small world network: close-knit, inward-
looking, and circumscribed. Adding to the likelihood that Galilean society was 
conducive to strong norm-building is the fairly homogenous Jewish composition of 
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 which made it harder for people to “defect” from one set of norms to 
participate in a network in which other norms prevailed. 
In addition to the rules formally spelled out in the Torah, Galilean society surely 
produced a host of norms that further spelled out proper and improper behaviors in 
terms of piety and impiety. To some extent, the emergence of such norms would be 
made necessary by the often vague, terse, and incomplete nature of many command-
ments. Such gaps left room for interpretation, and thus fertile soil for the cultivation 
of norms. Norms thrive where formal institutions fail to define such parameters of 
conduct, serving to decrease such barriers to interaction as uncertainty and incon-
gruity by encouraging conduct according to expected lines. This is especially true for 
those commandments whose fulfillment requires some amount of agreement in detail 
between two or more individuals. But the communal nature of the covenantal agree-
ment with God (see below) may have encouraged family and neighbors to keep a 
watchful eye on the conduct of others even with regard to fulfillment of command-
ments that did not directly affect them.
213
  
Many of the norms that agglomerated around the Law probably emerged 
gradually and less deliberately, initially as ad hoc solutions to the interpretive prob-
lems that were subsequently regularized through repetition over time and transmitted 
to other members of society through mimesis of peers and socialization of children. 
Such norms would in effect constitute an important component of a Galilean habitus, 
a system of motivating structures that orchestrate conduct and guide decisions that 
produce regularity without necessarily deriving from conscious intentionality.
214
 
While there are certainly examples of deliberate attempts to clarify aspects in the Law 
in Second Temple literature,
215
 it is not clear even in such cases that the author origi-
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nated the interpretation, rather than explicating what was already a norm held by a 
community—even if only a marginal community.  
Enforcement 
Institutions—formal and informal alike—are only effective in shaping the contour of 
economic behavior if the populace complies with them. Compliance to formal rules 
may of course be coerced through official, institutional mechanisms of violence, such 
as the use of the military by the Roman state to punish revolutionaries. As we noted 
above, though, even the state’s policing mechanisms in Palestine were not designed or 
deployed to enforce rules in a sustained and widespread fashion and lacked the infor-
mational infrastructure that would facilitate this. Jewish religious institutions in Pales -
tine were considerably weaker in their ability to coerce compliance through official 
agents and threat of violence.
216
 From what we can tell, the priests and other Temple 
officials seem to have had little capacity to enforce compliance with the statutes of 
the Torah, at least outside the Temple and Judaea, where most priests resided.
217
 The 
most coercion we see these agents engaging in is in the collection of tithes and the 
Temple tax from villages; but as we discuss in chapter 4, even these collections may 
have been largely voluntary and the agents may have lacked sufficient local data to 
accurately extract these resources by force. It is also highly unlikely prima facie that 
Temple agents ever kept official tallies of who made the obligatory pilgrimages or 
sacrifices, who brought their Second Tithe to Jerusalem, who complied with the 
dietary laws, etc. The Sanhedrin—insofar as such an entity existed to hear court cases 
in Jerusalem at a given point in this period—could try cases brought to them, but this 
depended on the voluntary reporting of violations by fellow Jews, and hardly consti-
tutes a strong institutional mechanism for enforcing widespread compliance.  
In lieu of official, institutionalized mechanism of enforcement, there are other 
pressures that drive individuals into compliance. Individuals may sanction themselves 
for failure to comply with rules and norms when they have come to internalize them. 
Most norms are transmitted and engrained in processes of teaching and modeling we 
may refer to as socialization, transmitting in deliberate and implicit ways the expecta-
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tions and responsibilities in a given social domain.
218
 These norms in turn shape the 
way that individuals see and operate within their social environment and form part of 
what Bourdieu referred to as the habitus—the “system of internalized structures, 
schemes of perception, conception, and action” that shape individuals’ strategic action 
in society without being a product of conscious deliberation.
219
 Once norms have been 
thus habitualized, they may simply become unconscious bounds around the types of 
behavior perceived of as possible within a social environment. But especially insofar 
as norms are imbued with moral imperative—the sense that they ought to be followed, 
not just that they are typical or regular modes of acting—internalization also entails 
the development of “an internal sanctioning system” whereby individuals inflict 
punishment on themselves for failing to act in accord with the norms.
220
 These sanc-
tions may take the form of feelings such as shame or guilt that dissuade one from 
recommitting the violation in the future.
221
 In some cases, internalization may result 
not only in instilling a self-sanctioning mechanisms, but also producing “zeal” to 
promote and enforce broad compliance with the rules and norms as a matter of public 
good, even when that entails great personal costs to enact.
222
 
Compliance with the strictures of the Mosaic covenant may have been largely 
voluntary. To some extent, Jews may have operated within the parameters of the Law 
without much conscious thought, acting according to a Galilean Jewish habitus they 
acquired through socialization. We may suppose, for instance, that the widespread 
embrace of the dietary laws within Galilee made adherence to them a matter of habit 
that did not require conscious thought, at least until the norm was raised to a level of 
consciousness through confrontation with gentiles that did not share those norms. The 
textual evidence also suggests that the religious rules and norms were internalized by 
many, and some even clearly exhibited zeal—the sectarian enclave at Qumran 
demanded strict adherence to their community’s normative rules (see, e.g., 1QS), and 
other texts depict Jews willing to face death rather than violate the commandments 
(see, e.g., Dan 3; 2 Macc 7; War 1.449–453). I believe there is warrant for presuming 
a general disposition toward adherence as the rule, rather than the exception. 
In addition to self-enforcement, obedience to Jewish religious institutions could 
also be compelled through mechanisms of peer policing. Peer policing broadly 
describes the array of tactics available to individuals in a community to compel their 
peers into conformity with social norms. While we may suppose broad adherence to 
the rules and norms around religious institutions in Galilee, we can hardly suppose 
universal compliance. But those who embrace and internalize a community’s norms 
                                                          
218
 Gary Alan Fine, “Enacting Norms: Mushrooming and the Culture of Expectations and 
Explanations,” in Hechter and Opp, Social Norms, 139–64 at 139–40. 
219
 See Bordieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 72–87, quote at 86. 
220
 Quote from Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, 293. On “norms of oughtness,” see 
Hechter and Opp, “Introduction,” in Hechter and Opp, Social Norms, xi–xx at xiii; Fine, “Enacting 
Norms,” Horne, “Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Norms.”  
221
 Hechter and Opp, “Introduction,” xiii. 
222
 And this in seeming contradiction to what we might expect to result in a free rider problem. 





may disincentivize violation by punishing “defectors” in terms of social capital, the 
access one is able to leverage through their network connections to achieve their 
goals.
223
 This can involve tactics like reprimand (calling attention to an error, 
privately or publically), shunning (refusing to engage an individual in social interac-
tions), boycott (refusal to exchange resources with an individual), or gossip (circu-
lating information by word of mouth about one’s conduct).
224
 And for our purposes, 
such tactics are interesting because they can disrupt an individual’s ability to interact 
with others and, concomitantly, to meet their economic needs with the help of others 
in the community.  
Sociologists have also found that people not directly affected by another’s defec -
tion from rules and norms are often willing to enact punishment, a phenomenon called 
third-party or altruistic punishment. It turns out the people are willing to sanction 
defectors regardless of whether they are familiars or strangers, or whether or not they 
expect to ever encounter the defector again. People are even willing to inflict punish-
ment for breaking the rules when it costs the punishers to do so. In part, this phenom-
enon is explained by motivations of reciprocal fairness and aversion to inequality. But 
punishing defectors also broadcasts to the community one’s own faithfulness to those 
institutions, increasing one’s own social capital with other members of the network 
that value the community’s norms.
225
 
One of the reasons for this focus on reputation and mechanisms of sanction that 
specifically effect interpersonal relations is the fact that economic exchanges—espe-
cially those in antiquity—were highly dependent on interpersonal networks.
226
 As 
Stuart Plattner has noted, long-term relationships are useful strategies for mitigating 
risk and information problems in economic exchange.
227
 Most exchanges of resources 
occurred face to face, or through a broker who personally knew both parties. And 
agriculture, the primary occupation of most laborers, was at many junctures a cooper-
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ative affair, dependent on paid or reciprocal labor agreements. One of the biggest 
impediments to such interpersonal exchanges is the inherent uncertainty and risk that 
comes from not knowing what the other party will do—will they faithfully act 
according to the terms of the agreement? is there important information he is 
neglecting to relate? Reputation is one of several tools that serve to ameliorate that 
knowledge disparity—if imperfectly—because it allows one to extrapolate a likely 
outcome and assess the riskiness of an interaction on the basis of purported past 
behavior (true or otherwise).
228
  
In lieu of direct access to information, humans are dependent on the reports and 
actions of others. In contemporary terms, we may think of the extent to which we are 
reliant on customer reviews and the recommendations of our acquaintances in deter-
mining where to purchase a given item or which competing brand to chose.
229
 The 
circulation of favorable reports about a particular market vendor’s use of fair weights, 
for instance, signals to potential clients that this vendor has a reputation for not 
cheating his customers. However, if a client discovers that he has been cheated at the 
market stall, he may publicly chastise the vendor for this injustice, and communicate 
to the rest of his personal network that this vendor is not to be trusted. Reports 
continue to pervade through the system through gossip to “third-tier hearsay network 
members,” individuals who do not personally know anyone involved with the person 
whose reputation is in question.
230
  
Reputation recurs as an important concept in social policing, with important rami-
fications for how people decide to interact with others in economic transactions. 
While we tend to speak of a reputation as something one has, as if it were an individ-
ual property, reputation fundamentally resides in the flow of information between 
members of a society and is hence a relational property.
231
 Reputation manifests itself 
as “the impressions, beliefs, and evaluations of all those who know the person.”
232
 
Reputations may be based on firsthand interactions or observations—whether extrap-
olated from a singular incident or the accumulated assessment from repeated inter-
changes—or it can be based on gossip as individuals relate their impressions to other 
members of their social network.
233
 But reputations need not be wholly based on facts 
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either; they can just as well be based on falsehoods developed intentionally as slander 
or emerging out of misunderstanding or overgeneralization. And reputation can be 
closely tied in with or affected by the mechanisms by which peers police each other in 
society: adherence to the norms and proper obedience of the rules can garner a posi -
tive reputation that creates opportunities and increases social standing, and deviance 
can just as easily garner a negative reputation that creates additional barriers to fu ture 
peer interactions.  
As we shall have occasion to explore in subsequent chapters, defectors could be 
harmed by deliberate peer sanction, but individuals might inflict similar damages in 
attempting to vigilantly adhere to the Law or religious norms themselves. Rather than 
abet violation of a commandment or risk accidentally violating one, they may choose 
to avoid such interactions. For instance, one hosting a feast might have trouble 
attracting guests if he had a reputation for flaunting the dietary laws, since guests 
risked unwittingly eating something forbidden. Likewise, trading with a produce 
dealer deemed unscrupulous in his production of foodstuffs according to the 
constraints of the Torah might also scare off potential customers who wanted to 
ensure they did not violate the Law (or did not abet such behavior) and thereby harm 
their own reputations. Fears of participating in violation of the religious institutions—
even if only guilt by association—may have been a significant disincentive to inter-
acting with lawbreakers in a society where piety was valued.
234
 Widespread sanctions 
would constrain one’s ability to meet one’s social and economic needs through coop -
eration and interaction with peers in the community, impinging on their ability to 
share meals together, arrange cooperation in agricultural or other types of labor, or 
exchange necessary goods in the marketplace or between neighbors. 
Up to this point, we have focused on the role of other human agents in enforcing 
the religious laws, but we should not ignore the role of God in the system. Robert A. 
Orsi has advocated for the need to take seriously the experience of religious partici -
pants.
235
 Ancient Jews, as with many contemporary religious practitioners, perceive 
gods and other supernatural beings are very real actors in the world, with whom they 
have very real interactions and complex relationships. There are limits to how acces-
sible these relationships are to us, since we obviously cannot observe ancient Jews in 
their everyday interactions with the divine, and all that is available to us is mediated 
through textual and archaeological evidence. Even if we cannot get at the complex-
ities of their phenomenology, we can still say something about some of the expected 
effects of a network in which God is an agent. 
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The Torah defines a transactional relationship between God and the people of 
Israel. On the condition that the people heed the statutes of the covenant handed down 
to them at Sinai, God will protect and bless Israel with ample rain, produce, livestock, 
and offspring (Deut 28:1–14). But failure to adhere to the Law brings about God’s 
curses on the people—a section much longer and more graphic than the blessings 
(Deut 28:16–68)—that includes, among other things, bodily harm and the obliteration 
of agricultural crops. The relationship between a Jew and God, under this conception 
of “covenantal nomsim,” is fundamentally predicated on whether or not the former 
has adhered to the rules. And maintaining this as a positive relationship, according to 
those same conditions, is vital to ensuring one’s continued freedom from harm and 
ability to produce the necessities of life through the all-important occupation of agri-
culture. The commandments concerning sacrificial offerings and festivals are even 
more explicit in their transactionality, as Jews offer material resources to maintain the 
goodwill relationship, to atone for some wrongdoing in order to repair the relation-
ship, or to ask for reciprocation for some more specific need. As with any social rela-
tionship, these sorts of interactions and exchanges are useful mechanisms for main-
taining the relationship and ensuring its durability so that one had the social capital 
accrued to call upon God in times of need. 
To return to the matter of policing the rules of the religious institution and norms, 
God could obviously be considered the ultimate enforcer. Let alone the fact that he is 
the agent of punishment or reward in the covenantal agreement, the fact that he is not 
limited in knowledge, space, or power in the way that human agents are gives him a 
privileged position to see and act upon infringements. One cannot hide one’s infringe -
ment from the watchful eye of God like one can from humans, and the imbalance of 
power would dissuade all but the boldest believer from blatantly flouting the Law. 
And above all, he is able to punish behavior through mechanisms unavailable to any 
person, such as withholding the rain or imposing famine.  
The strength of these social mechanisms of enforcement, which we shall return to 
in subsequent chapters, is somewhat predicated on the composition of the community 
in which they are deployed. As we noted earlier, closed social networks are most 
conducive to strong norms and effective social enforcement due to the ease of 
communication and the limitations to engaging individuals outside the circumscribed 
system.
236
 Coleman notes that reputation can only really have a powerful effect under 
such conditions, in which everyone knows everyone else and information travels 
broadly and redundantly.
237
 If Galilee was indeed a “small world” as I argue in the 
next chapter, then it would have been difficult for defectors to find viable alternate 
outlets for interaction and exchange if they find themselves shunned for flouting local 
norms, making Galilee quite conducive to effective lateral, rather than top-down, 
enforcement of religious institutions. 
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Summary: Galilee’s Experience of Roman Administration 
The above survey helps us to grasp the multitude of changes that the Roman admin-
istration of the region of Palestine underwent between the advent of and the eve of the 
First Jewish Revolt in 66 CE. There can be no doubt that, unlike provinces such as 
Egypt in the same period, there was frequent reconfiguration and reassignment of 
territories that had important ramifications for the loci and range of authority held by 
the various administrators.  
How much was Galilee as a region affected by these changes? During the period 
of Antipas’ reign over Galilee and Peraea as a separate kingdom, Galilee certainly  
lied at the center of things, due to the local presence of the ruler and his court. 
Sepphoris and then Tiberias became centers of political power at the highest tier of 
administrative hierarchy. Yet for the rest of the Early Roman period, Galilee was a 
relative backwater; it lied far from the centers of administration in Caesarea and 
Jerusalem, and the Galilean cities functioned as second-rank cities. They may still 
have been included in the circuit of the governor’s travels, but if so we hear nothing 
of it. The greatest effect of the changes in the first century was the attachment and 
detachment of the region to various neighbors, in terms of administrative districts; the 
moving of provincial/client kingdom borders had ramifications for taxation and 
therefore the movement of goods (see appendix below). But the Romans generally left 
the region to manage its own affairs internally unless it reached a crisis point—and 
this seems from the narrative of Josephus, at least, not to have happened nearly as 
much in Galilee as in Judaea. 
Our investigation of Roman administration and taxation of Palestine corroborates 
Mann’s description of the Roman Empire as infrastructurally weak. At the beginning 
of the Early Roman period, the Romans relied upon local officials for the administra-
tion of the region and directly intervened only on rare occasion. Insofar as Hyrcanus’ 
government was effective, it was largely left to its own devices. But the fact that the 
Romans had never successfully quelled the internecine conflict between the 
supporters of Hyrcanus and of Aristobulus led the region to repeatedly relapse into 
civil war. Aside from a brief interlude in which Caesar affirmed Judaea’s internal 
autonomy and systematized the tribute obligations, the situation was often chaot ic. 
These conditions meant that Roman tax collection was fairly ineffective. While the 
system of contracting tax collection to publicani guaranteed revenues to the state, the 
ability of the tax farmer to profit hinged on their ability to extract payments in excess 
of the contract’s cost. The volatile political landscape, coupled with the quite limited 
knowledge that these foreign publicani would have of the region and its productive 
potential, made it difficult for these Roman officials to actually collect revenue effi-
ciently and thoroughly. Roman power at this time was felt most strongly in its occa-
sional despotism, when particular governors or generals made sudden, excessive 
demands of the population and threatened them with violence if they failed to comply 
in a timely manner.  
Herodian rule over Palestine was also infrastructurally weak. Despite the greater 





ored to expand bureaucratic institutions that would have improved the capacity of the 
king to enforce his will on the populace and extract resources from it efficiently. The 
administration was small and held close to the chest, as Herod at least delegated his 
authority to relatives, but the everyday activities of a Galilean were unlikely to 
involve the administration at all outside the collection of taxes and tolls. And as 
Joseph G. Manning has noted, even strong bureaucracies are no guarantee of effi -
ciency, since it allots to the bureaucrat considerable control given their positions as 
brokers with asymmetrical information.
238
 It was even more unlikely that Galileans 
had much interaction with Roman agents at that time, since the kingdoms were inde-
pendent political entities and Roman officials played no role in managing the state, 
intervening only occasionally during crises or a change in ruler. 
When Palestine came under direct Roman rule again, provincial subjects might 
occasional encounter the governor, his small staff, and the military, but much of the 
day-to-day operation was still in the hands of the native elite and local administrators. 
As much as possible, the Romans outsourced the administrative functions to the local 
elite in their provinces. In the relative backwater of Galilee, we can detect no hint of 
direct engagement with Roman officials; when the governor is depicted hearing cases, 
he is always in Caesarea or Jerusalem. Most direct engagement with Romans occurred 
in these two cities, and otherwise Roman authority was only felt through its expres-
sion in the form of local retainers. Though the province was again subjected to tribute 
payments, the Romans did not attempt to reinstitute tax-farming as the mechanism for 
tax collection, instead taking the path of least resistance: co-opting existing infra-
structures for tax collection conducted by provincial administrators. Use of provin-
cials to collect tribute was a double-edged sword: outsourcing collection to natives 
meant relying on agents with better access to information in a state with poor bureau-
cracy, but it also gave them considerable control in the flow of said information and 
opportunities to mitigate the burden the Roman state could impose.239 It seems again 
that the Romans were more concerned with maintaining a regular and reliable flow of 
revenues to the imperial coffers than they were concerned to milk the province for all 
it was worth. 
What should be clear from the above discussion is that Roman Imperial govern-
ance was in many cases experienced indirectly. Seth Schwartz was correct to question 
the common characterization of Pompey’s Settlement of the East as a watershed—in 
many ways, and for many areas, little about the state apparatus changed substantively 
with the advent of Rome.
240
 As much as possible, the Romans preferred to leave the 
region to local administration and interfere only when called upon to do so by the 
population, as in adjudicating matters of dispute. Even Roman taxation, when it was 
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effective, was conducted indirectly through Jewish tax collectors, customs agents, and 
market officials like agoranomoi.
241
 The oscillation between client kingdom and prov-
ince and between partitioned regions and united whole had important effects on the 
ways that economic interactions unfolded by changing the nature of political and tax 
barriers. But these boundaries did not wholly interrupt the patterns of movement 
between Galilee and Judaea (see chapters 2 and 4) and their effect was often marginal 
on the Galilean regional economy. For most of the Early Roman Period, and espe-
cially the period of direct rule, Galilee was a marginal region that saw little direct 
interaction with the agents of the imperial government. 
In this chapter, we also considered the potential role of non-state institutions—in 
particular, religious institutions—in shaping the context in which Galilean Jews made 
decisions about how to behave and how to manage their resources. While these insti -
tutions would still need to be considered in the case of a strong set of state institutions 
over Galilee, the fact that the state seems to have been infrastructurally weak only 
heightens the case for religious institutions playing a substantial role in bounding the 
rationality of various economic choices. We will return to examine some Jewish reli -
gious institutions in detail in chapters 3 and 4. But before doing so, we will turn to 
Galilee’s regional economy and the networks along which and within which economic 
transactions were conducted. These networks will not only have implications for the 
conduits of trade, but also for the formulation, spread, and enforcement of norms of 
behavior important for our subsequent discussions of religious institutions in Galilee.  
Appendix: Galilee’s Shifting Borders 
As we have seen above, the border lines that separated the various administrative 
regions within Palestine changed numerous times over the course of the Early Roman 
period. For our study of Galilee, the following transformations are of note, especially 
for considering the potential effects of portoria on the movement of resources in and 
out of this region under different political geographies: 
(1) It is not clear if Pompey’s reorganization of Syria would have 
created new borderlines for the purposes of reckoning portoria, since 
Judaea and the other territories were components of the same province, 
Koile-Syria, despite the administrative subdivision. Accordingly, traffic 
through the Levant would not have been impeded by tolls. However, 
even within the province of Asia, autonomous “free cities” seem to 
have collected portoria at their bounds. Removal of the cities from 
Judaea certainly impoverished the resources of the Judaean administra-
tion since the revenues were no longer directed to the Jerusalem 
regional government.  
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(2) Under Herod’s kingdom, Judaea was detached from Syria, creating 
new borders. This would likely have created new portoria collections 
on the coastal road north of Caesarea and around the free cities of 
Ascalon and Gaza, and perhaps along some routes between Galilee and 
the cities nearest to it—Ptolemais, Tyre, Hippos, Gadara, and 
Scythopolis. Caesar’s bestowal of Gaza, Gadara, and Hippos shifted 
borders again, and for Galilee meant the removal of a financial barrier 
to trade with Hippos and Gadara. The intervention of Scythopolis, a 
Syrian Decapolis city, in the route through the Jordan disincentivized 
that route for traffic to Peraea and the Dead Sea region. The addition of 
territories northeast of Lake Kinneret expanded the toll-free zone 
northeastward, but the degree of trade contact between this region and 
Golan seems to have been minimal. 
(3) The partition of Herod’s kingdom in 4 BCE was arguably the most 
significant imposition of trade disincentives due to portoria. Carving 
up the kingdom meant again imposing barriers between Galilee and 
Judaea, as well as between Galilee and Golan. As a significant revenue 
stream, we should suppose that each of the client rulers maintained 
some sort of import/export tax. For Galilee, this probably meant the 
introduction of customs posts on the major route through Samaria to 
Jerusalem, as well as on the east–west road running along the northern 
coast of Lake Kinneret between Upper Galilee and the Golan. Customs 
posts were also likely located on the lakeshore (see, e.g., the toll booth 
in Mark 2:14, seemingly at Capernaum) to collect dues on traffic to 
Philip’s kingdom and the Decapolis cities, which were again annexed 
to Syria. These borders remained largely the same from 4 BCE to 41 CE 
despite changes in the administration elsewhere in Palestine. 
(4) With the death of Philip in 34 CE, the tetrarchy was annexed to Syria 
and thus the border between Golan and the Decapolis was erased. 
(5) In 37 CE, Agrippa I inherited Philip’s tetrarchy as a kingdom, 
cleaving it off from Syria once again, and reintroducing the potential 
for toll collection on the north–south road on the east side of the lake. 
With his inheritance of Antipas’ tetrarchy in 39 CE, the portoria 
between Galilee and Golan would again be lifted, though the movement 
of goods between Peraea and these regions were still interrupted by the 
Decapolis cities and would entail border tolls. In 41 CE, Agrippa I’s 
kingdom was expanded to encompass all of Herod’s kingdom (and 
more), at long last removing the borders imposed in 4 BCE between the 
Jewish-occupied regions and thus lessening the barriers to trade 
between them. Moreover, the inclusion of Gadara and Hippos expanded 





(6) In 44 CE, the whole kingdom of Agrippa I was made a province, 
meaning little change in the border (perhaps the removal of Hippos, 
Gadara, and Gaza again). 
(7) In 53 CE, the tetrarchy of Philip was split off from the province of 
Judaea, re-imposing borders and portoria between Galilee and Golan. 
In 55 CE, the toparchies of Tiberias and Magdala on the west side of the 
lake were joined to Agrippa II’s kingdom, splitting them from the rest 
of Galilee and creating new border crossings along the north–south 
highway running beside the western lakeshore and the east–west 
highway running from Ptolemais to Tiberias. Depending on the extent 
of Magdala’s toparchy, it may have cut Galilee off from the lake alto-
gether, with implications for trade to the Decapolis cities on the other 






CHAPTER 2—CAST THE NET AND YE SHALL FIND 
Galilee’s Regional Economic Network 
A major concern of specialist scholarship on the economy of Early Roman Galilee has 
been how to assess the economic conditions experienced by the majority of Galilee’s 
inhabitants, especially the agrarian base often referred to as “peasants.” Were these 
people oppressed by an economic system of exploitation, in which a small , urban elite 
controlled a disproportionate amount of wealth and extracted what they needed from a 
countryside of insular, autarkic farmers who struggled to get by? Or were these peas-
ants multi-faceted, engaged in a variety of productive activities, engaged in reciprocal 
market exchange with other communities, and thriving despite tax burdens and envi -
ronmental uncertainty? To assess the economic conditions in Early Roman Galilee, 
scholars of both views have attempted to frame the question in terms of so-called 
“urban–rural relations.” Given that cities depended on the surrounding countryside for 
their resource needs, the question goes, did cities obtain these resources through 
extractive rents and taxes, or through trade exchanges that might be considered recip-
rocal (or at least not wholly parasitic)?  
The “urban–rural” lens used to assess the economic conditions in Galilee is 
fundamentally grounded in the conceptual framework of Moses Finley’s model of the 
ancient Mediterranean economy. Setting aside the criticisms and developments of this 
model in the four decades since he authored The Ancient Economy,
242
 the assumptions 
on which the model is based accord poorly with what we know of the settlement 
pattern in Early Roman Galilee. Finley’s model focused on parts of the ancient Greek 
and Roman worlds where large cities with politically attached territories were 
common, if not the norm, and were therefore a reasonable basis for analysis. Galilee 
in the Early Roman period, as we shall see, looked quite different: it was a land of 
villages and towns with a handful of relatively small cities, none of which were large 
enough to warrant the assumption that they inherently commanded and overburdened 
the surrounding settlements. Galilee did not contain a “primate city”—a single, 
disproportionately large settlement that dominates the economic system and on which 
the rest of its periphery depends—to serve as the urban pole in the urban–rural 
dichotomy.
243
 While we cannot outright dismiss the value in assessing the relationship 
of these cities to the smaller settlements, we need to recalibrate it for local conditions 
in Galilee. Myopically focusing on the urban–rural axis overstates the cities’ role in 
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determining the contours of the economic network and obscures the overall economic 
system and its effects on the agrarian population. 
In this chapter, I make the case for viewing Galilee through a different lens. 
Rather than conceptualizing the economic network as a hub and spokes, in which the 
primary connections are between a city and the surrounding villages, we do better to 
visualize Galilee as a well-integrated web of villages and towns. Glimpses in the 
literary sources of movement through the region suggest the ease of travel through the 
region from settlement to settlement, making communication and trade easy at the 
regional level. The material evidence from Galilee and Golan is distinctive when 
compared against the largely gentile-populated cities and settlements that surround 
them to the west, north, and east, and from Samaria to the south, and suggest a rela-
tively insular and circumscribed regional economy. This model has implications for 
how we understand the configuration of social networks in Galilee and with it the 
social mechanisms for enforcing religious institutions and norms there, topics we will 
develop in chapters 3 and 4. I also propose that the evidence for economic stratifica-
tion in not just urban but even rural sites undermines the notion that Galilee was 
composed of a homogeneous peasantry struggling to meet the bare minimum to 
survive. Not only does this undermine notions of urban–rural economic conflict based 
on polarized wealth disparity, but it also forces us to recognize that not all agricultur-
alists were struggling just to meet their food needs and many could produce sufficient 
resources to allow them to fulfill the religious obligations of the Torah. 
By looking at Galilee through a different lens, one that allocates a more modest 
and, I believe, accurate place to the cities in this economic network, we can bypass 
the ongoing debate about whether rural relations with the cities were positive or 
negative. This approach also allows us to mitigate the importance that scholars have 
granted to the political and economic elite (i.e., the urban elite) in determining how 
economic interactions were conducted and how peasants managed their resources. In 
so doing, we may shift our focus to considering the role that social forces and reli-
gious institutions played in configuring the economic system in which Galilean Jews 
participated. By denying the absolute position of the city and its power to extract 
resources, command the markets, and keep the villages powerless under their thumbs, 
we also free ourselves to look at the rest of the population as active players, making 
their own strategic decisions, acting in ways that resist, subvert, or evade the power 
wielded by those with ample resources. If there was a shift in the pattern of move-
ment, communication, and interaction that accompanied the founding of new cities, 
we must not think of it in terms of an irresistible imposition of new relations of domi-
nation and dependency, but as a change in incentives and demography to which 
agrarians (as agents in and of themselves) responded in complex ways. Another way 
to put this is that we allow that the agrarian base acted with tactics of their own 
device in participating in economic transaction and cooperation, even if they were 
compelled to play within the strategic bounds of an economic field defined by 
political elites. 
In order to assess the utility of this “web-like” model of economic interactions 





excavating sites in Galilee over the last few decades have produced important data 
about economic production and consumption, infrastructure facilitating movement 
and trade, and the location of relative wealth between and within settlements. The 
archaeological data sadly cannot be resolved to a depth that allows us to differentiate 
much within the Early Roman period. Moreover, the archaeological record leaves 
only hints of trade: only non-organics survive, with few exceptions, and in many 
cases we know the place of consumption but can only infer the place of origin and/or 
the route of transmission. Nevertheless, those hints are incredibly valuable, especially 
insofar as ceramic storage vessels may signal the trade network in foodstuffs. We will 
also look to literary evidence to try to corroborate and expand upon the impression the 
archaeological record gives. Sections in the writings of Josephus and the New Testa-
ment gospels are instructive in their depictions of movement through Galilee, even 
though they do not generally depict economic interactions. The episodic and modular 
nature of these narratives complicates their utility as a depiction of movement, but I 
shall argue that they often depict regional travel in a way that is realistic if somewhat 
incomplete and impressionistic. The movement of people depicted in these sources 
may serve as a proxy, indicating the habitual tendencies of people communicating 
between settlements in the region and therefore indicating natural connections for 
economic interaction as well, given the highly interpersonal nature of premodern 
trade.  
Modeling Economy in Early Roman Galilee 
In his chapter on “Town and Country,” Moses Finley defined the ancient city by its 
function as a consumer: “All residents of a city who are not directly engaged in 
primary production derive their food and raw materials from the producers in the 
countryside.”
244
 Finley did not view the existence of urban craftsmen and merchants 
as a threat to this model; the products of these craftsmen and tradesmen were directed 
inward to the urban elite (rather than outward to the countryside), and they were 
dependent for their livelihoods on the urban elites, whose wealth in turn was extracted 
from the countryside through rents imposed on their tenants.
245
 According to the 
consumer city model, therefore, this relationship between “town and country” was 
characterized by the unidirectional flow of resources from country to town. Higher-
order goods produced in the city were directed toward the urban elite, as were handi-
crafts produced outside the city. The peasant population of the countryside strove for 
self-sufficiency and abstained from engaging in trade even at the regional level.
246
 
According to this model, the ancient city’s existence was wholly dependent on the 
extraction of resources from the countryside to the city rather than reciprocal 
exchange with the countryside. There was minimal overland commerce since the 
                                                          
244
 Finley, The Ancient Economy, 125. 
245
 Finley, The Ancient Economy, 125. 
246





countryside was self-sufficient and the food needs of the city were achieved through 
collecting taxes and rents in kind to feed the urban proletariat, and so there was little 
need or opportunity for the countryside to engage in farming as a commercial activity.  
This model presumes the existence of large cities, especially the sort of Greek 
poleis that came to dominate the landscape of the Hellenistic East after Alexander.
247
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The wealthy landowning elite clustered in these cities as political and cultural centers, 
while drawing their resources from a surrounding territory—the chora—that was both 
politically and economically subject to the city through mechanisms of city taxes and 
rents to absentee landlords. Such systems continued under the Roman Empire, espe-
cially when cities with a pedigree as Hellenistic poleis were granted nominal “auton-
omous” status by the new imperial power and retained the ability to impose city taxes 
and maintained direct control over a dependent chora. On the periphery of Early 
Roman Galilee were a number of such cities, e.g., Scythopolis and Tyre, whose terri-
tories in part defined the bounds of Galilee. 
A number of scholars of Early Roman Galilee, in particular New Testament 
scholars and others working primarily with literary sources, have applied the Finley 
model to understand the conditions accompanying Herod Antipas’ establishment of 
Sepphoris and Tiberias as cities in the early first century CE. Richard Horsley has 
characterized these as “consumer cities,” the construction of which created new impo-
sitions on the autarkic village population. He presumes that the creation of these 
settlements brought with it the same conditions of unilateral extraction of resources 
from the countryside by making the villages economic dependencies of the city 
subject to taxes and by alienating peasants from their land and forcing them into 
tenancy. The model allows Horsley to argue that erecting these cities added 
substantial economic burdens to a peasant population already struggling at the 







 and John Kloppenborg
251
 all have argued that the 
founding of Sepphoris and Tiberias put significant economic pressure on the Galilean 
peasantry, seeing hints of the peasants’ deteriorating economic conditions and their 
anxiety in Jesus’ messages of egalitarianism and role-reversal.
252
 Seán Freyne 
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perceives tensions between city and countryside, though he places greater emphasis 
on social/cultural conflict than on actual economic disparities.
253
 Even where the 
urban–rural relationship per se is not at focus, scholars often presume it in positing a 
narrative of a widening wealth gap between the elites (assumed to correlate with 
Sepphorites and Tiberians) and the poor (assumed to correlate with villagers).
254
 
It is remarkable that scholars drawing on Finley’s work have applied the 
consumer city model to the cities in Galilee with so little modification. Finley’s 
model has been subject to decades of debate among Greek and Roman historians, 
qualifying many aspects of it, including the notion that all ancient cities were 
“consumers” and that trade was marginal.
255
 One major difficulty with the consumer 
city model is that it draws a clear dichotomy between city and country. There were 
often settlements of various intermediary sizes, however, and their role in the model 
is unclear. Rob Witcher has demonstrated the multidimensional role of the suburbia 
around Rome, which acts both as consumer and producer, and constitutes a place for 
urban–rural interaction.
256
 Others have sought to reorganize the model into a hier-
archy of settlements, with Rome at top, metropoleis below, followed by smaller cities, 
towns, and villages in turn.
257
 According to Greg Woolf’s model, the difference 
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between settlements is that the settlements higher on the hierarchy were capable of 
providing “higher order” goods and services, while “lower order” goods and services 
were dispersed throughout the settlements lower in the hierarchies. The distinction, 
basically, is that comestibles and everyday needs could easily have been met by going 
to a town market, whereas larger cities were able to offer goods and services that were 
more specialized or harder to come by, due to the “gravity” of these sites as central 
places.
258
 Neville Morley has argued for a similar model, and also recognized that the 
consumer city model fails to account for the variety of cities that existed.
259
 Different 
regional, geographic, and ecological factors, for instance, play a role in determining 
the relationships between cities, smaller settlements, and the countryside. He also 
suggested that cities should not necessarily be considered units of their own, separate 
from the countryside; where they were mutually dependent on one another we do 
better to conceive of them together as an “urban unit.”
260
 
The models of Witcher, Woolf, and Morley are helpful correctives in their own 
right, but even these do not seem wholly appropriate for Galilee. These scholars are 
working with parts of the Roman world where there were large cities that can be 
placed at the top of a hierarchical system. Even the largest cities in Galilee would 
only rank as a large town if they were transplanted into Asia Minor or Italy. It is 
harder to so sharply distinguish a hierarchy of settlements within Galilee, and for this 
reason I suspect that the differences are of relatively minor importance.  
As we shall see below, the archaeologists working in Galilee over the last few 
decades have painted a very different picture. They have argued that trade was amply 
attested and a common and important facet of the economy, to some extent following 
the arguments of Keith Hopkins that trade and monetized economy were well -inte-
grated aspects of the ancient Mediterranean world by the Roman period. They have 
also questioned the notion that cities were entirely parasitic entities on the country-
side. But while these archaeologists tend to characterize the relationship between city 
and country as more mutually beneficial and engaged in inter-settlement trade, the 
framing of this discussion is still often heavily indebted to Finley’s model. The recip-
rocal model perpetuates the notion that the urban–rural dichotomy is still productive 
and meaningful, and still identifies the cities as the focal nexus for trade.  
I find Douglas Edwards’ propositions about the Galilean economy a fitting 
starting point. He argues that cities, towns, and villages were quite similar insofar as 
they were sites of production as well as consumption, and insofar as their inhabitants 
all sought to diversify, store, and redistribute their resources to achieve thei r resource 
needs.
261
 He argues that the settlement pattern of Galilee, densely packed with 
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villages and hamlets, would have allowed for a highly interconnected trade network 
with a greater volume of regional trade than Finley’s model assumes.
262
 And a 
significant amount of this trade took place between villages, bypassing the cities 
altogether.
263
 Since most settlements were situated within easy walking distance from 
one another, it was easy for people, goods, and information to travel between 
settlements fairly quickly. 
What Douglas envisions is essentially 
a web-like network, in which most settle-
ments were engaged with neighboring 
settlements, rather than a hub-and-spokes 
network in which cities were the primary 
locus for interconnection.
264
 We may also 
think about this in terms of “small world” 
networks. In such networks, there is a 
high level of “clustering,” a term that 
connotes the high density and redundancy 
of interconnections, or in other words, 
the likelihood that one’s direct connections will in turn be  connected to one another 
(see Error! Reference source not found.B). Such networks also exhibit short 
paths—i.e., the minimum number of connections—between any two given nodes in 
the network.
265
 This differs from the hub-and-spokes model not in path length (since 
the city hub is a common connection to all) but in clustering, since most interactions 
are brokered through the city rather than through other varied conduits (see Figure 
8A). In the following sections, we shall look at the ways that settlement patterns, 
patterns of movement, and evidence of trade fit this characterization of the inter -
settlement network that characterized Galilee in this period.  
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Figure 8. Two network configurations: hub-and-





Settlement Density and Settlement Size 
The urban–rural model is predicated on a bifurcation of the sites into two easily-
distinguishable categories, and population size is one of the more crucial metrics for 
making this distinction. The larger the population of a settlement, the greater the 
resources needed to support it, and at a certain threshold, a settlement cannot support 
itself from land directly worked by its inhabitants. We cannot estimate population 
directly for Galilee or any of its sites in this period from the literary evidence in 
Josephus. The numbers in Josephus’ writings are notoriously exaggerated and unreli -
able, as a quote from Jewish War makes clear: “The cities are so packed and the 
multitude of villages are everywhere so populous due to the abundance [of produce] 
that the smallest of them contains more than fifteen thousand inhabitants” (3.43). 
Even the terminology used in the literary sources to differentiate settlement categories 
is frustratingly imprecise. Josephus sometimes uses the words for city (πόλις) and 
village (κώμα) interchangeably for the very same settlement.
266
 The New Testament 
gospels seem to use the term for city somewhat arbitrarily, applying it even to such a 
tiny site as first-century Nazareth (Matt 2:23; Luke 1:26; 2:4, 39; 4:29).
267
 The 
ancient terminology is complicated by the fact that κώμα and especially πόλις some-
times indicate political status, available services, and public structures rather than 
simply a difference in size.
268
 The Hebrew and Aramaic terms deployed in the 
rabbinic sources are more numerous and potentially offer more nuance, but as Zeʼev 
Safrai has noted, these texts are often indiscriminate in their application of termi-




In order to suss out population numbers, we are reliant on archaeological data. 
The best available method for determining population figures multiplies the area of 
the settlement—as determined through excavation or archaeological survey—by a 
population density figure. Surface surveys give a general impression of site area from 
the scatters of pottery sherds and architectural fragments visible on the surface. Exca-
vated sites give a firmer sense of the settlement area, but in most cases the full extent 
of the site has not yet been determined or cannot be determined due to continued 
occupation in later periods. Magen Broshi proposed a range of 400 to 500 residents 
per hectare for the densely populated walled cities of later Roman Palestine in his 
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attempt to derive a population estimate for the whole region.
270
 But that multiplier is 
significantly greater than the ones typically used to estimate population in other 
regions, such as Greece and Egypt. As Andrew Wilson notes, multipliers ranging 
from 100 to 400 for ancient cities are common.
271
 Simon Price prefers a multiplier of 
110 to 250 per hectare for orthogonal Greek cities, and as few at 40 to 60 per hectare 
for unplanned villages and towns.
272
 It seems quite unlikely that population density in 
settlements of Early Roman Palestine was substantially higher than elsewhere, and we 
would be wise to incline toward more conservative estimates in assessing population 
in Galilee. 
For an area of only about 1,500 square kilometers, Galilee was quite densely 
settled. Josephus’ claim that “there are 204 cities and villages throughout Galilee” 
(Life 235) accords surprisingly well with what we know of settlement density in the 
eastern Galilee and western Golan from archaeological surveys undertaken over the 
last few decades.
273
 Both Douglas Edwards and Uzi Leibner have concluded from 
their use of survey data that Galilee saw a marked expansion in the number of settle-
ments in the Early Roman period compared to the Hellenistic and Hasmonaean 
periods that preceded it.
274
 But the density in the Early Roman period did not press 
the land’s carrying capacity to its limits, as Galilee’s population boomed in the 
Middle Roman period, in no small part due to migrations from Judaea after the two 
failed revolts.
275
 Many of the settlements in Galilee sit upon the hilltops, leaving the 
fertile valleys below open and available for cultivation (though hillsides too were 
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used for terraced agriculture),
276
 and many of them naturally cluster around springs 




Sepphoris and Tiberias were the largest settlements in Galilee in the first century 
CE. That they stood at the top of the regional administrative hierarchy under Antipas 
is unquestionable—they would have been the locus for the regional collection of taxes 
and tribute payments, housed the royal bank and archives, and served as palace cities 
(Life 37–39). They also retained regional administrative functions as toparchies under 
later Herodian kings and Roman direct rule (see ch. 1). But in terms of population and 
resource demands, to imagine them as cities on par with Tyre, Ptolemais, Caesarea, or 
the Decapolis cities on Galilee’s periphery would be misleading. Sepphoris and Tibe -
rias paled in size compared to Scythopolis or Caesarea Maritima, which may have 
been as large as 100 hectares in the Early Roman period.
278
 We must put Sepphoris 
and Tiberias in perspective: they were minor cities whose importance was chiefly 
                                                          
276
 On terracing and other agricultural techniques employed in antiquity to maximize the cultiva -
tion of arable land in the Galilean hill country, see B. Golomb and Y. Kedar, “Ancient Agriculture in 
the Galilee Mountains,” IEJ 21 (1971): 136–40.  
277
 Leibner, Settlement and History, 14–17, 316–19. 
278
 Reed, whose assessment of the cities’ sizes is higher than I would propose, nonetheless notes 
that they are incomparable to the poleis on Galilee’s periphery and were of only regional rather than 
international importance; Archaeology and the Galilean Jesus, 93–94. 









The continuous occupation and expansion of Tiberias and Sepphoris over the 
course of the Roman and Byzantine periods has two unfortunate consequences for us: 
(1) little evidence remains for first-century structures and (2) it is difficult to deter-
mine the extent of the earlier cities. Magen Broshi’s initial estimate of the site of 
Sepphoris set the area at 60 hectares, but his estimate was based on the site in later 
centuries.
280
 Moreover, the excavators of the Joint Sepphoris Project (JSP) have 
reduced this figure to 35 hectares.
281
 Even this may overestimate size in the first 
century. This figure includes both the hilltop and the city grid in the plain below it. 
The city grid, built around two axial streets—the cardo and decumanus—represents 
an expansion of the settlement that according to the JSP probably occurred in the 
second century CE. This dating was made on the basis of probes beneath the paving 
stones that revealed second century coins, indicating the expansion took place well 
after the First Jewish Revolt and perhaps even after the Bar Kokhba Revolt.
282
 They 
also identified an earlier limestone plaster street beneath the stone pavers; the pres -
ence of a coin minted by Archelaus would be consistent with the construction of the 
earlier axis and grid under Antipas (as C. Thomas McCollough and Douglas Edwards 
argue), but it only establishes the terminus post quem.
283
 The theater on the plain, 
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aligned with the axial streets and covering multiple blocks, would also date from 
around the time of the orthogonal city expansion. While the University of South 
Florida (USF) team initially dated this theater to the first century, the JSP has 
convincingly redated the theater to the post-70 period on the basis of late first-century 
potsherds uncovered from probes beneath the theater’s outer wall, as well as its 
general congruence with second-century building practices in the region.
284
 The 
development of Sepphoris by Antipas is perhaps more plausibly associated with the 
Early Roman expansions on the western summit, which are not orthogonal but still 
exemplify some amount of urban planning. The foundation trenches for the walls of 
the domiciles there support a first-century CE dating, possibly under Antipas but 
potentially under Agrippa I or the procurators.
285
 As a minimalist assessment, if first-
century CE Sepphoris were confined to the hilltop and slopes, it could have been as 
modestly sized as 8 hectares.
286
 The orthogonal expansion onto the plain may better 
cohere with the period after the First Jewish Revolt, when Galilee’s population 
dramatically expanded with the influx of refugees and settlers from Judaea and 
Sepphoris was developed and renamed Diocaesarea. 
The size of Tiberias in the Early Roman period is even harder to discern. Unlike 
Sepphoris, Tiberias has remained an inhabited city up to the present day. As a result, 
extensive excavations have only been possible in select areas of the city, supple-
mented by the finds uncovered in salvage excavations conducted during modern 
construction projects. Most of the archaeological material that has been recovered 
dates to the Byzantine period.
287
 The city gate and cardo that define the orthogonal 
grid of the ancient city were once dated to the first century CE, but more recent probes 
beneath the paving stones indicate that the cardo was constructed sometime in the 
second or third century.
288
 The only major structures securely datable to the Early 
                                                                                                                                                                             
certain. For the JSP/Hebrew University dating, see Zeev Weiss, “Sepphoris: From Galilean Town to 
Roman City, 100 BCE–200 CE,” in Fiensy and Strange, Galilee, vol. 2, 55, 62; Zeev Weiss and Ehud 
Netzer, “Architectural Development of Sepphoris during the Roman and Byzantine Periods,” in 
Edwards and McCollough, Archaeology and the Galilee, 117–30 at 118. 
284
 James F. Strange suggests that the theater was constructed by Antipas, though again on the 
basis of Antipas as a likely agent for urban development; see “Sepphoris: The Jewe l of the Galilee,” 
28. For the JSP’s revised dating, see Weiss, “Sepphoris: From Galilean Town to Roman City,” 66. 
Even if we understand the theater as a two-phase construction, originally built under Antipas and 
expanded after 70, the pre-70 theater would have been quite modest in size.  
285
 Eric M. Meyers, Carol L. Meyers, and Benjamin D. Gordon, “Sepphoris: Residential Area of 
the Western Summit,” in Fiensy and Strange, Galilee, vol. 2, 43–44. 
286
 The value given by Steve Mason, in Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary, vol. 9, 
Life of Josephus (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 194. 
287
 Moreover, no official reports were ever published for the first two excavation projects led by 
B. Ravan and A. Druks respectively; See Katia Cytryn-Silverman, “Tiberias, from Its Foundation to 
the End of the Early Islamic Period,” in Fiensy and Edwards, Galilee, vol. 2, 188–89. 
288
 Yizhar Hirschfeld and Katharina Galor supported the dating of the cardo to the first century 
on the basis of its axial alignment with the traces of a Herodian palace structure found beneath 
remains of a later basilica; “New Excavations in Roman, Byzantine, and Early Islamic Tiberias,” in 
Zangenberg, Attridge, Martin, eds., Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee, 207–30 at 
















Roman period uncovered so far are the theater and stadium, the latter probably 
outside the city proper.
289
 Excavations beneath a later basilica have also revealed 
fragments of an opus sectile floor and plaster painted in second Pompeian style—both 
of which are consistent with Herodian palatial architecture—together with ceramic 
fragments dating to the first century CE; these fragmentary remains probably came 
from a wealthy mansion, quite possibly Antipas’ palace.
290
 In addition to the archaeo-
logically attested remains, we can also add to the city features a proseuche (prayer 
house, or synagogue). The proseuche is a prominent setting in Josephus’ Life, where 
it is depicted as the largest building in town and serves as the site of sizable commu-
nity gatherings (277–284). The later Byzantine walls encompass a settlement of 60 
hectares, but the excavators have estimated the size of the Roman-period settlement at 
about 30 hectares.
291
 Aside from the stadium, which is typically located near but 
outside a city, the extant first-century remains are concentrated in the southeastern 
part of the later walled area. Given the paucity of information, we must keep in mind 
that even the 30 hectare estimate is an educated guess, and the northern areas may 
represent later expansion.  
On the other end of the spectrum 
were villages, some of which were 
minuscule. According to Leibner’s 
survey of sites in southeastern 
Galilee, about 95 percent of the 
settlements in eastern Lower Galilee 
in the Early Roman period were 0.4 
to 6 hectares, while the plurality of 
sites were a meager 0.4 to 1 hectare 
(see Figure 10).
292
 Many of these 
sites have not been excavated and 
their size is determined primarily 
from the surface scatter of pottery. In 
cases where these small villages have 
been excavated, such as Shikhin (conservatively estimated at 2.3 hectares),
293
 they 
generally consist of domestic and workshop spaces constructed in fairly simple 
building techniques from local, uncut fieldstones and lack indications of central 
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planning. In the Early Roman period, most of them also lack discernible monumental 
public buildings, such as synagogues, which become commonplace even in very small 
settlements in the Late Roman period. Among these relatively small settlements, there 
is also a considerable difference in size from tiny hamlets to fairly substantial hilltop 
settlements like Yodefat. And, as we shall see below, the villages (especially larger 
ones) often show signs of internal wealth stratification and differentiation in produc-
tive industries.  
We can look to Capernaum as an example of a moderately large village. As with 
Sepphoris and Tiberias, the long settlement history has resulted in fairly sparse 
recovery of Early Roman structures and materials. Most of the site as it lies exposed 
today reveals the Byzantine-period settlement, and the excavations did not generally 
proceed to earlier layers. Because of this, assessing the full extent of the Early Roman 
phase of the site is difficult. Reed offers a reasonable assessment of the site’s size in 
this period as 6 hectares (and no more than 10 hectares), which he uses to derive a 
population of 600–1,500.
294
 Even at the smaller end of this spectrum, we can charac-
terize Capernaum as one of the larger villages or a small town. In terms of the layout 
(organic rather than centrally planned and orthogonal), construction (unhewn local 
fieldstone), and lack of built public structures (no built market stalls, no discernible 
synagogue), it looks substantially different from settlements like Sepphoris.
295
 But its 
position on the lake and at the frontiers of two client kingdoms (in the period from 4 
BCE to 39 CE) also made it an important crossroads, and the presence of a toll collec-
tion post (on the road, port, or both; Mark 2:13–14) and a royal army commander 
stationed there (Matt 8:5–13; Luke 7:1–10; John 4:46–54) lend to this impression.  
We can also identify a tier of sites situated somewhere between the two “cities” 
and the spectrum of villages. In Leibner’s survey region, Magdala (also called Migdal 
or Tarichaeae) stands out as substantially larger than the rest—over 9 hectares.
296
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More recent excavations indicate that even that is an underestimate.
297
 The settlement 
also looks considerably different from the villages in its layout, construction tech-
niques, infrastructure, and public buildings. In addition to the waterworks noted by 
Leibner in 2009, the Magdala Project excavations have revealed large public spaces 
(e.g., a quadroporticus, area F), paved roads (including a cardo) complete with 
covered sewer system, and a synagogue decorated with painted plaster, all datable to 
the Early Roman period.
298
 Excavations have revealed city blocks of very well-built 
houses, constructed of large hewn stones tightly fitted together, in contrast to the 
rough, fieldstone constructions that characterize the domiciles in the smaller settle-
ments of Galilee.
299
 That Magdala exhibits this urban character should not be 
surprising. Josephus indicates that Magdala was an administrative center, as one of 
the toparchies of eastern Galilee (War 2.252), and he refers to its public entertainment 
facilities, namely a hippodrome (Life 132).
300
 That it maintained civic officials and 
regulated marketplaces—as Tiberias and surely Sepphoris did—is also indicated by 
the inscribed agoranomos weights with a supposed provenance from here.
301
 Though 
some earlier scholars have in the past dismissed the identification of Magdala as a city 
in Galilee, recent excavations confront us with a site of clearly urban nature.
302
 Even 
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if Magdala was substantially smaller than Tiberias and/or Sepphoris in the Early 
Roman period—which, as noted above, we cannot be certain about—it indicates that 
the pattern of settlements was more complex than a facile division of Sepphoris and 
Tiberias as large, demanding settlements over a landscape of country villages.  
Nor is Magdala alone. The hilltop settlement of Gamla in the southeastern Golan 
Heights covered an area of about 15 hectares at the time of its destruction during the 
First Jewish Revolt.
303
 The site does not exhibit the same sort of orthogonal layout 
seen at Magdala and (at least later) at Sepphoris and Tiberias, but this is mostly due to 
the steep topography of the ridge on which the settlement rests. The conscious 
construction of terrace housing and a number of east–west-oriented streets do indicate 
some amount of deliberate town planning.
304
 Many of the houses exhibit the construc-
tion techniques of tight-fitting, hewn stones, though there is also ample use of simple 
fieldstone and mud plaster.
305
 The site had at least two public buildings: a synagogue 
complete with attached miqveh,
306
 and a large building the excavators tentatively 
identified as a basilica.
307
 On the basis of both its large area and the public structures, 
Gamla exhibits some similarities to the larger cities and distinctions from the smaller 
Galilean villages. 
The size of sites in Galilee is an important factor for making inferences about 
their relationships. Galilee’s settlement pattern exhibits a broader spectrum than we 
might assume from a simple city–country/urban–rural model, with settlements 
ranging from tiny hamlets less than a hectare in area, to villages of up to 6 hectares, to 
fairly small towns and cities ranging from 9 to a still-modest 35 hectares. The effects 
that the (re-)founding of Sepphoris and Tiberias had on the resource demands of the 
region is dependent on an understanding of how big these settlements were and to 
what extent their resource needs were obtained through command versus trade. Even 
at their zenith in the later Roman and Byzantine periods, Sepphoris and Tiberias never 
came close to approaching the size of the major cities of the coast and the Decap-
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 Accordingly, it is doubtful that either of them exhibited as strong a market 
draw as did those poleis, except perhaps as a secondary market for luxury goods 
imported along the main east–west highway (see below). Given their relatively small 
size, it is also unlikely that Sepphoris and Tiberias exhibited the same resource 
demands on the surrounding countryside that large population centers like 
Scythopolis did. The relatively small population of these settlements meant that much 
of the city’s food needs could be accommodated by inhabitants cultivating the 
agricultural land proximate to the city, as inhabitants of other towns and villages of 
the region did with the lower slopes and valleys adjacent to their settlements. And 
while large poleis usually had a region of land politically attached to it from which to 
draw resources in terms of tax revenue, there is hardly enough evidence to suggest 
such relations of dependency were characteristic of Sepphoris and Tiberias in Galilee. 
While this does not mean that the cities were on an even footing with other settle-
ments, in terms of the relative volume of economic transactions conducted with or 
through them, it does suggest that the system was not so driven toward the cities that 
it precluded strong inter-village network connections. 
Wealth Stratification within Galilean Settlements 
Besides population size, the allocation of wealth and landholdings has been another 
important factor in the analysis of urban–rural relations in Early Roman Galilee. To a 
large extent, wealth and landholding were synonymous in the ancient world; the most 
secure investment of wealth was in the acquisition of real estate and the possession of 
real estate in turn assured some level of agricultural self-sufficiency or income. As 
indicated in the discussion above, the collocation of the wealthy, landholding elite 
with the urban population is an integral component of the consumer city model, 
driving the motor of resources from country tenants to city elites by means of rents. 
Shimon Applebaum in the mid-1970s argued that the late Second Temple period 
was a time of growing economic wealth disparity in Palestine. A population explosion 
put pressure on the availability of landholdings, small-scale farmers became increas-
ingly indebted attempting to subsist on smaller farm plots, and many were alienated 
from their land altogether when they defaulted, resulting in the accumulation of land 
under a small portion of the population. Together, these economic tensions stirred 
popular support for revolt.
309
 Though not uncontested,
310
 this narrative has remained 
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popular especially for those scholars who argue that urban–rural relations in Galilee 
were exploitative and parasitic.
311
 Horsley, for instance, has argued that the wealthy 
landholders who amassed these lands from loan defaults resided in the newly-founded 
cities of Sepphoris and Tiberias as absentee landlords to rural tenants.
312
 According to 
this interpretation, the large-scale landowners were located primarily in the cities, 
while the villages were relatively homogeneous peasant communities with little 
wealth and dwindling landholdings. In other words, the urban–rural relation that 
Applebaum and Horsley present is correlated with the wealth stratification between a 
binary rich and poor. 
The evidence for a growing wealth gap and the consolidation of land is, however, 
quite tenuous. Despite the tantalizing literary references to royal estates, landowners, 
tenants, and farmers, these texts do not indicate whether or not a particular land 
tenure arrangement was more prevalent than any other in a given period.
313
 The New 
Testament parables draw on agricultural settings that surely exhibit verisimilitude to 
real landholding and land-use arrangements. The Parable of the Wicked Servants 
(Matt 21:33–46; Mark 12:1–12; Luke 20:9–19) envisions an absentee landlord with a 
large vineyard let out to multiple tenants. The Parable of the Workers in the Vineyard 
(Matt 20:1–16) and the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11–32) depict the use of 
hired hands in the fields of at least moderately wealthy landholders. But there may be 
other reasons for the over-representation of large-scale landholders in these para-
bles—e.g., the absentee landlord as an apt analogy for God. Several scholars have 
looked to archaeological remains to support the notion of diminishing plot sizes for 
small-scale landholders, using B. Golomb and Y. Kedar’s study of stonewall-bounded 
farm plots.
314
 This study suggested that small landholdings predominated but were too 
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small to support the average family, but the authors made no attempt to distinguish 
these boundaries chronologically, and individual plot size alone is not enough to 
prove the increasing poverty of the agrarian population. After all, diversifying one’s 
landholdings (whether owned or rented) across multiple plots in scattered locations 
was a common practice and was a useful tactic for mitigating the risks of crop failure 
in any given plot.
315
  
Sharon Mattila has looked to the documentary evidence of land registers from 
Philadelphia in Egypt to argue that the generalization that agricultural land ownership 
was concentrated among the urban elites is inaccurate, as is the notion that villagers’ 
landholdings were roughly equal and homogeneous. According to her analysis, over 
92 percent of the private grain land in the village was owned by the villagers them-
selves, not urban absentee landlords. The registers also revealed that among villagers 
there was a considerable range in field size, from meager plots incapable of 
supporting a household to middling plots capable of producing a respectable surplus. 
Urban ownership of orchards was significantly greater but not monopolistic—34 
percent were owned by villagers, again with internal stratification in terms of land-
holding size.
316
 The data from Egypt suggests that the “peasant economy” model does 
a poor job of representing the actual economic conditions of the Mediterranean 
agrarian economy in antiquity. Though we lack comparable documentary evidence 
from Galilee, we may cautiously suggest that the emergence of urban centers in the 
landscape did not necessarily produce conditions of a countryside largely owned by 
the elite members of the urban population. 
Since we cannot accurately assess the allocation of wealth by looking to land-
holding evidence for Galilee, we may find instructive signs of wealth stratification in 
the archaeological evidence for building construction and decoration. This cannot 
produce for us figures to discern absolute levels of wealth, but it is a good indicator of 
the relative difference in wealth and the geographic distribution of the relatively well -
off to the relatively poor.  
Sepphoris and Tiberias, as one might expect, have revealed traces of fancy urban 
residences. At Sepphoris, pieces of colored wall plaster similar to that found in 
Herodian palaces found beneath a second- or third-century residence on the acropolis 
suggest the decorated interior of a wealthy or even royal building, perhaps from the 
first century.
317
 Another structure was re-interpreted by the USF team as a villa 
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urbana, an urban mansion, dating to the first century CE or even earlier.
318
 At Tibe-
rias, the excavators uncovered the remains of what they believe to be Antipas’ palace, 
featuring painted and molded plaster, marble slabs, and opus sectile tiles.
319
 At 
Magdala as well, excavators have uncovered the remains of a villa urbana with a 
pictorial floor mosaic and an aqueduct-fed plaster pool.
320
 Other residential structures 
at Magdala, even when lacking the ornate artistic accoutrements, indicate relative 
wealth in the fine, hewn-stone masonry used to construct them. The presence in some 
of the domiciles of private miqvaʼot may also indicate that they were wealthier resi -
dences, as most would have to make use of public miqvaʼot or natural bodies of water 
for water purification practices.
321
 All of these finds are consistent with the usual 
expectation that cities contained the homes of the wealthy. 
Archaeological excavations in the villages and towns of Galilee have uncovered 
exciting evidence that upsets the traditional identification of the “rural” population 
with the economically homogeneous peasantry. Most of the residential buildings in 
these settlements were small and constructed of unhewn fieldstones, stacked together 
without mortar into precarious-looking (but structurally sound) walls, with floors of 
compacted dirt. Nestled among the poor, unadorned structures of some of the larger 
villages, archaeologists have discovered homes that share some of the decorated 
features of the wealthy structures found at Sepphoris, Tiberias, and Magdala. Among 
the terrace houses of Yodefat, a house was discovered with stucco walls painted in 
Second Pompeian-style fresco and imitation marble.
322
 At Gamla, there was a whole 
residential area whose houses contained the remains of colored fresco walls, along 
with other evidence of wealth such as fine jewelry.
323
 We can discern economic 
stratification of a lesser extent at Khirbet Qana, where some houses were found with 
plastered floors and walls, in contrast to the majority that lacked them, and some 
private miqvaʼot were discovered.
324
 These examples demonstrate that there was 
social stratification within some of the larger villages, and indicates that the strict 
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dichotomy that locates the wealthy elites in the cities is inaccurate, as is the notion of 
homogeneity in the economic conditions of the supposed “peasantry” of the villages. 
The strict rich–poor dichotomy fails; there were indeed people who fell in between.  
We may also discern village wealth or wealth stratification in the presence or 
absence of public buildings. Such structures, especially if well-build, indicate the 
presence of a wealthy local patron who could donate the funds for its construction, or 
enough people making a significant income from their work—agricultural or other-
wise—to pool their resources to pay for the structure’s construction. Where such 
public buildings have been discovered in Galilee, archaeologists have identified them 
as synagogues, though we should note that they were multi-functional rather than 
strictly religious spaces, as the term often connotes.
325
 In addition to the aforemen-
tioned first-century synagogues at Magdala and Gamla, the excavators of Khirbet 
Qana believe they have identified one at their small village site,
326
 and literary refer-
ences suggest synagogues also for Tiberias, Nazareth, and Capernaum.
327
 Such public 
structures need not have been grand or well-decorated—the only ornate first-century 
synagogue discovered so far is the one at Magdala—but would require that at least 
some of the population produced enough means beyond their “subsistence” needs to 
finance the construction of a public, non-domicile structure.
328
 
That such internal stratification characterized Galilee should not surprise us. 
Other studies of so-called peasant societies have acknowledged the existence of strati-
fication within village settings. James C. Scott, whose work on communities in 
Malaysia serves as an interlocutor for Horsely and Oakman, notes that such economic 
differences were a source of contention and concern among the residents within a 
community.
329
 Likewise, F. G. Bailey argued that competition within Western Euro-
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pean villages took place chiefly among equals or near equals.
330
 This suggests that the 
concern of wealth disparity between larger settlements like Sepphoris and small ones 
like neighboring Shikhin probably caused less anxiety among villagers than did rela-
tively slight disparities between neighbors of comparable status. 
Movement and Communication through Galilee 
A look at the patterns of movement through the region of Galilee can help us to 
conceive of the conduits along which economic interactions occurred in the region as 
well. The literary sources for first century Galilee give little indication of the 
networks of economic exchange directly. But there are depictions of movement for 
other purposes, which we may take as an impressionistic indication of how people in 
Galilee may have conducted themselves through the region. This pattern may largely, 
though not wholly, overlap with the economic network by which inhabitants of these 
settlements bought, sold, and traded resources with one another. Most economic inter -
actions in the ancient world were highly interpersonal, taking place face-to-face or 
brokered through correspondence with an acquaintance.
331
 Travel was often multi-
purpose, meaning that traveling to see a family member in the next village over might 
also serve as the occasion for making a purchase or negotiating a future contract to 
labor.
332
 Transactions in general are less risky with a “known quantity,” whether that 
knowledge is derived from direct interactions with that agent in the past or from a 
reputation constructed from the impressions of those who have.
333
 As such, the paths 
along which Galileans moved from site to site for a variety of purposes gives us a 
useful starting point for understanding the paths along which economic transactions 
were conducted. 
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We may begin with the region around Lake Kinneret. Boat travel sped up move-
ment between the settlements along the shore, allowing settlements to be more closely 
connected than distance would suggest. The depiction of movement in the lake region 
in the synoptic gospels, and especially in the Gospel of Mark, is illustrative. For most 
of Jesus’ ministry in Galilee, he is based in the town of Capernaum on the northern 
part of the west lakeshore. From there he and his disciples repeatedly takes excursions 
across the lake to Bethsaida (6:45–56; 8:22), Dalmanutha (8:10),
334
 and the Decapolis 
(cf. 7:34).
335
 Even where the destination was distant and inland, boat travel could be 
used to expedite the journey, as when Jesus and his disciples used Bethsaida as a 
waypoint to Caesarea Philippi (8:22–27). The lake network also included, not surpris-
ingly, the city of Tiberias and its neighbor Magdala. The Gospel of John portrays 
residents of Tiberias crossing the lake in order reach Jesus near Capernaum (6:23). 
Josephus, in recounting his strategems during his tenure in Galilee, indicates the ease 
with which boat travel could be used to move back and forth between Magdala and 
Tiberias (see War 2.641; Life 163), as well as from Magdala to Hippos on the eastern 
shore of the lake (Life 153). Life 42 suggests that Gadara and Scythopolis were also 
easily within reach. 
Archaeological evidence of ancient harbors on the lake shore expands the number 
of nodes of interconnectivity along the lake to include Aish, Tabgha, Gennesar, 
Sennabrus, and Philoteria.
336
 The short distance involved in navigating the lake made 
it very easy to connect eastern Galilee to the southwestern regions of the Golan 
(where most Gaulanite Jews lived) and even some of the Decapolis cities. As scholars 
of the ancient Mediterranean economy have long noted, it was easier, faster, and 
cheaper to move large volumes of goods across waterways than over the roads.
337
 
                                                          
334
 Dalmanutha may be a reference to Magdala, in a corrupted form; see De Luca and Lena, 
“Magdala/Taricheae,” 287–89. Otherwise, it is an unknown lakeside settlement. 
335
 Mark 5:1 (cf. Luke 8:26) refers to the Decapolis city of Gerasa, but erroneously suggests it is 
near the lake rather than far inland (note 5:2, 18). There are, however, some textual problems with this 
verse: while most early majuscule manuscripts read Gerasa, the fifth-century Codex Alexandrinus 
reads Gadara in agreement with the Matthean parallel (8:28). It seems most likely that Mark origin ally 
read Gerasa (since Luke follows in this error) and that Matthew made the correction. Gadara would, 
however, make much more sense contextually, since it is near enough to the shore that its chora (τὴν 
χώραν) likely reached it. 
336
 Mendel Nun’s initial survey of anchorages lists the following (proceeding clockwise around 
the lake), though often without indications of the chronology of their usage: ʼAish, Kefar ʽAqavya, 
Gergesa (Kursi), ʽEin Gofra, Susita (Hippos), Gadara, Philoteria (Beit Yeraḥ), Sennabris, Tiberias, 
Magdala (Tarichaeae), Gennesar, Tabgha, and Capernaum; Sea of Galilee: Newly Discovered 
Harbours from New Testament Days (rev. ed.; Kibbutz ʽEin Gev: Kinneret Sailing Co., 1989). See 
more recently De Luca and Lena, “The Harbor of the City of Magdala/Taricheae,” 115–19 and fig. 1. 
337
 This is a truism of ancient travel, since water travel was considerably faster and did not 
require feeding an animal, if one wanted to haul more than could be car ried on one’s own body or a 
handcart. Exactly how much more expensive land transport was is a matter of some debate. Neville 
Morley notes, for instance, that the evidence from Diocletian’s Price Edict used to argue for prohibi -
tively high overland costs is misleading, and that this source exaggerates the expense of land travel 





Even this relatively small lake would have reduced the logistical costs of conducting 
goods from one settlement to another for trade, and bigger settlements such as Tibe-
rias and Magdala could even serve as major emporiums for the sale of goods from the 
Decapolis and points east. Underwater excavations along the western shore of Lake 
Kinneret have uncovered evidence of commerce across the lake. Early Roman vessels 
have been found in association with stone anchors on the lake bottom,
338
 including 







 suggesting some trade in cookware was conducted via port. 
There are no other navigable waterways in Galilee, and so outside the lake region 
trade was necessarily conducted overland. Naturally, this means that the level of 
interaction between various settlements was dependent on the existence of an exten-
sive system of overland roads, whether paved highways, regional roads, or little dirt 
paths. The major highways that sweep through Galilee were paved after 66 CE by 
Roman engineers ahead of the advancing army and/or to accommodate the military 
garrisoned there after the Revolt, but these highways surely overlay long-trodden 
routes through the region.
342
 It is doubtful, moreover, that these highways constitute 
the full extent of the road system, especially when it comes to connections between 
villages and cities and between villages and other villages.
343
 The Mishnah notes, for 
instance, a variety in the size and “ownership” of roads in Galilee in the age of the 
tannaim.
344
 A recent article by James F. Strange has compiled data from various road 
survey projects conducted in the last few decades.
345
 The resulting map is a cobweb of 
red lines indicating small local routes primarily constrained by the topography, 
running along the valleys or atop the ridges from village to village. Dating the 
unpaved roads is impossible, especially because of the long duration over which these 
routes were probably in use, given the constraints of the topography and the long 
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history of settlement at many of these village locations. Many of these roads probably 
served the population’s movement about Galilee from the Hellenistic period well 




Preferred lines of overland travel were to some extent guided—if not dictated—
by geography as well. Though he does not include any inter-village roads, Leibner’s 
study of eastern Lower Galilee suggests the likely location of major local routes 
according to the region’s topography, following the wadis and valleys.
347
 Travel along 
relatively flat terrain or gradual inclines was significantly less laborious that 
traversing up and down a series of mountains, which meant that much travel in 
Galilee was directed along major east–west lines through the Sakhnin, Beit Netofa, 
Turʽan, and Ksulot valleys, or alternately along the ridges that separate them. North–
south travel was made easy only at a few junctures where there were passes through 
the mountains. Accordingly, we should expect that this incentivized strong connec-
tions between settlements that fell along the same ridge or valley.  
The literary sources corroborate the portrait of a highly interconnected web of 
settlements. They depict travel not solely or even largely conducted between village 
and city, as one might expect from the urban–rural model of inter-settlement 
dynamics. Much of the movement depicted in the New Testament gospels and in  the 
writings of Josephus suggests the regular and commonplace nature of travel between 
the smaller settlements—the villages and small towns.
348
 The Gospel of Mark, for 
instance, presents a fairly coherent pattern of travel—despite its episodic nature—
from a settlement like Capernaum to the villages proximate to it. When Jesus travels 
to Nazareth, he goes out from there to visit the “villages all around it” (τὰς κώμας 
κύκλῳ; 6:2). When Jesus and his disciples travel to the region of Caesarea Philippi, 
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they bypass the city altogether in favor of performing a circuit of the villages (8:27). 
In fact, in the gospels, whenever Jesus is travelling within Galilee, his journeys take 
him between villages and small towns, while Tiberias, Sepphoris, and possibly even 
Magdala are conspicuously absent from the narrative, despite their proximity to his 
ancestral home of Nazareth and his base of operation in Capernaum. Josephus 
describes some travel through Galilee during the First Jewish Revolt. Much of his 
account depicts movement of characters between Magdala, Tiberias, Sepphoris, and 
Gischala (see Life 95, 101, 103, 107, 163, 275–276, 280, 304, 308), usually without 
much hint of the route or any stops in between. This is primarily a function of his 
narrative focus in Life on his contests against rivals/opponents based in the latter 
three, while Josephus was usually based in Magdala. But villages also factor 
prominently, occasionally serving as Josephus’ home base (Qana in 86–90, Simonias 
in 115, Chabul in 213, Yafiʽa in 270, Shikhin in 384). He describes the travels of the 
Jerusalem embassy from village to village, starting in Yafiʽa and circulating outward 
from there (Life 230–231). Josephus and his messengers move about from Chabul to 
Yodefat to Gabara (Life 234–235), from Gabara to Sogane to Yafiʽa (266–270), and 
from Bethsaida to Capernaum to Magdala (403). Josephus’ narrative too suggests the 
ease through which one could move about in Galilee from settlement to settlement, 
especially within Lower Galilee, where he spent most of his time. 
Trade in Galilee 
The Galilean economy was an agrarian economy. Most of the population was 
employed to some extent in the direct production of foodstuffs, much of it for their 
own household consumption needs.
349
 But even if we grant that most Galileans held 
self-sufficiency as an ideal to aspire to, there must nonetheless have been a consider-
able volume of trade in food both within settlements and between them.
350
 As 
Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell have argued, micro-regional differences could 
result in relative booms and busts in harvest yields in any given year, spurring short - 
and medium-distance trade to effectively redistribute these resources.
351
 These condi-
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tions of imbalance could occur even without regard to the volati lities of climate: since 
some soils and terrain were better suited to one crop over another, interdependence 
could also be a natural strategy for resolving the problem of uneven distribution of 
natural resources across the region.
352
 Not all households owned or rented sufficient 
land to grow enough food for themselves, and would have relied in part on trade 
regardless of growing conditions. And of course, some Galileans were engaged in 
non-agricultural enterprises, such as fishing, pottery production, or stone working,
353
 
and relied on trade to sell their products and obtain their foodstuffs from others.
354
 As 
Sharon Lea Mattila notes, “The rhythms of the ancient agricultural calendar left 
plenty of time for people to do other things.”
355
 
Yet while most of the trade volume in Galilee was surely in agricultural products, 
it can be difficult to discern in the evidence. Literary references suggest that market 
transactions in foodstuffs were common. There are a few references to inter-settle-
ment trade in Josephus and the New Testament gospels, such as John of Gischala’s 
sale of oil from Upper Galilee to Jewish residents of Caesarea Philippi (Life 76; War 
2.591–592) or when Jesus’ disciples suggest a crowd should be sent to the surround-
ing villages and countryside to buy food (Mark 6:36–37).
356
 The Mishnah often refer-
ences sale or purchase (e.g., m. Dem and m. BM passim), but by the nature of the text 
                                                                                                                                                                             
analysis, its most broad characteristic is the fragmentation and variation of the landscape at micro 
scales, and the concomitant variation in quality as well as kind and quantity of produce.  
352
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does not tell us much about the network along which these transactions occurred. The 
context seems sometimes to be fixed stalls in permanent or temporary markets (e.g., 
m. BB 2:3; 8:6; m. Dem 5:7; m. Tah 6:3), which we might expect to occur at the 
larger end of the settlement spectrum, while others could just as easily refer to direct 
sale from householder’s property in any settlement (e.g., m. Peʽah 2:8; m. Dem 5:7). 
Much of the reallocation of agricultural produce was probably accomplished between 
kin and neighbors within a given settlement, whether through monetized exchange, 
cooperative sharing or bartering agreements, or mechanisms of credit and debt. 
Decker notes that such comparatively low-value goods as agricultural produce were 
probably sold at village market centers, rather than just in the cities, and that most 
such transactions were conducted face-to-face between buyer and seller, rather than 
conducted through professional traders and other middlemen.
357
  
While agricultural production was omnipresent and generalized, and most trans-
actions likely conducted at the short distances between villages in the network, other 
goods were less ubiquitous. We turn to those next. 
Fishing 
Fishing in this region was obviously relegated to the settlements on the lakeshore, 
most prominently Tiberias, Magdala, Capernaum, and—in the Golan—Bethsaida. 
Archaeologists have uncovered evidence for fishing within and near all four sites. The 
most extensive infrastructure for fishing comes from Magdala, whose very name in 
Greek—Ταριχείαι—means “fish preserving factories.”
358
 In fact, the town was noted 
for its fish by Strabo (Geographica 16.2.45), suggesting a widespread reputation by 
the late first century BCE as a producer of fish products, some of which may have even 
made it to the coast and beyond.
359
 Archaeological excavation of the site revealed not 
only a breakwater harbor and wharf for boating more generally, but also a structure 
connected to the lake by a water channel that appears to be a holding tank for caught 
fish, and a rectangular building constructed of ashlars that may have served as a fish 
market.
360
 More astounding was the discovery of a fishing boat dating to the Early 
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Roman period in the lake near modern-day Kibbutz Ginosar, just north of Magdala.
361
 
At Capernaum, a number of small, manmade stone dikes in the water—interpreted as 
either fish ponds or anchorages for small fishing boats—also indicate fishing 
industry.
362
 Fishing weights have been found at Capernaum
363
 as well as off the coast 
of Tiberias,
364
 indicating that fisherman could be found operating out of even the 
largest Galilean settlements. That fishermen made up a notable population of Tiberias 
may be suggested by Josephus’ reference to a faction of “sailors and poor” (τῶν 
ναυτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων; Life 66), though some of those may have been engaged in 
boat transport. At Bethsaida, the material assemblage in several domiciles included 
fishing apparatus such as fish hooks, sinkers, and stone anchors, indicating fishing 
was a common occupation among the inhabitants.
365
 We may add to the archaeolog-
ical remains the literary depictions of fishing in the New Testament gospels, particu-
larly around Capernaum where much of the narrative is set (Matt 4:18–22; 17:26–27; 
Mark 1:16–20; Luke 5:2–7; John 21:1–14). 
K. C. Hanson has argued against the notion that fishermen constituted a sort of 
middle class of entrepreneurs, and are best understood as a subset of the peasantry.
366
 
While I take issue with his notion of a flattened peasantry struggling for subsistence, 
he is correct in noting that most fishermen were probably not what we might call a 
“middle class” or “entrepreneurial class.” The boat hull found off the shore of 
Kibbutz Ginosar was composed of several different types of wood, suggesting that it 
was cobbled together and repaired from whatever was available.
367
 If this boat is 
representative, it hardly looks like fishermen were wealthy. Hanson is also correct in 
seeing two tiers of fishermen, based on differential access to resources. The Gospel of 
Mark depicts both household labor (Zebedee and his sons John and James) and paid 
hands (τῶν μισθωτῶν) employed in one fishing boat operation (Mark 1:19–20). The 
Zebedee household had greater access to material resources (boat and equipment) but 
a deficit in labor, while the hired hands had excess labor but lack the capital to effec-
tively deploy it. But one could also profitably fish without a boat; Annalisa Marzano 
has recently argued that fishermen could catch substantial yields even with relatively 
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simple and inexpensive equipment and fishing from shore.
368
 Net fishing could be 
performed from shore, as Simon and Andrew appear to be doing in the gospels (Matt 




Hanson follows Michael Rostovtzeff in understanding fishing industry as a state 
monopoly, in which fishing rights are awarded to individuals or cooperatives through 
contract, pointing to comparanda from Egypt and Asia Minor and the aforementioned 
episodes in the gospels.
370
 In so doing, he envisions fishing as a form of production 
controlled by a select few wealthy individuals or groups, profiting solely from the 
labor of others, much as Horsley and other understand Galilean agricultural lands 
clustered in the hands of the urban elite. But Marzano points out that the consensus 
has shifted away from the notion that fishing rights were controlled by the state, and 
the literary evidence for these monopoly contracts are in part a product of misreading. 
Rather, individuals, groups, and communities alike fought for access, control, and 
profit over fishing grounds, making use of the existing legal frameworks, which 
makes fishing much more a grounds for contention than a simple government monop-
oly.
371
 While not impossible, Hanson’s readings of the relevant New Testament 
passages are sometimes quite forced: he believes that “the location of Levi’s toll 
office in Capernaum … probably identifies him as just such a contractor of fishing 
rights,” despite the more natural understanding of him as a toll collector for portoria 
at the harbor.
372
 He may be correct in identifying cooperative partnerships in Luke’s 
version of the call of the disciples, which references two ship crews cooperating as 
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partners (μέτοχοι, 5:7; κοινωνοί, 5:10),
373
 though there is no need to understand this 
as a guild that held monopoly fishing rights. It may merely exemplify cooperative 
endeavors between members of the community to take advantage of a boon catch and 
prevent damage to the equipment (cf. 5:6–7). 
We may presume that fish was a fairly regular component of the diet for the 
population living in far eastern Galilee, close to the lake. If not a fisherman, one could 
easily obtain fresh fish from a nearby settlement. Both of the gospel “feeding” narra-
tives, for instance, are situated near the lake and include fish (Matt 14:13–21; 15:32–
16:10; Mark 6:31–44; 8:1–9; Luke 9:10–17; John 6:5–15). That fish was a regular 
part of the regional diet is suggested also by the parable in Matt 7:7–12 that seems to 
places fish alongside bread as staples: “Is there anyone of you who, if their child asks 
for bread, will give a stone? Or if [the child] asks for a fish, will give a snake?” (7:9–
10). We may also infer that in these shore communities many fishermen needed to 
trade their excess fish (whether market transactions or other mechanisms of exchange) 
in order to obtain the agricultural goods they needed. The presence of such full -time, 
specialist modes of production necessitates some level of intra- or inter-community 
trade in the region to obtain the necessary variety in foodstuffs. 
It is harder to be certain how important or regular a foodstuff fish was to more 
inland communities; most of the gospel narrative occurs in the lake region and does 
not disclose meals in the Galilean heartland, and Josephus says little about the nature 
of his meals in Galilee in general. The Mishnah does make several references to fish 
consumption, though without geographic specificity (e.g., m. Ter 10:8; m. Beṣ 2:1; m. 
Ned 6:4; m. BM 2:1). We do have some archaeological evidence for inland fish trade 
to Sepphoris, though. Arlene Fradkin has analyzed fish bones collected from the 
Sepphoris excavations in order to determine their species and region of origin.
374
 The 
mere presence of fish in inland Sepphoris indicates the settlement was a partner in the 
fish trade, and the species included both freshwater catfish and tilapia and salt water 
fish that indicate both local Galilean and Mediterranean imports. Because the study 
does not break down the Roman–Byzantine period into smaller units, we cannot say 
with certitude that this pattern began as early as the Second Temple period.
375
 But if 
there were trade in fish along the major highway as far inland as Sepphoris, then it 
seems likely that trade in fish also connected to smaller settlements, especially those 
within a few hours walk of the shore.  
The range of trade in preserved fish could in fact have been quite extensive. 
Preservation through pickling, salting, or curing the fish would greatly expand the 
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fish’s “shelf life,” making it easier to transport to other settlements without fear of 
spoiling, and allowing people to purchase larger amounts at a time and s tore them for 
months.
376
 The extent of Magdala’s fishing processing facilities,
 
if we are right to 
interpret them as such,
377
 suggests that it may have been the major site for exporting 
preserved fish for consumption in Galilee and perhaps beyond—to the coasts or 




Some essential craft products were also unevenly distributed in Galilee, and obtaining 
them required some amount of inter-settlement trade. One such craft is ceramics, 
since producing them requires access to good clay soil not available at every locale. 
Because wet clay would be laborious and likely more expensive to transport than 
finished products, most communities obtained them through trade rather than 
producing them in the household. In fact, Galilee seems to have been largely reliant 
on a handful of sites for the bulk of the region’s ceramic supply, and the major 
producers left behind such voluminous waste remains that it is certain their produc-
tion efforts were directed toward widespread market sale with other settlements, 
rather than just producing vessels to be used by residents of the village.  
Ceramics were not just a onetime expense either; while the material is durable 
(hence their ubiquity in archaeological remains), the vessels themselves were quite 
fragile, and we must assume that households regularly needed to procure replace-
ments. The regular need for replacement would be all the more exacerbated when 
purity concerns are considered, since a ritually polluted ceramic vessel could—
according to some circles—never be rendered clean again and needed to be broken 
(Lev 11:33; see discussion in ch. 3).  
Because of their durability, ubiquity, and their regularity as a market commodity, 
ceramics serve as a useful metric for assessing the overall bounds of Galilee’s 
regional trade network. If we can determine the site of production of a vessel, then we 
can roughly determine the extent of the overall system in which it was traded. The 
trade in common cookware is perhaps the most straightforward, since these types of 
vessels are not likely to be resold. The site of deposition is often the endpoint of a 
distinct transaction—the line between start and end either represents a direct site-to-
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site transaction between producer and consumer, or a transaction at a third-site 
market, or a transaction mediated by a middleman (e.g., professional trader).
379
 
Storage vessels—jugs and jars—have the potential to say much more as proxy 
evidence for the movement of perishable goods like agricultural produce and fish,
380
 
though they say much less about direct transactions than about the overall bounds of 
the economic network. That is because, unlike cookware, storage vessels were likely 
reused over and over, and may have change hands many times before ultimately 
breaking. Their sites of deposition do not tell us the full tale of their movement 
through the region, masking a host of transactions that may have occurred between 
point A and point B.
381
 Moreover, to use storage vessels to trace movement of food-
stuffs requires assuming that the vessel was filled for sale near the site of production. 
While it might be the case that many jars and jugs were initially purchased full, to 
presume that this was always the case would give the false (and absurd) impression 
that the major storage vessel production site of Shikhin was the primary food clear-
inghouse for all Galilee! Storage vessels are therefore a better gauge of the bulk of 
trade in foodstuffs,
382
 but they only give us a picture of the overall trade network 
rather than individual inter-settlement transactions. 
David Adan-Bayewitz’s work on ceramics in Galilee has been incredibly 
important for our understanding of regional trade in the region.
383
 Using the tech-
niques of neutron activation analysis and x-ray fluorescence, he has been able to 
group pottery finds according to their clay composition and identify the source of 
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production by comparison with the composition of samples from the known produc-
tion site of Kefar Ḥananiah, on the frontier between Upper and Lower Galilee. His 
excavations there found kilns made out of fieldstones and several plastered pools 
nearby for kneading clay. Adan-Bayewitz dates production at Kefar Ḥananiah from 
the first century BCE through the end of the Roman period.
384
 The early and Middle 
Roman wasters—misfired or over-fired pottery—in the plastered pools indicate mass 
production began in the Early Roman period, and the presence of Late Roman wasters 
on the bottom of the kiln suggests that it went out of use around this time.
385
 Unfortu-
nately, excavations did not really extend beyond the pottery manufactory, so we do 
not have a clear picture of the size or wealth of the village or the place of potting 
alongside other productive enterprises conducted by its inhabitants.
386
 
 According to his sampling of 
ceramic remains from archaeological 
sites in northern Palestine, an over-
whelming percentage of the common 
everyday pottery at Galilean sites 
were Kefar Ḥananiah wares (hence-
forth, KḤW).
388
 In general, the per-
centage of KḤW in a site’s ceramic 
assemblage declines at a linear re-
gression with distance from the pro-
duction site, at least for sites within 
46 kilometers of Kefar Ḥananiah 
(see Error! Reference source not 
found.).
389
 This pattern is best 
explained as a product of the friction 
of overland travel; the greater the 
distance, the greater the relative cost of acquiring KḤW versus more proximate 
competitors. This also fits well with the notion than much of the regional trade was 
conducted directly from villages, rather than chiefly in urban hubs, since the pattern 
correlates proportion of KḤW with distance from Kefar Ḥananiah rather than distance 
from the cities. Kefar Ḥananiah was, after all, not very close to Tiberias, Sepphoris, or 
even Magdala. Much of the trade in KḤW would have entailed buyers coming to 
Kefar Ḥananiah, potters transporting their wares to nearby sites directly, or 
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Kefar Ḥananiah 100 0 
Hazon 100 4.5 
Rama 97 5.1 
Meiron 99 9.7 
Yodefat 76 23 
Ḥammath Tiberias 97 23.2 
Sepphoris 74 26.5 
Zabdi 59 36.5 





 Kanaf 12 30.3 
Nashut 21 41.3 
Gamla 11 44.5 
Table 1. Percentage of KḤW at sites in Galilee and the 







middlemen purchasing directly from the potters and circulating the region to make 
sales.  
 This does not, of course, preclude the notion that there was some amount of 
urban peddling in KḤW. Indeed, Adan-Bayewitz noted that KḤW composed an 
anomalous 97 percent of the assemblage at Tiberias. This may be explained by the 
small sample size collected there, but it may also be explained by its lakeside 
location, which decreased the amount of overland distance necessary to reach Kefar 
Ḥananiah,
390
 and made this port town a useful node extending the trade reach beyond 







 on the western lakeshore all turned up 
Early Roman-period ceramic vessels (KḤW forms) in association with stone anchors. 
Since Capernaum was relatively close to Kefar Ḥananiah, it is unlikely that these 
offshore ceramics represent imports from the lake, but rather suggests export from a 
non-urban center to other settlements around the lake. For Magdala and Tiberias, 
farther south along the coast, they may indicate imports or the function of these 
settlements in secondary distribution to points east and southeast along the periphery 
of Galilee. 
While KḤW constitutes the vast majority at sites in the Galilean heartland, it also 
appears in smaller proportions at sites around Galilee’s periphery, such as Hippos in 
the Decapolis and Ptolemais on the coast, but is absent altogether in Samaria.
394
 This 
gives us a sense of the maximal range of the trade network in ceramics, with high 
proportions in Galilee suggesting dense clustering of the trade network there, and a 
few external connections to the system with outlying settlements. Moreover, it is 
notable that the predominantly gentile cities of the coast and Decapolis where KḤW 
has been found had Jewish minority populations (see War 2.457–480), while there are 
no signs of similar trade to the south with the Samaritans, with whom Galileans at 
times had tense relations (see ch. 4). 
Though Kefar Ḥananiah was undoubtedly one of the major ceramic producers for 
the region, it did not have an absolute monopoly on production. Adan-Bayewitz 
himself determined that many of the vessels found at sites in the southern Golan 
shared the same vessel forms as KḤW but were made from local Gaulanite clays for 
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 In his excavations of Yodefat, Mordechai Aviam unearthed 
several first-century kilns and ceramic wasters from vessels of KḤW forms, indi-
cating that potters at that site were producing their own versions of those vessels from 
local clay that competed with KḤW at market.
396
 Douglas Edwards’ excavations at 
Khirbet Qana uncovered wasters of KḤW forms there as well, and even though no 
kiln was found, ceramic waste materials tend not to travel far from sites of manu-
facture and suggest some amount of local production even in this tiny hamlet.
397
 The 
proportion of KḤW is densest in the eastern part of Galilee, while the known compet-
itors of Yodefat and Khirbet Qana were located in western and southern Lower 
Galilee respectively. This points to the interrelation of expense/distance of KḤW and 
the ability of more local operations to effectively compete for sales. It may be the 
case that KḤW were more popular on account of their quality and durability (as later 
rabbinic texts seem to suggest; cf. b. Shab 120b), and the others were regional 
competitors or local “knockoffs.” It is also worth noting that Adan-Bayewitz’s anal-
ysis is in part based on compositional analysis (see the sites in Error! Reference 
source not found.), but outside of these sampled sites he relies on form 
comparison.
398
 It is thus worth taking the form-based conclusions with a grain of salt 
until further compositional analysis can definitively determine which pottery they 
came from; there may have been some other small regional competitors that competed 
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The other predominant ceramic manufacturing site in Galilee was the small 
village of Shikhin, located approximately 3 kilometers from Sepphoris.
400
 Although 
the kiln site has not yet been identified, the ancient clay beds were discovered in the 
initial survey of the site
401
 and five seasons of excavations have yielded hundreds of 
ceramic wasters with dates indicating a boom in the Early Roman period tapering off 
in the Late Roman period.
402
 Whereas Kefar Ḥananiah was specialized in producing 
cookware, Shikhin was specialized in storage vessels; there are signs from the wasters 
that Shikhin produced familiar Galilean bowls and cookware forms in smaller 




David Adan-Bayewitz and Isadore Pearlman identified Shikhin as the production 
site for the storage jar forms that are common throughout Galilee and the Golan. 
Their initial compositional analysis using neutron activation analysis found that 
kraters, bell-shaped bowls, and a common type of storage jar found at sites 
throughout Galilee and the southern Golan share a common composition profile with 
several wasters discovered during the Shikhin survey.
404
 The sampled sites indicate 
that vessels produced at Shikhin were distributed over a similar territory as KḤW 
over a period spanning the first and second centuries CE.
405
 This initial study did not 
produce data about the proportion of Shikhin wares at each of these sites, nor did it 
sample storage vessels from peripheral sites besides the Golan (e.g., Ptolemais or 
Scythopolis), and so a full picture of the distribution of Shikhin storage vessels must 
await a thorough comparative compositional analysis.
406
 
It will be interesting to see in coming years whether the impression of Shikhin’s 
dominance of the storage vessel market endures, or whether archaeologists discover 
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evidence for competing production at alternative sites as we saw for KḤW. If such 
competition was enabled or even driven by distance from the manufactory, we should 
expect such producers to be based in northeastern Lower Galilee or in Upper 
Galilee.
407
 Then again, Shikhin’s proximity to Sepphoris and the major east–west 
highway to the lake may have increased the accessibility to Shikhin wares that made 
it easier for them to proliferate. And as we already suggested, their reuse could enable 
them to travel farther more easily through iterations of short transactions, from 
settlement to settlement, such that they gradually filtered out from Shikhin to far-
flung settlements.  
Lamps were another everyday ceramic product that were likewise dependent on 
the proximity of quality clay and were produced in a few settlements as specialist 
products. There were several different types of ceramic lamps,
408
 but by far the most 
popular in first-century Galilee was the ubiquitous “Herodian” or “knife-pared” lamp, 
the base of which was spun on a wheel and the nozzle appended and cut to make 
wing-like projections at the tip. David Adan Bayewitz (et al.) performed a composi-
tional analysis of Herodian lamps from sites in Galilee and determined that in each 
case, a striking 80 to 96 percent of the lamps belonged to the same compositional 
group originating at pottery workshops in the vicinity of Jerusalem.
409
 Some Herodian 
lamps were produced locally in Galilee—knife-pared nozzles that have never been lit 
emerged from the Shikhin excavations
410
—but these apparently failed to attract much 
popularity.
411
 This profile differs from those Herodian lamps found at the cities of 
Dora and Scythopolis on Galilee’s periphery, the majority of which seem to have 
been produced from local clays and a smaller proportion from Jerusalem clays.
412
 
While Herodian lamps were ubiquitous, they were not the only types of lamps 
available for purchase in Galilee. Another was the “northern collar-neck” or “boot 
lamp,” but its distribution was limited to the center of Galilee and it does not make up 
a large proportion of lamp assemblages even there.
413
 Varda Sussman has also specu-
lated that a number of other Galilean lamp forms were produced in northern work-
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shops and in circulation during the Early Roman period.
414
 James R. Strange believes 
that Shikhin was probably the site of production for two of those lamps, which 
Sussman had situated near Nazareth, but the evidence for and dating of production of 
these lamps at Shikhin is still mounting.
415
 
The strong preference among Galileans for Herodian lamps, and particularly ones 
from Jerusalem, raises interesting questions about consumer preferences and the trade 
connections between Galilee and Jerusalem. Why was there such a piqued interest for 
the interregional import of simple lamps, especially when the distribution of common 
cookware and storage vessels gives the impression of a fairly insular system restricted 
to Galilee and southern Golan with weaker connections to the Decapolis and 
Ptolemais? Herodian lamps were simple in design—lacking ornate decorations found 
on some moldmade lamps—and could easily be replicated at any of the pottery manu-
factories in Galilee (as the examples from Shikhin demonstrate). But Galileans 
continued to purchase Jerusalem-made lamps until the close of the Second Temple 
Period. This undermines the notions that trade patterns in Galilee were wholly deter-
mined by “purely economic” factors (i.e., cost); other motivations or qualities of the 
product are necessary to explain the phenomenon. 
This pattern may be comprehensible if we consider Jerusalem lamps as 
(quasi-)religious objects that Galilean Jews imbued with additional value by virtue of 
their origin near the holy city or composition from Jerusalem soil. That lamps in 
particular were valued may be explained by the practice of lamp lighting before the 
onset of the Sabbath, especially if this act was understood as one imbued with reli -
gious imperative, not just pragmatic necessity. Lighting a fire on the Sabbath was a 
prohibition of the Torah (Exod 35:3).
416
 Josephus references lamp lighting as one of 
the characteristic practices of the Sabbath that Jews across the Roman world perform, 
alongside fasting and certain food prohibitions (Against Apion 2.282), and two 
roughly contemporaneous gentile authors connect lamp lighting with Jewish Sabbat-
ical practice (Persius, Saturae 5.176–184; Seneca, Epistulae morales 95.47).
417
 
Traders may have transported lamps from Jerusalem for sale at secondary distribution 
sites in Galilee. But many of the lamps in Galilee may have been purchased as 
souvenirs while on pilgrimage in Jerusalem for the festivals and brought back home 
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 Adan-Bayewitz and his co-authors doubt that pilgrimage can explain 
percentages reaching as high as 96 percent,
419
 but if just one person from most Jewish 
households in Galilee went to the festivals each year, that could account for a large 
portion of them. We shall return to the matter of pilgrimage and connections to 
Jerusalem in chapter 4. 
The above discussion of ceramic production and distribution throughout Galilee 
gives us a sense of the overall network in with Galileans were participating on a day-
to-day and periodic basis. The sites in Galilee, especially Kefar Ḥananiah and 
Shikhin, were the predominant manufacturers in the region, and produced volumes 
that clearly indicate intentional production for market sale. We also noted that these 
two settlements exhibited some amount of specialization (cookware and storage wares 
respectively) that allowed them to complement one another on the market. But there 
are also examples of competition—at least by potters at Yodefat, Khirbet Qana, and 
somewhere in the southern Golan—that produced the same forms as Kefar Ḥananiah 
but out of local clays. The overall impression from common cookware and storage 
vessels is of an insular Galilee with a rather enclosed system of exchange, with some 
weaker connections between the region’s borders and the cities along the periphery. 
That these connections to major urban hubs encircling Galilee were so weak, and the 
ceramic profiles of them so disjunctive, is a signal of Galileans’ desire to trade 
primarily with fellow Jews rather than with major markets of gentiles. The small 
amounts of characteristically Galilean ceramics that appear in these cities may best be 
plausibly attributed to trade with the Jewish minority enclaves in those cities, who 
were at times (especially on the eve of the First Jewish Revolt) at odds with the 
gentile majority population. The proclivity for intra-ethnic trade and transactions 
among Jews may be explained in part by concerns over ritual purity and other aspects 
of observing the religious obligations of the Mosaic covenant, a point we shall 
explore further in the next chapter. We also suggested that the peculiar dominance of 
Jerusalem-made lamps in Galilee is another signal of the role religious concerns 
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might play in shaping economic behavior in Galilean society. These lamps demon-
strate that while everyday transaction may have been primarily oriented inward, the 
connection to Jerusalem facilitated by pilgrimage travel was an important periodic 
conduit for economic exchange beyond the confines of the region of Galilee. 
Stone 
In addition to ceramic evidence, we can 
discern something of regional trade in 
the products of stone working. Stone 
was of course the material from which 
most buildings (and all the ones we can 
identify archaeologically) were con-
structed in Galilee, but building stones 
were probably not a major item of inter-
settlement trade. As we noted above, 
most of the buildings in Galilean set-
tlements were composed of unhewn 
fieldstones of local varieties that could 
be gathered from the immediate vicinity. 
And the builders likely did not go far 
even for the hewn stones from which some structures in Tiberias, Sepphoris, 
Magdala, and Gamla were built, as they do not differ from the local bedrock.
420
 More 
interesting for discerning regional trade than building stones were cut- or shaped-
stone products that were distributed widely but clearly produced in limited areas or 
specific localities. It is to these objects that we now turn. 
Stone vessels were a ubiquitous commodity at Jewish sites in this period. Stone 
vessel remains have been identified at essentially every site that has undergone exca-
vation and some where surface surveys have been conducted in Galilee.
421
 They also 
appear to be evenly distributed within settlements, such as at Capernaum, indicating 
that stone vessels as a class were not the preserve of the wealthy, though the rarity of 
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 may suggest that that form was significantly more expensive.
423
 
Where they do not appear is just as significant: stone vessels are conspicuously absent 
from Samaria, and few in predominantly gentile areas.
424
 This marks stone vessels as 
a particularly Jewish phenomenon, and thus production and trade in these products 
was restricted to an ethnically-defined network. They first appear in first-century BCE 
contexts and continued to be produced throughout the first century CE and taper out 
after the First Jewish Revolt. Though some stone vessels may have been reused by 
successive generations, these vessels are exceedingly rare in contexts dated after the 
Bar Kokhba Revolt the 130s CE.
425
  
Stone vessels were apparently very popular in Galilee despite the wide 
availability of alternatives in ceramic. The popularity and ubiquity of stone vessels 
may in part be explained by Jewish concerns over ritual purity.
426
 While ceramic 
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vessels were highly susceptible to taking on and transmitting impurity to food and 
other utensils (Lev 11:33), according to the later Mishnah, stone vessels were not 
(e.g., m. Kel 10:1; m. Beṣ 2:3).
427
 And the famous episode of the Wedding in Qana 
featuring large vessels for purification suggests that such an association of stone 
vessels with ritual purity goes back considerably earlier (John 2:6–7). Andrea M. 
Berlin argues from the material remains at Gamla that the krater and “measuring cup” 
forms lack parallels in common pottery, suggesting a different and specific use aptly 
attributed to ritual washing and immersion. The more open forms—bowls, platters, 
dishes—lack an obvious purpose for ritual purity concerns, and seem to mimic luxury 
fineware forms that permeated the region before the first century CE.
428
 
These vessels were carved out of chalk limestone, which was relatively easy to 
cut to produce a variety of forms for different volumes and uses—bowls, cups, mugs, 
lids, and kraters. They were formed either by hand-carving with chisels, or by rotating 
and cutting the stone on a lathe; alternately, some vessels evidence a combination of 
the two—hand-carving the exterior and lathing the interior.
429
 Yitzhak Magen’s 
seminal study of stone vessel production argued that Galilean manufacturers inno-
vated a method of coring the interior of smaller forms with a lathe, whereas Judaeans 
chiseled them out, but more recent discoveries have called that dichotomy into ques-
tion.
430
 Large cores discovered at Jerusalem indicate that lathes were used to hollow 
out large qalal kraters as well as some of the smaller vessels,
431
 indicating this was 
not a regional variation in production method. Vessels at Gamla indicate the converse 
as well—that not all northern productions were lathe-cored.
432
 There is at present no 
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systematic study of the Galilean stone vessels, and much of the data on them still 
exists only in summary form.
433
 But it appears that at many sites in Galilee the 
preponderance of vessels were lathe-turned.
434
 The lathing process is especially 
helpful for identifying the proximity of stone vessel manufactories, since it produces 




The production of these vessels in Galilee was likely to be located in close 
proximity to chalk deposits. Just as transporting heavy, wet clay to potteries far from 
the clay pits would have added unnecessary labor to the production process, so too 
would moving blocks of stone only to discard the considerable volume of the core at 
the workshop. This meant that stone vessel production in Galilee was situated in the 
chalk hills of interior Galilee, especially around the Nazareth mountains, rather than 
in the lake region where the local bedrock is basalt—a hard, heavy, volcanic rock (see 
Figure 11). In fact, our current evidence for manufacturing sites in Galilee clusters 
near there. Stone cores were discovered at Kefar Reina on the Nazareth ridge and 
Bethlehem on a hilltop to its west.
436
 Just last year, newly begun excavations yielded 
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chalk vessels at various stages of production in a cave at ʽEinot Amitaim, just south 
of Kafr Kanna on the ridge.
437
 Cores have also been found at nearby Sepphoris and 
Shikhin, though at least at the latter they appear in reuse for other purposes.
438
 Gibson 
and others have suggested that the boom of stone vessel production in Jerusalem 
during the Herodian period may be connected to the major building projects, and that 
quarrying for hewn-stone construction and chalk vessel carving may have gone hand 
in hand.
439
 If the two stone-working trades were in fact linked, this may help to 
explain the concentration of Galilean production in the Nazareth ridge, where there 
are abundant signs of quarrying building stone, much of it likely associated with the 




Since production seems to have been concentrated around Nazareth and around 
Jerusalem, most settlements must have obtained their stone vessels through trade with 
producers in one of these areas or the other. On the basis of material alone, it is clear 
that the chalk vessels at sites around the lake, such as Capernaum and Magdala, and 
in the Golan, such as at Bethsaida and Gamla, were obtained through trade (see 
Figure 11). This is not because they could not have produced stone vessels of basalt 
with similar purity-resistant properties—in fact, there are examples of basalt vessels 
and tools—but they would have been more laborious to produce, and there may have 
been other social forces driving a preference to conformity with the chalk vessels 
used by Jews elsewhere in Palestine.
441
 Because we can no longer claim a distinction 
in the coring method between Galilee and Judaea, it is impossible to say with any 
certitude whether the pattern of trade looked more like common pottery—produced 
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and consumed as a regional commodity—or like Herodian oil lamps—exhibiting a 
strong preference for Jerusalemite products with potential religious significance.  
At present, the archaeological record gives the impression that the operations at 
Jerusalem were far more extensive than in Galilee,
442
 where the few workshops we 
know of all seem like fairly small operations. The work space at Reina was not even 
associated with a settlement! If this view is correct, the Galilean manufactories might 
best be understood as local competitors attempting to edge into the market with 
lower-priced alternatives to Jerusalem imports or by making the products easier to 
acquire than bringing them back from pilgrimage. This would especially be the case 
for the large qalal vessels, which would have been bulky in addition to their 
weight,
443
 and whose Galilean examples appear on average to be less ornate than 
those decorated samples uncovered in Jerusalem.
444
 There is also a relative paucity of 
qalal vessels in comparison to Jerusalem.
445
 We may reasonably suspect that a greater 
proportion of the qalal finds in Galilee were locally produced, since the costs and 
difficulties of transportation created a higher barrier to obtaining Judaean qalal 
vessels than smaller “measuring cups.”  
Basalt grinding stones also signal intraregional trade. Basalt, as a hard igneous 
rock, was the preferred material for grinders in Palestine. Outside of the western 
lakeshore and the Golan region (and to a lesser extent near the Dead Sea), where 
basalt is the local bedrock, these grinders could only be obtained through trade. 
Grinders were used for crushing olives or grain, and took several different forms, 
including large rotary querns, rectangular Olynthus mills, and hand mortars.
446
 O. 
Willaims-Thorpe and R. S. Thorpe used x-ray fluorescence to analyze the compo-
sition of querns and mills found throughout Palestine, and determined that most could 
be traced to a basalt provenance on the western shore of Lake Kinneret, though some 
examples (in southern Palestine and coastal Caesarea) evidence other nearby 
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 Local manufacture of millstones in the Galilean lakeshore region is also 
evidenced by the find of a partly hewn quern at Capernaum.
448
 Basalt querns and hand 
mortars are ubiquitous at sites all around Galilee, including inland sites like 
Shikhin.
449
 But unlike chalk vessels and Galilean pottery forms, basalt grinders were 
distributed beyond Galilee proper to points south and even out to Cyprus.
450
 The 
fairly narrow region from which to get sturdy grinders of this material made it 
possible for Galilee to participate to some extent in interregional trade to the coast 
and beyond, though the nature of this business arrangement is of course obscured to 
us. It does demonstrate that while most Galileans seem to have preferred to consume 
products produced locally, they were not opposed to exporting such finished products 
when there was external demand for them. 
A Small World Network and Its Social Implications 
In this chapter, I have argued that the regional economy of Galilee—together with the 
southern Golan—should be understood as a fairly circumscribed and highly intercon-
nected closed network. This was a region chiefly inhabited by Jews and surrounded 
on the periphery by large cities dominated by gentiles and their satellite settlements. 
There are strong indications that the network of movement, communication, and 
exchange in this region were primarily inward-looking. Literary depictions of move-
ment through Galilee suggest that people could travel from one settlement to the next 
with ease. Most neighboring settlements—especially in Lower Galilee—were within a 
few kilometers and could be reached in less than an hour. Evidence for roads between 
settlements—though of indeterminable date—give the impression of a dense web of 
connections within Galilee. Upper and Lower Galilee, once thought to be somewhat 
regionally isolated from one another, now appear to be much more integrated into the 
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 From what we can discern of trade from the material remains, 
Galileans exhibited strong proclivities for consuming goods produced within this 
network rather than importing them from outlying areas or from abroad.  
The material evidence seems to indicate, as others have suggested, that Galileans 
may have made their trade decisions based in part on motives of ethnic self-iden-
tity.
452
 Galilee and southern Golan shared similar ceramic forms, distinct from 
surrounding regions, even if the Golan and some Galilean settlements were engaged 
in competition with the two major Galilean pottery manufactories. Although trade 
connections brought some of these Galilean wares to sites on the periphery—such as 
the Decapolis or Ptolemais on the coast—these were in much smaller volumes and are 
still probably explicable within the understanding of an ethnically-bounded trade 
network that incentivized interaction with other Jews in the region. Export of basal t 
grinders may have been more extensive, given the limited regional suppliers in this 
material. But it is notable that connections to extra-Galilean/Gaulanite sites were 
predominately in terms of export, rather than import. The exception to this is the 
connection with Jerusalem, from which most lamps and perhaps many of the stone 
vessels in Galilee originated; this link was, as we shall develop further in chapter 4, 
established and reinforced through the periodic travel of Galileans southward for the 
pilgrimage festivals. This pattern suggests that Galileans were more apt to consume 
goods produced by fellow Jews, even if they were willing to sell goods to gentiles in 
surrounding regions; and they generally tended to consume goods produced in Galilee 
or Golan, with the startling exception of some items from Jerusalem. 
We began the chapter by undermining economic models that prioritize cities by 
demonstrating their inappropriateness to the settlement landscape of Early Roman 
Galilee. While Sepphoris and Tiberias may have had a higher capability for 
supporting “higher order” luxury goods, given their larger population and their 
geographic positions along a major east–west corridor, they did not necessarily domi-
nate everyday trade in Galilee. Certainly, they made natural market sites for 
surrounding villages, but in many areas it was equally or more convenient to make 
arrangements with family or acquaintances in neighboring villages than to trek to the 
city. The pattern for KḤW, for instance, suggested that sales were not dependent on 
the city markets but correlated with distance to the pottery workshop itself. The 
pattern in the Golan likewise demonstrates that inter-settlement trade could 
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effectively take place in lieu of a large city nearby. And in the lakeshore region, the 
close proximity of a large and long-established settlement of Magdala to the new city 
of Tiberias throws a wrench into the simplistic hub-and-spokes model for trade in that 
vicinity. We would do well to envision a rather decentralized web of trade networks 
and social interaction instead. 
Settlements in Early Roman Galilee were more alike than they were different, 
contrary to what we might perceive through the lens of models that emphasize an 
urban–rural dynamic. Cities, as has long been recognized, were not just inhabited by 
wealthy individuals, but also producers of various sorts. In the case of the relatively 
small Sepphoris and Tiberias, surrounded by arable land, it is likely that a consider-
able portion of the population was engaged in agricultural production, as villagers 
were.
453
 Villages were not homogeneous settlements of impoverished peasants, but 
settlements that similarly exhibiting economic stratification and diversification in 
productive occupations, if different in scale. While most people were engaged to 
some extent in agricultural production, there were clearly some who specialized in 
other trades such as fishing or potting, or who may have engaged in them in a part -
time capacity when the rhythms of 
the agricultural labor season 
allowed. All of this suggests that 
rather than understanding the aver-
age Galilean struggling to meet nar-
rowly-defined subsistence needs 
through agriculturally conservative 
strategies, the landscape of produc-
tive opportunities created some 
room for multiple strategies by 
which a household could manage 
their labor and resources within the 
settlement and between settlements.  
It is worth taking a moment to consider some of the implications of this model of 
the Galilean network for social relations and the social development and policing of 
both institutions.
454
 In our discussion of the settlement pattern in Galilee, we noted 
just how small most of the settlements in Galilee were; many were less than 1 hectare 
and most were less than 4 hectares, with populations of less than 40–60 and 160–240 
respectively, using Price’s multipliers.
455
 With populations so small, it is highly likely 
that everybody in these villages was connected to everyone else through only one or 
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Figure 12. Schematic intrasettlement networks for a 
small village (C) and larger city (D); brokers in the 





two degrees of separation, i.e., everybody knew everybody else personally, or through 
one common connection (see Figure 12C). Moreover, these relationships were likely 
multiplex—i.e., not limited to a singular interest but engaged for a range of 
purposes—and tapped frequently.
456
 These close-knit, small world networks could 
serve as effective conduits for the rapid flow of information about others throughout 
the village. They also greatly extended an individual’s access to resources, since they 
could call upon their relations to participate in cooperative arrangements or to 
exchange resources and/or allocate labor to more efficiently meet their needs. Joseph 
Manning argued a similar situation pertained to settlements in Ptolemaic Egypt—
property movement often occurred between family members or individuals of similar 
social standing within the same settlement, embedded in the same social relationships 
that serve a multitude of functions.
457
 
Sociologists have found that such small, close-knit settlements tend to foster 
behavior of communal cooperative assistance and the development of strong social 
norms.
458
 The rapid flow of information allows members of the community to closely 
monitor the behavior of their peers and develop robust reputations.
459
 The multiplex 
nature of these relationships also gives individuals considerable power to sanction 
defectors by simply withdrawing from interactions, since a host of arrangements may 
depend on the ability to enlist the cooperation of others. These conditions highly 
incentivized adherence to normative behavior and widespread adherence to norms in 
turn enhanced the level of trust between members of the community.  
The largest “cities” in Galilee were still relatively small themselves. At their 
maximal extents in the Byzantine period, both Sepphoris and Tiberias reached an esti -
mated 60 hectares in area,
460
 but were certainly much smaller in the Early Roman 
period—no more than 35 hectares, and probably considerably less. If we assume an 
urban density multiplier of 100 to 200 persons per hectare,
461
 this yields an estimated 
                                                          
456
 Bailey, “Gifts and Poison,” 4–7. 
457
 Joseph G. Manning, “Networks, Hierarchies, and Markets in the Ptolemaic Economy,” in The 
Economies of Hellenistic Societies, Third to First Centuries BC, ed. Zofia H. Archibald, John K. 
Davies, and Vincent Gabrielsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 296–323 
458
 See James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American Journal 
of Sociology 94, Supplement: “Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches  
to the Analysis of Social Structure” (1988): S95–S120; Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1990), 296–97; Karen S. Cook and Russell Hardin, “Norms of Coopera-
tiveness and Networks of Trust,” in Hechter and Opp, Social Norms, 327–47 at 333–34. In her study 
of early rabbinic networks in Galilee, Cather Hezser points out sociologists’ observation that “the 
more people interact with each other, the more likely they are to develop similar attitudes, while 
greater social distance may go hand in hand with a decrease in attitude similarity”; The Social Struc-
ture of the Rabbinic Movement, 49. 
459
 The trustworthiness of reputation is enhanced through multiple lines of corroborative gossip 
reports, as found by Ralf D. Sommerfeld, Hand-Jürgen Krambeck, and Manfred Milinski in “Multiple 
Gossip Statements and Their Effect on Reputation and Trustworthiness,” Proceedings of the Royal 
Society 275 (2008): 2529–36. 
460
 See n. 281 and n. 291. 
461
 I here deploy the lower end of the 100–400 spectrum noted by Wilson, “City Sizes and 





urban population of 3,500 to 7,000. We may reasonably assume that intra-city 
networks were considerably less dense than in smaller settlements when assessing the 
network as a whole; more of the relationships may have been “single-stranded,” 
meaning they were restricted to one purpose, creating personal networks that were 
broad but shallow.
462
 But we may also identify smaller communities within the city 
that coalesce around particular neighborhoods or institutions, which may exhibit the 
features of a small world network within that community and allow for many of the 
same social phenomena as in tight-knit villages, such as the development of strong 
norms.
463
 The power of peer sanctions in norm enforcement of course weakens as the 
density of the overall network diminishes, since information does not necessarily 
spread as far or as quickly and one may find peers to interact with outside the sanc-
tioning group. We may expect, on this model, to find larger cities less homogeneous 
in terms of the operative norms and providing greater opportunities for avoiding 
compliance, though particular enclaves within the settlement may still exhibit strong 
norm building and enforcement depending on the degree of their internal network 
density and closure (i.e., separation from the broader city network).  
Similar principles apply to the overall network of Galilean settlements. We have 
argued that there was ample movement, communication, and trade between settle-
ments in the region. Villages and towns were neither completely inward-looking and 
self-sufficient, nor oriented primarily toward the more “urban” sites of Sepphoris, 
Tiberias, and Magdala. Instead, they were engaged with most other nearby sites, 
regardless of size, in the manner of a densely-linked small world network. As indi-
viduals travelled to neighboring settlements for social or trade reasons, they brought 
news and gossip with them. Relationships forged with individuals in neighboring 
communities could be very important for gathering information about economic 
opportunities (trade needs, labor demands, etc.) and information that could lower the 
risks involved in interaction with hitherto unknown parties in the community. One’s 
established connections to individuals in adjacent communities could serve as 
brokers, forging new connections by bridging acquaintances and to some extent 
controlling the flow of information (see Figure 12D).
464
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Obviously, at the level of the region, we are no longer looking at a scale at which 
everybody knows everybody. But the level of interaction and integration between 
adjacent settlements suggests that, as a system, Galilee was a relatively dense 
network. It was also, as we noted, a fairly closed network, with most interactions 
directed inward. It may be prudent to compare this to our discussion of the social 
network of the city: as one moves outward from a small, dense cluster of connections 
to a larger conglomerate of interconnected clusters, the social pressures that compel 
homogeneity and conformity and norm-compliance reduce. We need not, therefore, 
expect Galilee as a whole to have operated according to a singular, consistent, and 
stable set of norms. But the combination of strong intra-settlement pressures to 
conform with internally defined norms of behavior (at least in the villages and moder-
ately-sized towns) with the pressures to operate according to expected norms in inter-
settlement interactions makes it likely that some things would become normative 
across the region. And, as we shall argue in the next chapter, certain religious norms 
concerning ritual purity and reputations of piety could play an especially important 
role in shaping behaviors in trade, both within and between settlements.  
In sum, the available evidence for a Galilean regional economic network suggests 
a system of highly integrated settlements in a relatively closed network. People, 
goods, and information could easily move through the region. Inter-settlement 
exchange was in part a necessity, as certain settlements and regions produced 
specialists goods desired elsewhere, and in part a strategy, as individuals could make 
arrangements to more efficiently exploit their resources and labor. These conditions 
facilitated the emergence of norms and strengthened mechanisms of peer policing, 
especially at the settlement level but also at the regional level. In the next chapter, we 
will delve further into the question of how religious norms governing agricultural 
production, consumption, and exchange may have served to constrain and shape the 







CHAPTER 3—CULTIVATING PIETY 
Mosaic Laws and Their Role in an Agrarian Economy 
Many studies of the ancient Mediterranean economy have taken for granted the notion 
of the “peasant” as a cultural type, a distinct subset of a population that can be identi-
fied cross-culturally and historically that is defined in part by their agrarian focus, 
economic contingency, and adherence to a particular ethos.
465
 Many scholars of Early 
Roman Galilee have likewise adopted this concept of peasantry,
466
 especially as 
filtered through the work of James C. Scott.
467
 According to Scott, the primary 
characteristics of the peasant ethos are (1) economic decision-making based on a 
notional minimum value of resources required, (2) a general aversion to risk when it 
threatens this base subsistence, and (3) evaluation of economic conditions in relation 
to the ability to attain this threshold.
468
 Studies of the ancient Mediterranean and 
Palestine alike have deployed this model far too rigidly, especially in deploying a 
narrow definition of subsistence that concentrates on food needs (often simplified to 
grain needs) and obligations of taxes and rents. As a result of this fairly narrow defi -
nition of economic needs, analysis of the economy has barely considered the role of 
“religious” factors in defining the household’s target resource needs.  
We may benefit from altering the assumptions by which we seek to understand 
the relationship between economic and religious concerns in Galileans’ economic 
decision-making. As we noted in the introduction to this dissertation, recent scholar-
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ship has demonstrated that the religious cannot be separated from other “spheres” of 
the social world, such as the economic or the political, as though they were unrelated 
phenomena.
469
 The focus on evaluating “subsistence needs” according to a minimal-
ist, lowest common denominator model of the peasant has led scholars to effectively 
relegate religious obligations to a secondary concern or afterthought, fulfillment of 
which was only considered once the “essential” needs were met. Needs and risk are in 
part biologically and ecologically determined, of course, but these factors only define 
the bare minimum.
470
 The definitions of “necessity” and “luxury” and the boundary 
between them are not universal constants, but rather are variable and culturally 
defined.
471
 Why, then, should we assume that Jews considered their tax dues in calcu-
lating their target for subsistence, but not those economic obligations stipulated by 
God and inscribed in the Torah? If we take seriously the notion that most Jews 
thought of God as a real and powerful agent in the world with whom they had inter-
actions and a relationship, we must also acknowledge that the covenantal constraints 
and obligations that define this relationship would have factored into their decisions 
about how best to allocate their resources. In the language of New Institutional 
Economics, the Law may be considered a “formal institution,” the “rules of the game” 
that define the human environment within which individuals cultivate tactics for 
meeting household needs.
472
 I work from the assumption that the Law constituted a 
set of rules that Jews could not ignore with impunity, rules that fundamentally shaped 
the default positions and incentives that bounded economically “rational” behavior. 
As Pierre Bourdieu put it, “the economic calculation directing the agents’ strategies 
takes indissociably into account profits and losses which the narrow definition of 




In this chapter, I offer an analysis of some of the Mosaic laws pertaining to agri -
cultural production, consumption, and exchange. These commandments helpfully 
demonstrate that religious institutions are in many cases inseparable from the 
economic framework that they reflect and shape. Some would place constraints on the 
manner and timing of the agricultural process, limiting how crops could be sown, how 
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they could be harvested, and when and where they could be consumed. Other 
commandments would establish obligations that placed demands on the allocation of 
resources. Insofar as Jews sought to adhere to the constraints and obligations laid out 
in the Mosaic Covenant, these rules defined the goals of economic behavior and the 
tactics appropriate to meet those goals. It is useful to begin with these laws because of 
the ubiquity and essentiality of agriculture. A majority of the population in Galilee 
and the Mediterranean more broadly were engaged to some extent in agricultural 
production, though the amount of land they owned, rented, or worked might vary 
considerably, and some of the population was engaged in non-agricultural production, 
as discussed in chapter 2. Even Jews who did not produce all  or any of their own 
foodstuffs needed to obtain agricultural products through trade to meet their food 
needs. As such, all members of society were in some way affected by the command-
ments pertaining to agricultural produce, even if the Law’s constraints were felt 
differently by Jews of different socioeconomic positions and those positions enabled 
different tactics for managing resources in compliance with the Law.  
As we noted in chapter 1, the Roman state permitted the Jews to conduct them-
selves according to their “ancestral laws,” and at times explicitly endorsed them 
through official decrees, such as those issued by Caesar and Augustus (see Ant. 
14.194–195, 199, 203, 208). But the infrastructurally weak state was content to let 
provincial Jews govern themselves according to these laws, and offered little if any 
support in policing adherence. The Temple authorities and the priesthood were simi-
larly weak in their ability to enforce adherence to the Law, especially in Galilee 
where few of them resided. Moreover, many of the agricultural laws would be diffi-
cult for centralized authorities to police since they would require intimate knowledge 
of the minutiae of a farmer’s conduct. Since the state and cultic authorities were in no 
position to effectively police adherence to the Law, observance was largely reliant on 
mechanisms of self-policing and peer policing. As E. P. Sanders has argued, most 
Jews in the late Second Temple period seem to have understood the Torah’s 
commandments as the conditions of the covenant established between God and Israel, 
observance of which brought promise of reward and violation of which brought indi -
vidual or even collective punishment—a concept he dubbed “covenantal nomism.”
474
 
Assuming he is right that this ideology was prevalent in Palestinian Jewish society, 
the threat of individual punishment provided additional incentive for one to police 
their own behavior for fear of retribution from God, and to police peers for fear that 
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their transgression would endanger all Israel. Moreover, as we shall see, questions of 
adherence and purity could factor into the riskiness of interactions with peers, and the 
interlinking of adherence to the Laws with conceptions of piety incentivized Jews to 
cultivate and broadcast a reputation for adherence to the Law. 
In arguing that the particularly Jewish institution of the Mosaic Law could have 
profound effects on the contours of a regional agrarian economy, I am also highlight -
ing a key limitation in the utility of a universalizing “peasant economics” model. 
While there is certainly value to be gained from the cross-cultural approach (such as 
its emphasis on risk- rather than profit-based motivation), it overlooks the funda-
mental differences that regionally- and culturally-specific institutions can make in 
economic behavior. The Torah’s agricultural laws have peculiar ramifications that 
would have distinguished a Palestinian agrarian economy from the agrarian economy 
of other regions in the Roman Empire. Even if climatic conditions and basic needs 
were comparable to other agriculturalists in the Mediterranean basin, Galileans did 
not necessarily manage their economic resources in the same way or oriented toward 
the same resource targets. This chapter therefore suggests that such institutions as 
sacred laws and religiously-inflected customs matter in assessing the economy in 
other regions and sub-regions of the Mediterranean world as well. 
Torah Observance and Interpretive Norms 
It is innate in every Jew, right from birth, to regard them [the Law of Moses] as 
decrees of God, to remain faithful to them and, if necessary, gladly die on their 
behalf. (Against Apion 1.42) 
The above quotation from Josephus is obviously hyperbolic, depicting the Jews as 
born with intimate knowledge of the divinely ordained commandments and an instinc-
tual and deep-seated drive to obey them even at the risk of death. Nevertheless, this 
statement is illustrative of the seriousness with which many Jews from Second 
Temple Palestine took the commandments in the Torah. Adherence to the Law is 
extolled as a virtue in numerous other texts from this period, such as Ben Sira, Tobit, 
and Jubilees. Jewish literature from this period is replete with exemplars of Jews who 
piously observed the Law even under extreme pressure to violate it, risking life and 
limb in so doing (e.g., Daniel and 2 Maccabees).
475
 In 1 Maccabees and Josephus’ 
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(Dan 1; 3; 6). In 2 Macc, Jews resist compulsion to worship foreign gods and break the dietary laws 
(even when easy paths of deception were available) and continue to circumcise their children (6:18–
27). The martyrdom narrative in chapter 7 features impassioned speeches about steadfast adherence to 
the Law and the preference to die rather than break it.  
We may also note the zeal for which Jews continued to attend the festivals in spite of internecine 
violence or attack by Roman forces, as we will discuss in chapter 4. See, e.g.,  Ant. 14.338; War 1.253; 





narratives, Jews not only refuse to break the Law but actively fight against those who 
would compel them to do so and against fellow Jews would heed that compulsion.
476
 
The prevalence of these narratives suggests that adherence to the Law was a widely 
held and long-established ideal among Palestinian Jews by the Early Roman period.  
Other lines of evidence corroborate the portrait of Jews concerned to observe the 
Torah. Greek and Roman authors wrote about those elements of Jewish practice that 
seemed most peculiar or revolting to them or that created discord with the gentile 
populations where they resided.
477
 Perhaps the most widely recognized practice was 
the Jewish Sabbath.
478
 That the observance of the Sabbath was taken seriously and 
widely practiced by Jews cannot be doubted, and the extent to which Jews would go 
to avoid violating it can be seen in the refusal to fight to against Pompey during his 
siege of Jerusalem, as both Jewish and gentile authors record.
479
 Greek and Roman 
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authors were also quite aware that the Jews had peculiar dietary habits, particularly 
their abstinence from pork, though they imagined fanciful reasons for the practice and 
surely did not grasp the full extent of the Torah’s dietary laws.
480
 Elements of Jewish 
halakhah can also be discerned in the few extant legal documents from Roman Pales-
tine, such as the reference to the Sabbatical Year in P. Yadin 18 or tithing in P. Mur. 
24.
481
 As we discussed in chapter 2, archaeological remains of ritual baths and stone 
vessels indicate Jewish concerns for maintenance of ritual purity, the conditions of 
which were largely defined by the laws in the Torah. Together, these lines of evidence 
suggest that many Jews were concerned with adherence to the strictures in the Mosaic 
Covenant and strove to carry them out. 
Yet some scholars have expressed doubt about the extent to which Jews actually 
followed the commandments.
482
 One might justly object that the literary sources, in 
representing the Jews either to themselves or to others, often gloss over failures in 
adherence to the Law so as to highlight the general piety of the people. Josephus’ 
exposition of the Law in books 3 and 4 of Jewish Antiquities gives the impression that 
he is taking on the role of “native expert” (as a priest) in describing to his Roman 
audience the Jewish “ancestral law” as actually practiced by Jews in first-century 
Palestine, though he may at times simplify the practice or render it in terms more 
easily understandable to gentiles.
483
 Useful as this source is, as with any generalizing 
description, we cannot state from this alone that the entire population actually adhered 
to them as described. It would certainly be false to suggest that all Jews were zealous 
to follow every letter of the Law, as we know that at least some Jews who ascended to 
positions of authority in the Early Roman period ignored the laws of Torah or 
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 The Mishnah may suggest attitudes of laxity toward the 
Law in those it refers to as ʽamei ha-ʼaretz, though this more likely signals failure to 
follow the rabbis’ particular interpretation rather than eschewing the Law alto -
gether.
485
 While some commandments recur so often that it is nigh impossible to 
dispute widespread adherence to them, others have left relatively little evidence in the 
textual record, positively or negatively. “Silences” on particular commandments are 
ambiguous. They can be taken to mean that a commandment was not generally 
observed. But they may also be a product of the text’s interests lying elsewhere, or 
they may signal that a given practice was so widely followed and uncontested that it 
was taken for granted as part of the society’s doxa. Where the evidence is sparse, we 
are forced to make an assumption in order to move forward. 
I work from the assumption that for most Jews adherence to the Law as a general 
concept was not a matter of dispute; Palestinian Jews “wanted to obey the Law and 
that they considered how best to do so.”
486
 The Torah was so deeply revered and 
adherence to it so central to Jewish identity by this period that it could not be simply 
ignored. What was in dispute, however, was how to interpret and implement the Law. 
The commandments in the Torah were by no means unambiguous and complete. As 
Bernard M. Levinson has demonstrated, even as the books that make up the Torah 
were being compiled and composed, the commandments were being reinterpreted and 
revised through various textual strategies of rewriting, overwriting, and re-contextu-
alizing.
487
 The result muddied the waters as much as it clarified them. Even in the 
Early Roman period, the text of the Law was not homogenized, and variant versions 
could be deployed side by side in the same community without discomfort, as the 
variety of manuscript types at Qumran attests.
488
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The ambiguities and outright contradictions left considerable latitude for inter-
pretive difference in approaching the Law. For instance, the complicated and quite 
disparate commandments to tithe sometimes indicates the tenth is given to the 
Levites, sometimes consumed by the one tithing, and sometimes given over to the 
poor (Lev 27:30–33; Num 18:21–30; Deut 12:11–18; 14:22–29; 26:12–13). Numerous 
authors in the Second Temple period apparently resolved the problem by isolating 
three separate tithes, suggesting fairly broad agreement, but this is hardly the only 
possibility that the Torah’s texts allow.
489
 Furthermore, some texts from this period 
(such as Jubilees and the Temple Scroll) offer an alternative or supplemental account 
of the sacred Law that reinterpret it using strategies similar to the inner-exegetical 
strategies deployed within the Torah itself, overwriting and re-contextualizing the 
laws to make a singular interpretation appear as if it were the natural, authoritative, 
and incontestable rendering of the divine commandment.
490
 The question of whether 
or not a given Jew “adhered” to the Law is thus a matter of perspective—according to 
which standard and interpretation did one judge faithfulness and deviance?  
In this chapter, we will explore the ways that observance of the Torah’s agricul -
tural laws could have affected economic behavior, on the assumption that the majority 
of Jews strove to follow the laws as they were interpreted within a social network. 
Despite the seemingly open-ended possibilities allowed by the “gaps” in the Law, 
individuals were not necessarily free to interpret the commandments in any way they 
saw fit. The commandments were practiced within a network of family, friends, and 
neighbors and could have practical effects on interactions and transactions with them. 
As we argued in chapter 2, most Galilean settlements were probably fairly closed and 
dense networks that made ideal conditions for the development and enforcement of 
strong norms. Under such conditions, normative interpretations, as other social norms, 
serve to reduce the barriers to interaction, since homogeneity in practice reduces risks 
by making others’ actions more predictable and compatible. Moreover, once estab -
lished, normative traditions can be perpetuated by a combination of instructions and 
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 This does not altogether preclude the possibility of arriving at and 
practicing idiosyncratic interpretations through exegesis as an individual, private, 
cognitive exercise, but social forces weigh against it.
492
 
From what we can discern in the literary sources about Jewish practice in the 
Second Temple period, there was a considerable amount of agreement. Even among 
the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes, the so-called “sects,”
493
 where we might 
expect to see the greatest differences, halakhic differences were seemingly confined 
to a handful of issues.
494
 The Mishnah, too, alludes to local variations in the details of 
practice, despite general congruence, in its principle of “everything according to local 
                                                          
491
 We may postulate that as members of a community taught the Law to children or peers, they 
did so through a particular interpretive filter that conflated the lette r of the Law with the interpreta-
tion, possibly accreting other traditions or local norms to the commandment and rendering a given 
interpretation as the default, natural reading. Social scientists have also observed that individuals tend 
to act in accordance with the behavior of their peers, meaning that normative behaviors may spread 
and perpetuate through mimesis and thereby meld to one’s understanding of correct observance. Once 
a particular behavior has become normative in a given community, change is d isincentivized because 
there is less friction involved in continuing to act according to established norms than to break with 
them. This is all the more true once peer enforcement of prevailing norms is taken into consideration. 
See Duncan J. Watts, Everything is Obvious: How Common Sense Fails Us (New York: Crown 
Business, 2011), 71–73; North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance , 92–104. 
492
 John J. Collins seems to me correct in this regard: “The kind of halakhic analysis that we find 
in the Temple Scroll and Jubilees cannot have developed overnight. Undoubtedly, these issues were 
being discussed for some decades before these books were written, certainly before they attained their 
final shape”; “The Transformation of the Torah in Second Temple Judaism,” JSJ 43 (2012) 455–74 at 
473. 
493
 Judaism in the Second Temple period is often characterized by these three “sects,” due largely 
to Josephus’ extensive discussion of them together in excurses (Ant. 13.171–173; 18.11–22; War 
2.119–166) and his claim to have trained with each (Life 10). We should not, however, overemphasize 
the place of these groups in society. It is likely that only a minority of Jews were adherents to any one 
of these, and these identity categories likely overlapped with other allegiances that complicate a defi-
nition even of these factions themselves. Judaism of this period was marked by variety, but also by a 
number of common threads. Moreover, the use of “sect” to describe these groups is somewhat inade -
quate. The term carries modern connotations of a group that is self-segregating, separating itself from 
the rest of “mainstream” society. Although this may aptly describe the Qumran community, it would 
be inappropriate to characterize a group such as the Pharisees in this way. Where necessary, I prefer to 
refer to them as “factions,” which indicates distinction and separable identities, and even allows for 
conflict, without suggesting a removal from the world or a divergence from a conception of a 
“common” Judaism. We must also acknowledge that there may have been many more factions than 
Josephus’ tripartite schema would suggest. See Martin Goodman, “Josephus and Variety in First -
Century Judaism,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 7 (2000): 201–13; 
E. P. Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah: Five Studies (Philadelphia: Trinity Press Inter-
national, 1990), 236–42. 
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custom” (495.(הכל כמנהג המדינה We may presume, then, that while diversity of 
interpretation existed on particular issues, these different interpretations functioned as 
norms within certain regional sub-populations or social groups.
496
 Interpretive differ-
ence on matters of proper observance created problems and even barriers to social and 
economic interaction by increasing the “risk” that one may violate a commandment, 
enable someone else’s violation, or appear to others as a result  of the interaction to be 
a lawbreaker. Differences in interpretation of proper observance also increased the 
“risk” of violating piety. Such variations in interpretation add complication to the 
analysis of how religious institutions shape economic behavior, but they make the 
question of interaction all the more interesting.  
Mosaic Constrictions on Productions 
We can divide the Torah laws that would have impinged on agricultural production 
into two groups: (1) ones that defined when a Jew could engage in agricultural labor, 
and (2) ones that defined the manner of cultivation. In terms of temporal restrictions, 
the most obvious laws are the commandment to observe the Sabbath and the festivals. 
For the former, it suffices to briefly note that the command to rest from labor—
including but not limited to farming—on the seventh day left Jews with overall fewer 
days in which to accomplish the work they needed to do.
497
 We will return to the 
matter of the festivals in chapter 4. Perhaps the most interesting temporal const raint 
on production was the Sabbatical Year, which we shall treat in detail here. After-
wards, we shall turn to the commandment prohibiting planting a field with “mixed 
species” for an example of constraints on the manner of production. 
Sabbatical Year 
The Sabbatical Year is a septennial practice prescribed in Exodus and Leviticus that 
requires Jews living in the Land of Israel to let the farmland lie fallow: 
For six years you shall sow your land and gather in its yield; but the seventh year you 
shall let it rest and lie fallow, so that the poor of your people may eat; and what they 
leave the wild animals may eat. You shall do the same with your vineyard, and with 
your olive orchard. (Exod 23:10–11) 
Six years you shall sow your field, and six years you shall  prune your vineyard, and 
gather in their yield; but in the seventh year there shall be a Sabbath of complete rest 
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prohibited (see Ant. 13.252; Life 159–161, 275–276), meaning people in movement around the region 





for the land, a Sabbath for YHWH: you shall not sow your field or prune your vine -
yard. You shall not reap the aftergrowth of your harvest or gather the grapes of your 
unpruned vine: it shall be a year of complete rest for the land. You may eat what the 
land yields during its Sabbath—you, your male and female slaves, your hired and 
your bound laborers who live with you; for your livestock also, and for the wild 
animals in your land all its yield shall be for food. (Lev 25:3–7) 
It is not wholly clear from the text what scope is envisioned. Sowing certainly 
suggests grain crops, though it may also include a variety of pulses and vegetables. 
Exodus’ fields, vineyards, and olive orchards would seem to indicate the staple crops 
of the “Mediterranean triad”—grain, grapes, and olives—but this may also be read as 
a synecdoche for agriculture in general, tacitly including produce that composed a 
much smaller portion of the diet. At least by the Second Temple period this 
commandment appears to have been understood as a prohibition on cultivation alto-
gether. Josephus refers to it as a “respite … from the plough and from planting” (Ant. 
3.281), and the tannaim later refer to an extensive number of crops subject to the 
prohibition (m. Shev passim). The Sabbatical Year commandment even prohibited 
some maintenance projects and improvements that would have eased agricultural 
work in future years, explicitly pruning grape vines (Lev 25:4).
498
 
The version in Leviticus specifies a provision implicit in Exodus’ rendition of the 
commandment: people are permitted in the Sabbatical Year to collect food crops that 
spring from the soil without the aid of human cultivation (“aftergrowth”), such as that 
which grew from grain and seed dropped during the previous harvest (Lev 25:6–7; cf. 
Exod 23:11a).
499
 The two versions seem to have a different vision of who was entitled 
to make use of aftergrowth: in Exodus it is for the benefit of the poor, while in Levit-
icus it seems directed at the household. The prohibition on reaping aftergrowth (Lev 
25:5) could be taken as more than a statement about rest from the labors of cultiva-
tion, signaling that aftergrowth from one’s fields may not be treated as the private 
possession of the household alone. That is how Josephus describes the commandment:  
The enjoyment of those [products] brought forth of their own accord from the soil is 
to be for those who wish it, both compatriots and foreigners, nothing being withheld 
from them. (Ant. 3.281) 
This interpretation effectively deemed all vegetation that grew on Jewish lands in the 
Sabbatical Year to be available for use by all equally, combining aspects of both 
passages from the Torah. On this understanding of the Sabbatical Year command-
ment, it constituted a leveling of social and economic status among the Jews of Israel: 
it denied property owners sole rights over the produce on their farmlands and made 
them functionally public. In its ideal form, the Sabbatical Year served as a great 
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equalizer, causing all of Israel to live a sort of communal poverty and resort to strate-
gies of scrounging. 
Some scholars have accordingly questioned whether the Sabbatical Year was 
actually observed in the Second Temple period or whether it was merely a utopian 
ideal. Seán Freyne inclines to the latter, saying, “such leveling mechanisms as the 
Jubilee and Sabbatical Year institutions were increasingly employed as images for the 
eschatological future in the literature of the period, rather than as currently func-
tioning institutions.”
500
 Zeʼev Safrai likewise doubts that the prescription was strictly 
observed and believes it had only limited effects on the economic structure.
501
 Indeed, 
another aspect of the Sabbatical Year practice, the release of debts (Deut 15:1–11), 
was apparently rendered moot in some circles by Hillel the Elder’s procedural inven -
tion of the prozbul in the days of Herod, which made some sorts of loans payable 
even in the year of release (m. Shev 10:3–4).
502
 But even if we were to understand 
this as a complete abrogation of the release from debts—which is surely an over-
reading—there are indications that the agricultural practices and obligations associ-
ated with the Sabbatical Year continued. The Dead Sea Scrolls understand chronology 
on the sabbatical cycle and saw the seventh year as a year of rest, though the extant 
documents contain no reference to specific cultivation practices.
503
 The Mishnah’s 
tractate on the Sabbatical Year reflects engagement with actual practices and 
scenarios that cannot be credited to simple exegesis of Torah, and references to the 
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Sabbatical Year also appear in a loan document from 55/56 CE found in the Judaean 
Desert (P. Mur. 18) and in a series of land leases from around the time of the Bar 
Kokhba Revolt (P. Mur. 24).
504




Josephus also provides textual evidence for the sabbatical fallow in the Early 
Roman period. In addition to Josephus’ depiction of it in his Mosaic discourse, he 
also references the fallow in the narrative of Herod’s re-conquest of Jerusalem in 37 
BCE: “the Sabbatical Year … was still going on and forced the land to lie unculti-
vated” (Ant. 15.7). A few years earlier, Caesar had issued a decree that granted the 
Jews an exemption from tribute payments in the Sabbatical Year, which “compelled 
them to leave the land uncultivated” (τὴν δὲ χώραν μένειν ἀγεώργητον … ἠνάγκαζεν; 
Ant. 14.202); this decree of course made virtue of necessity: since tribute was 
assessed proportionally at this time, a fallow year would yield no tribute anyway.
506
 
The decree suggests that the fallow was practiced in Galilee as well as Judaea, since it 
remits the whole of the tribute for the Sabbatical Years, not just a portion. If Galilee 
did not participate in the sabbatical fallow, it is strange that the Romans forfeited the 
substantial revenues to be gained from Galilee.
507
  
The Sabbatical Year prohibition of cultivation would have shifted regional 
patterns of resource acquisition and the deployment of human resources. In a society 
where most inhabitants were to some extent engaged in agricultural production to 
meet their resource needs, a year in which cultivation was prohibited created a 
problem for how to allocate resources efficiently. In many ways, the Sabbatical Year 
was like a famine, but because of its regularity households could plan ahead to ensure 
they would have the resources they needed. Despite the difficulties that the sabbatical 
fallow caused for the many who observed it, it seems not to have spelled utter doom 
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for the average agrarian household.
508
 In general, there are two basic tactics that Jews 
could turn to meet their production needs for this year: store food in advance of the 
Sabbatical Year or acquire produce at market during the Sabbatical Year.  
Storage in kind was in many respects the safe strategy.
509
 While one could expect 
to gather some aftergrowth from the public lands in the Sabbatical Year, it was a 
tactic full of uncertainty: aftergrowth would never yield as much as a cultivated 
harvest, the amount that would be available was unpredictable, and one’s access to 
what did spring up was not exclusive or guaranteed. Building up a reserve capable of 
bringing the family through the Sabbatical Year alleviated the uncertainty and risk of 
depending on aftergrowth. The storage for the sixth year would be all the more crucial 
if the mishnaic prescription to burn leftover aftergrowth at the Sabbatical Year’s end 
(m. Shev 9:2) was also practiced in the Early Roman period, since stores would need 
to last into the next harvest season. Storage in kind guaranteed the availability of 
foodstuffs when needed, without recourse to the Sabbatical Year market situation, 
when the high demand and low supply could lead to higher prices. Building up an 
adequate reserve required producing food crops in the years prior to the Sabbath at a 
margin well above annual needs in order to stockpile a portion for the lean year to 
come. This thereby incentivized practices of intensive agriculture, even engagement 
in lucrative ventures in cash crop production, whose revenues could be used to buy 
and stockpile staples like grains. Storage in kind was not without its impediments, 
though; not all household necessarily had the space to silo an addit ional year’s 
supply, and those who did still ran the risks of spoilage and pests destroying their 
reserves. In addition to individual strategies of storage, it remains possible that some 
communities engaged in collective preparations for the Sabbatical Year, as suggested 
in the Tosefta, gathering produce into a collective hoard that was then rationed out 
during the fallow year (t. Shev 8:1–4).
510
 
Households who only obtained part of their food needs through their own 
production, or who lacked the infrastructure to store enough excess, were reliant on 
exchange with others to meet those needs. Some might be able to achieve assistance 
through social capital in their interpersonal networks—accruing favors and goodwill 
in the productive years that could be called in should their limited reserves or the 
aftergrowth prove insufficient for their resource needs in the Sabbatical Year. But 
there are also indicators that the produce markets could continue to function through-
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out the Sabbatical Year despite the lack of cultivation (see m. Shev 8). Craftsmen and 
agriculturalists alike could sell their goods at market during the productive years and 
store the value in coin to use for purchases during the Sabbatical Year. Savings in 
coin had the advantage of storing value compactly and without the problems of 
spoilage and infestation. But since local supply was so low and demand so high in 
Sabbatical Years, the difference in price at which produce was sold in the productive 
years and the price at which it was bought in the Sabbatical Year made saving in coin 
a more expensive strategy, though one that would be essential to the relatively poor 
and those in non-agricultural trades.  
Where did the food at market come from? It is possible that Galileans solved their 
market shortage problem by importing foodstuffs from the gentile and Samaritan 
regions on Galilee’s periphery.
511
 We argued in chapter 2, though, that the material 
evidence suggests relatively limited trade with outside of Galilee itself in this period, 
at least in terms of imports; we do not find the abundance of extra-Galilean ceramic 
jar forms we would expect if mass imports occurred every seven years. One important 
factor may have been concerns over the ritual purity of foods produced by gentiles. 
There is nothing inherently ritually impure about gentiles that would cause their prod-
ucts to be unacceptable, but their lack of knowledge of the stringencies of the Torah’s 
food and purity laws created uncertainty as to whether one might accidentally and 
unknowingly transgress the Law by consuming the imports.
512
 In Life 74–76, Jose-
phus indicates that the Jews of Caesarea Philippi (Syria in War) considered the use of 
“Greek” oil a violation of the Law (τὰ νόμιμα) while the parallel account in War 
2.591 suggests that oil from compatriots (δι’ ὁμοφύλων) would be implicitly 
trusted.
513
 As we shall discuss below, liquids were considered especially effective 
transmitters of impurity and thus especially risky, but dry goods may have been 
presumed safe, like the Egyptian grain that Herod imported for public distribution in a 
time of famine (Ant. 15.314). 
The bulk of the foodstuffs available at market was probably supplied by local 
Jewish farmers and landowners. The Mishnah assumes at several points that 
aftergrowth was sold at market (cf. m. Shev 8:3–5, 8), suggesting food gathered 
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locally rather than imported. More important were Galilean farmers who had the land 
access to produce a large harvest and who had sufficient facilities to store large 
volumes. For such farmers, the local scarcity in the Sabbatical Year created an ideal 
opportunity to earn a considerable cash return at market. The anticipation of these 
market conditions created every incentive for those who could afford to hold onto 
their crops to do so in order to take advantage of the expected hike in market prices 
during the Sabbatical Year. So much for the leveling ideal of the septennial fallow; it 
instead created conditions whereby those who were well-off were able to maintain 
their wealth because of their superior ability to hold and withhold resources, 
compared to those who lacked the surplus and infrastructure to store sufficient food 
and relied on the market. 
The prohibition on cultivation did not just affect the productive capacity of Gali-
lean agriculturalists. It also altered the subsistence needs of the household through the 
easement of external obligations on household resources. Payments that were depend-
ent on a proportional assessment of the year’s harvest were obviously nullified by the 
fallowing. This meant that those agriculturalists who relied in part or in whole on the 
rental of arable land had no need to do so in the Sabbatical Year, and for a year at 
least had no obligation to a landlord. It also meant the annual tithes were moot; there 
was no tenth to be given to the priests and/or Levites, no tenth to be consumed in 
Jerusalem, no tenth to the poor.
514
 At least under Caesar, the obligation to pay tribute 
to Rome was assessed proportionally (one-fourth of what was sown) but remitted in 
the Sabbatical Year (Ant. 14.203). We lack the data to confirm whether or not sabbat-
ical exemptions were granted at other times. But in general it seems that the Romans 
were fairly accommodating to Jewish “ancestral customs,” and when tribute was 
assessed proportionally, it would yield no returns to Rome in the Sabbatical Year. 
Tribute under the procurators may have been assessed at a fixed value (see ch. 1), 
which would have increased the needs for production in the year(s) prior if no 
exemption were granted. We do not know much about the form that Herodian direct 
taxation took, but given that the Herodian rulers knew the Law and generally avoided 
offending Jewish religious sensibilities within the Jewish regions of Palestine, it is 
likely that they would not have sought land-based agricultural revenue from their 
Jewish subjects during the Sabbatical Year.
515
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While I have concentrated here on the Sabbatical Year’s effects on the economy 
of foodstuffs, it should be noted that the fallow also affected other peripheral indus-
tries. Linen, seemingly the major textile produced in Galilee, was dependent on a crop 
of flax.
516
 Assuming the broad understanding of the commandment as a prohibition on 
all cultivation, textile manufacturers would have faced supply problems in the Sabbat-
ical Year. They faced the same set of choices as farmers of foodstuffs—scrounge 
through an unproductive year, set aside flax to continue production in the seventh 
year, or acquire flax from imports or local stockpilers.  
Ceramic production too was affected, at least in terms of storage wares. The 
production of ceramic jars and jugs was intimately related to cultivation, since these 
vessels were primarily used for the storage and shipment of agricultural goods. 
Demand for such vessels would have diminished in a year without a real harvest. 
Mishnah Sheviʽit 5:7 supports this assessment: “The potter may sell five oil jugs and 
fifteen wine jugs, for it is typical to bring [this much produce] from ownerless prop-
erty [הפקר]; but if he brings more from it [ownerless property], it is forbidden.” This 
passage raises the suspicion that any potter selling more than this amount to any given 
individual was abetting the transgression of the Sabbatical Year commandment. 
Because the majority of the population was primarily engaged in agriculture, the 
Sabbatical Year also created a situation of structural underemployment.
517
 Since there 
was no agricultural work or even improvement of the land to be done in the Sabbat-
ical Year, there was an abundance of labor that could be redirected to other forms of 
production. For households whose members were part-time craftsmen in normal years 
could expand their operations to redeploy their freed-up labor. Other agriculturalists, 
who were not trained in such a craft, would find the barrier to entry harder to over-
come and might be able to find employment in a support capacity to a handicraft 
operation, or perhaps in construction projects. In general, we may suggest that these 
conditions incentivized some amount of diversification in skills and trades among the 
members of the household—a tactic that also served more generally to mitigate risks 
in the household’s economic resource management. 
Mixed Species 
One of the major risks that producers in an agrarian economy faced each year was the 
threat of crop failure, whether due to natural or human causes. Agriculturalists could 
mitigate these risks through strategies of crop diversification (polyculture) and mixed 
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planting (intercropping) to spread risk over multiple types of crops, and fragmentation 
of landholdings (scattered plots) to spread risk by taking advantage of micro-climatic 
difference.
518
 The Torah, however, contains a prohibition on the “mixture of kinds” 
(kilʼayim) that, if heeded, would have placed constraints on the use of these tactics. 
The laws of kilʼayim apply to interbreeding of animals and interweaving of different 
fibers in clothing. But we will here focus on the prohibition on planting multiple 
difference species of crops on the same land, i.e., intercropping/polyculture. Produce 
rendered from a field or vineyard that had been intercropped was prohibited and the 
consumption of it a violation of the covenant. Did this mean that Jews did not make 
use of the strategy of intercropping deployed elsewhere in the Mediterranean agrarian 
regimes? We shall suggest the answer is no, though the commandment did complicate 
the manner in which one could do so.
519
  
The two versions of the commandment in the Torah are as follows: 
You shall not sow your field with two kinds. (Lev 19:19) 
You shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds, lest you make the fullness of the 
seed that you have sown prohibited along with the produce of the vineyard. (Deut 
22:9) 
Our literary sources from the late Second Temple period do not have much to say 
about practice of agriculture within these covenantal constraints. But we should not 
take this as testimony against its observance. The sources are largely silent on the 
mundane details of agricultural processes, since agriculture in the narratives is often 
incidental rather than the focus. Josephus includes the commandment in his rendering 
of the Mosaic Discourse, bringing together the versions from Leviticus and Deuteron-
omy: 
Do not sow the land that is planted with vines,
 
for it is sufficient for it to raise this 
plant and to be freed from the toils of a plough. … The seeds should be pure and 
unmixed; and do not sow two or three kinds together, for nature does not rejoice in 
association of dissimilar things. (Ant. 4.228) 
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Josephus was under no obligation to repeat every individual prescription in the 
Torah—Robert Paul Gallant’s study of Josephus’ rendering of the Law notes that he 
“freely omits and modifies scriptural elements”—which suggests to me he is 
repeating an ongoing practice rather than one that had fallen by the wayside.
520
 Refer-
ences to the law among the Dead Sea scrolls also suggest continued attention to this 
commandment, rather than flouting it. 4QMMT reads: “And he will not sow his field 
or his vineyard with two species because they are holy [קדושים; unfit to consume]” 
(4Q396 4.7–8; cf. 4Q418 frag. 103 2.6–9). Another fragment, 4Q481, references 
“judges of mixed species” (1.2 ;דייני כלאים), but it is too damaged to discern much 
more about their nature or function.
521
 The Damascus Document draws on the 
prohibition to prohibit unfit mixture in marriage by analogy (4Q270 5.16–17; 4Q271 
3.9–10; cf. 4Q394 4.8–11).
522
 This is, I believe, enough to cautiously consider that the 
commandment was acknowledged and practiced, according to local norms and inter-
pretation. 
Still, the aforementioned sources do not grant us any greater detail than the rather 
terse and lacunose forms of the commandment in the Torah itself. In order to suss out 
some of the interpretive problems, potential solutions, and tactics facilitated within 
the bounds on the commandment, we will find the discussions in Mishnah Kilʼayim 
helpful. The contents of this tractate contains little that could be the result of direct 
exegesis of the Torah, suggesting that much of what is said here is reflective of prac-
ticed local customs and not merely an abstract exposition on biblical text. And 
because pre-industrial agricultural practices often endure over long periods,
523
 it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the issues and tactics addressed by the Mishnah in an 
early third-century compilation may provide useful insights for the first century as 
well. 
One of the gaps that Mishnah Kilʼayim draws our attention is the Torah’s vague-
ness on what defines a field (שדה). Was all contiguous land that one owned a single 
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field, or could it be rendered into separate fields to facilitate a 
polyculture/intercropping regime? Kilʼayim suggests the latter by quantifying permis-
sible spacing between crops of different kinds and configurations of planting that 
would facilitate mixed-crop regimes. To define the extent of a field, the tannaim 
appeal to physical markers such as stone walls, fences, roads, and ditches as indica-
tors of its bounds (2:8), while in other cases this judgment is a matter of common 
sense—“because it seems like the end of his field” ( שהוא נראה כסוף שדהו מפני ; 2:7). 
They permit the configuration of a field into separate and perpendicular (lit. 
“straight,” משר משר) planting beds separated by the span of three plow furrows or a 
Sharon yoke (2:6), or into a sort of patchwork if the crops were sufficiently spaced 
and the size of a given patch sufficiently small (2:9–10). The latter especially would 
seem to accommodate the sort of small garden farming by which households could 
supplement the staple crops with spices and vegetables, as is common in other 
agrarian cultivation regimes.
524
 Above all, these passages indicate that the practice of 
intercropping was in fact common; the rabbis attempted to incorporate, define, and 
adjudicate the legitimacy of traditional regional practices in their discussions.  
Mishnah Kilʼayim also highlights points of ambiguity in the Torah’s proscription 
on sowing a vineyard. The bounds of a vineyard are subject to interpretation. The 
rabbis permit planting in a bare patch of substantial size in the midst of a vineyard (m. 
Kil 4:1) as well as the unplanted perimeter of the vineyard (4:2). Mishnah Kilʼayim 
also discusses the tactic of creating “bare soil” through the use of arbors and trellises 
to train vines off the ground, permitting in some cases a legitimate work-around to 
intercropping (6:1–3). The Mishnah is strangely silent about another potential “loop-
hole”—the use of orchard trees to train vines. This may be because only vineyards 
and sown crops are explicitly forbidden in the commandment, while orchards are 
unmentioned.
525
 The use of orchard lands for the growing of other crops is a well-
attested practice elsewhere in the Mediterranean and allowed intensification of agri -
cultural exploitation. Training vines on orchards to make an arbustum also obviated 
the need to build infrastructure to support the vines.
526
 The commonality of the prac-
tice of sowing orchards is suggested, perhaps, by the nonchalant reference to plowing 
orchard soil in m. Sheviʽit (cf. 1:1–2).
527
 Together, these “intercropping” practices 
made more efficient use of the arable land and the mishnaic discussion of them 
suggests that it was both common practice to intermingle different species and that it 
was defensible under certain modes of interpretation and within certain constraints.  
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Mosaic Constrictions on Consumption 
Torah laws also constrained the allocation of agricultural products and restricted how 
they could be used. Of the obligations that laid claim to agricultural resources in 
Second Temple Jewish religious practice, the tithes were certainly most substantial. 
But there were also a host of other obligations that pious Jew would need to attend to, 
including the offering of firstfruits, first shearings from sheep and goats, and portions 
from bread/dough. Altogether, this system of obligations redistributed resources from 
the general population of “Israelites”—at least those with access to agricultural land 
or herds—to the priesthood.  
This institutional system of resource reallocation should not be strictly equated 
with the extraction of wealth by the Jerusalem politico-religious elite, enriching the 
wealthy at the expense of the peasantry. Not all priests were members of this elite.
528
 
Our literary sources for the Second Temple period over-represent the Jerusalemite 
priests and especially the wealthy high-priestly families, distorting the impression of 
the overall wealth of the priesthood. Many priests resided outside Jerusalem, primar-
ily in settlements of the Judaean hill country, and only came to the city at their time to 
serve in the Temple.
529
 Most priests were probably no better off than the average lay 
Jew—priests, as Levites, were not supposed to own land in Israel (Num 18:20). Some 
would have been largely or wholly reliant on the tithes and other priestly perquisites 
for their sustenance; Josephus refers to poor priests in Ant. 20.181, and old priests 
dependent on tithes for survival in Ant. 20.207.
530
 The commandments do not just 
redistribute resources to the priests: there was an equal concern in the Torah 
commandments for redistribution of wealth and ascription of certain rights for the 
poor, widows, orphans, Levites, and laborers. The laws defining the redistribution of 
                                                          
528
 See Seth Schwartz’s discussion of high and lower priesthood, and internal socioeconomic 
differences within and between these groupings, in Josephus and Judaean Politics (Leiden: Brill, 
1990), 58–70. 
529
 Service in the Temple, at least since the Persian period, was divided into twenty-four 
“courses” (משמרות). See 1 Chr 24:1–19, which served to give this hitherto unknown division a pedi-
gree going back to the time of Aaron’s grandchildren. The priests served within one of these “courses” 
according to lineage, performing duties in the Temple according to lot (cf. Luke 1:8; m. Taʽan 4:2). 
They received in compensation for their service the privilege of priestly perquisites from the Temple 
services—portions of sacrificed animals, grain offerings, etc., along with their families. According to 
m. Suk 5:7, all the priests took equal part of the perquisites during the pilgrimage festivals, when all 
priests were present. 
There is little to suggest a substantial population of priests residing in Galilee during this period. 
Stuart S. Miller even argues that the mass movement of priests into Galilee and the relocation of the 
courses occurred well after the Bar Kokhba Revolt; “Priests, Purities, and the Jews of Galilee,” in 
Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee: A Region in Transition , ed. Jürgen Zangenberg, 
Harold W. Attridge, and Dale B. Martin (WUNT 210; Tübingen: Mohr Seibeck, 2007), 375–402. 
530
 The priest Zechariah in Luke 1 may represent a non-elite priest, though there are no specific 
indications of his wealth. For such priests, the Sabbatical Year could be especially difficult, since they 
received no income from the tithe. While it would be interesting to follow this thread further, since 





wealth granted them certain claims on the productive output of agriculturalists as 
well. 
The Levitical Tithe and other offerings are sometimes referred to in the scholar-
ship as “religious taxes.”
531
 We should not necessarily presume, though, that Jews 
perceived of the tithes and other dues prescribed in the Torah in the same manner as 
tribute extracted by the Romans or taxes by their Herodian vassals, or as inherently 
exploitative. While the state may have been viewed as a questionable authority, for 
many God’s authority was beyond reproach.
532
 These dues were not simply a tax 
imposed by the Temple cult, but an integral part of the covenant governing relations 
between God and Israel. Moreover, they went to support the sole cultic institution and 
its functionaries, an institution necessary for fulfilling still other commandments. 
Jews who strove to obey the Law would have needed to account for these obligatory 
offerings in the economic calculus of how to manage their household resources, 
tailoring strategies to simultaneously fulfill the obligations to tithe and reserve dues to 
the poor as an integral part of what it meant to meet household “subsistence” needs.  
First (Levitical) Tithe 
The Torah laws pertaining to the tithe are confusing and at times seem contradictory. 
The literary evidence indicates that Jews had by the late Second Temple period 
harmonized these commandments and took them to refer to three distinct tithes. Tobit 
(1:6–8), written in the Hellenistic period, refers to a triad of tithes. Josephus too 
distinguishes three in his rendering of the Law (Ant. 4.240). Lending further credence 
to the notion that a tripartite system of tithes was well established by this period is the 
fact that both agree with each other and with the Mishnah in enumerating them. We 
shall refer to the tithes below according to this reckoning: The First Tithe was a tenth 
given to the Levites and/or priests.
533
 The Second Tithe was a tenth earmarked annu-
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ally for consumption in Jerusalem by the owner of the produce, along with family, 
guests, and other beneficiaries. The Third Tithe was due in the third and sixth years of 
the Sabbatical Year cycle,
534
 designated for the poor, widows, orphans, and the 
Levites.  
The First Tithe applied to annual agricultural produce, but the commandments in 
the Torah were unclear about how extensively this was defined. Leviticus calls it a 
tithe “from the seed of the land, from the fruit of the tree” (מזרע הארץ מפרי העץ; 
27:30) and Josephus’s wording is possibly more expansive: “annual fruits” (ἐπετείων 
καρπῶν; Ant. 4.68). The Mishnah references a variety of specific fruits, vegetables, 
and nuts in its discussion of tithing (cf. m. MSh 1:1–4), also indicating an expansive 
definition. The very vagueness of the commandment’s wording left interpretive flexi -
bility in assessing which crops they considered obligatory for the “tax.” Surely the 
staples of grains, oil, and wine were beyond doubt, but other vegetation was defined 
by a combination of individual conscience and communal consensus. It was not 
simply a matter of choosing the laxest halakhic interpretation even if were defensible; 
piety and the social status that accompanied it depended upon communal rather than 
merely self evaluation. We can see the role of social stigmatization and pressure, for 
instance, in the parable in Luke 18:9–14, which depicts a Pharisee voicing his 
contempt of a tax collector in his prayers, contrasting his own faithful and stringent 
tithing to the presumed laxity of the tax collector. In other communities, overly-strict 
interpretation might likewise be condemned by others, as in the implicit criticism of 
the Pharisaic practice of tithing herbs (Matt 23:23–24; Luke 11:42).  
The obligation to tithe was self-evident in the case of landowners farming their 
own property, but under different land tenure arrangements, the matter of determining 
who was liable to tithe could be more complicated. In the case of leased farmland, 
who paid the tithes out of their portion—the landowner, the tenant, or both? Leviticus 
27:30–34 does not specify which party was liable to tithe, and the Second Temple 
sources do not explicitly deal with this issue either. But the Mishnah indicates an 
awareness of various possible arrangements for distributing the tithe’s burden, 
without adjudicating a singular and consistent position: the tenant might tithe the 
whole crop before paying rent (removing the landowner’s liability), or the tenant’s  
portion alone after paying rent (making both liable) (m. Dem 6:1).
535
 None of the 
Mishnah examples indicate that landowners would ever take the full burden of tithing 
upon themselves; the best-case scenario for the tenant was a split burden, when tithing 
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took place after the payment of rent.
536
 The Mishnah suggests that the practice of 
tithing could have important ramifications for quantifying the household income and 
rent payments, all depending on the local norms governing the timing of tithe and the 
contractual arrangements between Jewish landlord and tenant. 
Finally, let us return to the matter of the scholarly depiction of the First Tithe as a 
tax. Josephus presents our only depiction of tithe collection practices in the Second 
Temple period. In Life 63, Josephus gives the impression it was gathered by priests 
who went from village to village collecting the dues: “My fellow [priestly] ambassa-
dors, acquiring great wealth from the tithes—which priests receive as dues owed to 
them—decided to return home.” Josephus uses the tithe here as a means to boast of 
his own integrity, as he goes on to claim that he denied the tithes that the Galileans 
offered to him. In another episode, Josephus depicts priests forcibly exacting tithes of 
grain from threshing floors at harvest time (Ant. 20.181, 205–207), but he character-
izes this as an aberrant and wrongful usurpation of the tithes by wealthy priests to the 
detriment of the poorer ones.
537
 In general, Josephus suggests that under normal 
circumstances, priests came around to collect those tithes that people brought forth by 
their own volition. Even if Jews characterized the tithe alongside the taxes and 
tributes to the political establishment, the religious framework of piety concerns and 
the desire to uphold the covenant would have encouraged many to produce the tithe 
willingly. 
Third Tithe and Other Dues to the Poor 
In addition to the tithe to the Levites and priests, other commandments entailed the 
reallocation of portions of the crop to the poorer segments of society—“the poor, 
widows, and orphans” (and often Levites) in the parlance of the Torah. There were 
also laws that defined rights and privileges for hired laborers, typical during the time-
sensitive tasks of the harvest season. The Third Tithe (or Poor Tithe) was a tenth of 
the harvest set aside for the poor, though it was an obligation only due every three 
years or so.
538
 The other dues were less significant in volume but still limited the 
extent to which agriculturalists could exercise total efficiency in their agricultural 
endeavors. To the poorer elements of Galilean society, these amounted to a significant 
amount of aid. Together, these laws defined rights that these poor could claim to 
produce of land under others’ private ownership. 
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Who was eligible for these “poor dues”? The category of “the poor” is treated as 
vague yet obvious in the Torah and Second Temple sources—as known when seen. 
Mishnah Peʼah, on the other hand, attempts to fix a threshold for these institutions: 
“Let whoever has two hundred zuz not take leqet, shikheḥah, peʼah, and Poor Tithe” 
(8:8). This evaluation only considers liquid assets and specifically permits one to still 
have a home and property: “They do not compel him to sell his house (in order to take 
poor dues)” (8:8).
539
 That this threshold does not signify extreme poverty is clear 
from the preceding verse, which values a loaf of bread (ככר; the size and quality not 
described) for the poor at a dupondium, one twelfth of a zuz (8:7). This does not of 
course clarify the question of who was deemed eligible in the Early Roman period, 
but it does indicate that the notion of poverty was quite flexible and the dues 
commanded by the covenant might have been available to more than just the destitute.  
The Poor Tithe was due only in the third and sixth year of the sabbatical cycle, 
but in those years the demands of First and Third Tithes would have compounded to 
20 percent of the harvest.
540
 Those who could not easily absorb the loss of an addi-
tional 10 percent of the harvest for their household needs would have had to plan in 
advance to compensate for it. As with the Sabbatical Year, this obligation incentiv-
ized storage in cash or in kind in the prior year(s) to make up for the difference in the 
Poor Tithe years. For agricultural producers who cultivated land but were themselves 
poor enough to be socially permitted access to poor dues, the Third Tithe was not so 
problematic, since they received as well as gave. The Mishnah even suggests the 
possibility of an arrangement whereby “poor” sharecroppers of similar standing recip-
rocally give each other their poor tithe offerings (m. Peʼah 5:5).  
 In addition to the Poor Tithe, the Torah also includes commandments that 
prohibit the landholder or tenant from completely harvesting the produce from their 
fields, vineyards, and orchards. These rules restrain the farmer’s ability to use the 
fruit of their agricultural labors to meet their household needs, while allotting extra 
resources to the poor. Peʼah (פאה) refers to the corner of the field that one must leave 
unharvested so that the poor may pluck grains from it (Lev 23:22, cf. 19:9). The 
plainest reading of the commandment limits the obligation to field crops, especially 
grain, and Josephus’ language describing the commandment indicates as much: 
“When reaping corn (ἀμῶντας) and gathering the harvest, leave handfuls of uncut 
corn (δραγμάτων).” But Leviticus (19:10; cf. Deut 24:20) and Josephus (Ant. 4.231) 
also adjoin to the discussion of peʼah prohibitions against picking grapevines and 
olive trees clean, linking them together conceptually.
541
 Mishnah Peʼah does the same, 
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including alongside discussion of peʼah the obligation to leave behind portions of the 
crops of legumes [קטניות], grapes, olives, and a variety of other fruit-bearing trees 
(1:4–5; cf. 3:5). Those portions of the crop that were missed or dropped during the 
process of harvesting are called leqet (לקט) for grain gleanings and peret (פרט) for 
grape (and olive) gleanings. The Covenant also designates as property for the poor the 
shikheḥah (שכחה), “the forgotten sheaf,” referring to bundles of harvested grain that 
were overlooked and/or forgotten (Deut 24:19; cf. Ant. 4.231). 
These poor dues have in common the fact that the Torah does not quantify the 
obligations, nor do the Second Temple sources. Even the tannaim, who attempt to fix 
a standard minimum for peʼah (1/60 of the field unharvested), retain variability 
according to such factors as field size, the number of local poor, and the bounty of the 
harvest (m. Peʼah 1:1–2). The variable nature of the obligation permitted miserly 
interpretations that allowed a farmer to retain more of the harvest and maximize 
profit. But the same flexibility also created conditions whereby one could accrue 
social capital and a pious reputation through acts of charity and benefaction. Social 
pressure to appear pious in fulfilling one’s covenantal duty not to oppress the poor 
could have been an important consideration in how “efficiently” Jews decided to 
harvest their agricultural produce. In other words, factors besides the loss in material 
revenues would have factored into the decision of how to manage the harvest 
resources, and we cannot presume that “purely economic” profit motives drove all to 
maximize their harvest and minimize their leavings for the poor. 
During the harvest season, many farmers would need to bring on additional labor 
in order to speedily reap the grain before it went to seed or the fruit before it rotted. 
This could be achieved through cooperative agreements within the community to 
maximize the efficiency of the harvest and infrastructure like common presses and 
threshing floors.
542
 But it could also be achieved through the hire of paid workers, as 
exemplified in the Parable of the Laborers (Matt 20:1–16).
543
 Some of this seasonal 
labor force would have come from underemployed members of households otherwise 
engaged in other crafts and trades, but much of it would also have been composed of 
the community’s poor.
544
 Because the poor who were hired for harvesting were also 
eligible to obtain portions of the crop that were dropped or forgotten in the harvest 
process, they had every incentive to be careless in the course of harvesting in order to 
ensure that there would be ample leavings to collect afterward. Mishnah Peʼah 
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World”; Halstead, “Traditional and Ancient Rural Economies in Mediterranean Europe,” 64–66; 





acknowledges this issue in judging a landowner liable for shikheḥah even when 
contracting with a laborer on such problematic terms as “whatever I forget I myself 
shall take” (6:11 ;מה שאני שוכח אני אטל). Knowing this, this mishnah also sets out to 
define circumstances that justify a landholder’s claim that a bundle cannot in fact 
have been forgotten: when left in a conspicuous location (6:2–3), when earmarked for 
a particular purpose (6:3), when three or more are left together (6:5), when a sheaf is 
of a certain, larger-than-normal size (6:6), or when it is adjacent to an unharvested 
portion of the field (6:7). The cases listed are not exhaustive but are exemplary, 
suggesting circumstances under which one might reasonably claim that a sheaf was 
not “forgotten” and absolving one of the obligation to give up an extraordinary 
amount of produce due to the actions of the landowner or his workers. 
In addition to the gleaning benefits, the Torah makes other provisions for the 
hired hand. Deuteronomy 24:14–15 commands that workers must be paid on the day 
they labor, presuming that most hired laborers are in fact poor:  
You shall not oppress a hired servant, whether poor (עני) or destitute (אביון) … you 
shall give him his wage on the same day and the sun shall not go down upon it, 
because he is poor and he supports his life by means of it.
545
  
This required the landholder to have cash on hand before the harvest (i.e., money 
from the sale of prior harvests or from other trades), or to otherwise make arrange-
ment for payment in kind or in prepared food or for some future reciprocation of 
labor.
546
 Workers also had the covenantal right to freely eat of the produce while they 
worked, draining further the owner’s yield. Deuteronomy 23:25 reads, “When you 
come into your neighbor’s vineyard, you may eat grapes according to your will and to 
your satiety, but you may not put them in your vessel” (cf. Ant. 4.235; m. MSh 2:7–8; 
3:2–3). Deuteronomy 23:25 also permits the casual consumption of grains from 
another’s field, so long as one does not act in the manner of harvesting—taking the 
sickle to the crop and removing them from the premises to prepare. The Mishnah 
attempts to curb abuse of these provisions by constraining eating to the crop in which 
one is working (m. MSh 2:8; m. BM 7:2–7), but the practice of eating more generally 
from the field must have been common. Similar allowances were made for travelers 
walking through fields (see Ant. 4.234), as illustrated in the story of Jesus and his 
disciples plucking grains while walking through a field on the Sabbath (Matt 12:1–8; 
Mark 2:23–28). 
Enforcement of these rights would have largely depended on the force of social 
pressure. In his discussion of the poor dues, Josephus says that failure to heed them 
could be punished by whipping, drawing on Deut 25:1–3.
547
 We do not know enough 
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 This is also illustrated in the Parable of the Laborers, Matt 20:1–16 in which a landholder 
hires day laborers from the market place several times over the course of the day, with a wage for the 
day agreed upon in advance and paid out before nightfall.  
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 M. BM 7:1 gives evidence for the practice of hiring workers on the promise of prepared meals 
rather than hiring them for a wage in coin or in kind. 
547
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about the enforcement of such laws by village leaders and Jewish judges in the 
Second Temple period to know with what regularity such punishment was meted out. 
Insofar as the community saw the preservation of the poor and their basic sustenance 
as an obligation of religious statute, concern for personal reputation within the 
community was an impetus to comply with the Law. And if oppressing the poor was 
viewed as a gross violation of the covenant, peers in the community could and would 
punish through the social mechanisms available—spreading gossip, publically chas-
tising, refusing to interact with them. There were also other incentives to following 
these commands, and doing so zealously; as the following passage illustrates, some 
Jews understood God to play a role in rewarding such generosity to the poor:  
For great wealth will not adhere to the owners through such painstaking gathering on 
their part as much as gratitude will come from the needy. The Deity also will make 
the earth better disposed to the growing of fruits for those who care not only for their 
own advantage, but also have concern for the nourishment of others. (Ant. 4.232) 
Value is earned not through “painstaking gathering,” i.e., through efficient maximiza-
tion of the material crop. Rather, making the allowances for the poor earns value with 
God. Given the centrality of the covenantal relationship, obedience to the Law was 
essential to maintaining the all-important relationship with God, who was himself an 
integral participant in the economic network through his role in determining future 
agricultural bounty or calamity. 
Limited Use of Consecrated Goods—Second Tithe 
Some of the commandments in the Torah identified certain types and portions of the 
agricultural produce as consecrated goods, subject to additional constraints on how, 
when, where, and by whom they could be used. When First Tithe was separated i t 
became a consecrated good that only the Levites and priests could legitimately 
consume (see Num 18:31; Ant. 4.75); for others, its consumption was a sin. Likewise, 




                                                                                                                                                                             
dues to the punishment by forty lashes reiterates his emphasis throughout this section of his Mosaic 
discourse on the requirements to aid the poor and the rewards and punishments that God meets out 
depending on one’s response to the needy. 
548
 Many of the implications of observing the Second Tithe would also have applied to the 
commandment on produce from trees in their fourth year (רביעית) from planting, which is consecrated 
and thereby limited in the conditions under which it may be used (Lev 19:23–25). Josephus’ rendition 
of the Law suggests it was only permissible for Jews to consume it in Jerusalem or to redeem it and 
use the money to feast in Jerusalem (Ant. 4.226–227). An alternate interpretation in Jubilees, the Dead 
Sea Scrolls, and some rabbinic texts, however, understands the fourth-year produce as a priestly 
perquisite, which would render it more like firstfruit offerings (see ch. 4, p. 218). On the interpretation 
of the laws in Jubilees and the Dead Sea Scrolls, see Joseph M. Baumgarten, “The Laws of ʽOrlah and 
Firstfruits in the Light of Jubilees, the Qumran Writings, and Targum Ps. Joanthan,” JJS 38 (1978): 
195–202; Aharon Shemesh, Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from Qumran 





Like the First Tithe, the Second Tithe entailed setting aside one-tenth
549
 of the 
harvest each year (Deut 14:22–27), except, of course, in the Sabbatical Year, when 
there was no harvest. The Mishnah understands the Third Tithe for the poor to replace 
the Second Tithe in years three and six of the cycle, but Second Temple sources 
strongly indicate that the Second Tithe was broadly considered an annual obligation. 
Josephus and Tobit are particularly clear on this matter:
550
  
I tithed the second tenth in silver for six years and would go and spend these things 
in Jerusalem each year (καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν). (Tob 1:7) 
In addition to the two tithes that I previously said were paid each year (ἔτους 
ἑκάστου)—the one for the Levites, the other for the feasts—they bring a third [tithe] 
every third year. (Ant. 4.240) 
If observed, this would mean that 20 percent of the harvest each year was spoken for 
before Galileans’ daily household needs could even be reckoned in.  
The Second Tithe was significantly different from the other two in that it was 
consumed by producers, rather than given like a tax to a third party.
551
 The Torah 
obligates Jews to bring the tithe to Jerusalem to furnish a feast with family, friends, or 
other charitable beneficiaries. Because it remained part of the family’s household 
resources, it may not be obviously apparent that this would constitute an imposition 
on the management of household resources. But the conditions on its use meant that 
Galileans needed to consume a large portion of the annual produce in Jerusalem and 
therefore could not use it for their general subsistence needs. To consume it outside 
Jerusalem would be a violation of the covenant and an affront to God. Because it 
could not be used for regular subsistence needs, the remaining portion of the harvest 
would need to stretch further. And since it applied to all agriculturalists, and not just 
priests, this tithe serves as an example of the Torah’s constraints on the use of agri -
cultural produce that would have directly affected most Galileans. 
For Galileans, geographically distant from Jerusalem, the optimal time to fulfill 
the obligation to consume Second Tithe was during the pilgrimage festivals, when 
many were travelling to Jerusalem anyway (see ch. 4). Doing so avoided the logistical 
costs of making additional trips between Galilee and Jerusalem, which could take at 
least a week roundtrip, and depending on one’s trade and the season could entail costs 
in lost work time back home. But the close interlink between Second Tithe and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
larity to either Second Tithe or priestly perquisites like firstfruit offerings, we will not devote further 
discussion to fourth-year produce. 
549
 According to the Mishnah’s reckoning, however, it would be 9 percent of the sum total—a 
tenth of the amount remaining after First Tithe. See n. 540 above. 
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 It also appears to be an annual obligation in Jub 32:11; Temple Scroll 43.1–17. 
551
 As it has sometimes erroneously been rendered by scholars. Hamel, for example, grossly 
mischaracterizes the obligation by claiming “it was only collected with considerable difficulty, simply 
because many people could not afford to pay it;” Poverty and Charity in Roman Palestine, 217. It was 
not “collected” by a third party and the impositions it caused were not from its extraction wholesale —
for it was consumed by its very cultivators—but rather from its effects on allocation of foodstuffs for 
consumption over the course of the calendar year. See Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the 





festivals may have been so normalized by this period that using it for any other occa-
sion in Jerusalem would have been outside the realm of acknowledged possibilities, 
and simply read into the commandment as the natural interpretation. Josephus, for 
instance, presents the use of Second Tithe for “festal meals” as the default (Ant. 
4.340) and glosses over other possibilities. The Temple Scroll explicitly prohibits it: 
“And they shall not eat from it on non-work days for their strength because it is holy; 
and it will be eaten on the holy days and will not be eaten on the work days” (43.15–
17). Since the festivals were correlated with major agricultural harvests, bringing 
them at the festivals also minimized the period over which Galilean Jews needed to 
guard the tithe produce against incurring impurity (rendering them unfit to consume 
as a consecrated good; cf. Deut 26:14). Both the logistical calculations and risk-aver-
sion to ritual pollution would have incentivized Galileans correlating their fulfillment 
of the Second Tithe obligation with the pilgrimage festivals. But restricting its use to 
the festival seasons also meant that the value of at least one-tenth of the annual 




Most Galileans of the Early Roman period did not actually bring a tenth of their 
harvest to Jerusalem in kind. Especially for large farming operations, but even for 
more modest ones, the task of transporting a tenth of the harvest on the long journey 
from Galilee to Jerusalem would have been difficult and expensive, and only profes-
sional traders would find it economical to maintain the animals and equipment needed 
for such a haul. Instead, most Galileans would have appealed to the Torah’s provision 
for redeeming the tithe: “If the distance is too great for you … then you shall 
exchange it for money, and bind the money in your hand and go to the place that 
YHWH your God chooses” (Deut 14:22–24; cf. Lev 27:30–31). In other words, the 
good in kind was substituted for its equivalent value in coin. The general popularity of 
redemption as a tactic for fulfilling this commandment is indicated by the fact that 
Josephus completely omits the conditional nature of this provision, and renders 
redemption the default: “Let there be a selection by you of a tithe of fruits … and let 
it be sold in its native regions” (Ant. 4.205).
553
 While this does not indicate universal 
redemption of the tithe (he may just be simplifying the unusual practice for his  
Graeco-Roman audience), it does suggest the regularity of this practice. 
Redemption deconsecrated the tithed produce, rendering it profane (חול) and 
available for mundane, everyday use and for market sale, and consecrated the 
redemption money in its place to be used to buy meals in Jerusalem. In addition to the 
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 We may briefly acknowledge as well that one might extend their stay in Jerusalem beyond the 
holiday and continue to use these resources there, though it would not seem to be the normal practice. 
When Josephus describes the Second Tithe in Ant. 4.240 it is designated the tithe “for the festivals” 
(πρὸς τὰς εὐωχίας), and, as we noted above, the Temple Scroll is similarly restrictive.  
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 In describing the Second Tithe, Josephus does not even note the option to bring the tithe in 
kind and consume it directly and does not depict redemption as conditional on distance. See Robert 
Paul Gallant, “Josephus’ Expositions of Biblical Law: An Internal  Analysis” (PhD diss., Yale 
University, 1988). Surely not all people redeemed their tithe, and his omission is in large part a result 





value of the tithe, redemption required the addition of a 20 percent surcharge as s tipu-
lated in Leviticus (27:31 ;חמישית). The Torah does not define a notional value for the 
redemption of consecrated crops as it does for vowed human beings or farmland (Lev 
27:1–8, 16–18). And whereas the priest determined the nominal prices for other 
consecrated properties should one wish to redeem them from the Temple—livestock, 
houses (27:11–12, 14–15)—the priest plays no such role in reckoning the tithe value 
(see 27:27, 30–32). The redemption value of a given crop was apparently variable, 
dependent on prevailing prices at local markets or in brokered transactions between 
associates. Since prices fluctuated seasonally and differed from region to region and 
from season to season, changing with the available supply and demand (cf. m. MSh 




The Second Temple sources that reference redemption of the Second Tithe seem 
to agree that this effectively constituted a sale of the tithe produce. Both Josephus and 
Tobit describe redemption using Greek verbs for “to sell”: πιπράσκω (Ant. 4.205) and 
ἀποπρατίζομαι (Tob 1:7). The Temple Scroll also envisions Second Tithe money 
produced through direct sale: “And he will sell [the tithe] for silver and bring the 
silver [to Jerusalem]” ( מכרוהו בכסף והביא את הכסףו ; 43.14). This seems to stand in 
contrast to the Mishnah’s conception of consecrated property, which could not be sold 
but could only be redeemed with cash on hand (as in m. MSh 1:1–2; 2:6; 4:3–4). Of 
course, the fact that the Second Temple texts refer to it as sale does not necessarily 
preclude the possibility of redeeming with cash on hand, and both may have been 
options. The difference may seem at first to be a mere technicality, but it could make 
a big difference. The time when Second Tithe would be redeemed was shortly after 
the harvest, before the festival, at the time when supply was at its absolute highest 
and demand at its lowest, when most were trying to sell off their tithe. These circum-
stances suggest that the period of redemption prior to the festival would have marked 
the nadir for prices of the newly-harvested crop. 
Selling the crop directly for redemption money would have yielded a small value 
to spend in Jerusalem, relative to how substantial a portion of the yearly revenue was 
expended. The situation would have been equally disadvantageous if one needed to 
sell an equivalent portion of the harvest to produce the needed redemption money. 
This also required the sale not only of 10 percent, but of 12 percent in order to obtain 
the value of the 20 percent redemption surcharge.
555
 The household with stored cash 
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 On the existence and recognition of seasonal and regional price variations in the markets of 
the ancient Mediterranean more generally, see Morley, Trade in Classical Antiquity, 29–34; Peter 
Temin, The Roman Market Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 29–52. These 
price differences created information problems in ancient trade and required strategies for mitigating 
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resources from previous seasons, on the other hand, could retain the use of the tithed 
produce for later or for market sale under better conditions, with a relatively low cash 
expenditure. The combination of the conditions of redemption and its timing incen-
tivized strategies of storing some amount of household assets in the form of money, 
and hence incentivized Galileans to engage in market exchange more generally in 
order to build savings in coin. Moreover, the redemption practice itself forced 
Galilean agriculturalists to engage to some extent with monetized market transactions. 
This stands in stark contrast to the notion of a peasantry leery of the risks of the 
market.  
Once in Jerusalem, whether tithe was brought in cash or in kind, the command-
ment restricted its use to furnishing the food and drink for feasting (Deut 14:25–26). 
Since there was high demand during festival time in the Jerusalem markets, we can 
expect that prices would have been relatively high and the buying power of Second 
Tithe money considerably reduced compared to Galilee. But redemption was none-
theless an appealing strategy even on the consumption side. It made consuming a 
tenth of the yield easier to accomplish in such a short time by converting low-value 
crops like grain into more expensive goods. Moreover, crops in kind, most of which 
would have been staples like grain, oil, and wine, could only fashion rather simple 
meals. Redemption money could be spent on any number of food items, though. As 
Deuteronomy says, “spend the money for whatever you wish—oxen, sheep, wine, 
strong drink, or whatever you desire” (14:26). It effectively encouraged the diversifi-
cation of diet for the festival, converting high volumes of cheaper foodstuffs such as 
wheat and barley into relatively expensive and foods via the market. The festival 
season would have marked a rare opportunity to eat meat in the annual diet of an 
agrarian farmer. Josephus and the Mishnah both suggest that Jews could even use the 
tithe to finance their festal peace offering, which was eaten by the offerer and his 
household and hence fulfilled the requirement that the Second Tithe money must be 
spent on food (Ant. 4.205; m. Ḥag 1:3). Tithe money could thereby coordinate two 
ritual obligations and efficiently fulfill both.
556
 We shall return to the connection 
between Second Tithe and the pilgrimage festivals in chapter 4. 
All of this demonstrates that if Galileans were indeed observant of the command-
ments in the Early Roman period the institution of tithing was not of mere peripheral 
importance to the agriculturalists of Galilee, but an integral concern in the annual 
budget, as it occurred at the beginning of the harvest and framed the resource alloca-
tion for the rest of the year within tighter margins. This is especially true for Gali -
leans, who—unlike Judaeans—lacked the ability to spread out expenditure of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
after the First Tithe was removed, Second Tithe would constitute 9 percent of  the total yield, and 10.8 
percent with the added fifth. 
556
 M. Ḥag 1:3 proscribes use of Second Tithe to fund whole-burnt offerings, as they do not serve 
as a feast for the offer and doing so would thereby violate the obligations of the Second Tithe 
commandment. It goes on to note a disagreement between Hillel and Shammai on the matter of the 
paschal lamb and whether it was permissible to use Second Tithe money to buy it; Hillel assented, 





Second Tithe afforded by proximity to Jerusalem and who needed to coordinate 
timing with the planned festival trips. 
Transaction and the Economics of Purity 
In the preceding sections, we considered specific laws in the covenant that pertained 
to agricultural production and consumption. These commandments were situated in 
the broader context of a covenant between God and Israel, stipulating the conditions 
under which a positive relationship with God would be maintained or broken. Deuter-
onomy 28 offers a detailed list of the sorts of rewards and punishments—individual 
and communal—that Jews could expect from God depending on whether or not they 
heeded the Law. Josephus echoes this at the conclusion of his own account of the 
Law, and like Deuteronomy, he especially emphasizes punishment for wrongdoers:  
And on the following days … [Moses] delivered blessings to them, and curses upon 
those who would not live according to the laws but would transgress the things delin -
eated therein. (Ant. 4.302) 
If we assume that most Jews in the Second Temple period took these threats seriously, 
then we ought to expand the notion of “risk-aversion” to include the risks of divine 
retribution.  
No matter how zealously one guarded against breaking these rules, one could 
never totally escape the risks of accidentally violating them. This risk was especially 
endemic to interactions of various sorts because of a problem that economist term 
information asymmetry.
557
 Human beings operate with imperfect information about 
their environment and the behavior of others humans within it, meaning that nobody 
has complete access to all of the data that matters in deciding whether to interact or 
not. Information asymmetry describes conditions in which the parties involved have 
differential access to such information. For example, the host of a feast may know 
significantly more about the meal’s ingredients than the guests, who are ignorant of 
these details. The application of information asymmetry to economic analysis typi -
cally considers questions of a product’s origins, quality, price, and other details  not 
discernible through personal inspection prior to purchase.
558
 But we may suggest that 
for pious Jews, uncertainty about whether foodstuffs were produced, processed, 
stored, and consumed in accordance with the Law would have produced considerably 
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more anxiety. This was, after all, not a mere issue of paying more than the optimal 
price or buying an inferior product; it risked damaging the relationship with God.  
This should not steer us to believe that Jews were inherently autarkic for fear of 
violation. We already saw in chapter 2 ample evidence that Galileans were engaged in 
trade, most of which was conducted intraregionally. To some extent, exchange was 
necessary to meet a household’s diverse and fluctuating needs. If the problem of 
uncertainty could not be avoided, the risk could still be mitigated.  
One tactic for making judgments about the riskiness of a transaction is to follow 
the actions of one’s peers. As Duncan J. Watts has noted, social scientists and social 
psychologists have found that in the absence of other effective metrics, people often 
make decisions on the basis of how other people act—especially friends and close 
associates—believing them to be operating on more or better information (even when 
they in fact are not).
559
 If one saw a friend purchase food from a given vendor, and 
one knew that friend to be scrupulous in observing the Torah’s dietary laws, one 
might reasonably assume (though not be certain) that one could eat the vendor’s food 
without fear of accidentally violating the covenant.  
Another way that social networks may be used to mitigate uncertainty is by 
considering reputation.
560
 Reputation is not a static quality, but one that emerges from 
the impressions and experiences about an individual that are relayed between 
members of a community through gossip.
561
 Reputation can play a powerful role in 
shaping the overall pattern of interactions in the community. Positive or negative 
reports echo and cascade through the social network: reputations are reinforced as 
more and more appear to shun interactions with those of dubious reputation and flock 
to those who are seemingly more trustworthy. Evidence for the role of reputation and 
trustworthiness can be discerned in Mishnah Demaʼi, a tractate dominated by the 
question of uncertainty, where buyers’ and sellers’ reputations for properly tithing or 




Another tactic people use to make decisions in lieu of sufficient information is to 
rely on stereotypes.
563
 Stereotypes are of course crude and often gross mischaracteri-
zations of the groups they supposedly describe, but they may nonetheless have strong 
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effects on patterns of interaction and decision-making. The Mishnah speaks in broad 
stereotypes about Samaritans and ʽamei ha-ʼaretz and their trustworthiness—or their 
proclivities—with respect to the Law (see m. Dem 2:3; 3:4–5). Stereotypes especially 
marked transactions with gentiles as risky. Samaritans and ʽamei ha-ʼaretz were 
supposedly aware of the commandments, or at least a particular interpretation and 
execution of them that the rabbis thought lax, but gentiles were assumed to be largely 
ignorant of the Law and assumed not to observe it.
564
 While there was nothing inher-
ently polluting about gentiles, this stereotype for ignorance of the Law meant that a 
Jew ran a high risk of accidentally violating the dietary laws in consuming food 
purchased from gentiles.
565
 Likewise, their propensity for making offerings to “false 
gods” meant selling to gentiles certain types of goods used for sacrificial offerings ran 
the risk of abetting violation of the important commandment against idolatry.
566
 
As Jonathan Klawans has observed, the dietary laws (Lev 11; Deut 14) occupy a 
somewhat ambiguous position in the Torah, bearing characteristics of both ritual and 
moral impurity laws. Ritual purity could be contracted from certain genital 
discharges, childbirth, skin conditions, or corpses; this impurity was contagious, but it 
was temporary and could be cleansed through ritual ablution and time. Moral impurity 
was contracted through sins such as breaking the commandments against idolatry or 
incest, and threatened divine punishment unless properly atoned for.
567
 Certain 
animals were prohibited for Jews to consume outright (e.g., various rodents and 
insects), while other foodstuffs could be rendered impure through direct or even indi -
rect contact with the carcasses of such creatures. While the former seemingly consti -
tuted a moral violation, the latter only rendered one ritually unclean until sundown 
after washing. The ritual purity of food and the body was of great concern for priests, 
who consumed sanctified goods for their meals and had to do so in a pure state (Lev 
22:4–7).
568
 Ritual purity of body and food was also a requirement for lay Jews eating 
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consecrated meals in Jerusalem during pilgrimage festivals, for the person and for the 
food consumed (Lev 7:19–21).
569
 Thus there were circumstances when being ritually 
impure could lead one into sin by violating the holiness laws. 
There is evidence from Second Temple sources and the archaeological record that 
supports the assertion that many Jews outside the priesthood were also concerned 
about maintaining ritual purity.
570
 Josephus claims that Antipas had difficulty 
attracting settlers to his new city of Tiberias because it had been built over a grave-
yard, thus putting everyone in perpetual risk of contracting corpse impurity (Ant. 
18.36–38).
571
 Matthew’s reference to whitewashed tombstones may also suggest 
measures to avoid accidental corpse impurity (23:27). The Qumran community seems 
to have envisioned themselves as a temple community in exile, and thereby closely 
adhered to the priestly purity regulations despite many of them not actually hailing 
from Levitical lineage.
572
 Although some adherents to these purity laws may be 
explained as an imitation of priestly purity, it seems more that many did so out of 
concern for purity for its own sake, since purity reflected a state of holiness.
573
 The 
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New Testament gospels, for instance, attribute to the “tradition of the elders” 
followed by the Pharisees the practice of washing hands before eating (Matt 15:2; 
Mark 7:2–3; Luke 11:38),
574
 washing produce bought at market before eating it (Mark 
7:3), and washing vessels (Mark 7:4; Luke 11:39–41),
575
 none of which are prescribed 
by the Torah at all. 
The desire to maintain ritual purity may also be discerned in the phenomenon of 
stone (chalk) vessels in the late Second Temple period. As we discussed in chapter 2, 
there was a burgeoning stone vessel industry in Judaea and even in Galilee during this 
period.
576
 Stone vessels are among the most common and distinctive archaeological 
finds at settlements inhabited by Jews in the late Second Temple period.
577
 According 
to the Mishnah, stone vessels were not susceptible to the transfer of impurity, as 
ceramic vessels were (Lev 11:33), making them the ideal container for the practice of 
ritual hand-washing before meals and purifying contaminated instruments for reuse. 
Their casual reference in the Gospel of John suggests they were commonplace and 
essential to Jewish rites of purification (2:6–7). The ubiquity of these vessels suggests 
that this halakhic interpretation or something like it was widely embraced in the Early 
Roman period, and not just restricted to the Pharisees or the rabbis.  
Another indication of concern for ritual purity among lay Jews is the distribution 
of stepped ritual baths (miqvaʼot) designed for immersion, found at sites throughout 
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 These installations allowed an individual to conduct ritual bathing to 
remove impurities in accordance with the laws in Leviticus 15, if other bodies of 
water were not readily available.
579
 Yonatan Adler’s recent studies have found that 
there were often miqvaʼot in association with olive and grape pressing installations, 
especially in vicinity of Jerusalem where the priestly population centered and the 
demand for ritually pure liquids was stronger.
580
 The presence of miqvaʼot at treading 
and pressing installations allowed a worker who incurred ritual impurity to immerse 
and stave off the risk of transmitting the ritual impurity to the whole batch of oil or 
wine and disqualify it from certain uses or users. While impurities endured until 
nightfall, according to Leviticus (see, e.g., Lev 11:24–28, 31–32, 39–40), it seems 
that cleansing was understood in some circles to have immediate effect or to at least 
render impurity inert, as in the Mishnah.
581
 Though not as widespread, there are 
examples of the collocation of miqva’ot and presses in Galilee as well, especially 
where natural bodies of water were unavailable.
582
 We can infer from this that some 
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Galilean Jews were concerned not only about cleansing regularly from impurities 
incurred, but doing so during agricultural processing to avoid producing ritually 
contaminating wine and oil.  
Having made the case for the importance of the food laws and purity concerns, let 
us return to examining some of the implications of conducting transactions in a soci-
ety shaped by these religious institutions but characterized by imperfect information. 
For Jews averse to the risk of accidentally consuming animals prohibited as unclean 
in the Torah, or food that had been rendered unclean by contagious ritual impurity, 
the problem of information asymmetry again raises its specter.  
The concern for observing the Law discouraged Galilean Jews from obtaining 
many types of foodstuffs from the gentile populations of the cities on the region’s 
periphery, as we argued in chapter 2. This is best exemplified by the case of John of 
Gischala’s sale of oil to the inhabitants of Caesarea Philippi, referenced above  (War 
2.591; Life 74–76). The reliance on stereotypes about gentiles to assess the relative 
risk involved is telling. Even though they could have obtained olive oil locally from 
suppliers in the upper Hula Valley of the Golan, about whom they could have been 
better informed, John of Gischala depicts the Jews of Caesarea as unwilling to use 
gentile oil, deeming it unlawful. Assuming the verisimilitude of John’s claim, these 
Jews opted to trade with fellow Jews of the more distant Upper Galilee rather than 
local pressing operations and merchants about whom they could have been better 
personally informed. In the case of oil, this may signal a concern for the ritual purity 
of the product, since olive oil is not prohibited by the dietary laws. Impurity was 
especially transmissible through moisture (cf. Lev 11:33–34), making oil and wine 
highly susceptible to ritual pollution during processing and storage, while dry goods 
(unground grain, dried fruits) were at a lower risk of being contaminated.
583
 Meat 
from gentiles was particularly risky. The Torah requires properly draining blood from 
a slaughtered animal: “You shall not eat the blood of any creature, for the life of 
every creature is its blood; whoever eats it shall be cut off” (Lev 17:14). It also deems 
as unclean an animal that has died of natural causes (Lev 17:15–16) or has particular 
injuries/defects (Exod 22:30), and it prohibits eating certain parts of the animal (Gen 
32:33; Lev 7:23). And since gentile meat (as well as wine; cf. m. AZ 2:3) may have 
come from an offering to foreign gods, the use of such goods could be viewed as 
participating in, or at least abetting, the violation of the first of the Ten Command-
ments (Exod 20:3; Deut 5:7).
584
 Purity concerns also created a barrier to engaging 
with gentiles in other capacities, such as participating in feasts and shared meals. That 
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Jews were circumspect about dining with non-Jews was widely recognized by Greek 
and Roman authors in antiquity, who levelled accusations of misanthropy and amixia 
against them.
585
 Altogether, Jews assumed transactions and interactions with gentiles 
involving food were a high risk for violating the Torah’s dietary laws.  
But even in transactions among Jews, information asymmetry could be a 
problem. Even if most Jews, contrary to gentiles, could be presumed to know the 
Law, and though there was general agreement on a number of halakhic question, there 
were some issues that sparked strong interpretive disagreements.
586
 Where such 
differences existed, they constituted a transaction cost, a barrier to trade that required 
extra effort to overcome.
587
 Knowledge of a vendor’s adherence to a particular sect or 
membership in a particular community could serve as a clue to the buyer about 
whether the produce would be acceptable or not.  
Reputation about one’s trustworthiness with respect to the Law could he lp miti-
gate the transaction costs. As people spread information of their personal experiences 
with or hearsay about a peer, they contribute to the construction of a reputation for 
piety or impiety, for stringency or laxity, for adherence to one interpretation or 
another. Individuals could also attempt to craft their own reputation through carefully 
constructing their public image. Public demonstrations of one’s piety could contribute 
to a general reputation for adherence to the Law. Deuteronomy prescribes a triennial 
public declaration of proper fulfillment of the tithes and other commandments (26:12–
19), which could serve as one such occasion:
588
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When you have finished paying all the tithe of your produce in the third year  … you 
shall say before YHWH your God, “I have removed the sacred portion from the 
house, and I have given it to the Levites, the resident aliens, the orphans, and the 
widows, in accordance with your entire commandment that you commanded me; I 
have neither transgressed nor forgotten any of your commandments: I have not eaten 
of it while in mourning; I have not removed any of it while I was unclean; and I have 
not offered any of it to the dead. I have obeyed YHWH my God, doing just as you 
commanded me. Look down from your holy habitation, from heaven, and bless your 
people Israel and the ground that you have given us, as you swore to our ancestors—
a land flowing with milk and honey.” (26:12–15) 
Of course, such displays were only useful insofar as one’s peers deemed them 
credible and representative of one’s character; if someone attempted the oath but was 
rumored to have wantonly broken the commandments, the display would only serve to 
conjure accusations of hypocrisy and untrustworthiness.
589
 
For the sellers and vendors of ancient Galilee, the aversion to risking abrogation 
of the Torah, or abetting and seemingly endorsing those who did, would have incen-
tivized being scrupulous about the nature of the produce marketed. Not only social 
but also economic pressures thereby served to enforce halakhic adherence, as inter-
preted within a given locale. Mishnah Demaʼi gives us some more concrete examples 
by which we can see some of these effects of piety on the market. The subject of this 
tractate is demaʼi, a rabbinic term for produce when it was not certain whether or not 
tithes had properly been removed. According to the rabbis’ standards, it was illegiti-
mate to consume produce from which tithes had not been properly removed.
590
 It is 
not certain how many Jews in the Second Temple period held this view, but the fact 
that Philo too deemed it impermissible to eat of the crop before the tithes were set 
aside (De specialibus legibus 1.156–157) suggests it was not merely an anxiety of the 
tannaim and their successors. Regardless, it provides a useful analogy for considering 
the role of ideology and institutions in shaping economic behavior. 
Proper and pious use of produce was dependent on precise knowledge as to the 
status of a body of produce, whether it has been fully tithed or not. One could be 
fairly certain about whether or not one’s own property had been properly tithed 
(except insofar as work was delegated to others), but not in market transactions. The 
Mishnah exhibits considerable anxiety over the question of how one guards against 
the accidental consumption of produce that has not been tithed, taking it to the 
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extreme of suggesting that one should tithe anything one buys, sells, or eats (m. Dem 
2:2)—potentially causing multiple parties to tithe the same produce! Even worse, one 
could unknowingly buy produce that had itself been separated as tithe, whose use by 
unauthorized persons (non-Levitical Jews for First Tithe) or outside the designated 
location (Jerusalem for Second Tithe) constituted a violation and a sin for the unwit-
ting user. To avoid this, the Mishnah suggests that it was common practice to mark 
storage jars with a letter to indicate whether produce was qorban (a highly stringent 
level of purity), maʽaśer (tithe), demaʼi (uncertainly tithed), ṭevel (certain untithed), 
or terumah (heave-offering) (m. MSh 4:11).
591
 
We can see the role of reputation and trust in determining from whom to buy 
foodstuffs through a couple of examples from Mishnah Demaʼi: 
If one says to someone who is not trustworthy (למי שאינו נאמן) regarding tithes, 
“Buy [produce] for me from one who is trustworthy and tithes,” he [the messenger] is 
not trusted. [If one says,] “[buy] from so-and-so,” this [messenger] is trusted. If he 
went to buy from him [so-and-so], but said to him [the sender], “I could not find him 
and I bought for you from someone else who is trustworthy,” he [the messenger] is 
not trusted. (m. Dem 4:5) 
In this first case, the issue is whether the messenger can properly discern a vendor 
who can be trusted to follow proper tithing procedures since the messenger himself 
cannot. If, however, the buyer can direct his messenger to a particular individual of 
known reputation, this reduced the risk involved. Moreover, it hints at the ability of a 
particular individual to garner more customers through a positive reputation and/or 
established networks of trust. 
If one enters a city and does not know any person there, he says, “Who here is trust-
worthy (מי כאן נאמן)? Who here tithes?” If a person replies “I am,” he is not trusted. 
If he said, “so-and-so person is trustworthy,” he is trusted. If he goes to buy from 
him and says to him, “Who here sells last year’s grain (ישן)?” If he replies, “The 
person that sent you to me,” even though it is as if they are rendering services to each 
other, they are trusted. (m. Dem 4:6) 
In this second example, we catch a glimpse of some of the complications of 
conducting transactions in an unfamiliar market. As Neville Morley has noted about 
traders, they “sought to reduce their exposure to risk and improve their bargaining 
position by gathering information.”
592
 But this passage clearly demonstrates that 
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information gathering was essential for the buyer as well. The tactic here is to tap into 
local networks of communication and reputation, while being circumspect about 
believing an unfamiliar character who signals his own trustworthiness. 
Given the communal nature of the covenant, maintaining piety was not solely an 
individual responsibility, but a communal one, and transgression by a few could 
damage the relationship between God and Israel as a nation.
593
 In light of this, it is 
likely that many Jews were zealous to keep their compatriots from breaking the Law 
as well. As we discussed in chapter 1, social scientists have noted that people will 
often go out of their way to discourage others from breaking social norms or to punish 
those who violate them, a phenomenon known as altruistic punishment.
594
 Among the 
mechanisms for punishing peers are publically chastising violators, boycotting inter-
actions with them, and spreading gossip damaging to their reputation. Choice of how 
and with whom to conduct trade could therefore be as much about punishing others as 
it was about avoiding breaking the Law oneself. While many of the agricultural laws 
we discussed above would not necessarily cause others to directly violate the 
commandments, a reputation for laxity might nonetheless result in fewer peers willing 
to trade and cooperate. These mechanisms of peer punishment could thereby have 
powerful effects on the ability of individuals to make transactions necessary to meet 
their needs. And to the extent that there were broadly established norms, these mech-
anisms of punishment encouraged homogenization of practice by reprimanding 
outliers. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that we cannot properly understand the economic 
system in which Galilean Jews participated without considering the obligations and 
limitations that the sacred law made on Jews and their agricultural practices. Our 
sources strongly suggest that many Jews in Early Roman Palestine took their religious 
commitments to God and the Law quite seriously; the commandments were not 
suggestions to be heeded only when convenient, or goals to strive for only once the 
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“strictly economic” matters of putting food on the table and paying taxes and rents 
had been achieved. The commandments were the conditions that governed the cove-
nantal relationship between God and his people Israel that ensured providence, pros-
perity, and security for observance, while threatening violators with calamity. Under 
such conditions, there can be no discussion of economy that excerpts the production, 
consumption, and exchange of goods from the social and religious framework in 
which such exchanges were conducted. The very economic notions of “subsistence 
needs” and “financial obligations” can only be reckoned in a social context, and for 
Galilean Jews, the Law of the Torah was among the most important institutions that 
defined this context. 
We examined several commandments pertaining to agricultural practices to illus-
trate the impact of the Torah on economic behavior. We focused on agricultural laws 
in part because they indicate the effects of a religious institution on a broad segment 
of the largely agrarian economy, since most Galilean Jews were directly involved in 
food production and the rest at least dependent on it. The selection of laws discussed 
above indicate a variety of ways that the Torah could have meaningfully shaped prac-
tices of cultivation, consumption, and economic exchange in Galilee. These cases 
should be understood as exemplary, but not exhaustive. We could cite many more 
statutes of the Mosaic covenant that would have shaped other aspects of the agricul-
tural economy, and many more still that pertained to other aspects of the economy 
altogether (e.g., lending practices and deposits).  
In the section on agricultural production, we considered the case of the Sabbatical 
Year restriction on cultivations and the prohibition on “mixed kinds.” The Sabbatical 
Year commandment, which compelled Jews in the Land of Israel to leave their fields 
and vineyards fallow every seven years, very clearly set limits on the types of 
economic activities that Galileans could engage in during the Sabbatical Year. We 
also saw that the limited availability of new resources in the Sabbatical Year incen-
tivized advanced preparation through strategies of savings—whether in kind or in 
coin—requiring advanced planning and perhaps even tactical intensification of agri-
cultural production in the year(s) prior.
595
 We also saw how the conditions of food 
scarcity caused by the fallow would have incentivized certain patterns of engagement 
with the marketplace depending on one’s resources and the availability of storage 
infrastructure, sometimes exacerbating socioeconomic difference. The law prohibiting 
“mixed kinds” also constrained agricultural production, but in a different manner: it 
prohibited the planting of multiple crops in the same field, and thereby constricted the 
tactics available to cope with the contingencies of the perennial risks of crop failure. 
We juxtaposed this prohibition with the crop diversification strategies practiced in 
other regions of the Roman Empire, indicating how the Torah’s law on kilʼayim 
complicated matters. But we also saw from the discussions in the Mishnah how the 
vague wording of the commandment left space for interpretations that paid heed to the 
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letter of the Law while still permitting certain formulations of crop diversification 
strategies that were essential safeguards against wholesale crop failure. 
In the section on agricultural consumption, we examined some of the obligations 
that the Mosaic covenant places on the agricultural products of Jewish farmers. The 
tithes were most important in terms of quantity, since each separate tithe was a tenth 
of the annual yield. The First Tithe was an annual portion that Jews were obligated to 
render to Levites and priests, and the Poor Tithe a portion due every three years or so. 
Jews needed to account for these obligatory dues in advance, and could not simply 
ignore them without incurring the threat of divine wrath as well as social conse-
quences for their impious lawbreaking. Tithes acted as a mechanism of wealth redis-
tribution, directing resources from the general body of agricultural producers to 
others. It would be a mistake to simply identify the First Tithe payments to priests as 
enrichment of the wealthy, as some scholars have presumed, since many priests were 
not elites and depended on this produce, and the Third or Poor Tithe was entirely 
directed to those of limited means. We also noted the possible effects of the tithe 
obligation on land tenure agreements between tenant and landlord, since it added 
another factor to the contractual arrangement of financial responsibilities and burdens 
that such economic relationships entailed. 
In addition to the tithes, we discussed how the Torah designates certain portions 
of the agricultural crop as property of the poor. These commands would have limited 
the ability of farmers to make complete and efficient use of the whole of their harvest; 
they required Jewish farmers to leave a portion of the field unharvested, prohibited 
the thorough picking of olives and grapes, and allotted to the poor any sheaves left 
behind in the harvesting process. While these obligations to the poor were not quanti -
fied by the Torah, and allowed stingy interpretations, we discussed the social mecha-
nisms that would have discouraged a miserly attitude to these commandments. The 
widespread ethical notion that to deny the poor their dues was a violation of the 
divine command not to oppress the poor and the negative reputation that accompanied 
such impious behavior was further incentive to give and even give generously.  
We also examined the ramifications of following the Second Tithe command-
ment, which placed conditions on the free use of a tenth of the annual harvest. Since 
this commandment obligated the consumption of the tithe or the use of its redemption 
value in Jerusalem, the tithe could not be used to fulfill everyday household needs, 
thus demonstrating how the constraints of the Law complicated the calculus of house-
hold resource management. The Second Tithe was effectively a fund earmarked for 
subsidizing festal food needs and thereby structurally directed economic resources 
from Galilee to Jerusalem and compelled Jews to participate in the monetized market 
economy of Jerusalem as well. For Galilean Jews, far from Jerusalem, redemption 
was a virtual necessity, and this incentivized and even required some amount of 
monetized market transaction in Galilee. It therefore explicitly encouraged the move-
ment of resources from the regional economy of Galilee down to Jerusalem, under-
mining notions that Galileans were effectively autarkic and abstained from trade and 





In the last section, we looked at some of the peripheral effects of the concerns for 
ritual purity, as spelled out in the Torah, and as they pertained to the production, 
consumption, and exchange of agricultural goods. The problem of information asym-
metry created conditions of risk for Jews careful to avoid abrogating the Law. Risk 
was an unavoidable fact for all but the most self-sufficient and wealthy of land-
holders, who produced an abundance, could store it in kind, and could avoid market 
transaction when it was disadvantageous. We discussed some of the strategies avail -
able to Jews to minimize the likelihood of accidental transgression of the Law or 
incursion of ritual impurity, many of which are suggested in the Mishnah’s discussion 
of demaʼi. Reputation and stereotyping were crude methods of decision-making, 
perhaps, but nonetheless served as a guide to strategic decision-making in lieu of 
access to good information about the purity status of a vendor’s product. The 
important role of reputation in marketplace interactions in turn served as a powerful 
incentive toward stringent observance of halakhic standards by merchants hoping to 
maintain an expansive clientele. It may even have encouraged homogenization of 
normative interpretation, at least at a community level, since standardization served to 
reduce the transaction costs between buyer and seller by decreasing information 
asymmetry. 
Our investigation indicates that we need to view religion as an integral element in 
understanding the economy in antiquity. The intervention of the sacred law in matters 
of agricultural cultivation meant that the economic system of agrarian production in 
Galilee was not simply determined by profit-maximization motives (as in Neoclas-
sical Economics) or by strict orientation toward “subsistence” defined solely by 
household nutritional needs (as in the “peasant economy” model). Religious concerns 
for maintaining piety—through observance of God’s covenantal conditions, in the 
case of Galilean Jews—simultaneously placed limits on certain types of behavior and 
incentivized others. These practices illustrate that an accurate rendering of the Gali-
lean economy requires an expanded notion of economic rationality that includes the 
religious rather than treating it as an epiphenomenon of social and economic factors.  
In this chapter, we highlighted factors that made the patterns and strategies of 
economic resource management by Galilean Jews unique, operating in ways distinct 
even from diaspora and Judaean Jews. But in doing so I do not intend to mark the 
Jews and their economic behavior as an outlier in the ancient Mediterranean. Much to  
the contrary, I believe that my findings signal that the particular cultural and religious 
institutions of any given region of the Roman Empire may have fundamentally shaped 
local economic behavior in distinctive ways. Religious obligations on the individual 
and the household cannot be dismissed as peripheral to the analysis of the ancient 
economy. In other regions, too, local cults and their sacred laws must have created 
conditions that configured economic resource management at the household level, and 






CHAPTER 4—MAKING SACRIFICES FOR THE FESTIVALS 
How the Temple and Festivals Shape Household Economic Resource Management 
The heart of Jewish religious practice in Early Roman Palestine was undoubtedly the 
Temple in Jerusalem. While Jewish piety was enacted on a local and regular basis 
through fulfillment of Torah commandments such as the Sabbath rest, observance of 
the dietary laws, and the agricultural laws discussed in the previous chapter, other 
commandments could only be fulfilled in this one location. The Torah specifies Jeru-
salem as the sole legitimate site for the sacrificial cult, meaning that any command-
ment or rite requiring animal or vegetal sacrifice could only be fulfilled in Jeru-
salem.
596
 The Torah also specifies certain consecrated goods that must be consumed 
in Jerusalem alone. The fact that Jerusalem was the site chosen by God “to make his 
name dwell there” (cf. Deut 12:11) also meant that activities and objects connected 
with the city and its cult site could carry additional symbolic capital that set Jerusalem 
apart from other settlements on the map.  
Jerusalem was effectively the only large “Jewish” city in the region, a fact that is 
best explained by its religious cachet. Unlike the other large cities that encircled 
Jewish Palestine, Jerusalem was not proximate to abundant resources or especially 
fertile lands and was not strategically located along major trade routes or the coast -
line.
597
 It was not even centrally located in Jewish Palestine, situated relatively far 
from Galilee and Golan and much of Peraea. And though it had long served as a seat 
of government, for much of the Early Roman period in question here it was largely 
supplanted as the primary political “capital” by Caesarea Maritima. All of these 
factors make Jerusalem somewhat unlikely as a “center” for a broader economy of 
Jewish Palestine. Yet Jerusalem flourished on account of the Second Temple, which 
made the city a center of gravity for the Jewish population and drew people and 
resources in every year from all over Palestine (and well beyond).  
Though Galilee’s interpersonal and economic network was a largely closed, 
insular system (as we argued in chapter 2), the Jerusalem cult was a notable and 
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prominent exception. The commandment to attend the so-called “pilgrimage festivals” 
compelled many to travel to Jerusalem at the same time every year. This confluence 
of Jews from a wide geography made Jerusalem a hub for interpersonal connections, 
information exchange, and economic transactions, bridging otherwise disconnected 
and insular networks. This was especially true for the regions within Palestine, whose 
inhabitants attended the festivals in far greater numbers and with more regularity than 
diaspora Jews. The festivals brought Galileans and Judaeans together at regular inter-
vals each year, creating good conditions for the forging, reinforcing, and perpetuation 
of interpersonal connections.  
The Temple cult, pilgrimage festivals, and other commandments observable 
solely in Jerusalem encouraged the flow of money and resources from outlying 
regions into the city. Participating in the Jerusalem cult made many demands on the 
economic resources of Galilean pilgrims—there were the direct costs of sacrifices and 
other offerings as well as the logistical costs of travel, lodging, and foodstuffs. In 
addition to the necessities, the festivals also gave Galileans opportunity to conduct 
other transactions that they might not otherwise have had they not been drawn to Jeru-
salem to fulfill their religious obligations. The commandments mandating pilgrimage 
to Jerusalem, we will see, had the effect of periodically integrating at least some 
sectors of the Galilean and Judaean economies, as pilgrims brought resources and 
money from the north to spend in Jerusalem’s markets and in support of the Temple 
institution. 
Galilee provides us with a particularly interesting test case for considering the 
ways that a temple institution and its rites interlinked with “household economies.” 
To date, most scholarly discussion of economy and religion in the ancient Mediterra-
nean has focused on “temple economies”—the production, exchange, and consump-
tion networks that accommodate the needs of the Temple institution itself.
598
 We shall 
briefly touch on that topic. But the “temple economy” had little to do with Galilee, 
insofar as most of the Temple’s material needs were met out of its immediate envi-
rons. Yet Galilee was in the Jerusalem Temple’s “catchment zone,”
599
 close enough to 
realistically expect that many made the trip each year, and because of this would have 
been accounted for in the ways households planned their allocation of economic 
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resources. As such, the focus of this chapter is not on maintenance of the Temple but 
on the economic burdens that participating in the Temple cult and fulfilling other 
commandments restricted to Jerusalem had on the economic calculus of pilgrims.  
Pilgrimage to Jerusalem 
In the introduction to this chapter I used 
the oft-deployed language of pil-
grimage to refer to Galilean travel to 
the Jerusalem Temple.
600
 I use the term 
“pilgrimage” to refer to a ritualized, 
multi-day journey to a sacred site 
undertaken in part for religious pur-
poses. Pilgrimage is distinguished from 
everyday, local religious practices in 
that performing it requires lengthy 
travel that is not undertaken on a 
regular basis.
601
 For many Judaeans, 
participation in the Temple cult would 
not constitute pilgrimage, since their 
proximity to Jerusalem meant they 
could conduct rites there without radi-
cally interrupting their weekly routines, 
while for Galileans the distance made 
cult rites a major undertaking. While 
the overt purpose of such a journey 
may be primarily religious, most sacred 
travel in Antiquity was multipurpose.
602
 Travel to a site for the purposes of making 
sacrifice did not preclude one from engaging with family and friends, from 
conducting business, or making tangentially related purchases. In other words, 
fulfillment of Torah commandments may have defined the timing and impetus for 
travel to Jerusalem, but did not limit the pilgrims to “purely religious” activities. 
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Figure 13. Pilgrimage Festivals on the Jewish luni-
solar calendar. In dark grey is a visual approxima-
tion of the length of festivals, while the light grey is 






The primary occasions for Galileans to travel to Jerusalem were the three 
pilgrimage festivals (חגים): Passover/Unleavened Bread (Nisan 14–21),603 Weeks 
(Shavuʽot; Sivan 6), and Booths (Sukkot; Tishrei 15–21). These three differed from 
the other festivals of the sacred calendar in that presence and participation was 
mandated: “Three times a year all your males shall appear before YHWH your God at 
the place that he will choose” (Deut 16:16; cf. Exod 23:14, 17; 34:23). For other festi-
vals, the priests performed rites and sacrifices on the behalf of Israel but attendance 
by lay Jews was optional. Galileans could of course come to the other festivals and 
even make pilgrimage outside of festal time, but because of the distance and the 
burden such travel entailed, we may presume that most Galileans concentrated their 
time in Jerusalem to the seasons of the pilgrimage festivals as much as they could. 
Pilgrimage to the Temple, as defined by distance, was really a phenomenon of the 
later Second Temple period and especially the Early Roman period. When the Temple 
was initially constructed in the Persian period, the Jewish population was concen-
trated around the city of Jerusalem itself, and only a relatively small number of Jews 
seem to have expanded into Galilee and Peraea under the Ptolemies and Seleucids.
604
 
With most Jews residing proximate to Jerusalem and its Temple, it is not surprising 
that there is little textual evidence for pilgrimage at this time.
605
 Circumstances began 
to change during the Hasmonaean period, when Hyrcanus I annexed Galilee (along 
with Peraea, Samaria, and Idumaea) to the Hasmonaean realm. The marked change in 
the material culture of Galilee in this period further indicates that many Jews migrated 
from Judaea to settle in Galilee.
606
 For those Jews who had migrated to Galilee, 
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participation in the Temple cult and fulfillment of the festival obligations now 
entailed a journey of several days, with all of the concomitant dangers and burdens of 
travel.  
Pilgrimage to the Jerusalem Temple reached its zenith In the Early Roman period. 
Martin Goodman has argued that several of Herod the Great’s building projects were 
intended to increase the volume of pilgrimage from the diaspora and the economic 
activity this fostered in Jerusalem.
607
 These projects included the renovation of the 
Temple from a modest structure into an expansive and splendid complex, the 
construction of a protected harbor at Caesarea Maritima,
608
 and the establishment of a 
fortress city called Bathyra in Batanaea to secure the pilgrimage route from Babylonia 
(Ant. 17.23–26). But these improvements did not just foster pilgrimage from abroad—
they also had secondary effects on local pilgrimage: improvements in the Temple 
facilities and road infrastructure and security would have made pilgrimage easier for 
pilgrims within Palestine as well. It is no surprise that Josephus portrays the festivals 
as well attended in this period. 
We can say with certainty from our sources that the festivals drew huge crowds 
of pilgrims three times a year, but this in and of itself does not necessarily demon-
strate that Jews appeared before God at the Temple triannually
609
 and consistently. 
Many diaspora Jews probably conducted the pilgrimage only once or twice in their 
lifetimes, since it was a considerable undertaking both in terms of the long and some-
times dangerous travels over land and sea and the great expenses involved. Even 
Philo, from one of the wealthiest Jewish families in Alexandria, seems not to have 
undertaken the pilgrimage often, if he even made it more than once.
610
 Josephus’ 
description of the pilgrimage commandment indicates that by the Early Roman period 
at least, this obligation was understood to be incumbent only upon people “from the 
bounds of the land that the Hebrews should conquer” (Ant. 4.203), i.e., Palestine.  
Some scholars have suggested that even among Palestinian Jews, few would have 
appeared at all three festivals each year. Shemuel Safrai, and other following his lead, 
have taken the statement in Luke that “every year Jesus’ parents went to Jerusalem for 
the Festival of the Passover” (2:41) to indicate that they only went to Jerusalem for 
Passovers.
611
 Susan Haber likewise takes Luke as evidence that Galileans prioritized 
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Passover at the expense of other festivals.
612
 Jeffrey Rubenstein, by contrast, has 
argued that Booths, not Passover, was the most widely attended and popular of the 
pilgrimage festivals, coming as it did at the end of the agricultural season.
613
 E. P. 
Sanders contends that “Palestinian Jews on average attended one of the three festivals 
each year” and the close timing of Passover and Weeks would make it nigh impos-
sible for Jews outside of Judaea to attend both.
614
 Martin Goodman is less specific, 
but likewise believes that because of the distance Galileans were less likely to attend 
all the festivals than Judaeans were.
615
  
In all cases, these assessments are best guesses from limited evidence, and in the 
case of Safrai and Haver, overly dependent on a narrow reading of Luke 2:41. Most 
Second Temple textual statements about festival attendance describe it on a global 
rather than familial scale, which does not allow us to make strong, positive statements 
about whether any given individual attended all three festivals each year. The excep-
tions are Tobit, written sometime in the Hellenistic period, whose protagonist is a 
Galilean whose attendance at all three pilgrimage festivals each year is noted as a 
mark of piety (1:4–6),
616
 and the Gospel of John, in which Jesus is depicted in attend-
ance at numerous festivals, not just Passover (2:13; 5:1; 7:10; 10:22; 11:55). The only 
positive literary evidence suggesting a Galilean may have chosen to ignore the 
pilgrimage obligation also comes from John. Federico Colautti argues that John 6 
depicts Jesus sitting out a Passover and in John 7:6–8 stating his intention to skip 
Booths.
617
 Both are contestable, however. John 6:4 notes that Passover was near 
without ever mentioning his travel to Jerusalem, but given John’s proclivity to change 
location unannounced and the episodic nature of the gospels in general, this is hardly 
a statement that he (and his followers) did not go to Passover. And while Jesus states 
openly his intention to sit out Booths in 7:6–8, he subsequently went in secret (7:10), 
and the reason for potentially missing the festival was the imminent threat of being 
killed by the Jerusalem authorities (before the proper time) (7:1, 6). 
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Since the evidence for the frequency of individual attendance at the festivals is 
quite limited, any assessment of the effects of pilgrimage is dependent on one’s 
starting assumptions. To argue, as some have, that economic concerns precluded 
many Galileans from participating in the festivals each year requires the assumption 
that the commandment was treated by Jews as a secondary concern, a goal to aspire to 
only if the primary “subsistence” needs were met. But this perspective errs in 
importing a rather modern, secular, capitalist conception of rational choice to a social 
world in which religious institutions were an integral part of society. If we take seri -
ously the notion that such institutions contribute to social definitions of acceptable 
behavior and shape economic priorities, then many Jews would not have considered 
abstaining from the pilgrimage as an option available to them in the first place. As we 
noted in the previous chapter, the very narrow sense of “subsistence” (defined by 
nutritional and taxation needs) often applied in evaluation of Galilean economic 
conditions fails to acknowledge the social-constructedness of the notion of economic 
“needs” and the possibility that other obligations may be deemed just as economically 
imperative. In other words, we should explore the implications of a “bounded” 
economic rationality that deems religious obligations as a component of “subsistence” 
needs, rather than being in competition with and subordinate to them.  
As with the agricultural laws we examined in chapter 3, the obligation to attempt 
the pilgrimage festivals does not seem to have been enforced through official institu -
tional mechanisms of policing. The Temple lacked surveillance or registration mech-
anisms that would have allowed its personnel to systematically identify individuals 
who, for whatever reason, shirked their obligations. So far as we know, the priests did 
not register the names of individuals who showed up to the Temple to offer festal 
sacrifices, and, furthermore, individuals who shared another’s festal offering did not 
necessarily need to go to the Temple themselves (as we shall discuss below). Taking 
roll through the city itself, given the size and mobility of the crowds, would have been 
nigh impossible. The Temple as a central, authoritative institution lacked the sort of 
omniscient gaze made possible by more modern mechanisms of data recording and 
technology. 
For many, the impulse to fulfill the pilgrimage and attend the festivals would 
come from the normalization—i.e., rendering into a norm—of these obligations and 
the internalization of them.
618
 Children would be socialized into the practice from a 
relatively young age (Jesus is a twelve-year-old child on pilgrimage in Luke 2:41–42; 
children younger still are envisioned in m. Ḥag 1:1) as they conducted the trek 
through accustomed roads and past familiar landmarks, trained through repetition year 
after year into a regular rhythm. James B. Rives has described civic cults in the 
Roman Empire in a similar fashion:  
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To a large extent, however, the importance of civic cults lay not in the enthusiasm 
that they might or might not have inspired in people, but rather in their banality, in 
the familiar way that temples shaped public space and festivals shaped the year.
619
 
The act of going on pilgrimage, and the details of conducting the preparation and 
journey, may be understood as a part of Galilean habitus, in which the norms are 
embodied through a habitual set of practices collectively and regularly orchestrated 
without necessary reference to rules enforceable by authorities. The structures 
shaping individuals and communities into such behavior are regenerative, the product 
of past iterations of the act and producers of future iterations.
620
 The decision to go on 
pilgrimage in this sense is not so much a decision at all as it is a naturalized sense of 
what one simply does. 
But pilgrimage was more than just regularized behavior, since it was also imbued 
with a sense of moral obligation and socially-constructed notions of piety. The 
importance of the festivals can be glimpsed in some of our literary sources, as in the 
praise for the eponymous protagonist in Tobit for his regular attendance (1:6) and 
Jubilees’ portrayal of pious pre-Mosaic patriarchs performing festival rites (e.g., 
6:17–20; 16:20–31; 22:1–4). If indeed the norms around making the pilgrimage were 
internalized as “norms of oughtness,” and attendance of the festivals was one dimen-
sion by which one assessed one’s piety, then violating them would cause one’s 
internal sanctioning system to produce feelings of guilt and shame to dissuade future 
transgression.
621
 An affront to the conditions governing the covenant between God 
and his subjects Israel might also spur feelings of anxiety,
622
 as one anticipates with 
uncertainty the possibility of divine sanction and the deleterious effects on one’s 
standing with God. Internalization of these norms can also take the form of zeal,
623
 a 
hypervigilant form of observance encouraging actions beyond what might be expected 
of simple compliance and exhibiting a willingness to adhere to norms even at great 
personal costs. For an example of zealousness to observe the festivals, we may note 
the fact that a vast multitude of Jews attended the Passover in Jerusalem despite the 
dangers presented by the encroaching Roman armies during the revolt, which ulti-
mately left the celebrants trapped in an overcrowded Jerusalem during the siege in 70 
CE (War 6.421–435).
624
 In an earlier incident, the celebrants blithely returned to their 
sacrifices after slaughtering a cohort of Archelaus’ soldiers sent to Jerusalem to 
curtail sedition, returning promptly to the festival rather than making preparations for 
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an almost certain reprisal from the ethnarch (War 2.10–12). These episodes also illus-
trated that there was sometimes an upper limit on the costs to safety that Jews were 
willing to undertake, as they abandoned the festival when Archelaus sent an entire 
army against them (see, e.g., War 2.13).
625
 
Of course, there were external forces at work as well. Social pressures from peers 
inside one’s community and broader social network could have exercised a powerful 
constraint on the behavior of others. Conducting the pilgrimage was a highly conspic-
uous activity, and it was quite easy for others in the community to observe whether 
their peers were making the trek or staying home. In one episode, Josephus indicates 
that the large settlement of Lydda was completely devoid of men save for fifty inhab-
itants, since the rest had gone up to the festival in Jerusalem (War 2.515–517).
626
 
With such large numbers vacating the city, skipping the festival would have stood 
out. We should note that there may have been some norms that narrowed the defini -
tion of who was obligated to attend beyond gender (as specified in Deut 16:16): in the 
aforementioned case of Lydda, at least some of those who remained were apparently 
male,
627
 and the Mishnah claims exceptions for young children, slaves, elderly, and 
some others (m Ḥag 1:1).
628
 But presuming one did not fit these conditions, staying 
behind signal to others in the community that an individual was impious and a vio-
lator of the Law and the social norms around it. As with other social norms, we can 
expect that those who were scrupulous about following the Law used mechanisms 
such as reprimand, shunning, boycott, or gossip to sanction violators for the offence 
and discourage the defector and others from subsequent violations. The act of sanc-
tioning also reaffirmed to others the strength of the social norm and the sanctioner’s 
own status as a pious adherent to the community’s religious practices.  
Sanctioning was encouraged further by the fact that the Law was framed as a 
covenant between Israel as a collective and God, and widespread violation was under-
stood to threaten the Jews as a whole, not just the individual defector.
629
 Sanctioning 
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could have important ramifications for individuals’ social and cultural capital, as well 
as for their ability to make productive use of their interpersonal networks. These 
social mechanisms of enforcement thus created strong incentives for Jews to comply 
with the pilgrimage obligation and act in accordance with the norms of the commu-
nity. This is all the more so for our Galileans, most of whom resided in small settle -
ments with closed networks where everyone knew everyone and sanctions could be 
effectively deployed (see ch. 2), and where the very small gentile population would 
have left few alternative interpersonal connections available for whom the norms of 
Torah adherence were inconsequential.
630
 
The references to pilgrimage in Josephus are consistent with the notion that 
attending the festivals was normative and widely practiced, even if not universally so. 
Many of his narratives in War and the later books of Antiquities are contextualized in 
relation to the festivals, and depict the magnitude of attendance of the festival crowds 
with evocative—if not quantifiable—language.
631
 Josephus speaks of festival-goers 
most often as a multitude (e.g., War 1.253), but at other times as “myriads” 
(μυριάδες; Ant. 14.338) or “an innumerable crowd” (λαὸς ἄπειρος; War 2.10) or an 
inflated numerical estimate (e.g., 3 million; War 2.280). Josephus’ narratives abound 
with references to mass movement of people from all regions of Jewish Palestine: 
“out of Galilee, Idumaea, Jericho, and Peraea-over-Jordan, and the true people of 
Judaea itself” (War 2.42–43).
632
 The mass movement of pilgrims from Galilee to Jeru-
salem is the launching point for a narrative of conflict between Jews and Samaritans 
(Ant. 20.118; War 2.232–233). Josephus notes that the majority of Jews besieged in 
Jerusalem during the First Jewish Revolt were “not native to there [οὐκ ἐπιχώριον; 
i.e., not from Jerusalem or Judaea], for they were suddenly engulfed by war when 
they had gathered from the entire countryside for the Festival of Unleavened Bread” 
(War 6.421). The palpable threat of violence was seemingly not enough to dissuade 
many from the festivals either, as when “myriads” came to the Festival of Weeks 
despite the ongoing political strife between Antigonus and Herod (War 1.253; Ant. 
14.338), or when festival-goers continued the paschal sacrifices despite having just 
engaged Archelaus’ soldiers and thereby invited imminent retribution (War 2.11–12). 
The New Testament gospels corroborate this image of widespread observance of the 
festivals, especially Luke and John who explicitly refer to masses of Jews travelling 
from Galilee to Jerusalem for the festivals.
633
 These texts corroborate our contention 
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that Jews in Palestine—including Galileans—saw participation in the festivals as an 
important act and strove to fulfill their festal obligations even in the face of danger. In 
what follows, we will look at the ways that travel to Jerusalem for the festivals and 
the resources required to do so would have shaped the parameters of economic deci -
sion-making for Galileans on the assumption that these obligations constituted reli -
gious norms that most strove to observe. 
The Logistics of Pilgrimage 
Making the pilgrimage from Galilee to Jerusalem imposed a number of costs on the 
pilgrim’s economic resources. In order to make the multi-day journey, Galileans 
needed to account for the expenses of travel, lodging, and food not only for the trek to 
and from Jerusalem, but for their sojourn in the city as well. Because of the distance 
from Jerusalem, Galileans would have felt these logistical costs more acutely than 
other, more proximate regions like Peraea. Travel from Galilee to Judaea was a 
considerable undertaking, though Jewish pilgrims could mitigate these costs, we shall 
suggest, through planning and tactic. Because of the distance, pilgrimage also meant 
time idle from one’s productive activities. Together, these costs undertaken by many 
will indicate how the obligatory performance of religious rites at the Jerusalem 
Temple could have a profound effect on the economic resource management of 
Galileans. And, furthermore, because the pilgrimage festivals occurred according to a 
regular calendrical cycle, we may surmise that they played an important role in 
structuring the rhythms of movement and transaction between the regional economies 
of Galilee and Judaea and accordingly the rhythms of supply, demand, and price 
fluctuations. 
Travel 
The trip to Jerusalem was significantly more onerous than the everyday inter-village 
travel conducted within Galilee, as discussed in chapter 2, where settlements were 
situated very close to one another. Travel between Galilee and Jerusalem was typi-
cally conducted overland and required at least three days and perhaps a week, 
depending on the route, mode of transportation, and duration of stops on the way. 
Water travel was not a viable option or at least not a marked improvement in travel 
time—the Jordan River was not navigable, and sailing along the coast from Ptolemais 
to Jaffa still entailed at least a day’s travel to and from each port. With the exception 
of Jews coming to the Temple from the diaspora, literary sources suggest that Gali-
lean travelers used two major routes to reach Jerusalem: (A) south through the Jezreel 
Valley and Samaria (e.g., Mark 10; Ant. 20.118; War 2.232–233) or (B) eastward 
along the Jezreel Valley to the Jordan River valley, south through the valley to 
Jericho, and from there west to Jerusalem (e.g., Luke 9:51–56).
634
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Figure 14. Approximation of the pilgrimage 
routes from Nazareth to Jerusalem through Samaria 
(A) and through the Jordan River Valley (B). 
approximates these two routes from Nazareth to 
Jerusalem on the basis of topography and the 
recent maps of ancient roads and routes produced 
by James F. Strange.
635
 Both routes are draw to 
avoid steep changes in elevation, preferring to 
remain in the valley lowlands rather than ascend 
and descend hills. Route A, through Samaria, was 
the shorter and more direct of the two at 
approximately 124 kilometers, and at a rate of 30 
kilometers per day
636
 it could be traversed in about 
four days. Route B, through the Jordan Valley, was 
approximately 136 kilometers, and could be trav-
ersed in about four and a half days, perhaps slowed 
by the steep uphill climb from Jericho to Jeru-
salem. 
Which route was preferable depended on a number of factors. In terms of 
distance, the Samarian route was a bit shorter and 
more direct for those in central and western 
Galilee. For those in the eastern lake region, a 
distance-based choice may have been moot. 
Josephus’ evaluation of travel from Galilee to Jerusalem plainly favors the Samarian 
route for speed: “It was absolutely necessary for those who desired to go quickly to 
traverse through it [Samaria], as it is possible to reach Jerusalem in this way from 
Galilee in three days” (Life 269).
637
 This figure of three days may represent a more 
                                                                                                                                                                             
tenuously inferred from John 11, in which Jesus travels from a village called Ephraim (interpreted as 
in the Ephraim hill country) to Jerusalem for Passover (11:54–55). But since Jesus had most recently 
come from Bethany near Jerusalem, rather than from Galilee, this tells us nothing about pilgrimage 
routes, and surely not that he traveled via the coastal plain.  
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strenuous trip, though, with longer travel days and perhaps the assistance of a horse. 
For many travelling on foot, with or without laden asses, four to five days would be 
typical. 
The other important factor was whether or not a route took pilgrims through 
Samaritan territory. The Gospel of Luke suggests that there were often tensions 
between Jews and Samaritans. When Jesus travels from Galilee to Jerusalem, as his 
party approaches a village of Samaria, Jesus sends messengers ahead in order, 
presumably, to procure lodging or other provisions. The Samaritan inhabitants, 
however, “did not admit him, because his face was set to go to Jerusalem” (Luke 
9:51–53).
638
 At its worst, Samaritan hostilities could lead to physical violence against 
pilgrims passing through their region: 
And next there occurred a conflict between the Galileans and the Samarians; for at a 
village called Gema [Ginae], which lies in the Great Plain of the Samarians, when 
many Jews were going up for the festival, a certain Galilean was killed. (War 2.232–
233; cf. Ant. 20.118) 
This murder of a pilgrim in 50 CE triggered an armed assault by Jews (from Galilee 
and Judaea alike) against the Samaritans, even abandoning the festival itself to avenge 
his death. Tacitus, in describing the same incident, depicts the animosity between 
Galilee and Samaria as habitual and long-standing (Annales 12.54.2–12.54.4). 
The Jordan Valley route could be regarded as the “safer” route, in that it avoided 
the Samaritan heartland altogether. Susan Haber takes this to have been the default 
route for Jewish pilgrims for this very reason.
639
 We should remember, however, that 
hostilities were not always so piqued. Josephus at other points indicates that Samari -
tans sometimes acted in concord with Jews. He criticizes the Samaritans for being 
“fair-weather” Jews who claim Jewish identity when convenient but eschewing it in 
the face of danger (Ant. 9.290–291; 11.341; 12.257), but this also indicates that there 
were times of eased relations between them. It is not until after 6 CE that an incident 
causes the Temple authorities to ban Samaritans from attending Passover (Ant. 
18.29),
640
 implying that they had been welcome (or at least permitted) beforehand. 
Animosity between Jews and Samaritans was not a constant; it increased and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
After the last, seven days: so that he may walk home (three), he may return (three), and he may 
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decreased in response to particular events. In the aftermath of the murder at Gema, 
there was probably a shift in the pattern of migration eastward to the Jordan for a few 
years. But many may have reverted to traversing Samaria before the onset of  the First 
Jewish Revolt in 66. When Josephus signals the danger of passing through Samaria, 
after all, he credits it not to the hostilities of the local inhabitants but to the presence 
of the Roman military (Life 269). In the same passage, he even claim to have friends 
there, perhaps signaling Samaritans with whom he was on good terms or fellow Jews 
who were able to reside in Samaria without problem. 
Galilean pilgrims also needed to weigh the concerns for safety against other 
logistical factors. As noted, the Jordan Valley route was longer and therefore required 
more provisions and entailed the costs of being away from one’s home and trade for 
at least an extra day each way. It also meant, as we shall see below, more limitations 
in the availability of accommodations and provisions along the route. As much as 
Samaritans could be hostile, they could also be useful, in that their disconnection 
from the Jerusalem Temple and its reckoning of the festal calendar meant that Samar-
itans were around to buy goods and services from during the festival season.  
No matter which route pilgrims took, they also faced the dangers of overland 
travel in antiquity. In few areas of the Roman Empire do there seem to have been 
anything like police or patrolmen, and where they did exist they were stationed in 
frontier zones and the major Roman highways.
641
 Most roads were relatively unpro-
tected zones, and except where they passed settlements they left travelers vulnerable 
to robbery and assault. Greek and Latin literature is replete with stories of highway 
robbers attacking unwary travelers.
642
 Palestine was not exempt from such dangers. 
The premise of the Parable of the Good Samaritan is that a traveler is robbed and 
beaten on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho (Luke 10:29–37). Josephus often refer-
ences bandits operating in the Herodian kingdoms, and while he often applies the 
term to political opponents as a pejorative, some of the references are surely to simple 
bands of highwaymen as well.
643
 The pejorative would not work, of course, if bandits 
were not a recognizable threat. 
The tactic of travelling in groups served to mitigate these dangers. The Gospel of 
Luke gives the impression that people travelled together in large caravans to and from 
the festivals. Jesus’ family returned from Passover in a large group composed of 
family (συγγενεῦσιν) and friends (γνωστοῖς); so large, in fact, that Jesus’ absence 
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could go unnoticed for several days (2:43–45). Travelling in groups provided safety 
in numbers against bandits on the road.  
Traveling in groups came with trade-offs too, though. To some extent, they would 
have slowed down the average speed of travel. A caravan could only collectively 
move as fast as its slowest members, and if a travelling party had a large number of 
children, elderly, or others for whom the long hike was challenging the trip would 
take longer than for a solo traveler unencumbered by others. However, on balance it 
seems that the advantages of group travel outweighed the disadvantages. And if 
indeed traveling in groups was safer and less expensive for the individual, this only 
reinforces the suggestion above that travel from Galilee to Jerusalem was mostly 
effected during the festival season; travel outside of these periods of mass migration 
subjected individuals to higher risks on the road and fewer strategies for spreading out 
costs. 
Pilgrimage Travel and Idle Hands 
For Galileans, participation in the festivals meant that three times a year, most Jewish 
men and male children
644
 were absent from their homes and from their work for 
significant periods of time—one to three weeks, varying with the length of the 
festival, the speed of the caravan, and the route taken.
645
 Fulfillment of one’s Torah 
obligation to attend the festivals meant stepping away from one’s productive occupa -
tions—at least insofar as they were geographically bound—at certain anticipated and 
regular periods of the year. These sorts of trade-offs are typically referred to as 
“opportunity costs,” the costs entailed in choosing one option over another. But 
“opportunity cost” is the wrong way to conceptualize how pious Galileans would have 
understood the ramifications of their participation in the pilgrimage, since the very 
concept presumes that non-observance was considered a legitimate and possible 
choice. The religious institutions and societal norms that expanded on or further 
defined these rules to some extent constrained the very set of conceivable actions; to 
draw on Bourdieu’s terminology, these institutions contributed to the construction of 
doxa, the set of undisputed positions taken for granted in a society, in contrast to the 
realm of opinion in which choices are a matter of argument over competing possibil -
ities.
646
 We may nonetheless find it heuristically useful to compare the constraints that 
pilgrimage and the festivals created against the theoretical possibility of breaking 
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these commandments, in that it allows us to see how a rationality “bounded” by these 
religious institutions diverges from our expectations based on neoclassical economic 
notions of rationality. For even if skipping the festivals was a conceivable option to 
these Jews, individuals in the tight-knit society of ancient Galilee were not free to 
make the choice in a vacuum: their behavior was constrained by the expectations of 
their peers. Our literary sources do not, unfortunately, convey how grave a violation 
failure to participate in the festivals was—our sources primarily speak about them in 
terms of attendance, rather than abstinence
647
—but failure to attend could signal to 
others a more systematic breach of the Law, since it was the chief occasion for Gali-
leans to fulfill an array of obligatory offerings, thereby inviting rather severe sanc-
tions that would make defection costly in other ways. 
Because the festivals are linked to the rhythms of the agricultural calendar, they 
follow the most intensive periods of the year—the harvests.
648
 The fact that agricul-
tural and festival calendars did not perfectly align (since one was solar and the other 
lunisolar) meant that in some years there may have been increased pressure to 
complete the harvest in a narrower timeframe. The harvests were already intensive 
because of the relatively narrow window for cutting and collecting the crop and the 
increase in labor required, compared against the other agricultural tasks of plowing, 
sowing, and weeding. The timing of harvest could have significant impacts on both 
the quality and the quantity of the produce. For instance, reaping grain when the 
stalks were fully ripened and dry would yield high quality grains but risked shaking 
many of them loose in the reaping process, diminishing the yield; harvesting early 
would increase the total and spread labor over a longer period, but include relatively 
“green” grains in the process.
649
 Since the work needed to be performed quickly, agri-
culturalists often needed to enlist additional labor. If some members of the household 
were typically engaged in non-agricultural production—e.g., handicrafts—they could 
be redeployed during the harvest to agricultural duties. Harvests were also occasions 
when it would be useful to cash in social capital and call in favors from kin, neigh-
bors, and other members in one’s interpersonal network. Paul Halstead has noted that 
cooperation and labor sharing between households were important tactics that farmers 
deployed to maximize the efficiency of the harvest before the age of mechaniza-
tion.
650
 In addition to labor sharing, one could also hire hands to harvest the crop. 
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There are ample literary references to paid laborers at harvest (see, e.g., Matt 20:1–
16; m. BM 7). And as we saw in chapter 3, the Torah defines some parameters around 
the hiring of agricultural hands for the harvest, permitting them to eat while working 
and—if “poor”—glean the leftovers afterward. Harvest was an opportune time for 
households with structural oversupply of labor
651
—that is, more labor than necessary 
for their own fields and other industry—to make some additional money. Clearly, 
strong social networks were a significant asset during the harvest, since they facilita te 
strategies to maximize the allocation of labor. This also suggests the potential damage 
that members of the community could inflict through peer punishment, as sanctions 
for violating rules and norms could weaken the defector’s ability to get others to act 
cooperatively. 
The period immediately following the harvest is a relative lull, and as such is the 
ideal period for a respite from the fields and travel to Jerusalem. Since the pilgrimage 
obligation was only incumbent upon the men, women could stay behind to continue 
maintenance tasks like weeding other crops and caring for any livestock. It seems, 
though, that some women went to Jerusalem for at least some of the festival (e.g. , 
Mary in Luke 2:48), and even if they did not they may have still observed the festi-
vals’ prohibition and/or limitation on labor. Either way, the labor force to perform 
such maintenance tasks would have been greatly reduced during the length of the fes -
tival. The ability to call in favors from women who stayed behind or those otherwise 
normatively exempt from the pilgrimage (esp. the elderly) would be an asset. If this 
was not possible, agricultural tasks like weeding could be more arduous upon return 
and could have a deleterious effect on the crop yield if the weeds grew too pervasive. 
Widespread absenteeism also left many settlements open to the threat of 
robbery.
652
 Crops left exposed could be raided with little threat of resistance. Homes 
could be burglarized and valuables stolen. This problem is even tacitly admitted in 
Exodus’ rendition of the pilgrimage commandment: “I will drive out nations before 
you and enlarge your territory, and no one will covet your land when you go up three 
times each year to appear before YHWH your God” (34:23–24). Making the 
pilgrimage always entailed some risk that one may discover that they had been robbed 
upon return. Even though the Herodian and Roman states were infrastructurally weak, 
the rulers do seem to have actively sought to curtail rampant banditry through military 
intervention. As we noted in chapter 1, for instance, Herod clamped down on the 
endemic violence and banditry that had characterized the early years of Roman rule 
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(e.g., Ant. 14.159–160, 431–433; 15.344–348; War 1.204–205, 314–316, 398–400), 
and the governor Cumanus destroyed villages in which members were suspected of 
abetting robbers (Ant. 20.113–114; War 2.228–231). The presence of a military 
colony at Gaba on the outskirts of Galilee probably served as some enduring deter-
rent.
653
 Many of Josephus’ reports of rampant robbery occur around periods of regime 
changes.
654
 In periods of relative political stability (i.e., after 40 BCE), widespread 
robbery was probably less a concern than isolated incidents, since the former would 
likely be met with military reprisal but the latter might go unanswered entirely. 
 Pilgrimage could also threaten life and limb. In addition to the threats from 
highway robbers and potentially hostile Samaritans during the trek, the festivals 
themselves could be occasions for violence and calamity. Many of the festivals in 
episodes of Josephus’ Jewish War and Jewish Antiquities are referenced as the 
settings for unrest, riots, and assassinations.
655
 Attending the festivals often entailed a 
heightened risk of danger, since the gathering of the multitudes from all around 
Palestine could lead to inter-group fighting and conflict with the authorities—espe-
cially, ironically, when gentile military forces were deployed to “keep the peace.”
656
 
For households engaged in non-agrarian production, the effects of pilgrimage on 
their productivity depended in part on the portability of the trade. For some trades, 
work in transit was difficult or impossible. Some crafts were location dependent, such 
as quarrying and pottery making (because of the heaviness of wet clay for transport 
and the fixity of kilns). Others, such as leather working, may have been quite manage-
able in Jerusalem. The commandments for observing the pilgrimage festivals also 
include prohibitions on labor during the opening and closing days of each festival.
657
 
Work on the minor festival days in between is not prohibited in the Torah, and Jose-
phus seems to suggest that work ceased only on the days that are singled out in the 
Torah for rest (Ant. 3.247). The rabbis qualify work on the minor festival days, 
permitting some forms of labor required for maintenance and handiwork so long as it 
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was not performed in the fashion that professional tradesmen do (m. MQ 1). Some 
may have followed these or similar limitations, though others who performed their 
regular work during the middle days of Unleavened Bread or Booths could stand on 
equally justifiable halakhic ground. Clearly, certain professional activities were 
necessary to the functioning of the festival and Jerusalem during the pilgrimage 
season, such as traders, market vendors, and moneychangers.  
Provisions 
Pilgrims travelling to Jerusalem also needed to secure provisions, especially food-
stuffs, to sustain them on the trek southward, the sojourn in Jerusalem, and the return 
trip home afterward. For the festivals, some of which were as long as eight days, this 
could entail as much as eighteen days of supplies. Foodstuffs could be brought from 
the household stores in Galilee, purchased from vendors at settlements along the 
route, obtained as hospitality meals from relations along the way, or some combina-
tion of the above.  
Pilgrims bringing resources from their own agricultural produce or household 
stores were not subject to the vicissitudes of the market at the time of travel. Of 
course, since the festivals occurred around the time of the harvest, the abundance of 
supply meant low market prices; therefore even Galileans who did not have produce 
of their own at their disposal could buy foodstuffs for the festival pilgrimage at a rela -
tively cheap rate back home. Transporting foodstuffs for a few days of travel may 
have been feasible without infrastructural support, but transporting enough resources 
for the whole duration of the pilgrimage would likely require the aid of pack animals. 
So too in the case of a travelling party composed of many individuals incapable of 
carrying the necessary burdens on the trek—children, the elderly, the infirm.  
The trade-off of using animals, however, was that it added to the amount of 
resources the pilgrim needed to haul, since the animal too needed to eat. And since 
the festival period was a time of rest from occupational labor, the drain on resources 
could not even be recouped by hiring the idle animal out once arriving in Jerusalem. 
Using an ass to haul resources was a reasonable option if one already owned one—the 
animal needed to eat anyway. But for those who did not, leasing an animal meant 
taking on the fees and feeding costs of as much as eight days of idle time. This is 
another instance in which traveling in a group could prove tactically advantageous. 
Fellow travelers in a community could pool resources in order to collectively 
transport whatever foodstuffs they wanted to bring south; one who kept draft animals 
could earn social capital and the promise of reciprocal aid for assisting fellow 
pilgrims in transporting their supplies.
658
 Pilgrims travelling in a caravan could share 
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Purchasing provisions while en route to Jerusalem from vendors at settlements 
along the way evaded the logistical costs of transporting goods, lightening the burden 
of the pilgrim. But the high volume of travelers traversing the major pilgrimage routes 
would have meant a higher demand for resources at the settlements the route passed, 
allowing the residents to demand a higher price for the goods than would be the case 
elsewhere during the harvest season. To take advantage of village and town produce 
vendors along the route, pilgrims would also need to travel early enough that these 
settlements were not themselves devoid of Jews, unless we may assume that Jewish 
women who stayed behind continued to sell after the men went on pilgrimage.
660
 
Purchasing foodstuffs en route could be more risky in terms of ensuring that they met 
the Torah’s dietary laws and Jewish ritual purity concerns (see ch. 3). Galileans were 
operating outside their day-to-day transactional and informational networks that 
reduced the transaction costs of buying foodstuffs back home. However, the regular 
cycle of pilgrimage over accustomed routes would have allowed individuals to culti -
vate reliable contacts for exchange or for information about local vendors that were 
suitably observant of the Law.
661
  
As we discussed in chapter 3, Galileans seem to have preferred to avoid trade in 
foodstuffs with non-Jews, who could not necessarily be expected to know the Torah’s 
rules concerning food nor Galileans’ normative interpretations of these laws. We 
discussed already the stereotypes about gentiles that exacerbated their anxiety about 
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exchanging foodstuffs with them. But in traveling south to Jerusalem, Samaritans 
were more likely to be the non-Jewish community with whom pilgrims would need to 
trade to obtain foodstuffs en route. A few passages from the literary sources suggest 
wariness of Samaritan food. The Gospel of John’s story of the Woman at the Well 
contains an explanatory note that “Jews do not share things in common with Samari-
tans” (John 4:9).
662
 Misnah Sheviʽit compares eating Samaritan food to eating pork 
(9:10), a gross violation of the dietary laws. Even though Samaritans and Jews shared 
the Torah, tannaitic sources remained somewhat ambivalent about whether Samari -
tans could be presumed to know how to prepare unleavened bread for Passover in a 
manner fitting Jewish norms (t. Pes 2:3).
663
 Moreover, the periods of intensified 
tensions or hostilities between Jews and Samaritans may have strained or broken 
those interpersonal connections that bridged the cultural divide and that might have 
furnished some with the information necessary to take an informed risk in Samarian 
markets. Especially for those Jews who strove to eat their ordinary meals in ritual 
purity, bringing provisions from Galilee for the southbound trip was probably prefer-




In Jerusalem itself, the market during festival season would have been less favor-
able to the buyer. Jerusalem’s population at this time swelled with Jews from all 
around Palestine and many from far beyond, all of whom required ample foodstuffs 
for their daily meals and celebratory feasts. Being the period of peak demand, 
produce in Jerusalem itself would have been quite expensive, despite the fact that new 
crops had just been harvested. Supporting the vast flood of pilgrims required the 
import of resources from Judaea more broadly and to some extent even outlying 
regions.
665
 Yet Josephus and the Mishnah suggest that in the Second Temple period 
most Jews opted not to bring large volumes of produce to Jerusalem for their provi-
sions during the festival itself, preferring to bring coin make their requisitions in Jeru -
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salem despite the cost.
666
 As we discussed in chapter 3, the Second Tithe was gener-
ally redeemed in Galilee, and the Torah commanded the redemption money be spent 
on the food for feasting in Jerusalem and incentivized purchasing foodstuffs in Jeru-
salem despite the steep costs. (The Second Tithe could not finance provisions for the 
travel, however, since the commandment restricts its use to Jerusalem itself [Deut 
14:25–26; cf. m. MSh 3:5–6].) Whether or not this was sufficient for the whole of the 
festival provisions depended on the size of one’s harvest and hence one’s tithe, and 
the market price at the time of redemption. Some might also benefit from the hospi-
tality of friends, family, or other benefactors whose tithe was abundant or who were 
wealthy. Otherwise, pilgrims would need to allocate extra money or bring extra 
resources from home for the sojourn in Jerusalem. 
Travel outside the festival season required many of the same logistical considera-
tions, but a different calculus, since the change of travel circumstances and market 
prices restructured the economic incentives. There was probably greater disincentive 
to transporting bulk provisions during the “off-season.” The sojourn in Jerusalem 
need not be as long as the weeklong festivals, and therefore would not require so 
many provisions. And since pilgrims were more likely be travelling alone or in small 
parties rather than large caravans, transporting cargo on the roads from Galilee would 
make one an enticing target of thieves. This also meant less opportunity for sharing 
the costs of obtaining and maintaining an ass to bear the burden, though these costs 
could be mitigated by leasing the animal out for work while in Jerusalem, since the 
festival prohibitions from labor did not pertain. Market conditions both along the 
route and in Jerusalem would have been more favorable to the buyer than during the 
festival season as well, since the volume of demand was not so high. (The prices in 
Jerusalem, thought, were still probably markedly higher than elsewhere year-round 
due to pilgrims to the Temple.) Off-season travel also increased the chances that 
friends, family, and other acquaintances would be home and able to receive the trav-
eler as a guest in hospitality, making it easier to acquire accommodations in this 
manner as well. 
Lodging 
Pilgrims also needed to consider their lodging needs, both during the multiple-day 
journey and during the sojourn in Jerusalem. The three main options available to 
pilgrims would be camping, paying for accommodations, or receiving accommoda-
tions as hospitality.  
For the large caravans traveling the roads during the festival season, camping at 
night along the route was a viable option. The large numbers of a travelling party 
offered relative safety against robbery, which was an even greater threat to the trav-
eler at night. And insofar as many groups were composed of families, friends, and 
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neighbors, the internal familiarity of the group also mitigated the chances of danger 
from fellow travelers. The weather during the Festival of Weeks and the Festival of 
Booths was favorable to travel as they fell securely within the summer season, when 
conditions were dry. Passover was more problematic in this regard; the holiday fell 
near the point of transition (due to the fluctuations of a lunisolar calendar) from wet 
to dry season.
667
 Rain not only meant a tent or another form of shelter was needed 
against the elements, but it also meant additional precautions needed to be taken in 




Travelers who for whatever reason did not travel with a large group could rent 
rooms at inns or in private residences along the route.
669
 The presence of inns in 
Palestine in the Early Roman period is suggested in some literary sources (see Luke 
10:30–35; m. Yev 16:7) but none have yet been identified archaeologically.
670
 Inns 
were commercial, for-profit enterprises and could be quite varied in the services 
offered; some even doubled as a tavern, serving food to lodgers and other passers -by 
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 A traveler choosing to layover in an inn needed to account for this 
expense in the travel budget and have sufficient cash on hand. For inns along the 
pilgrimage routes we should expect that this would have been the busy season; the 
surge in demand would mean high prices for rooms and little guarantee of vacancy. 
Outside of the festival season, when there were fewer people on the roads and one 
was less likely to be travelling in large groups, inns may have been a more attractive 
option than during the festival season. Camping outdoors alone along the roads was 
an invitation to robbers to attack, and hardly a viable option. An off-season traveler 
would likely have encountered lower prices for lodging, making it relatively more 
attractive an option than during peak demand.  
If an inn were run by Jews, they may have been restricted in the number of days 
they were in operation before the festival. Outside the immediate vicinity of Jerusa-
lem itself (say, a few hours travel), the innkeeper would need to depart for Jerusalem 
for the festival as well. Since only males were obligated to attend, inns with a female 
owners or staff could remain in operation without transgression.
672
 During the festival 
season, inns may have been more readily available through Samaria, at least when 
Jewish and Samaritan festal calendars did not coincide and in periods when Samaritan 
inhabitants would abide Jewish pilgrims. Since the sacrificial meals of the festival 
were supposed to be offered and eaten in a state of ritual purity (see Lev 7:19–21), 
some Jews might have been wary about lodging at an institution run by a Samaritan 
(or worse, a gentile) for fear of contracting ritual pollution. The anxiety in the 
Mishnah about impurity at inns does not, however, altogether preclude the possibility 
that Jews made use of this institution—the references in fact suggest Jews often did 
make use of these accommodations.
673
 Since many underwent purifications in Jeru-
salem upon arrival before the festival,
674
 this was more of a concern for those who 
strove to maintain a state of purity during everyday meals or for one’s reputation in a 
community where this was the norm. 
Long-distance travelers would also sometimes receive accommodations as hospi-
tality from family, friends, and other acquaintances that lived along the route. This 
was a common practice across the Mediterranean world in antiquity. As Catherine 
Hezser suggests, “Hospitality towards status equals seems to have been an important 
moral value in Graeco-Roman, Jewish, and Christian society.”
675
 Second Temple 
Jewish literature contains numerous references to the provision of hospitality to 
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friends and strangers alike.
676
 In the gospels, private hospitality is especially preva-
lent, with Jesus residing with sympathizers he gains on his travels teaching and heal -
ing. While the gospels present Jesus breaking norms in lodging with the “sinners” and 
“unclean” (fulfilling an important ideological function in the gospels by showing 
Jesus’ “boundary-crossing”), most Jews would have had greater concern for avoiding 
incurring ritual impurity during a trip to Jerusalem for religious purposes.
677
 In a 
different travel context, Paul in Acts is depicted accepting hospitality to meet his 
lodging needs while travelling through Greece and Asia Minor, often staying with 
tradesmen whose network connections could also have helped him in his “profane” 
work during his sojourn.
678
 Having a network of friends with hospitality relationships 
was especially useful when making the journey to Jerusalem outside of the festival 
season, when travelling alone or in small groups made outdoor lodging inadvisable 
due to the threat of robbery or worse. During the festival season, however, most 
Jewish households on the route to Jerusalem would themselves be preparing to set out 
on pilgrimage. Securing lodging with them would require appropriate planning and 
timing, and might require building an extra day into the itinerary, as one would need 
to arrive at the host’s residence prior to the host’s own departure.  
Accepting hospitality meant more than attaining secure and comfortable sleeping 
and dining. It was a networking opportunity. Hospitality served as a mechanism for 
reinforcing existing interpersonal connections between friends and relatives that 
might thereafter serve them in other ways.
679
 The networks of relations could be 
important in the conveyance of information or for enacting economic transactions,  
bridging Galilee and points south. These network connections could be used, for 
example, to enact purchases at a distance on behalf of one another, as one sees often 
in Egyptian papyri as a purchasing tactic.
680
 Receiving accommodations without a fee 
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by no means came without costs—the guest thereby incurred a debt in terms of social 
capital, affording the host to call later for reciprocation or some other favor. And 
insofar as hosting someone strengthened that connection over other potential connec-
tions in guest’s interpersonal network, the host also gained power as a broker in the 
network, allowing the host to steer the guest’s decision-making during the trip by 
controlling the dissemination of information and suggesting other agents to interact 
and transact with. For instance, the host could steer his guests to trade with certain 
merchants in Jerusalem with whom the host already has business relations rather than 




So much for lodging on the road. Once in Jerusalem, demand for accommoda-
tions was all the higher, as the festivals saw migrants not only from Galilee but also 
Peraea, Idumaea, the coastal cities, Decapolis, and the diaspora. Most simply set up 
camp outside the city and continued to lodge outdoors with their travelling party.
682
 
Others might rent a house or a room in someone’s home, whether through payment in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
These and similar letters demonstrate the practice of conducting economic transactions at a distance 
by means of interpersonal networks of friends and family. These letters suggest ad hoc personal 
requests for goods and acts of gift-giving within a personal network. But family networks could be 
important avenues for business transactions as well, as Jessica Goldberg has demonstrated for Medi -
eval Jewish merchants from the Cairo Geniza documents, and letters were an important mechanism for 
projecting authority over others and directing their actions from a distance; Trade and Institutions in 
the Medieval Mediterranean, 56–92. 
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Nevertheless, the context here is not the establishment of camps for lodging during the festival 
observance but the establishment of camps for the launching of military offensives on the Romans 
present. The locations given do not necessarily indicate the locations where the typical pilgrim camps 





cash or kind or as a gesture of hospitality by the owner.
683
 The latter is exemplified in 
the narrative of the Last Supper in the New Testament gospels, in which Jesus and his 
companions obtained the right to use the upper room of a house (Matt 26:17–19; 
Mark 14:12–16; Luke 22:7–13) seemingly without payment. Sacrificial and festal 
meals were supposed to be conducted within the bounds of the city, but one could 
spend the night lodging with friends who possessed homes outside the city itself such 
as in the nearby village of Bethany (Matt 21:17; 26:6; Mark 11:11–12; 14:3; John 
12:1–2). One can imagine that attaining indoor lodging in the vicinity of the city was 
quite competitive, and securing such accommodations required that one had close 
friends or family upon whom they could depend for hospitality, or that one was lucky 
enough or early enough to be the first to inquire about a vacancy. 
Some pilgrims could also find lodging in hostels. The so-called “Theodotus 
inscription” found in Jerusalem attests to the existence of a hostel attached to a syna-
gogue, directed primarily at pilgrims coming from the diaspora.
684
 The inscription 
reads: 
Theodotus son of Vettenus, priests and archisynagogos, son of an archisynagogos 
and grandson of an archisynagogos, built the synagogue for reading of the Law and 
for the teaching of the commandments, as well as the guest room, halls, and water 
installations as an inn for those in need from abroad, which his ancestors, the elders, 
and the Simonides founded. (CIJ II 1404) 
The building from which this inscription came has not been found, and so we can 
only speculate at the capacity of this installation. Such synagogues in the vicinity of 
Jerusalem itself may have been oriented primarily to diaspora Jews on the basis of 
language or provincial origins, catering to the needs of a particular diaspora commu-
nity.
685
 If this is the case, these accommodations were not necessarily open to pilgrims 
from Galilee, and even if there were other synagogues that had similar installations 
for more regional pilgrims, during the festival season the demand for their lodging 
space would have been incredibly high. 
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From the above discussion, we can see that there were many factors to account for in 
simply making the journey from Galilee to the Temple, before even considering the 
resource needs of participating in the Temple’s festal and cultic rites. The traveler 
needed to weigh the costs and benefits of which route to take, of whether to transport 
all or part of the resource needs for the road and the sojourn in Jerusalem, and of 
whether to camp outdoors or seek pay or guest lodging. The mass movements of trav-
elers during the festival season created circumstances that mitigated the perennial 
threat of highway robbery and allowed communities to optimize the conveyance of 
whatever resources and supplies they decided to bring through sharing. The mass 
migration also had important effects on the market prices in Jerusalem and along a 
couple of topographically-determined routes due to the burgeoning demand during the 
festival season.  
These migrations also brought Galileans out of the day-to-day insular regional 
economy of Galilee into a regular, periodic engagement with vendors along the 
pilgrimage routes and in Jerusalem itself. Out of concerns for the Torah’s strictures 
on food consumption, many pilgrims probably brought supplies for the southbound 
trek with them. Those who did not may have cultivated relationships over the years 
with individuals who could be trusted to provide halakhically permissible food or to 
act as information brokers to aid them in that task. Most of Galileans’  expenditures, 
though, would have been in Jerusalem and its immediate environs. As we noted above 
and also in chapter 3, the Second Tithe commandment—among other factors—incen-
tivized Galilean pilgrims to buy their resources for the festival in Jerusalem i tself, 
creating a flow of cash from Galilee into Jerusalem. And while participation in Jeru-
salem’s markets was primarily spurred by the need for the basic necessities of suste -
nance and cult offerings, these occasions also provided opportunities for Galileans to 
procure souvenirs and commodities not readily available at home. As we suggested in 
chapter 3, archaeological evidence from Early Roman oil lamps found in Galilee may 
hint at this sort of behavior. Despite the fact that oil lamps could be and were made 
locally in Galilee in this period, the abnormally high percentage (80–96 percent) of 
Jerusalem-made Herodian lamps in Galilean assemblages indicates strong preference 
for lamps from the Temple city.
686
 If we are correct in assuming that a high percent-
age of Palestinian Jews participated in the Temple cult on a regular annual—even 
triannual—basis, many if not most of these Jerusalem lamps may have been 
purchased directly by pilgrims and brought back as souvenirs. 
The movement of Galileans southward for the festival could create opportunities 
for forging new interpersonal connections as well as maintaining and reinforcing 
existing links with friends, relatives, and neighbors. Caravans, sometimes composed 
of entire villages, brought together the community for the singular goal of success-
                                                          
686
 On the distribution patterns of Jerusalem-made lamps in Galilee, see David Adan-Bayewitz et 
al., “Preferential Distribution of Lamps from the Jerusalem Area in the Late Second Temple Period 
(Late First Century BCE–70 CE),” BASOR 350 (2008): 37–85. The three sampled sites from Galilee 





fully moving everyone and their supplies to Jerusalem, facilitated through sharing. 
This could have the effect of solidifying the bonds between families cooperating as 
equals, or of storing up social capital in the cased of well-off individuals “generously” 
sharing resources with others. Caravans that brought together whole communities also 
created great conditions for putting social norms on display and policing against 
defectors. The trek also allowed one to maintain network connections with people 
farther from home, especially in Jerusalem and at sites along the route, through 
displays of hospitality in the form of lodging, meals, and gifts. Having these more 
distant connections could prove useful for acquiring the intelligence necessary to 
making informed decisions about a somewhat unfamiliar marketplace.
687
 
Finally, we should note that the festival calendar would have had a strong effect 
in structuring the temporal rhythms of market prices, flow of resources, and consumer 
behavior. The festivals effectively produced “peak” and “off-peak” seasons, with 
starkly different incentives and risks for the traveler to accommodate. Sometimes an 
obligation (like the redemption for childbirth; see below) would compel Galileans to 
travel in the off-season. But because of the opportunity cost a weeklong trip entailed, 
most Galileans would have clustered their activities in Jerusalem as much as possible 
to pilgrimage season. This means that Galileans much more so than Judaeans were 
beholden to the state of the Jerusalem economy in the in-season, lacking the tactical 
ability that Judaeans had to strategically time their obligations in Jerusalem to avoid 
the often less favorable economic conditions of the festivals. 
Offerings at the Temple during the Festival Season 
Once in Jerusalem, participation in the festival rites entailed a number of obligatory 
offerings. The most well-known offerings were of course the animal sacrifices made 
at the altar by the priests, but also important were vegetal (mostly grain) offerings and 
wine libations.
688
 The festivals were arguably structured around agricultural produc-
tion, as suggested by their timing as well as prominent and central rituals involving 
firstfruit offerings. In this section, I shall review the various offerings associated with 
the festivals and what effects they would have had on the economic resources of Gali -
lean pilgrims. This is not simply a straightforward accounting of the numbers and 
kinds of sacrifices needed; as we shall see, there could be considerable latitude in 
interpreting what constitutes fulfillment of the festal offerings, and a variety of tactics 
were available for mitigating the expenses of performing them. 
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Temple Offerings Made at “Public” Expense 
As with most temple festivals in the ancient Mediterranean world, publically-funded 
animal sacrifices were a major spectacle, and perhaps the culminating ritual, of many 
of the festivals held in Jerusalem. Such public sacrifices, by which I mean those 
financed and enacted by the Temple institution personnel, were also made daily, 
weekly, and monthly, as prescribed in the Torah. According to Hayim Lapin’s calcu -
lations of the Temple’s expenditures, the total annual requirements for the public 
sacrifices were quite substantial:
689
  
Sheep Rams Goats Cattle Wine (hin) Oil (hin) Wheat (ʽissaron) 
1,103 41 33 115 354 354 2,810 
Table 2. Resource needed for public offerings per annum. 
Most of these were whole-burnt offerings, completely destroyed on the altar fire. The 
rest were sin offerings, parts of which were burnt on the altar, while other parts were 
allotted as perquisites to the attending priests and their households. While at other 
sanctuaries in the Roman world the festal sacrifices made at public expense or by the 
benefaction of the local elite constituted a feast for all of the participants,
690
 the 
Jewish festivals were distinctive in not furnishing meat to its participants. Since the 
Temple did not thereby subsidize pilgrims’ food needs, participants had to supply 
their own foodstuffs and private sacrifices for consumption during the festival cele-
bration. 
Many temple complexes in the ancient Mediterranean and Near East had sacred 
lands and sacred herds to at least partly supply the sanctuary’s sacrificial needs.
691
 
There is not much evidence to suggest, however, that the Jerusalem Temple either 
directly or indirectly managed public property and herds for the purpose of supplying 
the Temple with sacrificial resources.
692
 The Mishnah explicitly refers to Temple offi-
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cials acquiring the resources needed for the public sacrifices through purchases at 
market using Temple funds (m. Sheq 4:9). Josephus does not explicitly state how the 
public sacrifices were procured, but his references to daily, weekly, monthly, and 
festal offerings prescribed in the Torah as paid at “public expense” (ἐκ δὲ τοῦ 
δημοσίου ἀναλώματος; Ant. 3.237) are consistent with a picture of the purchase from 
the Temple treasury funds.
693
 And though ostensibly a public expense, the public 
sacrifices were indirectly financed by Jews through the Temple Tax and voluntary 
offerings to the sanctuary.  
Temple Tax 
By the Hasmonaean period, the Temple Tax was an annual tax of half a sheqel 
collected for the Temple offerings and upkeep.
694 
According to Josephus, the Temple 
Tax was incumbent upon all free male Jews between the ages of twenty and fifty (Ant. 
3.196),
695
 and was assessed at a fixed rather than variable rate (Exod 30:15; cf. m. 
Sheq 1:6). The Gospel of Matthew envisions Temple agents travelling from settle-
ment to settlement in Palestine in order to collect the tax
696
—rather than individuals 
paying the tax in Jerusalem personally—and a population generally in compliance 
with the command (Matt 17:24).  
The Temple Tax could only be paid “according to the sheqel of the sanctuary” 
 In the Second Temple period, this was taken to refer to a sacred 697.(בשקל הקדש)
                                                                                                                                                                             
Eastern and Mediterranean temple complexes, fields were only consecrated in the short terms and 
were limited in scope, and the beneficiaries were often the priests rather than the Temple treasury 
itself; see “Sacred Land Endowments.” 
693
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reduce the burden of transport. 
697
 See, e.g., Exod 38:24–26, which specifies the measure of the sheqels “according to the Sheqel 
of the Sanctuary.” In the First Temple period, the sheqel would have represented a weight alone, as 





currency distinct from the common coinage of everyday transactions, and the coin 
used was the Tyrian sheqel, equivalent to a silver tetradrachm or two denarii (cf. Ant. 
3.193–195; 18.312; War 7.218; Matt 17:24).
698
 The use of a specialized currency for 
payments to the sacred treasury explains in part the need for moneychangers at the 
Jerusalem Temple (see Matt 21:12; Mark 11:15; John 2:14–15, cf. m. Sheq 1:3). 
Mishnah Sheqalim presumes that moneychangers set up to collect the tax included 
such a fee for exchanging currencies, as evidenced by claiming an exemption from 
this surcharge for the poor and priests (among others) (1:6–7).
699
 Even if the 
exemptions were a rabbinic invention in accordance with their ideological defense of 




It is reasonable to believe that most Jews voluntarily paid their Temple Tax.
701
 
Most externally-imposed state poll taxes were only as successful as the system for 
registering and documenting the population allowed,
702
 but the Temple Tax would 
have had more gravitas in the eyes of Jews than did an imposition from the imperial 
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administration. As a religious tax grounded in the Torah, its payment was compelled 
by the internal drives of piety and patronage of the Jerusalem Temple and the external 
drives of social pressure and peer policing. And unlike tribute, which left the province 
to be used to unknown and unseen ends far away, the Temple Tax was spent 
regionally and supported an institution that was both widely attended by its 
“taxpayers” and that served through its sacrifices to maintain right relations between 
God and Israel. Josephus and Philo attest to the fact that diaspora Jews from the 
eastern Mediterranean and from Babylonia eagerly sent the Temple Tax to Jerusalem, 
sometimes in spite of attempts by local municipal administrations to prohibit them 
from doing so.
703
 Moreover, we may note that the value of the tax was relatively 





The Temple Tax was not the only source of revenue for the sacred coffers. Individuals 
could dedicate property, animals, foodstuffs, and money to the Temple as an act of 
piety. The pericope of the Widow’s Mite is illustrative:  
And sitting near the [Temple] treasury, [Jesus] observed how the crowd cast copper 
into the treasury. And the many wealthy individuals cast many [coppers]. And one 
poor widow cast in two lepta, that is, a quadrans. (Mark 12:41–44) 
The Lukan parallel (21:1–4) explicitly deems the dedicated coins δῶρα—gifts, or 
more aptly, votive offerings. Even non-monetary forms of property that individuals 
consecrated to the Temple through vows contributed to the liquid assets that the 
Temple spent furnishing the public offerings.  
Animals and other goods fit for the altar were seemingly ineligible for use as 
public offerings. The Torah’s discussion of votive animal offerings stipulates that 
they needed to be sacrificed and then consumed in Jerusalem by the offerer (Lev 7:16; 
Deut 12:11, 17), which precludes their use for public sacrifices. The Mishnah 
suggests that such votive offerings could either be offered as private sacrifice or 
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resold to others for use as a private sacrifice, but the possibility of deploying the 
votive for the Temple’s public offerings is not even considered (m. Sheq. 4:7–8).  
Vowed animals or agricultural products that were not fit for the altar due to 
impurity or blemish could be redeemed by the one who donated it or even by someone 
else, as could real estate such as houses and farmland (Lev 27:9–26). The redemption 
price of the property was usually reckoned by the priest (Lev 27:12, 18, 22–23).
705
 
This redemption was effectively a sales transaction with the Temple, the proceeds of 
which were pooled into the Temple treasury funds. Redemption of vowed property, as 
with any other property consecrated to the Temple, also required payment of an 
“added fifth,” a 20 percent surcharge assessed on the property (see, e.g., Lev 27:13, 
15, 19).  
The Torah also allows for Jews to make vows of persons, whether oneself or 
someone else, though in such cases redemption is mandatory rather than optional (Lev 
27:2–8). Josephus has little to say about vows in his Mosaic discourse, but does 
remark on this one (alongside the Nazirite vow), perhaps for its popularity as a form 
of vow, or as a peculiarly Jewish rite of potential interest to his gentile audience (as 
with the Nazirite vow) (Ant. 4.73).
706
 Unlike vowed property, the value of the vowed 
individual was assessed at fixed, nominal values, based on age and gender,
707
 though 
the price could be reduced by the priests if an individual or family did not have the 
means to pay the nominal price.
708
  
 1 month–5 years old 5–20 years old 20–60 years old 
Female 30 sheqels 10 sheqels 3 sheqels 
Male 50 sheqels 20 sheqels 5 sheqels 
Table 3. The redemption values according to Lev 27:1–8. 
While individual contributions may have been generally small, the obligation to 
pay the Temple Tax, let alone the individual proclivity to vow additional material 
wealth to the Temple, amounted to a large net flow of monetary resources from 
outlying regions to Jerusalem. Not only did this institution draw money from Galilee 
                                                          
705
 But note that Leviticus prescribes a specific method for the priests to reckon real estate, based 
on the cultivable area and the number of years left until the next Jubilee (Lev 27:18, 22–23). 
706
 On two other occasions, Josephus refers to prominent individuals—members of the Herodian 
family—fulfilling the Nazirite vow: King Agrippa I (Ant. 19.294) and Berenice sister of Agrippa II 
(War 2.313). 
707
 The redemption values in Lev 27:2–8 increased with age and were higher for men than for 
women. Josephus’ description, however, reduces the redemption to the two non-minor adult price 
categories: women for 30 sheqels, men for 50 sheqels (Ant. 4.73). Given his terseness of description in 
some of the laws, this does not mean that the lower values for younger individuals were no longer 
used. Gallant considers this omission a matter of Josephus simplifying the commandment to present it 
as a single rule; “Josephus’ Expositions of Biblical Law,” 163. But Josephus’ omission of the others 
may also be a product of his focus here on “those who call themselves (αὑτοὺς) qorban,” none of 
whom would have been infants and most of whom would have attained the age of majority. 
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 This point stipulated in Lev 27:8 was also reiterated by Josephus. That the cost of redemption 






despite its distance from Jerusalem, it also drew vast sums from overseas and from 
outside the Roman Empire. The monetary expenditure, on the other hand, was 
primarily spent locally in the region of Judaea. Zooarchaeological research on bones 
from the Jerusalem Temple dump indicate that the majority of sacrificial animals 
came from flocks and herds in the arid Judaean desert and scrubland.
709
 The “temple 
economy” was a motor for the flow of money from Galilee, Golan, Peraea, and the 
diaspora into the Judaean regional economy. But this redirection of revenues was, as I 
suggested above, not without any return for the Galilean Jew. On the contrary, the 
revenues could be understood not only as fulfilling a religious imperative unto itself, 
but also as fostering the regular sacrifices that atoned for the sins of Israel as a 
corporate whole and ensured right relations between God and his people. Rather than 
an exaction lamented and resisted, many practitioners payment of the tax was 
voluntarily performed as an act of piety, as with vows and other voluntary offerings. 
Obligatory Festal Sacrifices Made at “Private” Expense 
In addition to the multitude of public sacrifices made during the festivals, pilgrims 
also offered their own private sacrifices at the Temple. Deuteronomy 16:16 
commands that when the pilgrims arrive at Jerusalem for the festival “they shall not 
appear before YHWH empty-handed.” This cryptic commandment suggests that 
offerings of some sort were necessary for the proper fulfillment of the festival rites 
without specifying them. The Mishnah takes this commandment to mean a 
combination of “appearance” offering (ראיה)—a whole-burnt offerings—and “festal” 
offering (חגיגה)—a sacrifice serving as a feast for the offerer, especially a peace 
offering (שלמים) (m. Ḥag 1:2). Josephus’ description of the festivals seems to 
corroborate this picture. When Josephus references private sacrifices in his 
description of the Festival of Booths, he says the participants “celebrate a festival for 
eight days and at that time offer whole-burnt offerings and sacrifices of thanksgiving” 
(Ant. 3.245). A few verses later, in a summary statement about the festivals in 
general, he continues: 
There is not one of the festivals on which they do not sacrifice whole-burnt offerings 
or do not give relief from the toils involved in work, but at all of them the form of 
sacrifice is prescribed by law (νόμιμον), as is the leisure of the holiday, and they 
offer sacrifices with for feasts. (Ant. 3.254) 
In both cases Josephus offers a bipartite description of the festal offerings as whole-
burnt and thanksgiving/peace offerings, the latter of which can only refer to private 
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sacrifices, since the offerers consume them in a feast.
710
 This understanding of the 
festal obligation may not have been universal, but the fact that Josephus as a Temple 
priest describes it as such suggests that it was a widespread interpretation and practice 
of the commandment in Deut 16:16. 
In order to make the necessary offerings, pilgrims needed to procure the proper 
type of animal for slaughter in the Temple and a prescribed set of meal offerings and 
libations. Both peace offerings and whole-burnt offerings could be made from cattle, 
sheep, or goats, while whole-burnt offerings alone could be made from birds—an 
inexpensive option within reach of even the poorest Jews.
711
 Whole-burnt offerings 
could be made from males alone, while peace offerings could be either male or 
female. Josephus specifies the appropriate age of sacrificial animals, whereas 
Leviticus is silent on this matter: whole-burnt offerings should be a year old (oxen 
can be older), while peace offerings should be older.
712
 When procuring a sacrificial 
animal from market, a pilgrim needed to ensure that they were buying an animal fit 
for sacrifice—lacking any blemishes that would make it ritually impure for the altar—
and that met the conditions for the particular type of sacrifice desired. Here Jews 
would have encountered information problems similar to what we discussed in 
chapter 3 about purchasing foodstuffs: when buying an animal from a vendor, how 
sure could one be that they were buying an animal truly fit for sacrifice? We can 
imagine reputation playing a major role in steering pilgrims toward trustworthy 
establishments and away from riskier vendors, especially when the veracity of an 
animal’s ritual purity would be quickly evaluated at the Temple and unhappy 
customers could quickly spread word to a dense crowd of pilgrims about acquiring a 
“lemon.” It also seems that the Temple itself was engaged to some extent in selling 
animals for sacrifice, which would, effectively, have been “prequalified” for sacrifice 
by the Temple officials and therefore have been a safe choice. As m. Sheqalim 4:7 
indicates, the Temple officials could resell to pilgrims any animals that met the 
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 The peace offerings are described in Lev 3; 7:11–34; Ant. 3.226, 228–229. The whole-burnt 
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details presented in these chapters, except that Josephus specifies the age of the animals and does not 
explicitly mention the dough products associated with the peace offering. 
712
 That Josephus adds these age specifications suggests that these details reflect the norms of 
sacrificial animals accepted as legitimate offerings at the Temple in Josephus’ day. Moreover, as a 
priest who officiated sacrifices at the Temple, he was in a good position to have accurate knowledge 
about what a proper sacrifice entailed. There is no reason we need to accord this detail to the exegesis 
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earlier exegesis, it seems clear that Josephus is here referring to actual practices at the Temple and 





conditions for sacrifice at the altar that had been dedicated to the Temple. The 
vendors of sacrificial animals referenced in the gospel narrative of Jesus’ “Cleansing 
of the Temple” (oxen, sheep, and pigeons in John 2:14–15; pigeons alone in Matt 
21:12 and Mark 11:15) might be a reference to the Temple’s own resale operation, or 
otherwise to vendors operating with the permission of and partial oversight by the 
Temple’s own personnel. 
Depending on the type of animal 
sacrificed, peace offerings and whole-
burnt offerings alike required a meas-
ure of dough made from fine flour and 
oil, a libation of oil, and a libation of 
wine to be offered with it at the altar 
(Table 1). Peace offerings required 
additional meal offerings, according to Leviticus—one each of four specific types of 
baked grain-and-oil products, some leavened, some unleavened (7:12–14).
713
 These 
dough products required the pilgrim to procure ritually pure grain—grappling with the 
aforementioned risks due to information asymmetry—and prepare them in the proper 
manner for sacrifice. Or, presumably, pilgrims could acquire ready-made dough, 
breads, cakes, and wafers from other vendors, accepting a greater level of risk that the 
products were not up to ritual specifications but with the advantage of minimizing 
preparation. Oil and wine for sacrificial libations required no preparation, but as 
liquids were quite susceptible to incurring ritual impurity in their agricultural 
processing (see ch. 3). 
The vagueness of the commandment to “not appear before YHWH empty-
handed” also leaves unspecified the conditions that constitute adequate fulfillment of 
the sacrificial obligation. Does this mean that each participating individual needed to 
offer a separate sacrifice, or did sharing in a sacrifice as part of a group—a household, 
for example—count? The Mishnah interprets the obligation as corporate rather than 
individual. The judgment that “whoever has many dependents (lit.: eaters; אוכלים) 
and few assets may bring many peace offerings and fewer burnt offerings” (m. Ḥag 
1:5) presumes that the sacrifices can be shared by a group, represented by a head of 
household or some other benefactor. The minimum value that the rabbis suggest 
fulfils one’s obligation also demonstrates that they did not understand the 
commandment to require each person to make a separate offering: the combined 
minimum value for whole-burnt and peace offerings is a mere three maʽot (m. Ḥag 
1:3), a small fraction of the market value attached to sacrificial animals elsewhere in 
the Mishnah: 600 maʽot for an ox, 120 for a calf, 48 for a ram, and a 24 for a lamb 
(m. Men 13:8).
714
 On a pragmatic basis alone it should not surprise us that sharing the 
sacrificial obligation was the norm. Even the hungriest of individuals could probably 
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 Flour (ephah) Oil (hin) Wine (hin) 
Lamb 1/10 1/4 1/4 
Ram 2/10 1/3 1/3 
Bull 3/10 1/2 1/2 
Table 4. Values for grain offerings and libations 






not consume an entire sheep or goat—let alone a bovine—in the span of a day or two 
(since the meat could not be saved; Lev 7:15). We can reasonably assume that even in 
the Second Temple period Jewish pilgrims understood their obligation to sacrifice a 
peace offering as a corporate one. 
A look at the Passover sacrifice may prove instructive on the matter of shared 
sacrificial obligations. Unlike the Torah’s prescriptions for the connected Festival of 
Unleavened Bread and the subsequent festivals of Weeks and Booths, the Torah spells 
out the details of an obligatory private sacrifice for Passover, one shared at the level 
of the household. The paschal sacrifice was a yearling, often a lamb, though a goat or 
even a cow could be used.
715
 This sacrifice too probably required the dough, oil, and 
wine offerings that Numbers and Josephus say were required of all private, festal 
sacrifices (Num 15:1–12; Ant. 3.233–234).  
The Torah explicitly stipulates that this sacrifice was to be furnished and 
consumed by a household, that multiple households could share a lamb if each 
household were too small to consume one alone (Exod 12:3–4). While the Torah’s 
language suggests comingling of households, other configurations may also have been 
permissible and perhaps even likely, in the case that only the males of a family 
travelled for the Passover. Josephus uses the term “fraternities” (φ[ρ]ατρίας; Ant. 
2.312; 3.248; War 6.423) to describe the parties consuming a paschal offering, which 
may suggest a group more expansive than a “household,” cobbled together out of 
individuals sharing some other social bond. Josephus also claims that each sacrifice 
was consumed by parties of at least ten and often as many as twenty people (War 
6.423), though it is not clear that ten represented an official minimum rather than a 
norm or rule of thumb. The Mishnah references groups as small as five for the paschal 
feast (m. Pes 9:10).
716
 If a group (household or otherwise) was too large for a single 
sacrifice, the head of the group would need to make additional sacrifices, though the 
Mishnah suggests the meal might be supplemented by a festal (חגיגה) rather than a 
“paschal” offering:  
When may one bring a festal offering with it [the paschal offering]? When he comes 
on a weekday [not Shabbat], in a state of purity, and it is insufficient [too small for 
the number of dependents]. (m. Pes. 6:3) 
If the obligatory offerings for the other pilgrimage festivals were similarly treated as a 
corporate obligation rather than an individual, we may expect that the conditions by 
which the festal sacrifices were shared were similar, if not exactly the same. 
The Mishnah also suggests some of the tactics for resource allocation that a 
corporate interpretation of the sacrificial obligation might have enabled. Though 
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716
 Note that the Mishnah presumes the possibility of even smaller groups, as for example in m. 





pilgrims were expected to participate in both a whole-burnt offering and a festal 
offering in the Second Temple period, Josephus does not indicate anything of the 
proportional relationship between them. One way to offset the total cost of sacrifices 
would be to offer more peace offerings than whole-burnt offerings, since the former 
could be used to feed one’s party, offsetting the cost of other provisional needs, while 
the latter could not. In m. Ḥagigah, the House of Shammai and House of Hillel 
disagree on the proportions, with Shammai favoring a higher proportion of whole-
burnt offerings and Hillel favoring a higher proportion of peace offerings (1:1). The 
mishnah goes on to suggest that the total assets of the offerer and the number of 
dependents partaking of their festal offerings should guide the proportions:  
Whoever has many dependents [lit.: eaters] and little property should bring many 
peace offerings and few whole-burnt offerings. [Whoever has] much property and 
few dependents should bring many whole-burnt offerings and few peace offerings. If 
both [dependents and property] are few, of him it is said, “A silver maʽah [for a 
whole-burnt offering] and two maʽot [for a peace offering].” If both [dependents and 
property] are many, of him it is said, “Each according to his ability, according to the 
blessing that the Lord your god has given you.” (1:5) 
The group of consumers would presumably include any other members of the 
immediate family on pilgrimage, but might also have allowed for other configurations 
including more distant relatives, friends, neighbors, and beneficiaries of charity. The 
Mishnah describes some of these possible relationships between offerer and 
beneficiary of a sacrifice, at least in regard to Passover: a husband sacrificing for a 
wife, guardians for an orphan, masters for a slave, or father for sons (m. Pes 8:1, 3). 
Individuals poor in resources and unable to secure the benefaction of a person or 
family able to finance the sacrifices may even have pooled resources to meet their 
obligation, each person contributing the hypothetical minimum. Even small groups 
might have found it prudent to pool resources, so as not to waste a sacrificial meal too 
great for either party to finish alone. We cannot prove from Second Temple sources 
that this kind of pooling or dependency on a “patron” was prevalent, but if the poorest 
people in Jerusalem during the festival were to feast, we must posit such tactical 
relationships. 
Another potential tactic for mitigating the expenses of fulfilling the sacrificial 
obligation was to pay for it out of Second Tithe money. As we indicated in chapter 3, 
most Galileans probably redeemed their tithe and used the money for feasting in 
Jerusalem, rather than bringing the tithe in kind in order to consume. Many likely 
purchased their animals for the festal sacrifice in Jerusalem rather than bringing them 
on the trek. Mishnah Ḥagigah suggests the possibility of using consecrated Second 
Tithe money to procure the festal sacrifice: 
Whole-burnt offerings on the holiday may come from ḥullin (unconsecrated things), 
and peace offerings from [Second] Tithe. … Israel fulfills its obligation with vowed 
offerings, freewill offerings, and tithe of the beast; the priests [fulfill their 
obligations] with sin offerings, guilt offerings, firstborn [animals], and with the 
breast and shoulder [the priestly perquisites from others’ peace offe rings], but not 





The passage shows that the rabbis even judged that animals vowed or designated as 
freewill offerings—and even animals from the tithe of the flock (interpreted by the 
rabbis as consumed by the owner of the flock, rather than the priests)—could be used 
to fulfill the obligation for a “festal” sacrifice. In other words, the Mishnah allows for 
a single animal to serve two purposes, so long as the sacrifice fulfilled the conditions 
of each commandment individually: that the Second Tithe must be spent on food, that 
the festal sacrifice must be consumed by the offerer or his beneficiaries.
717
 The 
Second Tithe could not be used to purchase a whole-burnt offering, which would not 
properly fulfill the commandment of the Second Tithe, but a vowed thank offering 
could. Using this tactic, Galilean pilgrims could avoid the predicament of needing to 
procure, offer, and consume additional animals to fulfill all of the religious 
obligations while in Jerusalem. 
Mishnah Ḥagigah also suggests that the timing of one’s sacrifice could have been 
a factor to consider. The rabbis suggest that, at least in reference to the Festival of 
Booths, one was not obligated to make the sacrifice on the first day of the festival, but 
could do so at any point before its conclusion on the eighth day (m. Ḥag 1:6). For the 
many who purchased their sacrificial animals at the Jerusalem market, this could be 
significant. We may suppose that most pilgrims attempted to perform the sacrifice at 
the opening day of the festival, with the numbers of daily offerings made by pilgrims 
diminishing over the course of the week. The prices for sacrificial animals probably 
fell during the waning days of the festival, as market demand diminished and vendors 
sought to sell off their remaining unblemished animals rather than transporting them 
back, lest they incur a blemish before the next festival that disqualified them from 
sacrifice. The savvy pilgrim on a budget could wait until later in the week to make the 
necessary offerings. Similar conditions would have prevailed during the weeklong 
Festival of Unleavened Bread, but not the one-day Festival of Weeks.  
On the other end of the economic scale, the festival’s sacrificial obligations were 
an opportunity to turn economic capital into forms of social capital. In other cities 
across the Roman Empire, civic magistrates and priests who presided over public 
festivals were wealthy individuals who financed the festivities at their own expense as 
an act of euergetism that fed the masses in exchange for social prestige and 
authority.
718
 In Jerusalem, the festivals were financed through the Temple and the 
officiants were determined by lineage, but wealthier individuals could still take on the 
role of benefactor to the masses by sharing festal meals with others and generously 
distributing to the needy; this would build social cachet, fulfilling the biblical ethical 
ideal of generosity to the poor. Doing so was also a necessary corollary of following 
the Second Tithe commandment for those with large estates: beyond a certain 
threshold, the tithe itself would be too much for one’s household to consume, and 
would require sharing one’s tithe more extensively with others. The multiplication of 
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sacrifices at the Temple could also serve as a public display of wealth and success. 
Offering many peace offerings to feast a multitude both curried goodwill and 
demonstrated one’s success; making whole-burnt offerings in abundance was an act 
of conspicuous consumption simultaneously displaying one’s disposable capital and 
one’s piety, as these sacrifices were offered wholly to God without giving the offerer 
any additional value from their flesh. Feasts thus provided opportunities to reinforce 
social hierarchies and display power differentials, and to affirm networks of 




The three pilgrimage festivals were closely associated with the agricultural cycle and 
served as a communal celebration of the bounty granted by God. The timing of each 
festival roughly correlated with the ripening or finishing of major agricultural 
products: Unleavened Bread with the barley harvest, Weeks with the wheat harvest, 
and Booths with the fruit harvest, particularly the pressing of oil and the new 
vintage.
720
 This timing made the festivals ideal occasions for pilgrims to bring to 
Jerusalem their obligatory agricultural offerings.  
Second Tithe 
We have already introduced the Second Tithe obligation. Jews in Palestine were 
obligated to separate one tenth of their agricultural products at harvest and either 
bring this produce to Jerusalem in kind to feast on there, or redeem the produce and 
bring its value in coin to Jerusalem to spend on the foodstuffs to furnish meals in 
Jerusalem. The logistical expenses of transporting bulk resources from Galilee to 
Jerusalem incentivized most Galilean pilgrims to redeem their tithe and spend the 
money in Jerusalem. The festival season would also have been the primary occasion 
for fulfilling this tithe obligation, since the commandment could only be fulfilled in 
Jerusalem and the costs of making the pilgrimage—both money and time—created 
incentives for most Galileans to consolidate their Jerusalem-based activities to the 
festival season as much as possible. This seems to have been the case despite the fact 
that the coincidence of the festivals with some major agricultural harvests produced 
market conditions whereby the tithe crop was redeemed for relatively little money in 
Galilee while the prices of goods in Jerusalem would be at their peak due to high 
volumes of demand. 
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The permissibility and commonality of redeeming the Second Tithe also 
contributed to the effect that the festival seasons had of linking the Galilean regional 
economy to that of Jerusalem and its environs. While fulfilling the tithe obligation in 
kind would simply require the pilgrim to relocate their household resources in order to 
consume them in one place rather than another, fulfilling the obligation through 
redemption meant spending household resources in transactions with vendors in 
Jerusalem. In other words, observing the commandment would have stimulated 
market activity and thereby created a flow of monetary resources from Galilee into 
Jerusalem at a regular seasonal rhythm each year. And if we assume that agricultural 
production constituted a major productive activity for most Galileans, fulfilling the 
Second Tithe obligation through redemption meant spending at least one tenth of the 
annual household revenues on the festivals. The Second Tithe could seemingly be 
used to offset the most significant expenses incurred in Jerusalem: the festal sacrifices 
and the other foodstuffs necessary for daily and festal meals in Jerusalem. The 
logistical costs of travel and provisions along the way, the cost of whole-burnt 
offerings, and the costs of other goods picked up in Jerusalem as souvenirs required 
the pilgrim to tap into resources above and beyond this tenth. In sum, this represents a 
significant portion of the annual household revenues of Galilean agriculturalists that 
would be allocated to observance of the major religious rites in Jerusalem and 
fulfillment of their obligations as commanded in the Torah and framed by the norms 
of their community at the time. 
Firstfruit Offerings 
Another type of offering that the Torah commands Jews to bring to Jerusalem is the 
firstfruit offering. This commandment appears several times in slightly different 
configurations. The simplest, and vaguest, forms appear in Exodus (23:19; 34:26): 
“Bring the choicest firstfruits of your land to the house of YHWH your God.” 
Elsewhere, grain, oil, and wine are specified (Num 18:12; Deut 18:4). Deuteronomy 
26:2 takes an all-inclusive scope, requiring firstfruit offerings from “all the fruit of 
the ground” ( ל־פרי האדמהכ ). Though Josephus devotes little space to describing the 
firstfruit offerings, he seems to follow the expansive wording of Deuteronomy 26 in 
claiming that firstfruits were due “from all the produce that grows from the ground” 
(πάντων τῶν ἐκ τῆς φυομένων καρπῶν; Ant. 4.70). The Mishnah offers another 
suggestion entirely, restricting the obligation to the “seven species” from 
Deuteronomy 8:8 (see m. Bik 1:3), but no Second Temple sources seem to do so. 
There was surely consensus that firstfruits were required of grain (at least barley and 
wheat), grapes, and olives, but the conflicting statements in the Torah left 
considerable flexibility for Jews to interpret the liability beyond these three according 
to local and/or sectarian norms.  
The Torah does not quantify the obligation for designating firstfruits. 





of those fruits to ripen.
721
 According to the Mishnah, the firstfruits were designated 
and visibly marked when they first appeared on the plant (with another opinion 
claiming it needed to be re-declared when harvested; m. Bik 3:1). The firstfruit 
offerings were in some ways akin to a vow in that one made an oral promise to God 
that one fulfilled in thanks for God’s provision of a successful crop .  
The Torah does not explicitly designate the timing for all firstfruit offerings 
either. To some extent, this should be expected, since crops ripen at different times 
and are thus available for offering at different points in the growing season. We may 
reasonably expect that especially for regions farther away from the Temple, Jewish 
agriculturalists would have performed their firstfruit offerings primarily on the major 
pilgrimage holidays as well. Deuteronomy 26 furnishes additional details about the 
ritual surrounding the offering, commanding those with firstfruits to place them in 
baskets and bring them personally to the Temple. Once there, the pilgrim would hand 
the consecrated goods over to the priests, who would set the offering before the alta r 
and thereafter take the firstfruits as a perquisite of the office (Deut 26:2–10) The 
Mishnah develops the picture further by envisioning a procession of basket carriers 
from each district capital (מעמד), led by musicians and a bull with gilded horns (m. 
Bik 3:2–6). The procession does not seem to be based in any halakhic debate or 
grounded in the Torah itself, and so we may suppose that it is here reflecting norms 
that developed around the firstfruit obligation. Such processions could certainly have 
been integrated into the caravans of pilgrims coming from a given community.  
The association of firstfruit offerings with the major pilgrimage festivals is to 
some extent corroborated by the Torah. It seems that firstfruit offerings were 
especially associated with the Festival of Weeks. Exodus twice identifies Booths as a 
firstfruits festival: in 23:16, it is called the Festival of Reaping (חג הקציר); in 34:22 it 
is a celebration of the “firstfruits of the wheat harvest” (בכורי קציר חטים). The 
Mishnah also identifies this festival as the start of the period in which it is permissib le 
for Jews to make their firstfruit offerings (m. Bik 1:3). The same passage also 
designates the closing of the firstfruits season with the following pilgrimage festival, 
Booths. This festival is called the Festival of the Ingathering (חג האסיף) in the 
aforementioned verses from Exodus; this refers to the coordination of this festival 
with the conclusion of the major agricultural harvests for the growing season, and so a 
reasonable time for the conclusion of the year’s firstfruit offerings. Though 
theoretically permissible to bring firstfruits any time in between, the distance would 
have dissuaded most Galileans from doing so, and the existence of a tradition of 
procession and the desire to participate in it with the rest of one’s community served 
as a positive incentive to coordinating the offering with others during the festivals. 
The Festival of Unleavened Bread also included as one of its central rites a public 
firstfruit offering. This was the waiving of the ʽomer, a sheaf of newly reaped barley, 
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on the second day of the festival.
722
 The ʽomer was then brought to the altar, where a 
token portion of it was burned and offered alongside a whole-burnt lamb sacrifice 
(Lev 23:10–12; Ant. 3.250–251). While it is clear that this ritual is a firstfruit offering 
of sorts,
723
 it is not so clear whether the ritual was performed individually—each with 
a sheaf from their field and a sacrifice—or as a public sacrifice—an agent of the 
Temple preparing and making the offering on behalf of the whole community. Both 
Leviticus and Josephus seem to distinguish the plural agents bringing sheaves for the 
offering from the attending priests:  
When you enter the land that I am giving you (pl.) and you (pl.) reap its 
harvest, bring to the priest a sheaf of the first grain you (pl.) harvest. (Lev 23:10) 
They bring to the altar an assaron for God; and having thrown one handful from it, 
they leave the rest for the priests for their use. (Ant. 3.251) 
But the Mishnah offers a very different vision of the ritual in m. Menaḥot 10. There, 
an agent of the beit din harvests a pre-selected sheaf of barley from a field, preferably 
near Jerusalem, on the eve of the festival in a public ceremony; the sheaf is then 
prepared in the Temple and offered as instructed in Leviticus (10:1–4).
724
 Menaḥot 
distinguishes the ʽomer from firstfruit offerings, seeing it instead as the public 
offering that initiates the window when people can make firstfruit offerings (m. Men 
10:6; this seemingly contradicting the window depicted in m. Bik). In either case, this 
suggests that the Festival of Unleavened Bread was the occasion for barley firstfruits, 
whether in the form of the ʽomer sheaf or in the manner of other firstfruit offerings 
subsequent to the ʽomer ceremony. 
Another facet of the ʽomer offering and the Unleavened Bread festival is of 
import: Leviticus prohibits the consumption of food products made from the new 
year’s grain before the rite was performed (23:14). This prohibit ion on using the new 
crop before the festival is reiterated by Josephus:  
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On the second day of Unleavened Bread, that is, the sixteenth, they partake of the 




The Mishnah suggests that the conclusion of this rite brought a flood of new crops to 
the market, as food vendors began to sell processed and cooked grains for 
consumption:  
Once the ʽomer was offered, they used to go out and find the market of Jerusalem full 
of flour and parched grain [of the new produce]. … Once the ʽomer was offered, the 
new grain was permitted immediately, but for those that lived far off it was 
permitted only after midday. (m. Men 10:5)726 
This rite “released” barley specifically or cereals broadly for general use. While 
harvest and even sale of the new crop was perhaps permissible before Unleavened 
Bread (again, m. Men 10:6–8 prohibits harvest before the ʽomer, while Leviticus and 
Josephus presume it), consumption patterns were fixed to the festal calendar, and 
proper observance meant managing resources so that one would not need to tap into 
the new year’s crop too early. The Temple Scroll from Qumran takes this rationale a 
step further by envisioning separate festivals for the firstfruits of olive oil and wine 
respectively, authorizing the use of the new produce through the appropriate token 
offerings of the crop to God.
727
 Though there is no evidence that an official, 
independent firstfruits festival for either crop took place in the Second Temple, this 
did not necessarily prevent those whole held to such a calendar from coordinating to 
offer their firstfruits together at the same time. If it was the firstfruit offering itself 
that was understood to initiate the permitted use of new produce, then for most 
Galileans who came to the Temple primarily during the holidays, the use of the new 
crop was attached de facto to the official festival calendar. 
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The coincidence of the festivals and the obligatory agricultural offerings with 
harvest time also had implications for the agricultural work of harvesting itself, both 
in terms of timeframe and manpower. If firstfruits were to be offered before the altar 
at the festival, the would-be pilgrim would need to reap or pick at least the designated 
firstfruits before setting off for the festivals. And if one expected to use the Second 
Tithe to finance their festal obligations in Jerusalem, the whole crop would need to be 
harvested with enough time allotted to complete the calculation of the amount 
harvested and the amount to be separated as First and Second Tithe. Since the Temple 
operated on a lunisolar calendar, the harvest and festival varied annual in the degree 
to which they were coordinated. In some years, the task of completing the harvest in 
time to make most efficient use of the tithe or fulfill the firstfruit obligations would 
put the pilgrim under pressure to accomplish this work more quickly than in other 
years. This would have been even truer for Galileans than for Judaeans, since the 
former had at least three fewer days during which to accomplish the task. Galileans 
would thereby have been under greater pressure to hire as much additional labor as 
they could or to call in favors from friend and neighbors in order to ensure the harvest 
was reaped or picked in time. Cooperative arrangements between neighbors could 
increase the overall efficiency by which members of the community could complete 
their harvest, but it might be necessary to enlist the aid of more non-agricultural 
laborers to help with the harvest than normal.  
Conclusion 
All of the obligations discussed in this chapter linked the Galilean households into the 
economic network of Jerusalem and its environs. The Torah mandated the physical 
presence of male Jews at the festivals of Passover/Unleavened Bread, Weeks, and 
Booths, and most of the other offerings could only be made at the Jerusalem Temple. 
This brought thousands to Jerusalem three times each year, mostly from Palestine but 
some even from far away in the diaspora. In the pilgrimage season, Jerusalem’s role 
as the hub for the transregional Jewish community was amplified, as people from 
many different and generally distinct regional networks came into interaction en 
masse.
728
 Josephus even depicts the networking effect of the festivals as one of the 
reasons God institutes the pilgrimage commandment in the first place: 
Three times a year, let the [people] come together from the bounds of the land that 
the Hebrews should conquer into the city in which they should establish the Temple, 
in order that they may thank [or: give thank offerings to] God for the benefits they 
have received and entreat him for benefits for the future, and that by gathering and 
feasting together they may be dear to one another. For it is good that those who are 
of the same stock (ὁμοφύλους) and have the same practices in common should not be 
ignorant of one another—and this will come about through their intermingling, 
instilling memory of them through sight and association . For if they do not mingle 
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with one another they will continue to be regarded as utterly foreign to one another. 
(Ant. 4.203–204) 
Pilgrims comingled in the city markets, at the purification pools, in the Temple 
courts, in the crowds participating in the practices of the festival rites, and in festal 
meals shared with one another. Many also had opportunity to reinforce more local 
network bonds over the multi-day trek from their hometowns to Jerusalem, as friends, 
family, and neighbors in the caravan shared information and resources. The festival 
occasions served to reinforce a sense of unity in practice among Jews across regional 
lines. But they also created an occasion for putting differences on display, as regional 
or sectarian differences in norms of practice were juxtaposed. This could have the 
double effect of reinforcing a sense of allegiance to the norms that one embraced and 
participated in, and flagging certain interactions with the adherents to different norms 
as a risk to the maintenance of proper piety as one understood it.
729
 
The festivals were important in defining the temporal rhythms of the economy in 
Palestine. Since the festivals generally coincided with the harvest season, the price 
markets in both Galilee and Jerusalem were shaped not only by the factors of relative 
supply and demand, but also by the logistical considerations of meeting the needs of 
the Torah commandments. The need for money to redeem the tithe or to otherwise 
spend in Jerusalem might entail selling at a time of low prices rather than holding 
onto resources until a more lucrative price could be achieved. Or the compressed 
interval between the ripening and the pilgrimage some years might lead farmers to 
seek out more hired hands than would otherwise be necessary. The timing of firstfruit 
offerings made at the festivals, or at least the timing of the ʽomer offered at the 
Festival of Unleavened Bread, set limitations on the timeframe during which crops of 
the new year’s harvest could be eaten, thereby structuring the schedule around which 
Law-abiding households assessed how and when to ration their stored foodstuffs. The 
festival schedule also meant that villages would be relatively unpopulated and 
unguarded at predictable times of the year, creating a risk of robbery—whether by 
fellow Jews or by non-Jews who populated Galilee’s periphery.
730
 Galileans may have 
been confident enough that widespread robbery would not go unanswered by the 
Herodians and Roman governors who generally strove against brigdandry as a matter 
of policy, though isolated acts of robbery might find no redress and was simply the 
risk of piety.  
As the people flowed south from Galilee to Jerusalem, so did a significant 
quantity of their resources. Fulfilling the obligatory sacrifices meant tapping into the 
household resources to procure animals fit for the altar and ritually pure grain, oil, 
wine, and baked goods. Most Galileans would have purchased the resources for 
sacrifice and meals—both everyday meals and celebratory feasts—in the Jerusalem 
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marketplace, drawing to some extent on sanctified redemption money from their 
Second Tithes that could only be spent on food and drink in Jerusalem itself. In 
fulfilling the Second Tithe commandment, and doing so by means of redemption, 
meant that Galilean agriculturalists infused the equivalent of 12 percent
731
 of their 
harvest income (including the “added fifth”) into the Jerusalem economy.  
Although the Torah’s definition of these obligatory offerings was sometimes 
quite specific—enumerating and designating the types of breads and crackers and 
cakes to accompany a certain type of offering—it was at other times incredibly vague. 
In such cases, the gaps opened up space for interpretation and permitted an array of 
tactics for mitigating the resource demands of piety. The nebulous commandment to 
“not appear empty-handed” at the festival seems to have spawned a normative 
interpretation entailing a combination of peace offerings and whole-burnt offerings, 
but even this still permitted—and sometimes required!—tactics of sharing resources 
in meals with family, friends, and others. Since most immediate families were 
probably too small to finish a sacrifice themselves, the festal meals would have 
compelled pilgrims to invite others to share in the meal and thereby created 
opportunities for Galilean Jews to affirm network bonds outside the household and 
perhaps even transregionally. Large-scale landholders who produced a harvest and 
hence a Second Tithe too abundant to consume within the household would also be 
compelled to share meals with others, or give food away as charity, in order to fulfill 
the Second Tithe commandment. The geographic and temporal limitations of these 
obligations created conditions for some amount of wealth redistribution from those 
with overabundant resources to those with significantly less. This too can be 
understood in network terms as the forging or reinforcing of certain connections, and 
the creation of obligations for reciprocation or other forms of social and cultural 
capital that the benefactor could “cash in” later. 
The economic demands of the festivals on the average Jewish household were not 
limited to the private sacrifices that pilgrims made at the Temple. Even the public 
sacrifices offered at the Temple were in effect paid by the general populace, financed 
through a combination of the fixed-rate Temple tax and the various voluntary 
offerings that many Jews dedicated to the Temple year-round. The burden of the 
public sacrifices was therefore not evenly distributed, since those who vowed and 
redeemed large tracts of land contributed much more to the fund than did the widow 
offering her lepta. Paying the Temple Tax in the midst of one’s village or town 
community and making voluntary offerings in view of the crowds at the Temple 
offered individuals an opportunity to put their piety and wealth on display through the 
eagerness and generosity of their contribution to the continuing operation of the cult.  
The above discussion of the direct and indirect costs of participating in the 
Temple cult during the festivals is not exhaustive. I have focused on the sacrifices and 
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offerings because they were probably considered by most to be the central and most 
important expenditures of the sojourn in Jerusalem. But the festival rites sometimes 
made other demands of their participants, whether requiring that they construct, 
dwell, and dine in special structures during the festival (as in the eponymous Festival 
of Booths) or place additional restrictions on the types of food permissible (as with 
the prohibition of leavened foods for the span of Passover and Unleavened Bread). In 
other ways not examined here, the Torah’s prescriptions for performance of the 
holidays surely made additional demands on the household’s resources and defined 
the parameters by which the demands could be filled. And in the gaps of the text or in 
supplement to it, there were surely traditions that are no longer discernible that 





CONCLUSION—REAPING WHAT HAS BEEN SOWN 
I set out in this dissertation to formulate an alternative framework for thinking about 
the economy in Early Roman Galilee. Rather than granting a privileged role to either 
the state or the city, I argued that such centralized authorities played a more modest 
role in shaping the economic system in Galilee. I have followed Michael Mann in 
seeing political power as concentrated but limited in its effectiveness outside the thin 
ranks that composed the bureaucracy, capable of penetrating civil society only in 
occasional autocratic exercises of violence rather than in any sustained, systemic 
sense.
732
 In place of center–periphery models, I advocated for the considerably less 
hierarchical “small world” network as a more fitting framework for considering 
economic and social interactions within Galilee.  
Drawing on the insights of New Institutional Economics and social-scientific 
research on social norms and behavior, I have sought middle ground between the 
“modernist” and “primitivist” poles of contemporary research on the Ancient 
Economy.
733
 NIE carves out a position that simultaneously denies the “modernist” 
conceptualization of the economy as a separable and discrete sphere of activity, and 
denies the “primitivist” view that the economy’s embeddedness requires us to 
understand economic activity as wholly subsumed within social forms of exchange 
like reciprocity and patronage. It does so by instituting a more complex definition of 
economic rationality that does not privilege the patently modern, western, capitalist 
values of profit maximization as in Neoclassical Economics, one that is structured and 
bounded by the social world in which the agents conduct their economic pursuits.  
This approach has led us to question the use of a cross-cultural “peasant model” 
in analysis of Galilee’s agrarian base, particularly the tendency to treat “subsistence” 
as a fixed universal category rather than a socially-constructed one. The minimalist 
starvation definition offers a floor for “subsistence” needs, but I argued that this is 
rarely the operative understanding by which a household assessed its needs. The “bare 
minimum” may include a host of social and religious obligations generally ignored or 
relegated to an afterthought in the neoclassical economic approach. Religious Studies 
scholars have recognized for some time now that the religious, political, and 
economic are inextricably intertwined with one another. By treating “subsistence” as 
a malleable and socially-constructed concept, we offer an approach that allows us to 
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consider the interlinking of the religious and the economic without making the former 
a mere epiphenomenon of the latter.  
Given the incomplete, uneven, and disjointed nature of our evidence, we 
inevitably rely on such models in order to fill in the gaps and create a coherent whole. 
In the course of this dissertation, I have found several of the analytic frameworks 
previously deployed in assessments of socioeconomic conditions in Galilee to be 
wanting, either on the basis of flawed assumptions or a poor coherence with the data. 
Every model or approach is built on fundamental assumptions, though, and has its 
own set of limitations. I have tried to be as transparent as possible about my own 
assumptions, laying them out in the introduction and in the course of my analysis. In 
particular, I have asked the reader to share my assumption that most Jews in Galilee 
strove to adhere to the Law as they understood it, rather than considering the 
commandments as optional or secondary in importance. I hope the heuristic value in 
setting aside prevailing assumptions in order to explore the consequences of operating 
under alternative ones has been clear. Even if I have been too optimistic and produced 
an idealized portrait, by exploring the economic implications of following the Law, I 
will have produced a useful counterpoint to the pessimistic stance derived from 
neoclassical economic assumptions, and thereby opened up new avenues for thinking 
about economic behavior.  
Summary of Findings 
We began this study by considering the role of the state in Early Roman Galilee. The 
state has enjoyed a central role in analyses of the ancient economy in the Mediterra-
nean and Palestine alike. But the nature of Roman rule in this period was hardly 
homogenous across the burgeoning empire, and unless one is attempting a macro-
scopic study—which I am not—it behooves us to consider the conditions of govern-
ance and institutions of the state on a more regional level.
734
  
I argued that Roman governance over Palestine was despotically strong but 
infrastructurally weak: the Romans had the capability to intervene unilaterally 
through force, but lacked the capacity to penetrate civil society and implement politi-
cal decisions through the whole of the province. The Romans governed directly with a 
very small staff or indirectly through vassals, in both cases relinquishing considerable 
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control to native elites and local institutions. The rulers generally allowed their 
subjects to govern themselves in day-to-day matters according to local laws and 
customs when it did not otherwise represent a threat to the peace or to the govern-
ment’s nominal control. Except during the reign of Antipas, Galilee was a backwater 
region, far from Jerusalem (less so from Caesarea) and rarely visited by rulers. 
Distance from power was double-edged—the administration rarely interfered, but 
there were barriers to external mechanisms of justice and redress. The lack of a 
developed bureaucracy suggests that the flow of information to the state was poor and 
uneven, reducing the efficacy of institutions of taxation and administration, especially 
in regions far from the power center. Our data for Roman taxation and its collection is 
spotty, but it seems that as elsewhere in the Empire, the Romans were more 
concerned to procure a steady stream of revenue at little infrastructural cost than to 
maximize their extraction from the provinces. 
If the state ever played an important role in economic conditions, it was under 
Antipas. Antipas’ tetrarchy was concentrated in Galilee and Peraea, meaning the ruler 
and his court were proximate, and he developed first Sepphoris and then Tiberias to 
function as his royal capitals in Galilee. Antipas was the first and only ruler in this 
period to engage in major construction projects in Galilee (discounting Herod’s 
founding of Gaba at Galilee’s frontiers). I argued that these cities did not disrupt or 
impact the economy as dramatically as scholars often credit them with doing. Neither 
was an elaborate or expansive city prior to 70 CE, and these city-building projects 
were probably more modest than often assumed—certainly more so than Herod’s 
constructions at Caesarea, for instance. The need for building resources and laborers 
re-circulated Galilean tax revenues locally, rather than drawing them out of the region 
as under Herod and Agrippa I, moderating any tax increases that may have been 
levied to construct them. The refounding of Sepphoris probably produced little 
change in the extant regional network, since Sepphoris had been a comparatively 
large settlement and an administrative sub-center long before Antipas. Tiberias was 
founded de novo, but its proximity to another long-established urban center, Magdala, 
means it probably did not shift patterns too dramatically, except, perhaps, in pitting 
Tiberias and Magdala against each other in competition and rivalry.  
I argued that this interpretation of the inter-settlement dynamics of Galilee has 
given undeserved attention to the role of the cities in defining patterns of economic 
transaction. Scholars have drawn on Finley’s “consumer city” model of urban–rural 
relations as the primary lens through which to evaluate socioeconomic conditions of 
this region in the Early Roman period. Some have done so in a particularly extreme 
fashion, painting the cities as parasites extracting wealth from the countryside and 
forcing rural peasants into a spiral of debt. Others have tempered this view, seeing in 
the evidence of trade signs that relations were more reciprocal and balanced, but often 
retaining the same dichotomy. The evidence for socioeconomic stratification even in 
village settlements undermines the binary division of wealth locked up in the cities 
and a homogeneously impoverished rural peasantry. Rather than a hub-and-spokes 
model of inter-settlement interaction, with exchange mediated through the city 





ments interacted directly with all other nearby settlements. Given the close proximity 
of settlements, the relatively small size of cities, and the ease of regional travel as 
suggested by anecdotes from the literary sources and (admittedly hard-to-date) road 
evidence, I proffer this model as a more appropriate fit for the data.  
There is also significant evidence for regional trade in Galilee. As much as 
autarky may have been the peasant ideal, few if any households were completely self -
sufficient. The contingencies of the climate could lead to considerable variability year 
to year, and even create microclimates across relatively small distances. While trade 
in foodstuffs probably comprised the bulk of regional exchange, it is discernible 
archaeologically only through the proxy data of storage containers. These vessels, I 
argued, give us a sense of the outer contours of the network of exchange. The distinc-
tiveness of the Galilean material evidence suggests a relatively closed system of trade. 
I suggested that the Jewish dietary laws and purity concerns likely steered Jews away 
from trade in foodstuffs with the Samaritans and especially the gentiles on Galilee’s 
periphery. The distribution patterns of Kefar Ḥananiah cookware suggest direct trans-
actions with the potters rather than marketing through secondary distribution centers 
in Sepphoris and Tiberias. I suggested that the small volumes of these wares at 
Decapolis sites may be best explained by trade with the Jewish minority communities 
there. I also noted the signs of trade in worked stone products—basalt grinders and 
chalk vessels—between the lakeshore and inland Galilee on the basis of local 
bedrock.  
In order to support my contention that trade was conducted between proximate 
sites and not just through central hubs, I considered the depiction of travel through 
Galilee in the literary sources. Although few of those depictions reflect the movement 
of trade goods through the region, I proposed that many exchanges were conducted 
along familiar network connections, such that movement of people may serve as a 
crude proxy for trade. The literary sources suggest the ease of movement through the 
region from settlement to settlement, sometimes bypassing cities altogether in order to 
travel from village to village. Especially in Lower Galilee, neighboring settlements 
could be as close as a few kilometers away, making for easy daytrips to forge and 
maintain social connections and conduct exchanges in neighboring villages. Even if 
the villages did not have built permanent marketplaces, this did not preclude 
exchange at weekly/seasonal markets or through person-to-person arrangements. This 
is not to deny that cities were privileged marketplaces for certain types of goods, 
especially expensive “luxury” items, infrequent purchases, or specialty services. But 
the trade that happened most often and that most engaged in was a more local affair 
along these network connections in villages and towns. 
In the second half of the dissertation, I turned my focus to consider the Torah as a 
religious institution and the ways that observing it would have shaped economic deci -
sion-making. Since the Roman and Herodian states were infrastructurally weak and 
changes at the top largely left local institutions in place, it seems inappropriate to 
place great weight on the state institutions as a force shaping economic decision-
making in Galilee. Although non-state institutional structures would still be worth 





highlights the importance that deeply revered religious institutions of Torah and 
Temple could have had in defining the parameters and incentives of economic 
behavior. Though the Temple authorities and priests had little capacity to enforce 
observance of the commandments in Galilee, I suggested that adherence could be 
compelled by a combination of internalization and self-enforcement, peer policing 
through altruistic punishment, and threat of punishment by God as the enforcer par 
excellence in the social network.  
I considered several of the Torah’s agricultural laws and how they could have 
affected economic decisions regarding agricultural production and consumption, 
defining the obligations that constituted household needs and the permissible tactics 
to meet them. The Sabbatical Year prohibited cultivation every seven years, and the 
prohibition on “mixed kinds” complicated the use of crop diversification and inter-
cropping strategies to mitigate the perennial risk of crop failure. There were also a 
number of obligatory offerings to the priests and to the poor that were an integral part 
of the subsistence calculus. The Second Tithe remained part of the household 
resources, but because it could only be used in Jerusalem, the Law precluded its use 
for day-to-day consumption. 
I also considered the pilgrimage commandment, which required annual attend-
ance at the three pilgrimage festivals—Passover/Unleavened Bread, Weeks, and 
Booths. Once in Jerusalem, pilgrims were obligated to participate in sacrificial offer-
ings and feasts, among other rites. Because of the distance to Jerusalem, Galileans 
would need to travel considerable distances in order to observe this commandment. 
Travel to Jerusalem could be dangerous, time-consuming, and costly, and it required 
consideration of a number of logistical choices; nevertheless, it seems Palestinian 
Jews participated en masse each year. I argued that the burdens of travel incentivized 
Galilean to consolidate a number of cultic and ritual obligations during the festival 
season. I also suggested a number of ways that pilgrims could mitigate the risks and 
costs of fulfilling this commandment through cooperation and resource sharing.  
If most Jews indeed strove to abide by these commandments, they would have 
had a profound effect on the temporal rhythms of agricultural practice in Galilee. The 
Sabbatical Year effectively simulated the conditions of a famine every seven years, 
with relatively little growth due to the lack of cultivation. Unlike normal famines, it 
occurred predictably and households could prepare for it in the year(s) prior by 
storing away extra foodstuffs for the fallow year. Within the seven years of the 
sabbatical cycle, there were the two Third Tithe years. Observing this commandment 
meant devoting an additional 10 percent of the harvest to the poor every three years, 
including the year prior to the sabbatical fallow, requiring similar strategies of storage 
and perhaps agricultural intensification to meet household resource targets. 
On an annual basis, the festivals played a major role in shaping the temporal 
rhythms of economic behavior. The festivals themselves were times of rest from 
labor—it was specifically prohibited on certain festivals days, and the trek between 
Galilee and Jerusalem precluded work for several days before and after. With some 
flux due to the lunisolar nature of the calendar, the agricultural harvests and 





harvest schedule in some years to accomplish the tasks before setting out. The festival 
seasons were the optimal times for Galileans to fulfill a number of obligatory offer -
ings that could only be made in Jerusalem: bringing firstfruit offerings and other 
perquisites for the priests, consuming the consecrated Second Tithe and produce from 
four-year-old trees or spending their redemption money on food, making voluntary 
offerings, etc. In some cases, multiple obligations could be met simultaneously, such 
as using the Second Tithe money to purchase a sacrificial animal to meet the require-
ments to make a festal offering and provide the meat for a festal meal. Because of the 
agglomeration of obligations onto the festival season, the important temporal effects 
of the festal calendar were compounded. And because of the interlinking of the festi -
val seasons and agricultural harvests, the festival time also correlated in interesting 
ways with the seasonal flux of market prices and would have produced regional price 
differentials. 
While the primarily function of travel to Jerusalem was to perform the rites of the 
festival at the Temple, it was also an optimal occasion to reinforce social connections 
with friends or acquaintances at stops along the pilgrimage route or in Jerusalem 
itself. One could tap these connections later in order to conduct transactions or to 
expand one’s access to resources in times of need through accrued social capital. The 
festivals could also serve as occasions to purchase goods from the holy city a few 
times a year, such as the all-popular Herodian oil lamps of Jerusalem manufacture 
that were ubiquitous in Early Roman Galilee.  
I also noted the difference that one’s socioeconomic positions could make in the 
available tactics for conducting economic transactions in fulfillment of these 
commandments. Those with the ability to produce and store ample resources both in 
kind and in coin had considerably greater freedom to take advantage of the market 
effects of the seasonal/festal economic rhythms than those who lacked the capacity.  
The ability to produce and store a substantial surplus in foodstuffs made the Sabbat -
ical Year less a difficulty to overcome than an opportunity to make a profit, since one 
could sell goods to a needy market at prices higher than other years. Those of more 
modest means, those lacking ample storage facilities, or those engaged in non-agri-
cultural trades would find themselves more reliant on purchases at market to supple-
ment whatever they could gather from aftergrowth, expending resources stored in coin 
with considerably less buying power than in other years. Redemption of the Second 
Tithe too enabled different tactical options depending on wealth. Those able to earn 
and save value in coin throughout the year had the advantage of being able to redeem 
the tithe at harvest at low cost, reserving it for private use or sale under more 
favorable prices, while those without had to sell the tithe to produce the redemption 
money and were compelled by circumstances to do so at the least favorable prices of 
the year. This difference was felt all the more upon arrival in Jerusalem, where the 
throngs rushing in from around the world created high demands and likely high 
prices. In some ways, therefore, the obligations of the Torah would have reinforced 
some of the socioeconomic hierarchies of Galilean society.  
Other obligations served to redistribute resources. The First Tithe and firstfruit 





Galileans. While some have read this as the transfer of wealth from poor peasants to 
the wealthy elite, I contested this by pointing out that many of the priests were of 
modest means or even impoverished. According to the ideal in the Torah, the priests  
were supposed to live off their perquisites since they were give no inheritance in the 
land; we do not know how many priests owned or rented land, but many of them 
probably relied in part on these offerings for their livelihood. The Third Tithe moved 
agricultural foodstuffs to the poorer segment of society. It is unclear how many would 
have been liable to receive this tithe, since poverty is not defined in the command-
ment and later attempts to do so suggest a relatively generous upper limit. Although 
this obligation would seem at first glance a burden on the small-scale farmer, the 
possibility of giving as well as receiving the tithe would have nullified any delete-
rious effects. There were also commandments prohibiting the landholder from 
scrupulously removing every bit of produce from his field, vineyard, and orchard—an 
unspecified amount was to be left behind for the poor to eat. The vagueness of the 
Torah certainly allowed for stinginess in the poor dues, but it also created opportuni -
ties to turn excess agricultural produce into social capital and prestige through 
generous allotment to the poor. Likewise, the festivals and the associated feasts were 
ideal occasions for well-off members of society to create and reinforce hierarchies of 
dependence through redistribution of their resources, and thereby earn the respect and 
admiration of others that might prove valuable in the future. The festivals offered a 
wide audience for public display of piety through abundant sacrifices, charity to the 
needy, and public professions through oaths and prayers. 
I also considered how concern to observe the Torah could have affected exchange 
within Galilee. The problem of information asymmetry meant that trade always 
carried a risk of accidentally violating the dietary laws or attaining ritual impurity. 
Ritual impurity was especially difficult to discern through physical inspection of the 
product. In order to overcome the information problems, Jews could use gossip, 
reputation, and stereotype as mechanisms to gauge the relative riskiness of a transac-
tion. This is partially borne out in the material culture pattern we observed, 
suggesting that Jews of Galilee and Golan primarily engaged in trade with one 
another rather than with the gentile and Samaritan populations on their periphery. But 
even transactions with other Jews could be risky, if they did not follow the Law as 
stringently or according to the same interpretations as you. Discussion in the Mishnah 
suggests that patterns of transactional behavior could be guided by reputation and that 
buyers sought to tap into local informational networks to reduce risks when operating 
in unfamiliar markets. Discrimination in interaction was not solely a matter of 
avoiding breaking the Law oneself, though. I suggested that boycotting or frequenting 
a vendor could serve as mechanisms for peer policing, punishing those who were 
known or rumored to be lax in observance or outright violators of the Law, and 
rewarding those with reputations for piety. Overall, these social pressures may have 
incentivized greater homogeneity in local normative interpretations and practices, 
since standardization lowers transaction costs, and may even have driven venders to 






End of an Era 
I have chosen in this study to focus on the period before 70 CE, when the First Jewish 
Revolt came to a close. While conditions in the Early Roman period were not wholly 
stable or homogenous, 70 CE marked a break with important consequences for this 
analysis. Many of the patterns I discussed in this dissertation would have been 
disrupted by the siege of Jerusalem, the destruction of its Temple, and the consider-
able demographic shifts that followed the revolt. Initially, many Jews probably saw 
this as a temporary rupture and anticipated the restoration of the Temple, much as the 
Temple had been rebuilt after the Babylonian conquest in 587 CE.
735
 Josephus at the 
end of the first century CE speaks of the festal and cultic laws as if he expects a return 
to the status quo ante in the near future, and other texts from the same period, like 4 
Ezra, seem to hold similar expectations. But after the failed Bar Kokhba Revolt (132–
135 CE) in Judaea, these hopes seem to have been dashed. New solutions and new 
interpretations of the Law were required for a Temple-less age. 
The two revolts led to major shifts in settlement patterns. A few settlements in 
Galilee and Golan were destroyed during the First Revolt, never to be resettled (e.g., 
Yodefat and Gamla). The Romans left behind the Legio X Fretensis in Jerusalem and 
Legio VI Ferrata in Caesarea as a permanent military presence in the province.
736
 
Perhaps prior to the Bar Kokhba Revolt, but certainly after it, Jerusalem was 
refounded as Aelia Capitolina and the Jewish population in and around the holy city 
dwindled.
737
 Many of the Judaeans who survived the conflicts relocated to the north, 
including, presumably, a considerable number of priests.
738
 As Uzi Leibner’s survey 
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has shown, there was considerable expansion of settlements in at least eastern Lower 
Galilee during the Middle Roman period, and I argued that this was also a period of 
great expansion for the city of Sepphoris—which emerged from the First Revolt 
unscathed—and perhaps Tiberias as well.
739
 After the First Revolt and certainly by 
the end of the Second, Galilee had transformed from a backwater territory far from 
the focal point of Judaism—Jerusalem—into the new Jewish heartland of Palestine. 
The Temple had constituted one of the pillars of the “common Judaism” of 
Palestine in the Second Temple period and its destruction certainly disrupted religious 
practice, but it did not mark an end to Judaism. Many of the commandments, 
including most of the agricultural laws, continued to be operable even without a  func-
tioning Temple. Much of what we discussed in chapter 3 could pertain to the Middle 
Roman period as well, albeit with some modifications. For example, the First Tithe 
and most other priestly perquisites such as firstfruit offerings could still be given to 
the priests, but with priests now in Galilee, the timing of these offerings did not need 
to be structured around the pilgrimage festivals. More substantial changes were 
necessary in order to adapt the Jerusalem rites to a Temple-less age. The sacrifices, 
both public and private, could not be offered outside of Jerusalem and the Temple. 
Rabbinic sources grant considerably more emphasis to non-sacrificial rites in their 
descriptions of the festivals than Second Temple sources had, indicating the prag-
matic shifts in ritual practice for their contemporary society.
740
 Second Tithe, when 
set aside, could no longer be eaten in Jerusalem as part of the festival celebration, yet 
it was still a consecrated good that could not be consumed elsewhere: a new conun-
drum that rendered the tithe altogether unusable. No longer was there so steep a price 
differential between Galilee and Jerusalem to take into account, nor was the timing of 
sale and redemption necessarily linked as strongly to the harvest festivals as it had 
been. Pilgrimage to Jerusalem was effectively brought to a close, at least pilgrimage 
conducted along the regularized triennial pattern that had long defined the rhythms of 
movement back and forth between Galilee and Jerusalem. The economic calculus 
would surely have been different under a system without the motor of the festivals 
driving the system in the particular way it did during the Second Temple period.  
An altogether separate analysis would be necessary to consider the role of reli -
gious institutions in shaping the dynamics of economic decision-making in Galilee 
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after 70 CE. Especially after the Bar Kokhba Revolt in 135 CE, the fundamental 
assumptions I have made about widespread concern for adherence to the Law and 
normative interpretive practices may have weakened considerably. Seth Schwartz 
envisions a particularly dramatic shift in Judaism in the Middle Roman period as 
follows:  
I suggest that under the combined impact of the Destruction and the failure of the 
two revolts, the deconstitution of the Jewish “nation,” and the annexation of Pales-
tine by an empire under its power and prosperity, Judaism shattered. Its shards were 
preserved in altered but recognizable form by the rabbis, who certainly had some 
residual prestige and thus small numbers of close adherents and probably larger 
numbers of occasional supporters. But for most Jews, Judaism may have been little 
more than a vestigial identity, bits and pieces of which they were happy to incorpo -




If Schwartz is correct in reading the fading distinctiveness of Jewish material culture 
in this period as a sign that the majority was largely unconcerned with the Law and 
was less reticent about assimilating into generic Graeco-Roman culture, then the new 
social dynamics and the non-state institutions may also have changed the “rules of the 
game” dramatically. And if not, the reorientation of practice toward the community 
and household levels would have its own consequences for the institutional and 




This project is but a first step toward a more thoroughgoing investigation of the ways 
the economic decision-making was shaped by the constraints and incentives of insti-
tutional structures such as the Torah laws. It hardly constitutes a comprehensive 
account of economy in Early Roman Galilee. I have been selective in my choices for 
analysis, focusing on those laws that would have had strong or interesting implica-
tions for bounding economically “rational” behavior. Even some of these I have 
omitted based on my focus on production, consumption, and trade, and due to consid-
erations of space and variety. I have barely dealt, for instance, with the topics of 
lending and debt, or with the Torah’s laws concerning damages. Many more laws 
without readily obvious economic implications are worth closer examination, too; my 
discussion of the prohibition on “mixed kinds” should be exemplary of this. 
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I have opted for a qualitative rather than quantitative approach in this study. It 
was not feasible for me to undertake the task of building such a quantitative model for 
this project, and I have considerable reservations about attempting it given the 
number of unknowns.
743
 To construct this model would require determining minimal 
nutritional food needs, average agricultural landholdings, average seed-to-yield ratios, 
and the amount due to the state in taxes. Good, reliable quantitative data in the ancient 
sources are hard to come by. We cannot glean plot sizes from our literary sources, and 
attempts to determine them from aerial photography neglect the common practice of 
owning and/or renting multiple scattered plots. The harvest yield could vary wildly 
from year to year depending on climatic conditions. Paul Halstead has argued that 
even modern proxies from pre-industrial farming may mislead us; yields could also 
vary depending on the methods of sowing (broadcast versus drill), timing of planting 
and harvest, and other tactical decisions.
744
 This is not to dismiss the possibility that 
one could construct such a model and do so in a way that was convincing. A quantita-
tive study could of course lend support to my assumption that most Jews strove to 
adhere to the commandments by demonstrating the feasibility of producing enough 
surplus to meet the tithe obligations as well as the requirements for nutrition and 
taxation. But to follow that path responsibly would have considerably lengthened this 
project and must be reserved for future inquiry. 
While this study focused on Galilee, similar analysis could be deployed for 
Judaea or Peraea. Some aspects of the analysis would remain the same or quite 
similar. But the differences in proximity to Jerusalem, settlement patterns, population 
compositions (e.g., presence of priests), and ecology, among other factors, could 
produce quite different assessments of the social networks in which Jews in those 
regions operated and of the ways religious institutions shaped economic decision-
making. I presume, in fact, that the socioeconomic world of Judaea was substantially 
different from that of Galilee, despite the shared aspects of a “common Judaism.” It 
would also be very interesting to see the results of a similar analysis on the Samaritan 
community of Palestine: to what extent did their particular interpretation of the Torah 
laws and their regional network in Samaria shape economic behavior among 
Samaritans and with outsider groups? 
Beyond the historical study of ancient Judaism and early Christianity, I hope that 
my project will serve as the starting point for similar regional investigations in the 
study of the Ancient Economy of the ancient Mediterranean world. I have drawn 
heavily on insights from study in this field, but have also made my own advances. My 
analysis contributes to the variety of models that scholars have constructed for 
thinking about inter-settlement economic relationships. In response to Finley’s use of 
the “consumer city” model, others have offered alternative configurations for urban–
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rural relations, such as the “producer city,” the “organizer city,” or the urban–rural as 
an inseparably integrated unit.
745
 All of these models presume the city as the axis 
around which the economy revolved. I contribute to this list by offering a center-less 
framework for thinking of inter-settlement relations that may prove useful for those 
areas of the empire lacking in large, dominant urban centers such as Rome’s western 
provinces. 
Perhaps more importantly, while I have followed a recent turn toward NIE, I have 
deployed a more expansive approach to it. Most scholarship deploying NIE has 
centered on the role of state institutions of administration, taxation, and law (espe-
cially property rights), but the role of non-state institutions and norms has barely been 
considered. Regional and even highly local religious traditions could have been quite 
important in shaping economic behavior in regionally specific ways across Rome’s 
diverse empire. As James B. Rives reminds us,  
Imperial authorities not only tolerated variety in local religious traditions, they even 
expected and, within limits, supported it. … Although for the sake of convenience I 
will talk of “regional religious traditions,” there was in reality almost as much variety 
within these regions as between them.
746
 
As a result, we should not expect the economic calculus of the “peasant” populations 
in all regions to be homogenous; rather, religious institutions of sacred law, temple 
offerings, vows, and other rites would have contributed to socially-constructed defi-
nitions of economic needs and shaped the social world in which normative behavior 
and acceptable tactics for reaching those needs were determined. 
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